Files
certctl/internal/service/ca_operations_test.go
T
shankar0123 4e5522a999 F-001/F-002/F-003: CRL prefix-scan, digest error sanitization, ctx-aware sleeps
F-001 (P3): GenerateDERCRL scoped to issuer via composite index
  - Add RevocationRepository.ListByIssuer leveraging migration 000012's
    idx_certificate_revocations_issuer_serial composite index as a
    prefix-scan target. Previously CAOperationsSvc.GenerateDERCRL called
    ListAll() and filtered by IssuerID in Go — O(total revocations)
    regardless of how many revocations belonged to the target issuer.
  - Rewrite GenerateDERCRL to call ListByIssuer(ctx, issuerID) so PostgreSQL
    drives a prefix scan of the composite index. Drops the in-memory filter.
  - New regression test in ca_operations_test.go asserts the CRL hot path
    invokes ListByIssuer exactly once and never ListAll, and that the
    issuerID is threaded through correctly.

F-002 (P3): digest.go admin-auth endpoints no longer leak internal errors
  - PreviewDigest (GET /api/v1/digest/preview) and SendDigest
    (POST /api/v1/digest/send) previously wrote err.Error() into the HTTP
    response body on 500s. Replace with slog.Error server-side logging plus
    a generic "internal error" response body, matching the house pattern
    in certificates.go and export.go.

F-003 (P4): three blocking time.Sleep sites now honor ctx cancellation
  - internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:672 (DNS-01 propagation wait)
    now runs under a select{case <-ctx.Done(): CleanUp + return ctx.Err();
    case <-time.After(d):} so graceful shutdown doesn't get stuck behind
    the propagation delay.
  - internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:786 (dns-persist-01 propagation
    wait) same pattern, returns ctx.Err() on cancel.
  - cmd/agent/main.go:272 (polling backoff inside the heartbeat loop) now
    wraps the sleep in select{case <-ctx.Done(): continue; case <-time.After(backoff):}
    so the outer <-ctx.Done() case on the parent loop fires cleanly.

Verification: build, vet, and race-enabled short tests green across all
55+ packages. govulncheck reports zero vulnerabilities in the code path.
No migration needed — F-001 reuses the existing 000012 composite index.
No frontend changes.
2026-04-20 16:51:52 +00:00

328 lines
11 KiB
Go

// Tests for CAOperationsSvc, the focused sub-service that handles CRL generation
// and OCSP response signing extracted from CertificateService (TICKET-007).
package service
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// helper to create a CAOperationsSvc for testing
func newCAOperationsSvcTest() (*CAOperationsSvc, *mockRevocationRepo, *mockCertRepo) {
caSvc, revocationRepo, certRepo, _ := newCAOperationsSvcTestWithIssuer()
return caSvc, revocationRepo, certRepo
}
// newCAOperationsSvcTestWithIssuer also returns the mock issuer connector
// so tests can assert on the captured OCSPSignRequest.
func newCAOperationsSvcTestWithIssuer() (*CAOperationsSvc, *mockRevocationRepo, *mockCertRepo, *mockIssuerConnector) {
revocationRepo := newMockRevocationRepository()
certRepo := newMockCertificateRepository()
profileRepo := newMockProfileRepository()
caSvc := NewCAOperationsSvc(revocationRepo, certRepo, profileRepo)
registry := NewIssuerRegistry(slog.Default())
issuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
registry.Set("iss-local", issuer)
registry.Set("iss-other", &mockIssuerConnector{})
caSvc.SetIssuerRegistry(registry)
return caSvc, revocationRepo, certRepo, issuer
}
func TestCAOperationsSvc_GenerateDERCRL_Success(t *testing.T) {
caSvc, revocationRepo, _ := newCAOperationsSvcTest()
// Add some revoked certificates to the repo
now := time.Now()
revocationRepo.Revocations = []*domain.CertificateRevocation{
{
SerialNumber: "SERIAL-001",
CertificateID: "cert-1",
IssuerID: "iss-local",
Reason: "keyCompromise",
RevokedAt: now.Add(-24 * time.Hour),
RevokedBy: "admin",
},
{
SerialNumber: "SERIAL-002",
CertificateID: "cert-2",
IssuerID: "iss-local",
Reason: "superseded",
RevokedAt: now.Add(-12 * time.Hour),
RevokedBy: "admin",
},
}
crl, err := caSvc.GenerateDERCRL(context.Background(), "iss-local")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
if crl == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil CRL")
}
if len(crl) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty CRL")
}
t.Logf("DER CRL generated successfully: %d bytes", len(crl))
}
// TestCAOperationsSvc_GenerateDERCRL_UsesListByIssuer_NotListAll guards F-001.
// Before the fix, GenerateDERCRL called revocationRepo.ListAll(ctx) and filtered
// results in Go (if rev.IssuerID != issuerID { continue }). That was O(N) in the
// size of the entire revocation table and did not scale as revocations piled up
// across many issuers. Migration 000012 added the composite index
// idx_certificate_revocations_issuer_serial(issuer_id, serial_number), which is
// a prefix scan target — so the hot path must now call ListByIssuer(ctx, id) to
// drive an indexed query. This regression test asserts the hot path invokes
// ListByIssuer exactly once and never falls back to the full-table ListAll scan,
// and also double-checks that cross-issuer revocations are correctly excluded
// from the generated CRL (no in-Go filter left to catch them).
func TestCAOperationsSvc_GenerateDERCRL_UsesListByIssuer_NotListAll(t *testing.T) {
caSvc, revocationRepo, _ := newCAOperationsSvcTest()
// Pre-populate with revocations from TWO issuers. If the hot path regresses
// and calls ListAll instead of ListByIssuer, the generated CRL would either
// include the wrong rows or — with the in-Go filter gone — pull in both
// issuers' revocations. ListByIssuer scopes at the query level so only
// iss-local rows come back.
now := time.Now()
revocationRepo.Revocations = []*domain.CertificateRevocation{
{
SerialNumber: "LOCAL-001",
CertificateID: "cert-local-1",
IssuerID: "iss-local",
Reason: "keyCompromise",
RevokedAt: now.Add(-24 * time.Hour),
RevokedBy: "admin",
},
{
SerialNumber: "LOCAL-002",
CertificateID: "cert-local-2",
IssuerID: "iss-local",
Reason: "superseded",
RevokedAt: now.Add(-12 * time.Hour),
RevokedBy: "admin",
},
{
SerialNumber: "OTHER-001",
CertificateID: "cert-other-1",
IssuerID: "iss-other",
Reason: "keyCompromise",
RevokedAt: now.Add(-6 * time.Hour),
RevokedBy: "admin",
},
}
crl, err := caSvc.GenerateDERCRL(context.Background(), "iss-local")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
if len(crl) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty CRL")
}
// The contractual assertion: the CRL hot path MUST use the scoped query.
if got, want := revocationRepo.ListByIssuerCalls, 1; got != want {
t.Errorf("ListByIssuerCalls = %d, want %d — CRL hot path must call the scoped query driven by migration 000012 index", got, want)
}
if got := revocationRepo.ListAllCalls; got != 0 {
t.Errorf("ListAllCalls = %d, want 0 — CRL hot path must NOT fall back to the full-table scan after F-001", got)
}
if got, want := revocationRepo.LastListIssuerID, "iss-local"; got != want {
t.Errorf("LastListIssuerID = %q, want %q — issuer scoping argument lost", got, want)
}
}
func TestCAOperationsSvc_GenerateDERCRL_EmptyCRL(t *testing.T) {
caSvc, revocationRepo, _ := newCAOperationsSvcTest()
// No revoked certs for this issuer
revocationRepo.Revocations = []*domain.CertificateRevocation{}
crl, err := caSvc.GenerateDERCRL(context.Background(), "iss-local")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
if crl == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil CRL even when empty")
}
if len(crl) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty CRL bytes (at least the CRL structure)")
}
t.Logf("Empty DER CRL generated successfully: %d bytes", len(crl))
}
