mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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1b4de3fb2d
Closes L-009 + L-010 + L-011 + L-013 + L-020 + L-021 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25. L-004 deferred — recon found NO
rotation infrastructure exists at all; building it from scratch is
a feature project, not a Bundle-E mechanical sweep.
L-009 — ZeroSSL EAB URL configurable
Audit's 'no timeout' claim was wrong: ari.go:329 has 15s timeout.
internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go: zeroSSLEABEndpoint now
lazily reads CERTCTL_ZEROSSL_EAB_URL from env at package init;
defaults to ZeroSSL public endpoint. Pre-existing test override
path preserved.
L-010 — Verified-already-clean
grep -rn 'mock\.Anything' --include='*_test.go' . returned 0.
certctl uses hand-rolled struct mocks (mockJobRepo, mockAuditRepo,
etc.) with explicit method bodies; no testify-style mocks anywhere.
L-011 — IPv6 bracket-aware dialing pinned
Every production net.Dial / DialTimeout site audited:
cmd/agent/main.go:293 — intentional IPv4 literal '8.8.8.8:80'
verify.go / tlsprobe / network_scan — net.Dialer (no string addr)
email.go — net.JoinHostPort (bracket-aware)
ssh.go — addr derives from JoinHostPort upstream
ssrf.go — net.Dialer
internal/connector/notifier/email/email_ipv6_test.go (NEW):
TestJoinHostPort_IPv6BracketsRoundTrip pins IPv4/IPv6/zone variants;
TestSMTPDialerUsesJoinHostPort source-greps email.go and fails CI
if a future refactor swaps in 'host:port' concatenation.
L-013 — Verified-already-clean (monotonic-safe)
Only one site uses now.Sub: middleware.go:393 in tokenBucket.allow().
Both 'now' and tb.lastRefill come from time.Now() which carries
monotonic-clock readings per Go's time package contract;
intra-process now.Sub is monotonic-safe by construction. Doc
comment block added above the call to make the invariant explicit.
L-020 (CWE-563) — ineffassign sweep, 8 unique sites
certificate.go:135 — sortDir initial value dropped (set
unconditionally below by SortDesc branch).
certificate.go:169,175 — argCount post-increments dropped (var
not read past the LIMIT/OFFSET formatting).
agent_group.go, profile.go — page/perPage truly vestigial,
replaced with _ = page; _ = perPage.
issuer.go:633, owner.go:131, target.go:267, team.go:131 — same
treatment for the audit-flagged second-function ListXxx clamps.
First-function List() in issuer/owner/target/team KEEPS its
clamp because page/perPage is used for in-memory slice
pagination — ineffassign correctly didn't flag those.
Build + tests green post-sweep.
L-021 — Transitive CVE bump
go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.45.0 golang.org/x/net@v0.47.0
(crypto required net@0.47.0). go-text@v0.31.0 transitively
bumped.
Per tool-output govulncheck-verbose: x/net@v0.45.0 fixes
GO-2026-4441 + GO-2026-4440; x/crypto@v0.45.0 fixes
GO-2025-4134 + GO-2025-4135 + GO-2025-4116 — all 5 advisories
cleared. Bundle B's ISV grep guard + Bundle D's release-time
govulncheck step are the going-forward monitor + bump pass.
L-004 — Deferred to dedicated bundle
Recon: zero hits for RotateAPIKey / rotated_at / key_status
anywhere in source. API keys configured via
CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED env var; rotation is operator-managed
(edit env + restart). Building rotation infrastructure from
scratch is a feature project, not a mechanical sweep.
Documented in audit-report.md with scope-pivot note.
Audit deliverables:
audit-report.md: score 46/55 -> 52/55 closed
(Low 14/19 -> 19/19 — 100% Low closed except L-004 deferred)
findings.yaml: 6 status flips
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle E section
Verification:
go test -count=1 -short ./internal/service ./internal/connector/issuer/acme
./internal/connector/notifier/email green
go vet on changed packages clean
483 lines
16 KiB
Go
483 lines
16 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/crypto"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// ErrAgentNotFound is returned by [TargetService.CreateTarget] when the caller
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// references an agent_id that is empty or does not correspond to a registered
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// agent. The handler layer maps this to HTTP 400 via [errors.Is]. See C-002 in
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// cowork/certctl-coverage-gap-audit.md — this sentinel replaces a silent
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// Postgres FK violation (23503 → HTTP 500) with a deterministic 400.
