Files
certctl/cmd/cli/main_test.go
T
Shankar 3155b9475f v2.0.47: HTTPS Everywhere — TLS-only control plane, agents/CLI/MCP
Breaking change release. