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3189f3cd71
chained-auth combinator + AuthInfo OIDC providers extension + 2 CI
guards (Bundle-1-compat + Bundle-1-to-2-upgrade)
Phase 6 wires the Phase 4 session service + Phase 5 OIDC handlers into
the request path. Three middlewares + one combinator land in
internal/auth/session/middleware.go:
1. SessionMiddleware reads `certctl_session` cookie, validates via
SessionService.Validate, populates the legacy UserKey/AdminKey
+ Phase 3 RBAC context keys (ActorIDKey/ActorTypeKey/TenantIDKey)
so downstream RequirePermission + audit-attribution see a
consistent caller. Best-effort UpdateLastSeen keeps the idle-
expiry sliding window fresh. CRITICALLY: never 401s on validate
failure — defers to the next middleware so the chained-auth
combinator can fall back to Bearer.
2. CSRFMiddleware gates state-changing methods (POST/PUT/DELETE/
PATCH) for session-authenticated requests. API-key actors are
EXEMPT (no session row in context => CSRF doesn't apply; they're
not browser-driven). Constant-time-compares SHA-256(X-CSRF-Token
header) against the session row's stored hash via
SessionService.ValidateCSRF. Mismatch returns 403.
3. ChainAuthSessionThenBearer is the load-bearing chained-auth
combinator: tries the session cookie first; on miss/invalid,
falls back to the API-key Bearer middleware; if neither
authenticates, 401. The composition uses bearerSkipIfAuthenticated
so a request with both a valid session AND a valid Bearer uses
the session (cookie wins per the Bundle 2 contract).
Middleware chain order in cmd/server/main.go (per Phase 6 spec):
RequestID → Logging → Recovery → CORS → RateLimit → AUTH (chained:
session → Bearer) → CSRF (state-changing only; API-key exempt) →
Audit → Handler
The chained authMiddleware replaces the bare Bundle-1 bearerMiddleware
at the chain entry point; csrfMiddleware lands immediately after so
session-authenticated requests pass through CSRF before audit. Both
new middlewares are pass-throughs when sessionService is nil
(pre-Phase-4 builds).
AuthInfo extension (Category E): GET /api/v1/auth/info now returns the
list of configured OIDC providers (id + display_name + login_url
where login_url = `/auth/oidc/login?provider=<id>`) so the GUI Login
page renders the correct "Sign in with X" buttons. Endpoint stays
auth-exempt; the providers list is public configuration. Wired via
HealthHandler.OIDCProvidersResolver + a new OIDCProvidersListResolver
projection interface; the cmd/server adapter
oidcProvidersListAdapter projects the postgres OIDCProviderRepository
into the public-safe shape. Resolver lookups are best-effort: failures
fall back to the minimal payload rather than 500-ing the GUI's auth
probe. Nil resolver preserves the pre-Phase-6 minimal shape so test
fixtures + no-db deploys keep compiling.
Bypass list preserved (Category E): the existing public-route
allowlist in router.AuthExemptRouterRoutes is preserved by virtue of
those routes registering via direct r.mux.Handle (they bypass the
entire chain). The protocol-endpoint allowlist (ACME/SCEP/EST/OCSP/
CRL) bypasses via cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix
dispatch — those routes never reach the auth middleware at all. Both
preservations are pinned by the Bundle-1 compat CI guard below.
Tests (internal/auth/session/middleware_test.go):
All 7 Phase 6 spec-mandated middleware-chain tests pass:
1. Session cookie + correct CSRF → 200.
2. Session cookie + wrong CSRF → 403.
3. Bearer-only (no session) + no CSRF → 200 (API-key actors are
CSRF-exempt by design).
4. No cookie + no Bearer → 401.
5. Expired cookie + valid Bearer → fall back to Bearer succeeds.
6. Tampered cookie → 401 (no Bearer to fall back to).
7. Bypass-list awareness — state-changing method, no auth, no
session row → uniform 401 (NOT a CSRF 403; the CSRF check is
gated on session-row presence and never fires for unauth
requests).
Plus coverage-lift tests covering nil-service pass-through, safe-
methods bypass, SessionFromContext nil + populated, isStateChangingMethod
matrix, clientIPFromRequest variants (RemoteAddr / XFF first-hop /
XFF single / no-port), nil-bearer chain branches.
Coverage on internal/auth/session/middleware.go: 100% per-function
across the 9 entry points (SessionValidator interfaces +
NewSessionMiddleware + NewCSRFMiddleware + ChainAuthSessionThenBearer +
bearerSkipIfAuthenticated + SessionFromContext + isStateChangingMethod
+ clientIPFromRequest + lastIndexByte). Package coverage 94.9%.
