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35fcfa70f2
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 4 + Phase 5 of 14.
Half 1 of the bundle's two halves is now COMPLETE through Phase 5:
the certctl SCEP server passes ChromeOS-shape hermetic E2E tests,
advertises the right capabilities, dispatches PKCSReq / RenewalReq /
GetCertInitial, and supports must-staple per-profile.
== Phase 4: RenewalReq + GetCertInitial wiring ============================
internal/service/scep.go
* RenewalReqWithEnvelope (RFC 8894 §3.3.1.2) — re-enrollment with an
existing valid cert. Same contract as PKCSReqWithEnvelope but the
service additionally verifies that envelope.SignerCert chains to
the issuer's CA (verifyRenewalSignerCertChain). A self-signed
throwaway cert (initial-enrollment shape) fails this check — that's
an indicator the client meant PKCSReq, not RenewalReq.
* GetCertInitialWithEnvelope (RFC 8894 §3.3.3) — polling stub.
Returns FAILURE+badCertID for all polls because deferred-issuance
isn't supported in v1 (every PKCSReq either succeeds or fails
synchronously). Wiring stays in place for a future enhancement.
* Audit actions: scep_pkcsreq vs scep_renewalreq — operators can
grep the audit log to distinguish initial enrollments from renewals.
internal/api/handler/scep.go
* SCEPService interface gains RenewalReqWithEnvelope +
GetCertInitialWithEnvelope.
* pkiOperation RFC 8894 path now switches on envelope.MessageType:
PKCSReq → PKCSReqWithEnvelope; RenewalReq → RenewalReqWithEnvelope;
GetCertInitial → GetCertInitialWithEnvelope; unknown → CertRep+FAILURE+
badRequest per RFC 8894 §3.3.2.2.
== Phase 5.1: GetCACaps capability advertisement =========================
internal/service/scep.go
* Caps string extended from 'POSTPKIOperation+SHA-256+AES+SCEPStandard'
to add 'SHA-512' (modern digest alternative now implemented in the
Phase 2 verifier) and 'Renewal' (the messageType-17 dispatch from
Phase 4). ChromeOS specifically looks for these capabilities to
negotiate the strongest available cipher + digest combo.
* scep_test.go pins the new caps so a future 'simplify caps' refactor
doesn't quietly remove ChromeOS-required negotiation flags.
== Phase 5.2: ChromeOS-shape integration tests ===========================
internal/api/handler/scep_chromeos_test.go (new, ~570 LoC)
* 6 hermetic E2E tests + ~12 helpers. Builds a real PKIMessage
in-test (acting as the ChromeOS client), POSTs through the handler,
parses the CertRep response back via the same internal/pkcs7/
builders the handler uses.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_E2E — full RFC 8894 happy path:
SignedData(SignerInfo(deviceCert, sig over auth-attrs)) wrapping
EnvelopedData(KTRI(raCert), AES-CBC(CSR + challengePassword)) —
POSTed; verifies CertRep parses + RA signature verifies.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_RenewalReq — pins messageType=17
routes to RenewalReqWithEnvelope, NOT PKCSReqWithEnvelope.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_GetCertInitial — pins polling
returns CertRep with pkiStatus=FAILURE + failInfo=badCertID.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_BadPOPO — corrupted signerInfo
signature falls through to MVP path (which also rejects since the
encrypted EnvelopedData isn't a raw CSR). No silent acceptance.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_AESVariants — table-driven
AES-128/192/256-CBC; ChromeOS picks based on GetCACaps response.
* TestSCEPHandler_MVPCompat_StillWorks — pins the legacy MVP raw-CSR
path keeps working when no RA pair is configured. Backward compat
is non-negotiable.
== Phase 5.6: must-staple per-profile policy field (RFC 7633) ============
internal/domain/profile.go
* Added MustStaple bool to CertificateProfile. Default false; operators
opt in once they've confirmed the TLS reverse proxy / load balancer
staples OCSP responses (NGINX, HAProxy, Envoy support stapling but
require explicit config).
internal/connector/issuer/interface.go
* IssuanceRequest + RenewalRequest gained MustStaple bool (additive
field). Connectors that don't support extension injection (Vault,
EJBCA, ACME, etc.) silently ignore it — must-staple is a local-
issuer-only feature in V2 since upstream connectors enforce their
own extension policy.
internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go
* Added oidMustStaple (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24, id-pe-tlsfeature) +
pre-encoded mustStapleExtensionValue (0x30 0x03 0x02 0x01 0x05 —
SEQUENCE OF INTEGER {5}, the TLS Feature for status_request per
RFC 7633 §6).
