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345bafe5aa
Closes M-006 + M-007 + M-008 + M-015 + M-016 + M-019 + M-020 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25. M-028 was already closed by the
Bundle B CI follow-up.
M-006 (CWE-913) — Idempotent migration 000014
migrations/000014_policy_violation_severity_check.up.sql:
Prepended ALTER TABLE ... DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS before the
ADD. Mirrors the down migration's existing IF EXISTS shape and
the M-7 idempotent-index idiom. Re-runs against partially-applied
DBs now succeed.
M-007 — Bulk-op partial-failure tests (3 new)
internal/api/handler/bulk_partial_failure_test.go:
TestBulkRevoke_PartialFailure_ReportsBoth
TestBulkRenew_PartialFailure_ReportsBoth
TestBulkReassign_PartialFailure_ReportsBoth
Each asserts HTTP 200 + both success/failure counters round-trip
+ per-cert errors[] preserved with non-empty messages so operators
can correlate each failure to its certificate ID.
M-008 — Admin-gated handler enumeration pin (verified-already-clean)
Recon: only one admin-gated handler — bulk_revocation.go — with
full 3-branch test triplet already in place. health.go calls
IsAdmin informationally to surface the flag to the GUI without
gating.
internal/api/handler/m008_admin_gate_test.go:
Walks every handler .go file, asserts every middleware.IsAdmin
call site is in AdminGatedHandlers (with required test triplet)
or InformationalIsAdminCallers (justified). Adding a new admin
gate without updating both the constant AND adding the test
triplet fails CI.
M-015 — Single-profile cardinality pin (verified-already-clean)
Audit claim 'no cardinality validation' was wrong — enforced at
struct level. domain.ManagedCertificate.{CertificateProfileID,
RenewalPolicyID,IssuerID,OwnerID} and RenewalPolicy.
CertificateProfileID are bare strings, not slices.
internal/domain/m015_cardinality_test.go:
reflect-based pin on kind=String. Schema change to N:N would
have to update renewal.go's lookup loop in the same commit.
M-016 (CWE-754) — Reap stale-agent jobs
internal/repository/postgres/job.go::ListJobsWithOfflineAgents:
JOIN jobs to agents on agent_id, filter (status=Running AND
a.last_heartbeat_at < cutoff), exclude server-keygen jobs.
internal/service/job.go::ReapJobsWithOfflineAgents:
Flips matched jobs to Failed reason agent_offline so I-001
retry loop re-queues them on a healthy agent. Records audit
event per reap.
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go:
Scheduler.runJobTimeout cycle now calls both reaper arms.
agentOfflineJobTTL default 5min (5x agent-health-check default);
SetAgentOfflineJobTTL knob for operator override.
internal/service/job_offline_agent_reaper_test.go: 6 unit tests
cover happy path, server-keygen-skip, non-Running-skip, non-
positive-TTL fail-loud, repo-error propagation, audit-event
recording.
M-019 — Configurable ARI HTTP timeout
Audit claim 'no fallback timeout' was wrong — ari.go:52 already
had a 15s timeout. Bundle C makes it configurable.
internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:
Config.ARIHTTPTimeoutSeconds field with env path
CERTCTL_ACME_ARI_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS.
internal/connector/issuer/acme/ari.go:
Both HTTP clients (GetRenewalInfo + getARIEndpoint) now use the
new ariHTTPTimeout() helper. Zero / negative / nil-config all
fall back to the historic 15s default.
ari_timeout_test.go: 4 dispatch arm tests.
M-020 (CWE-770) — OCSP DoS hardening
Pre-bundle the noAuthHandler chain had no rate limit. An attacker
could DoS the OCSP responder, which for fail-open relying parties
is a revocation bypass.
cmd/server/main.go:
noAuthHandler refactored from fixed middleware.Chain(...) to a
conditional slice that appends middleware.NewRateLimiter when
cfg.RateLimit.Enabled. Per-IP keying applies; OCSP/CRL/EST/SCEP
are unauth.
docs/security.md (NEW):
Operator runbook documenting Must-Staple TLS Feature extension
RFC 7633 as the architectural fix for fail-open relying parties.
Profile-flip guidance + nginx/Apache/HAProxy/Envoy stapling
snippets + explicit scope statement on what the rate limiter
alone does NOT solve.
Audit deliverables:
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: score
31/55 -> 38/55 closed (Medium 13/27 -> 20/27).
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: 7 status
flips open -> closed with closure notes citing the Bundle C
mechanism.
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle C section under [unreleased].
Verification:
go vet ./internal/service ./internal/scheduler ./internal/connector/issuer/acme
./internal/api/handler ./internal/domain ./cmd/server clean
go test -count=1 -short on the same packages all green
helm template + helm lint clean
internal/repository/postgres setup-fail sandbox disk
pressure (same on master HEAD before this branch)
171 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
171 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"go/parser"
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"go/token"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"sort"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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// Bundle C / Audit M-008: pin the admin-gated handler set.