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var ErrAgentNotFound = errors.New("referenced agent does not exist")
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// validTargetTypes is the set of allowed target types for validation.
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var validTargetTypes = map[domain.TargetType]bool{
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domain.TargetTypeNGINX: true,
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domain.TargetTypeApache: true,
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domain.TargetTypeHAProxy: true,
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domain.TargetTypeF5: true,
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domain.TargetTypeIIS: true,
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domain.TargetTypeTraefik: true,
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domain.TargetTypeCaddy: true,
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domain.TargetTypeEnvoy: true,
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domain.TargetTypePostfix: true,
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domain.TargetTypeDovecot: true,
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domain.TargetTypeSSH: true,
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domain.TargetTypeWinCertStore: true,
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domain.TargetTypeJavaKeystore: true,
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domain.TargetTypeKubernetesSecrets: true,
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}
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// isValidTargetType checks if a type string is a known target type.
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func isValidTargetType(t domain.TargetType) bool {
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return validTargetTypes[t]
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}
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// TargetService provides business logic for deployment target management.
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//
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// The encryptionKey field holds the raw passphrase (not a pre-derived 32-byte
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// key). Per-ciphertext salt derivation is performed inside
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// [crypto.EncryptIfKeySet] / [crypto.DecryptIfKeySet] on each call. See M-8
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// in certctl-audit-report.md.
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type TargetService struct {
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targetRepo repository.TargetRepository
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agentRepo repository.AgentRepository
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auditService *AuditService
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encryptionKey string
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logger *slog.Logger
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}
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// NewTargetService creates a new target service. The encryptionKey is the raw
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// passphrase; it MUST NOT be pre-derived via crypto.DeriveKey (that was the
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// v1 behavior, replaced in M-8 with per-ciphertext random salt).
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func NewTargetService(
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targetRepo repository.TargetRepository,
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auditService *AuditService,
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agentRepo repository.AgentRepository,
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encryptionKey string,
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logger *slog.Logger,
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) *TargetService {
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return &TargetService{
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targetRepo: targetRepo,
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agentRepo: agentRepo,
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auditService: auditService,
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encryptionKey: encryptionKey,
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logger: logger,
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}
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}
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// List returns a paginated list of deployment targets.
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func (s *TargetService) List(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]*domain.DeploymentTarget, int64, error) {
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if page < 1 {
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page = 1
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}
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if perPage < 1 {
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perPage = 50
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}
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targets, err := s.targetRepo.List(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list targets: %w", err)
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}
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total := int64(len(targets))
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start := (page - 1) * perPage
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if start >= int(total) {
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return nil, total, nil
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}
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end := start + perPage
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if end > int(total) {
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end = int(total)
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}
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return targets[start:end], total, nil
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}
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// Get retrieves a deployment target by ID.
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func (s *TargetService) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
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target, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get target %s: %w", id, err)
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}
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return target, nil
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}
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// Create validates and stores a new deployment target, encrypting sensitive config.
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func (s *TargetService) Create(ctx context.Context, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, actor string) error {
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if target.Name == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("target name is required")
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}
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if !isValidTargetType(target.Type) {
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return fmt.Errorf("unsupported target type: %s", target.Type)
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}
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if target.ID == "" {
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target.ID = generateID("target")
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}
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now := time.Now()
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if target.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
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target.CreatedAt = now
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}
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if target.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
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target.UpdatedAt = now
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}
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if target.TestStatus == "" {
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target.TestStatus = "untested"
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}
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if target.Source == "" {
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target.Source = "database"
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}
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// Encrypt the full config and store redacted version in config column
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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encrypted, _, err := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(target.Config), s.encryptionKey)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", err)
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}
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target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
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target.Config = redactConfigJSON(target.Config)
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}
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if err := s.targetRepo.Create(ctx, target); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to create target: %w", err)
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}
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if s.auditService != nil {
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if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "create_target", "target", target.ID, nil); auditErr != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Update modifies an existing deployment target. Handles "********" preservation for sensitive fields.
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func (s *TargetService) Update(ctx context.Context, id string, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, actor string) error {
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if target.Name == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("target name is required")
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}
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target.ID = id
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target.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
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// If config contains "********" values, merge with existing decrypted config
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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mergedConfig, err := s.mergeRedactedConfig(ctx, id, target.Config)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to merge config: %w", err)
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}
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// Encrypt the merged config
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encrypted, _, encErr := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet(mergedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
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if encErr != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", encErr)
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}
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target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
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target.Config = redactConfigJSON(json.RawMessage(mergedConfig))
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}
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if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, target); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to update target %s: %w", id, err)
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}
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if s.auditService != nil {
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if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "update_target", "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Delete removes a deployment target.
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func (s *TargetService) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) error {
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if err := s.targetRepo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete target %s: %w", id, err)
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}
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if s.auditService != nil {
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if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "delete_target", "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// TestConnection tests a target's connectivity by checking the assigned agent's heartbeat status.
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// Target connectors run on agents, not on the server, so we can't instantiate a connector here.
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// Instead, we verify the agent is online and reachable.
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func (s *TargetService) TestConnection(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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target, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("target not found: %w", err)
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}
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if target.AgentID == "" {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("target has no assigned agent")
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}
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agent, err := s.agentRepo.Get(ctx, target.AgentID)
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if err != nil {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent not found: %w", err)
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}
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// I-004: AgentRepository.Get intentionally surfaces retired rows (the banner
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// + 410 Gone paths need to see them). A test against a retired agent can
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// never succeed — the agent is tombstoned, will never heartbeat again, and
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// any active targets have already been cascade-retired alongside it. Fail
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// fast with an explicit message instead of falling through to the Status /
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// heartbeat checks, which would produce a misleading "agent is Offline" or
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// "heartbeat stale" diagnostic.
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if agent.IsRetired() {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s is retired", agent.ID)
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}
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if agent.Status != domain.AgentStatusOnline {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s is %s (expected Online)", agent.ID, agent.Status)
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}
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// Check heartbeat freshness (agent must have heartbeated within the last 5 minutes)
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if agent.LastHeartbeatAt != nil {
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if time.Since(*agent.LastHeartbeatAt) > 5*time.Minute {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s last heartbeat was %s ago (stale)", agent.ID, time.Since(*agent.LastHeartbeatAt).Round(time.Second))
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}
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}
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "success")
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return nil
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}
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// ListTargets returns paginated targets (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) ListTargets(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.DeploymentTarget, int64, error) {
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// Bundle E / Audit L-020: page/perPage are unused; the underlying repo
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// List() does not yet take pagination params. Marked explicitly so
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// ineffassign sees no dead store and future maintainers see the
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// vestigial params rather than a misleading default-applied clamp.
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_ = page
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_ = perPage
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targets, err := s.targetRepo.List(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list targets: %w", err)
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}
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total := int64(len(targets))
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var result []domain.DeploymentTarget
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for _, t := range targets {
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if t != nil {
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result = append(result, *t)
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}
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}
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return result, total, nil
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}
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// GetTarget returns a single target (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) GetTarget(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
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return s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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}
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// CreateTarget creates a new target (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) CreateTarget(ctx context.Context, target domain.DeploymentTarget) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
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if !isValidTargetType(target.Type) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported target type: %s", target.Type)
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}
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// C-002: enforce agent_id FK at service layer so we return a clean 400
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// instead of bubbling a Postgres 23503 foreign-key violation out as 500.
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// The schema (migrations/000001 line 104) declares agent_id TEXT NOT NULL
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// with a FK to agents(id); we mirror that contract here for deterministic
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// error mapping.
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if target.AgentID == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: agent_id is required", ErrAgentNotFound)
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}
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agent, err := s.agentRepo.Get(ctx, target.AgentID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrAgentNotFound, target.AgentID)
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}
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// I-004: refuse to attach new targets to a retired agent. The agent is
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// tombstoned and no deployments would ever succeed against it; letting a
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// row slip past here would immediately be cascade-retired on the next
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// dependency sweep and confuse operators ("why is this brand-new target
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// already retired?"). Treating retired agents as "not found" for creation
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// purposes keeps the error surface tight and matches the default-list
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// contract established by repository.AgentRepository.List.
