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certctl/migrations/000029_rbac.up.sql
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shankar0123 6444e13b8f fix(migrations): two cold-DB regressions surfaced by Phase-9 docker compose smoke 
The v2.1.0 release-gate Phase-9 docker compose smoke run against a
fresh Postgres surfaced two real defects in the migration files that
testcontainers schema-per-test never exercised. Both reproduce by
running 'docker compose down -v && docker compose up --build'
against the current master tree.

Bug A — migration 000045_users_deactivated_at.up.sql is malformed.

  The 000029 schema defines:
    permissions      (id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
                      namespace TEXT NOT NULL)
    role_permissions (..., permission_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES ..., ...)

  But 000045 was written as:
    INSERT INTO permissions (name) VALUES ...        -- missing id + namespace
    INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission, ...) VALUES ...
                                                       ^^ wrong column name

  On a cold-DB run this fails immediately with:
    pq: null value in column "id" of relation "permissions"
        violates not-null constraint

  Fix: provide id + namespace columns, use permission_id (the actual
  column name), ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING. The new permission ids
  follow the existing 'p-auth-*' prefix convention (p-auth-user-read +
  p-auth-user-deactivate) used by 000029.

Bug B — migration 000029_rbac.up.sql is not idempotent post-000043.

  000029 originally created actor_roles with:
    UNIQUE (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id)

  Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-10 closure / migration 000043 drops that
  constraint and re-creates it WITH scope columns:
    UNIQUE (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, scope_type, scope_id, tenant_id)

  The migration runner (internal/repository/postgres/db.go::RunMigrations)
  is naive — no tracker table — and re-runs every *.up.sql file on
  every server boot. On the second-and-later boots, 000029's seed
  INSERT for actor-demo-anon-admin still references the
  pre-000043 constraint name in its ON CONFLICT clause:
    ON CONFLICT (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id) DO NOTHING

  Postgres errors out with:
    pq: there is no unique or exclusion constraint matching the
        ON CONFLICT specification

  Fix: pin the conflict target to the row's primary key 'id' column
  (always present, never altered). The seed row's deterministic id
  'ar-demo-anon-admin' makes ON CONFLICT (id) work under both pre-
  and post-000043 schemas.

Why testcontainers schema-per-test missed these:

  Each test in internal/repository/postgres/*_test.go spins up a
  fresh schema and applies every .up.sql in order ONCE. The full
  '000029 -> 000043 -> retry 000029' cascade never happens because
  migrations don't re-run within a test. Phase-9 docker compose
  smoke is the only test path that exercises the server-restart-
  on-error retry, which is exactly the missing coverage.

Verify (sandbox): go test ./internal/repository/postgres/ PASS.
Workstation re-runs 'docker compose down -v && docker compose up'
to confirm both bugs are closed.
2026-05-11 16:06:20 +00:00