Two new CI guards:
scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-compat-regression.sh — Bundle-1-only
compat invariants. Static-source checks that protect the Bundle-1
path since spinning up docker-compose + running the integration
test suite is sandbox-infeasible:
1. SessionMiddleware MUST defer-to-next on missing/invalid cookie.
2. CSRFMiddleware MUST be pass-through on missing session row.
3. cmd/server/main.go MUST wire ChainAuthSessionThenBearer.
4. The 4 public OIDC routes MUST be in AuthExemptRouterRoutes.
5. AuthInfo MUST guard on OIDCProvidersResolver != nil.
scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-to-2-upgrade-regression.sh — Bundle-1 →
Bundle-2 upgrade invariants:
1. Migrations 000034..000037 use CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS.
2. Migrations are wrapped in BEGIN; ... COMMIT;.
3. NO DROP TABLE / ALTER ... DROP COLUMN against any of the 19
protected Bundle-1 tables (api_keys, audit_events, certificates,
certificate_versions, profiles, issuers, targets, agents, jobs,
owners, teams, agent_groups, notifications, roles, permissions,
role_permissions, actor_roles, tenants, approvals,
intermediate_cas, issuance_approval_requests).
4. 000037 INSERTs use ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING (idempotent re-apply).
5. ChainAuthSessionThenBearer is wired (Bundle-1 Bearer keys
continue to authenticate post-upgrade).
6. Bootstrap handler is registered (fresh-deployment bootstrap
still works).
Both guards are sandbox-feasible static analysis. When the operator
gets a Linux VM with docker-in-docker, promote both to real `docker
compose up` integration tests against a v2.1.0 baseline DB dump.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet ./internal/auth/... ./internal/api/...
./cmd/server/... clean, go test -short -count=1 -race green across
internal/auth/session (94.9% coverage), internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, no regressions in Bundle 1 packages, both new
ci-guards green.
151 lines
6.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
151 lines
6.1 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-to-2-upgrade-regression.sh
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#
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# Auth Bundle 2 / Phase 6 Bundle-1 → Bundle-2 upgrade regression.
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#
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# Pre-commit invariant: an existing v2.1.0 (Bundle-1-shipped) deployment
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# upgraded in place to Bundle 2 must:
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#
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# (a) Have all Bundle-2 migrations apply cleanly. The new migrations
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# (000034 oidc_providers, 000035 sessions, 000036 users, 000037
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# oidc_pre_login + auth.session.*/auth.oidc.* permissions) MUST
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# be additive — no DROP TABLE / ALTER COLUMN that would break a
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# Bundle-1 dump.
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#
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# (b) Bundle 1's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN path keeps working for fresh
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# deployments without an admin (bootstrap.go invariant; pinned
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# by Bundle 1 Phase 6 tests).
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#
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# (c) Existing minted admin's API key continues to authenticate every
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# Bundle 1 endpoint (chained-auth combinator's Bearer fallback).
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#
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# (d) Existing admin's role grants in actor_roles survive the upgrade
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# (additive migrations preserve all rows).
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#
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# (e) Bundled certctl-agent continues to authenticate against
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# agent-demo-1 (Bundle 1 demo path; pinned by demo-compose.yml).
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#
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# This guard checks the static-source invariants that protect those
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# properties since spinning up a v2.1.0 dump + upgrading is sandbox-
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# infeasible. Concretely:
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#
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# 1. Migrations 000034..000037 use `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` (not
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# `CREATE TABLE`) so re-running against a partially-migrated DB
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# doesn't error.
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#
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# 2. Migrations 000034..000037 are wrapped in `BEGIN; ... COMMIT;`
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# so a partial failure rolls back cleanly.
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#
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# 3. NO migration in the 000034..000037 range runs `DROP TABLE` or
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# `ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN` against any Bundle-1 table
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# (api_keys, audit_events, certificates, certificate_versions,
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# certificate_profiles, issuers, targets, agents, jobs, owners,
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# teams, agent_groups, notifications, roles, permissions,
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# role_permissions, actor_roles, tenants, etc.). Adding a new
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# table or extending an existing one with a NULLable column or
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# DEFAULT-valued column is fine.
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#
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# 4. INSERT INTO permissions / role_permissions in 000037 use
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# `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING` / equivalent so a Bundle-2 deploy
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# whose v2.1.0 baseline already has the rows doesn't duplicate
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# them.