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//
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// The audit's request is "Admin-gated operation role-gate test coverage
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// needs verification". Verified-already-clean recon: only one handler
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// in internal/api/handler/ calls middleware.IsAdmin to gate access:
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// bulk_revocation.go — which has 3 dedicated tests
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// (NonAdmin_Returns403, AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403,
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// AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) covering all three branches.
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//
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// This test enforces the invariant going forward by walking every
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// .go file in this package, finding every middleware.IsAdmin call
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// site, and asserting the file appears in AdminGatedHandlers below.
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// Adding a new middleware.IsAdmin call without updating the constant
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// AND adding a parallel test triplet fails CI.
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// AdminGatedHandlers is the documented allowlist of handler files that
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// gate access on middleware.IsAdmin. Every entry MUST have:
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// - a non-admin-rejection test ("_NonAdmin_Returns403")
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// - an explicit-false-admin-rejection test ("_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403")
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// - an admin-allowed actor-attribution test ("_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor")
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//
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// Keys are the handler filenames; values are short descriptions of why
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// the gate exists. health.go is an INFORMATIONAL caller of IsAdmin (it
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// surfaces the flag to the GUI but does not gate) — explicitly excluded.
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var AdminGatedHandlers = map[string]string{
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"bulk_revocation.go": "M-003: bulk revocation is fleet-scale destructive — admin-only",
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}
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// InformationalIsAdminCallers is the documented allowlist of files that
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// call middleware.IsAdmin without using the result to gate access. The
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// only legitimate use of an informational call is reporting the flag to
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// a downstream consumer (e.g. health.go::AuthCheck reports admin to the
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// GUI so it can hide admin-only buttons).
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var InformationalIsAdminCallers = map[string]string{
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"health.go": "informational: reports admin flag to GUI for affordance gating, no server-side gate",
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}
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func TestM008_AdminGatedHandlers_PinExpectedSet(t *testing.T) {
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actual, err := scanIsAdminCallers(".")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("scan handler dir: %v", err)
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}
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expected := append([]string(nil), keys(AdminGatedHandlers)...)
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expected = append(expected, keys(InformationalIsAdminCallers)...)
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sort.Strings(actual)
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sort.Strings(expected)
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if !slicesEqual008(actual, expected) {
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t.Errorf(
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"middleware.IsAdmin call sites changed:\n"+
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" actual: %v\n"+
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" expected: %v\n"+
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"\n"+
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"If you added a new admin gate, append it to AdminGatedHandlers AND\n"+
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"add the 3-test triplet (_NonAdmin_Returns403 / _AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 /\n"+
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"_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) — see bulk_revocation_handler_test.go for\n"+
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"the template.\n"+
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"\n"+
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"If you added an informational caller (no gating), append to\n"+
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"InformationalIsAdminCallers with a justification.",
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actual, expected)
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}
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}
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func TestM008_AdminGatedHandlers_HaveTripletTests(t *testing.T) {
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for handlerFile := range AdminGatedHandlers {
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base := strings.TrimSuffix(handlerFile, ".go")
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// Look for the 3-test triplet in the corresponding _test.go file
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// or in any test file in the package — bulk_revocation_handler_test.go
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// follows a slightly different naming convention.
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matches, err := filepath.Glob("*_test.go")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("glob: %v", err)
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}
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var foundNonAdmin, foundExplicitFalse, foundAdminPermitted bool
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for _, m := range matches {
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body, err := os.ReadFile(m)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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s := string(body)
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// Look for tests that mention the handler base name + the
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// expected suffix. Loose match because some test files use
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// _Handler_NonAdmin and others use _NonAdmin.
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if strings.Contains(s, "NonAdmin_Returns403") {
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foundNonAdmin = true
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}
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if strings.Contains(s, "AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403") {
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foundExplicitFalse = true
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}
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if strings.Contains(s, "AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor") {
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foundAdminPermitted = true
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}
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}
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if !foundNonAdmin {
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t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_NonAdmin_Returns403 test", base)
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}
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if !foundExplicitFalse {
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t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 test", base)
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}
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if !foundAdminPermitted {
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t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor test", base)
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}
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}
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}
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// --- helpers --------------------------------------------------------------
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func scanIsAdminCallers(dir string) ([]string, error) {
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entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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var out []string
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fset := token.NewFileSet()
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for _, e := range entries {
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name := e.Name()
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if !strings.HasSuffix(name, ".go") || strings.HasSuffix(name, "_test.go") {
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continue
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}
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body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, name))
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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_, parseErr := parser.ParseFile(fset, filepath.Join(dir, name), body, parser.SkipObjectResolution)
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if parseErr != nil {
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continue
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}
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// Substring-match middleware.IsAdmin — cheap and sufficient
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// because the import path is fixed and there's no aliasing
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// shenanigans elsewhere in this package.
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if strings.Contains(string(body), "middleware.IsAdmin(") {
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out = append(out, name)
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}
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func keys(m map[string]string) []string {
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out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
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for k := range m {
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out = append(out, k)
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}
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return out
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}
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func slicesEqual008(a, b []string) bool {
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if len(a) != len(b) {
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return false
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}
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for i := range a {
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if a[i] != b[i] {
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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