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-- 000029_rbac.up.sql
-- Bundle 1 / Phase 1: RBAC primitive. Roles, permissions, role-permission
-- grants, actor-role assignments, plus a reserved tenant table for the
-- future managed-service multi-tenant offering.
--
-- All operations use IF NOT EXISTS / IF EXISTS / ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
-- so the migration is idempotent: safe to re-run on every certctl-server
-- boot per the project's "Idempotent migrations" architecture decision.
-- Wrapped in a single transaction so a partial-fail leaves no half-state.
--
-- Schema convention follows CLAUDE.md "Architecture Decisions": TEXT
-- primary keys with prefixes (`t-`, `r-`, `p-`, `ar-`), TIMESTAMPTZ for
-- time columns, FK cascade behaviour explicit (RESTRICT on roles with
-- active actor_roles, CASCADE on tenant + actor deletion).
--
-- Backwards compatibility: existing API keys configured via
-- CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED retain their behaviour. The migration backfills
-- one actor_role row per named key (mapping admin keys to r-admin and
-- non-admin keys to r-viewer) at server startup; the actual seed lives
-- in cmd/server/main.go because the named-key list is configured via
-- environment variable, not stored in the DB.
--
-- Demo-mode preservation: this migration UNCONDITIONALLY seeds
-- actor-demo-anon with the admin role. Bundle 1 Phase 3 wires the auth
-- middleware to inject this actor into the request context when
-- CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured (the demo path); when api-key
-- mode is active, the actor exists in the schema but is unreferenced.
BEGIN;
-- Tenants. Bundle 1 ships single-tenant; the future managed-service
-- offering activates multi-tenant by inserting additional tenants.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenants (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- prefix `t-`
name TEXT NOT NULL,
description TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
-- Roles. Each role is a named bag of permissions; actors hold zero or
-- more roles via actor_roles.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS roles (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- prefix `r-`
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
name TEXT NOT NULL,
description TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
UNIQUE (tenant_id, name)
);
-- Permissions: typed strings in the canonical catalog. Treated as rows
-- so role_permissions can FK-join. The catalog is documented in
-- internal/domain/auth/validate.go::CanonicalPermissions; adding a new
-- permission requires a migration AND a code update in lockstep.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS permissions (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- prefix `p-`
name TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, -- e.g. "cert.read"
namespace TEXT NOT NULL -- e.g. "cert"
);
-- Role-permission grants with explicit scope. ScopeType is one of
-- 'global', 'profile', 'issuer'; ScopeID is NULL when global, otherwise
-- references the resource id (managed at the application layer because
-- profiles + issuers live in different tables; we don't FK on scope_id).
-- Bundle 1 fix: PRIMARY KEY columns are implicitly NOT NULL in Postgres,
-- but global-scope grants legitimately have scope_id=NULL by design
-- (the CHECK constraint enforces it). The earlier composite PK over
-- (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) tripped on every
-- global-scope insert because scope_id was NULL. Fix: use a synthetic
-- BIGSERIAL primary key + UNIQUE NULLS NOT DISTINCT on the natural
-- key (Postgres 15+; the project's compose targets postgres:16-alpine).
-- NULLS NOT DISTINCT means two NULL scope_ids collide for uniqueness,
-- which is what ON CONFLICT (...) DO NOTHING below relies on.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS role_permissions (
id BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
role_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES roles(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
permission_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES permissions(id) ON DELETE RESTRICT,
scope_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'global',
scope_id TEXT, -- NULL for global
CONSTRAINT role_permissions_unique
UNIQUE NULLS NOT DISTINCT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id),
CONSTRAINT role_permission_scope_check CHECK (
scope_type IN ('global', 'profile', 'issuer')
),
CONSTRAINT role_permission_scope_id_consistency CHECK (
(scope_type = 'global' AND scope_id IS NULL)
OR (scope_type IN ('profile', 'issuer') AND scope_id IS NOT NULL)
)
);
-- Actor-role assignments. ExpiresAt + GrantedBy reserved for future
-- time-bound grants and JIT elevation; Bundle 1 leaves them NULL for
-- standing grants.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS actor_roles (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- prefix `ar-`
actor_id TEXT NOT NULL,
actor_type TEXT NOT NULL, -- domain.ActorType
role_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES roles(id) ON DELETE RESTRICT,
granted_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ, -- NULL = standing
granted_by TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'system',
tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
UNIQUE (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id),
CONSTRAINT actor_type_enum CHECK (
actor_type IN ('User', 'System', 'Agent', 'APIKey', 'Anonymous')
)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_actor_roles_actor
ON actor_roles(actor_id, actor_type, tenant_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_actor_roles_role
ON actor_roles(role_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_role_permissions_role
ON role_permissions(role_id);
-- Default tenant.
INSERT INTO tenants (id, name, description)
VALUES ('t-default', 'default', 'Single-tenant default; future multi-tenant managed offering activates by inserting additional tenants.')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
-- Default roles.
INSERT INTO roles (id, tenant_id, name, description) VALUES
('r-admin', 't-default', 'admin', 'Full access. All permissions, global scope.'),
('r-operator', 't-default', 'operator', 'Cert lifecycle + read access. No RBAC management.'),
('r-viewer', 't-default', 'viewer', 'Read-only access across cert / profile / issuer / target / agent / audit.'),
('r-agent', 't-default', 'agent', 'certctl-agent identity. cert.read + agent.heartbeat + agent.job.* perms.'),
('r-mcp', 't-default', 'mcp', 'MCP server identity. Operator-equivalent minus destructive verbs.'),
('r-cli', 't-default', 'cli', 'CLI user. Operator-equivalent plus auth.key.* for self-management.'),
('r-auditor', 't-default', 'auditor', 'Read-only audit access. Phase 8 splits this from admin for compliance reviewers.')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
-- Canonical permission catalog.
-- Bundle 2 will add auth.session.* and auth.oidc.* permissions; this
-- catalog is Bundle-1 minimum.
INSERT INTO permissions (id, name, namespace) VALUES
('p-cert-read', 'cert.read', 'cert'),
('p-cert-issue', 'cert.issue', 'cert'),
('p-cert-revoke', 'cert.revoke', 'cert'),
('p-cert-delete', 'cert.delete', 'cert'),
('p-profile-read', 'profile.read', 'profile'),
('p-profile-edit', 'profile.edit', 'profile'),
('p-profile-delete', 'profile.delete', 'profile'),
('p-issuer-read', 'issuer.read', 'issuer'),
('p-issuer-edit', 'issuer.edit', 'issuer'),
('p-issuer-delete', 'issuer.delete', 'issuer'),