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if agent.IsRetired() {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s (retired)", ErrAgentNotFound, target.AgentID)
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}
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if target.ID == "" {
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target.ID = generateID("target")
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}
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now := time.Now()
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if target.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
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target.CreatedAt = now
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}
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if target.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
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target.UpdatedAt = now
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}
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if target.TestStatus == "" {
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target.TestStatus = "untested"
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}
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if target.Source == "" {
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target.Source = "database"
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}
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// GUI-created targets should be enabled by default.
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// Go's bool zero value is false, which overrides the DB default when explicitly inserted.
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if target.Source == "database" && !target.Enabled {
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target.Enabled = true
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}
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// Encrypt config
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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encrypted, _, err := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(target.Config), s.encryptionKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", err)
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}
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target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
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target.Config = redactConfigJSON(target.Config)
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}
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if err := s.targetRepo.Create(ctx, &target); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create target: %w", err)
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}
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return &target, nil
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}
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// UpdateTarget modifies a target (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) UpdateTarget(ctx context.Context, id string, target domain.DeploymentTarget) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
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target.ID = id
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target.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
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// Merge redacted fields with existing config
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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mergedConfig, err := s.mergeRedactedConfig(ctx, id, target.Config)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to merge config: %w", err)
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}
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encrypted, _, encErr := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet(mergedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
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if encErr != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", encErr)
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}
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target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
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target.Config = redactConfigJSON(json.RawMessage(mergedConfig))
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}
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if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, &target); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update target: %w", err)
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}
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return &target, nil
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}
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// DeleteTarget removes a target (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) DeleteTarget(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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return s.targetRepo.Delete(ctx, id)
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}
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// --- Internal helpers ---
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// getDecryptedConfig returns the decrypted config JSON for a target.
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func (s *TargetService) getDecryptedConfig(target *domain.DeploymentTarget) (json.RawMessage, error) {
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if len(target.EncryptedConfig) > 0 {
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decrypted, err := crypto.DecryptIfKeySet(target.EncryptedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return json.RawMessage(decrypted), nil
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}
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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return target.Config, nil
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}
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return json.RawMessage("{}"), nil
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}
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// mergeRedactedConfig merges incoming config (which may have "********" values)
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// with the existing decrypted config so sensitive fields are preserved.
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func (s *TargetService) mergeRedactedConfig(ctx context.Context, id string, incoming json.RawMessage) ([]byte, error) {
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// Parse incoming config
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var incomingMap map[string]interface{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(incoming, &incomingMap); err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: incoming config is not a JSON object, using as-is", "target", id, "error", err)
|
|
return incoming, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if any values are "********"
|
|
hasRedacted := false
|
|
for _, v := range incomingMap {
|
|
if str, ok := v.(string); ok && str == "********" {
|
|
hasRedacted = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !hasRedacted {
|
|
return incoming, nil // No redacted values, use incoming as-is
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Load existing target to get real values
|
|
existing, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: could not load existing target, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
|
|
return incoming, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
existingConfig, err := s.getDecryptedConfig(existing)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: could not decrypt existing config, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
|
|
return incoming, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var existingMap map[string]interface{}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(existingConfig, &existingMap); err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: existing config is not a JSON object, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
|
|
return incoming, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Merge: for each "********" value in incoming, use existing value
|
|
for k, v := range incomingMap {
|
|
if str, ok := v.(string); ok && str == "********" {
|
|
if existingVal, exists := existingMap[k]; exists {
|
|
incomingMap[k] = existingVal
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return json.Marshal(incomingMap)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// updateTestStatus updates the test_status and last_tested_at fields in the database
|
|
// and records an audit event.
|
|
func (s *TargetService) updateTestStatus(ctx context.Context, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, status string) {
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
target.TestStatus = status
|
|
target.LastTestedAt = &now
|
|
target.UpdatedAt = now
|
|
if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, target); err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Error("failed to update test status", "target", target.ID, "status", status, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Record audit event for connection test
|
|
if s.auditService != nil {
|
|
action := "target_test_connection_" + status
|
|
details := map[string]interface{}{"target_type": string(target.Type), "result": status, "agent_id": target.AgentID}
|
|
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, "system", domain.ActorTypeSystem, action, "target", target.ID, details); auditErr != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Error("failed to record test connection audit event", "error", auditErr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|