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#
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# When the sandbox-feasibility constraint changes, promote this to a
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# real `pg_dump` round-trip from a v2.1.0 baseline + apply migrations
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# + assert the row counts on the protected Bundle-1 tables match
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# pre-upgrade.
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set -e
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ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)"
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cd "$ROOT"
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fail=0
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PHASE2_RANGE="000034 000035 000036 000037"
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# Bundle-1 tables that MUST NOT be DROPPED or have columns DROPPED in
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# the Bundle-2 migration range. Adding columns or new tables is fine.
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PROTECTED_TABLES=(
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api_keys audit_events certificates certificate_versions
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certificate_profiles issuers targets agents jobs owners teams
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agent_groups notifications roles permissions role_permissions
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actor_roles tenants approvals intermediate_cas
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issuance_approval_requests
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)
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for num in $PHASE2_RANGE; do
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upfile=$(ls migrations/${num}_*.up.sql 2>/dev/null | head -1)
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if [ -z "$upfile" ]; then
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echo "::warning::no migration ${num}_*.up.sql found; skipping invariants for this number"
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continue
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fi
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# Invariant 1: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS.
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if grep -E '^CREATE TABLE [^[:space:]]' "$upfile" | grep -v 'IF NOT EXISTS' >/dev/null; then
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echo "::error::$upfile uses 'CREATE TABLE' without 'IF NOT EXISTS' — re-running against a partially-migrated DB will fail"
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fail=1
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fi
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# Invariant 2: BEGIN ... COMMIT wrapping.
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if ! grep -q '^BEGIN;' "$upfile"; then
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echo "::error::$upfile is not wrapped in 'BEGIN;'"
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fail=1
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fi
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if ! grep -q '^COMMIT;' "$upfile"; then
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echo "::error::$upfile is not wrapped in 'COMMIT;'"
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fail=1
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fi
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# Invariant 3: no DROP TABLE / ALTER ... DROP COLUMN against
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# protected Bundle-1 tables.
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for tbl in "${PROTECTED_TABLES[@]}"; do
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if grep -qE "DROP TABLE[^[:space:]]*[[:space:]]+(IF EXISTS )?$tbl([[:space:]]|;|$)" "$upfile"; then
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echo "::error::$upfile contains DROP TABLE against protected Bundle-1 table: $tbl"
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fail=1
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fi
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if grep -qE "ALTER TABLE[[:space:]]+$tbl[[:space:]].*DROP COLUMN" "$upfile"; then
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echo "::error::$upfile contains ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN against protected Bundle-1 table: $tbl"
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fail=1
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fi
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done
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done
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# Invariant 4: 000037 INSERTs use ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
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upfile37=$(ls migrations/000037_*.up.sql 2>/dev/null | head -1)
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if [ -n "$upfile37" ]; then
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if grep -q 'INSERT INTO permissions' "$upfile37"; then
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if ! grep -q 'ON CONFLICT.*DO NOTHING' "$upfile37"; then
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echo "::error::$upfile37 INSERT INTO permissions missing ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING"
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fail=1
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fi
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fi
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if grep -q 'INSERT INTO role_permissions' "$upfile37"; then
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if ! grep -q 'ON CONFLICT.*DO NOTHING' "$upfile37"; then
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echo "::error::$upfile37 INSERT INTO role_permissions missing ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING"
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fail=1
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fi
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fi
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fi
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# Invariant 5: ChainAuthSessionThenBearer's Bearer fallback MUST be
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# wired in cmd/server/main.go so existing v2.1.0-minted API keys
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# continue to authenticate.
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if ! grep -q 'session.ChainAuthSessionThenBearer' cmd/server/main.go; then
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echo "::error::cmd/server/main.go does not wire the chained-auth combinator (Bundle-1 Bearer keys would stop authenticating)"
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fail=1
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fi
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if ! grep -q 'auth.NewAuthWithKeyStore(authKeyStore)' cmd/server/main.go; then
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echo "::error::cmd/server/main.go does not construct the Bundle-1 Bearer middleware"
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fail=1
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fi
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# Invariant 6: bootstrap path is preserved — v2.1.0 path still works
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# for fresh deployments without an admin.
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if ! grep -q 'bootstrapHandler' cmd/server/main.go; then
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echo "::error::cmd/server/main.go does not register the bootstrap handler — fresh-deployment bootstrap broken"
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fail=1
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fi
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if [ $fail -eq 0 ]; then
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echo "OK: Bundle-1 → Bundle-2 upgrade regression invariants hold."
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fi
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exit $fail
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