func TestCAOperationsSvc_GetOCSPResponse_Good(t *testing.T) {
caSvc, _, certRepo := newCAOperationsSvcTest()
// Add a non-revoked certificate
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{
ID: "cert-ocsp-good",
CommonName: "good.example.com",
IssuerID: "iss-local",
Status: domain.CertificateStatusActive,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
}
certRepo.AddCert(cert)
version := &domain.CertificateVersion{
ID: "ver-ocsp-good",
CertificateID: "cert-ocsp-good",
SerialNumber: "OCSP-GOOD-001",
NotBefore: time.Now(),
NotAfter: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
}
certRepo.Versions["cert-ocsp-good"] = []*domain.CertificateVersion{version}
// Request OCSP response for good cert
resp, err := caSvc.GetOCSPResponse(context.Background(), "iss-local", "OCSP-GOOD-001")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
if resp == nil || len(resp) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty OCSP response for good cert")
}
t.Logf("OCSP response for good cert generated: %d bytes", len(resp))
}
// TestCAOperationsSvc_GetOCSPResponse_Unknown_CrossIssuer guards the M-004 fix:
// a cert with the queried serial exists but under a *different* issuer. Before
// the fix, OCSP fell through to "good" (CertStatus 0) because no revocation row
// matched the (issuer_id, serial) tuple. Per RFC 5280 §5.2.3 serials are unique
// only within a single issuer, and per RFC 6960 §2.2 unknown certs must report
// "unknown" (CertStatus 2), not "good".
func TestCAOperationsSvc_GetOCSPResponse_Unknown_CrossIssuer(t *testing.T) {
caSvc, _, certRepo, issuer := newCAOperationsSvcTestWithIssuer()
// Real cert exists, but bound to iss-other (not iss-local).
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{
ID: "cert-cross-issuer",
CommonName: "cross.example.com",
IssuerID: "iss-other",
Status: domain.CertificateStatusActive,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
}
certRepo.AddCert(cert)
certRepo.Versions["cert-cross-issuer"] = []*domain.CertificateVersion{{
ID: "ver-cross-issuer",
CertificateID: "cert-cross-issuer",
SerialNumber: "CROSS-ISSUER-001",
NotBefore: time.Now(),
NotAfter: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
}}
// Query OCSP for iss-local + CROSS-ISSUER-001. The serial exists, but
// under iss-other — our JOIN-scoped lookup should return no match.
resp, err := caSvc.GetOCSPResponse(context.Background(), "iss-local", "CROSS-ISSUER-001")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
if resp == nil || len(resp) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty OCSP response")
}
if issuer.LastOCSPSignRequest == nil {
t.Fatal("expected SignOCSPResponse to be called")
}
if got, want := issuer.LastOCSPSignRequest.CertStatus, 2; got != want {
t.Errorf("CertStatus = %d, want %d (unknown) — cross-issuer lookup must not return good", got, want)
}
}
// TestCAOperationsSvc_GetOCSPResponse_Unknown_UnknownSerial guards the M-004 fix
// for the "forged/guessed serial" case: no certificate exists at this
// (issuer_id, serial) tuple anywhere in inventory. Per RFC 6960 §2.2 we must
// report "unknown" (CertStatus 2), never "good" — returning good for a serial
// we never issued is a protocol violation that would allow an attacker to get
// certctl to vouch for a cert it never signed.
func TestCAOperationsSvc_GetOCSPResponse_Unknown_UnknownSerial(t *testing.T) {
caSvc, _, _, issuer := newCAOperationsSvcTestWithIssuer()
// No cert rows added. Query for an arbitrary serial under iss-local.
resp, err := caSvc.GetOCSPResponse(context.Background(), "iss-local", "DEADBEEF-NEVER-ISSUED")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
if resp == nil || len(resp) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty OCSP response")
}
if issuer.LastOCSPSignRequest == nil {
t.Fatal("expected SignOCSPResponse to be called")
}
if got, want := issuer.LastOCSPSignRequest.CertStatus, 2; got != want {
t.Errorf("CertStatus = %d, want %d (unknown) — unissued serials must not return good", got, want)
}
}
func TestCAOperationsSvc_GetOCSPResponse_Revoked(t *testing.T) {
caSvc, revocationRepo, certRepo := newCAOperationsSvcTest()
now := time.Now()
// Add a revoked certificate
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{
ID: "cert-ocsp-revoked",
CommonName: "revoked.example.com",
IssuerID: "iss-local",
Status: domain.CertificateStatusRevoked,
RevokedAt: &now,
RevocationReason: "keyCompromise",
ExpiresAt: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
}
certRepo.AddCert(cert)
version := &domain.CertificateVersion{
ID: "ver-ocsp-revoked",
CertificateID: "cert-ocsp-revoked",
SerialNumber: "OCSP-REVOKED-001",
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-24 * time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
}
certRepo.Versions["cert-ocsp-revoked"] = []*domain.CertificateVersion{version}
// Add revocation record
revocationRepo.Revocations = []*domain.CertificateRevocation{
{
SerialNumber: "OCSP-REVOKED-001",
CertificateID: "cert-ocsp-revoked",
IssuerID: "iss-local",
Reason: "keyCompromise",
RevokedAt: now.Add(-24 * time.Hour),
RevokedBy: "admin",
},
}
// Request OCSP response for revoked cert
resp, err := caSvc.GetOCSPResponse(context.Background(), "iss-local", "OCSP-REVOKED-001")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
if resp == nil || len(resp) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty OCSP response for revoked cert")
}
t.Logf("OCSP response for revoked cert generated: %d bytes", len(resp))
}