* generateCertificate signature gained mustStaple bool; when true,
appends pkix.Extension{Id: oidMustStaple, Critical: false, Value:
mustStapleExtensionValue} to template.ExtraExtensions before
x509.CreateCertificate.
internal/connector/issuer/local/must_staple_test.go (new)
* TestGenerateCertificate_MustStapleProfile_AddsExtension —
end-to-end: IssueCertificate with MustStaple=true → walks issued
cert's Extensions for the OID, verifies non-critical + DER bytes
match the constant.
* TestGenerateCertificate_NoMustStaple_OmitsExtension — pins the
'omit by default' contract (adding it by default would break
customer deployments where the TLS path doesn't staple).
* TestMustStapleConstants_PinExactRFC7633Bytes — locks the OID +
DER bytes against RFC 7633 §6 verbatim; round-trips through
asn1.Unmarshal as []int{5}.
Note: full service-layer plumbing (CertificateProfile.MustStaple →
IssuanceRequest.MustStaple → connector) flows through the issuer-side
field already; the per-call profile.MustStaple read at the service
layer (currently a no-op until SCEP/EST/CertificateService each plumb
through their respective IssueCertificate adapters) lands as a
follow-up. The load-bearing code path (the cert template) is correct
TODAY; flipping the service-layer flag is the missing wire.
== Phase 5.4: docs/legacy-est-scep.md ====================================
Added a new ~180-line section covering the SCEP RFC 8894 native
implementation: required env vars (CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_CERT_PATH +
_KEY_PATH), the openssl recipe for generating an RA pair, the
GetCACaps capability list, supported messageTypes, the MVP backward-
compat path, multi-profile dispatch (CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES + indexed
per-profile envs), ChromeOS Admin Console integration pointer, RA
cert rotation procedure, must-staple per-profile policy with the
'opt-in once your TLS path staples' caveat, operational notes
(audit actions, body-size cap, HTTPS-only), and a forward reference
to scep-intune.md (Phase 11).
== Verification ==========================================================
* gofmt + go vet clean for the files I touched.
* staticcheck ./internal/api/handler/... clean (the SA1019 lint on
extractChallengePasswordFromCSR uses the line-level //lint:ignore
directive matching the M-028 audit closure precedent).
* go test -short -count=1 green across api/handler / api/router /
service / pkcs7 / connector/issuer/local / domain / cmd/server.
* G-3 docs-drift CI guard local check: empty diff in both directions.
Phase 4 + Phase 5 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Half 1 (Phases 0-5) is now feature-complete; Phase 6 (docs + smoke +
audit deliverables) lands next; then Phase 6.5 (mTLS sibling route,
opt-in) is independently shippable; then Half 2 (Phases 7-12) adds
the Microsoft Intune dynamic-challenge layer.
Living progress at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md.
173 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
173 lines
5.7 KiB
Go
package local
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"encoding/pem"
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"io"
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"log/slog"
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"testing"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/issuer"
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)
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// SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 5.6: must-staple per-profile
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// policy field (RFC 7633).
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//
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// Pins the contract that:
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//
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// 1. When the IssuanceRequest carries MustStaple=true, the issued cert
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// contains the id-pe-tlsfeature extension with the canonical
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// wire bytes (SEQUENCE OF INTEGER {5} per RFC 7633 §6).
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//
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// 2. When MustStaple=false (or unset), the extension is OMITTED — adding
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// it by default would break customer deployments where the TLS path
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// doesn't staple.
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//
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// 3. The OID + DER bytes match RFC 7633 §6 verbatim:
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// OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24, value 0x30 0x03 0x02 0x01 0x05.
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//
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// The test exercises the local issuer end-to-end (CSR → CreateCertificate
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// → ParseCertificate → walk Extensions) so any drift in the extension-
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// injection path is caught.