('p-target-read', 'target.read', 'target'),
('p-target-edit', 'target.edit', 'target'),
('p-target-delete', 'target.delete', 'target'),
('p-agent-read', 'agent.read', 'agent'),
('p-agent-edit', 'agent.edit', 'agent'),
('p-agent-retire', 'agent.retire', 'agent'),
('p-agent-heartbeat', 'agent.heartbeat', 'agent'),
('p-agent-job-poll', 'agent.job.poll', 'agent.job'),
('p-agent-job-complete', 'agent.job.complete', 'agent.job'),
('p-agent-job-report', 'agent.job.report', 'agent.job'),
('p-audit-read', 'audit.read', 'audit'),
('p-audit-export', 'audit.export', 'audit'),
('p-auth-role-list', 'auth.role.list', 'auth.role'),
('p-auth-role-create', 'auth.role.create', 'auth.role'),
('p-auth-role-edit', 'auth.role.edit', 'auth.role'),
('p-auth-role-delete', 'auth.role.delete', 'auth.role'),
('p-auth-role-assign', 'auth.role.assign', 'auth.role'),
('p-auth-role-revoke', 'auth.role.revoke', 'auth.role'),
('p-auth-key-list', 'auth.key.list', 'auth.key'),
('p-auth-key-create', 'auth.key.create', 'auth.key'),
('p-auth-key-rotate', 'auth.key.rotate', 'auth.key'),
('p-auth-key-delete', 'auth.key.delete', 'auth.key'),
('p-auth-bootstrap-use', 'auth.bootstrap.use', 'auth.bootstrap')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
-- Default-role permission grants. Each row: (role_id, permission_id, 'global', NULL).
-- Generated programmatically from internal/domain/auth/validate.go::DefaultRoles
-- and pinned here so the schema and the code stay in lockstep.
-- admin: every permission.
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
SELECT 'r-admin', id, 'global', NULL FROM permissions
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
-- operator: cert lifecycle + read across resources, no RBAC management.
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) VALUES
('r-operator', 'p-cert-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-cert-issue', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-cert-revoke', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-cert-delete', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-profile-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-profile-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-issuer-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-issuer-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-target-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-target-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-target-delete', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-agent-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-agent-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-operator', 'p-audit-read', 'global', NULL)
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
-- viewer: read-only across resources.
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) VALUES
('r-viewer', 'p-cert-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-viewer', 'p-profile-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-viewer', 'p-issuer-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-viewer', 'p-target-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-viewer', 'p-agent-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-viewer', 'p-audit-read', 'global', NULL)
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
-- agent: certctl-agent identity. cert.read + agent.heartbeat + agent.job.*.
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) VALUES
('r-agent', 'p-cert-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-agent', 'p-agent-heartbeat', 'global', NULL),
('r-agent', 'p-agent-job-poll', 'global', NULL),
('r-agent', 'p-agent-job-complete', 'global', NULL),
('r-agent', 'p-agent-job-report', 'global', NULL)
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
-- mcp: operator-equivalent minus destructive verbs.
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) VALUES
('r-mcp', 'p-cert-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-cert-issue', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-cert-revoke', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-profile-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-profile-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-issuer-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-issuer-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-target-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-target-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-agent-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-mcp', 'p-audit-read', 'global', NULL)
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
-- cli: operator-equivalent + key self-management.
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) VALUES
('r-cli', 'p-cert-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-cert-issue', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-cert-revoke', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-cert-delete', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-profile-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-profile-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-issuer-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-issuer-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-target-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-target-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-target-delete', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-agent-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-agent-edit', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-audit-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-auth-key-list', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-auth-key-create', 'global', NULL),
('r-cli', 'p-auth-key-rotate', 'global', NULL)
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
-- auditor: read-only audit access. Phase 8 splits this from admin
-- formally; Phase 1 reserves the role and its permission set.
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) VALUES
('r-auditor', 'p-audit-read', 'global', NULL),
('r-auditor', 'p-audit-export', 'global', NULL)
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
-- Demo-mode preservation: synthetic `actor-demo-anon` with admin role.
-- Bundle 1 Phase 3 will wire the auth middleware to inject this actor
-- into the request context when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured.
-- The row exists unconditionally; the env-var check happens in code.
-- Reserved system actor: API rejects mutations / deletions targeting
-- this id with 409 Conflict.
-- v2.1.0 Phase-9 cold-DB-smoke fix: this ON CONFLICT used to reference
-- UNIQUE (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id), the constraint
-- created by this migration. Migration 000043 (Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-10
-- closure) drops that constraint and re-creates it with scope_type +
-- scope_id columns. On a re-run of this migration (which the naive
-- file-walking RunMigrations does on every server boot), the original
-- ON CONFLICT spec no longer matches an existing constraint and
-- Postgres errors out. Pin the conflict target to `id` (the PK column,
-- unconditionally present in both pre- and post-000043 schemas) so the
-- seed stays idempotent across migration-ordering changes downstream.
INSERT INTO actor_roles (id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, granted_by, tenant_id)
VALUES (
'ar-demo-anon-admin',
'actor-demo-anon',
'Anonymous',
'r-admin',
NOW(),
'system',
't-default'
)
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
COMMIT;
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