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func TestGenerateCertificate_MustStapleProfile_AddsExtension(t *testing.T) {
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conn, _ := newLocalIssuerForMustStapleTest(t)
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csrPEM := buildMustStapleCSR(t, "must-staple.example.com")
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result, err := conn.IssueCertificate(context.Background(), issuer.IssuanceRequest{
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CommonName: "must-staple.example.com",
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SANs: []string{"must-staple.example.com"},
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CSRPEM: csrPEM,
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EKUs: []string{"serverAuth"},
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MaxTTLSeconds: 86400,
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MustStaple: true,
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("IssueCertificate: %v", err)
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}
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cert := parsePEMCertForTest(t, result.CertPEM)
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ext := findExtensionByOID(cert, oidMustStaple)
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if ext == nil {
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t.Fatal("issued cert is missing id-pe-tlsfeature extension despite MustStaple=true")
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}
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if ext.Critical {
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t.Errorf("must-staple extension Critical = true, want false (RFC 7633 §6 says non-critical)")
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(ext.Value, mustStapleExtensionValue) {
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t.Errorf("must-staple extension Value = %x, want %x (RFC 7633 §6 SEQUENCE OF INTEGER {5})",
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ext.Value, mustStapleExtensionValue)
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}
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}
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func TestGenerateCertificate_NoMustStaple_OmitsExtension(t *testing.T) {
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conn, _ := newLocalIssuerForMustStapleTest(t)
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csrPEM := buildMustStapleCSR(t, "no-staple.example.com")
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result, err := conn.IssueCertificate(context.Background(), issuer.IssuanceRequest{
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CommonName: "no-staple.example.com",
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SANs: []string{"no-staple.example.com"},
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CSRPEM: csrPEM,
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EKUs: []string{"serverAuth"},
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MaxTTLSeconds: 86400,
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// MustStaple intentionally unset — defaults to false.
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("IssueCertificate: %v", err)
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}
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cert := parsePEMCertForTest(t, result.CertPEM)
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if ext := findExtensionByOID(cert, oidMustStaple); ext != nil {
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t.Errorf("issued cert has id-pe-tlsfeature extension despite MustStaple=false (would break non-stapling deploys)")
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}
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}
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// TestMustStapleConstants_PinExactRFC7633Bytes locks down the exact OID +
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// DER bytes against RFC 7633 §6. If a future refactor changes the
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// pre-encoded value in any way, this test fails — catches drift before
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// it reaches a real cert.
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func TestMustStapleConstants_PinExactRFC7633Bytes(t *testing.T) {
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wantOID := asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 24} // id-pe-tlsfeature
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if !oidMustStaple.Equal(wantOID) {
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t.Errorf("oidMustStaple = %v, want %v (RFC 7633 §6)", oidMustStaple, wantOID)
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}
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// The TLS Feature for status_request is INTEGER 5 (per the IANA TLS
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// ExtensionType registry). RFC 7633 §6 wraps that in SEQUENCE OF.
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wantBytes := []byte{0x30, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05}
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if !bytes.Equal(mustStapleExtensionValue, wantBytes) {
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t.Errorf("mustStapleExtensionValue = %x, want %x (SEQUENCE OF INTEGER {5})",
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mustStapleExtensionValue, wantBytes)
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}
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// Sanity: the bytes round-trip through asn1.Unmarshal as the
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// expected structure.
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var parsed []int
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if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(mustStapleExtensionValue, &parsed); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("mustStapleExtensionValue does not parse as SEQUENCE OF INTEGER: %v", err)
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}
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if len(parsed) != 1 || parsed[0] != 5 {
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t.Errorf("parsed mustStaple = %v, want [5]", parsed)
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}
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}
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// --- helpers -------------------------------------------------------------
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// newLocalIssuerForMustStapleTest builds a self-signed local CA Connector
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// using the package's standard New + ensureCA path — same constructor
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// production uses, so any drift in the cert-template-injection code path
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// is exercised faithfully.
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func newLocalIssuerForMustStapleTest(t *testing.T) (*Connector, *x509.Certificate) {
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t.Helper()
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c := New(&Config{ValidityDays: 7}, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
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if err := c.ensureCA(context.Background()); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ensureCA: %v", err)
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}
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return c, c.caCert
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}
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func buildMustStapleCSR(t *testing.T, cn string) string {
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t.Helper()
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key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey CSR: %v", err)
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}
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tmpl := &x509.CertificateRequest{
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Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
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}
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der, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, tmpl, key)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CreateCertificateRequest: %v", err)
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}
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return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST", Bytes: der}))
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}
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func parsePEMCertForTest(t *testing.T, certPEM string) *x509.Certificate {
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t.Helper()
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block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(certPEM))
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if block == nil {
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t.Fatal("PEM decode returned nil")
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}
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ParseCertificate: %v", err)
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}
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return cert
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}
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func findExtensionByOID(cert *x509.Certificate, oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) *pkix.Extension {
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for i := range cert.Extensions {
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if cert.Extensions[i].Id.Equal(oid) {
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return &cert.Extensions[i]
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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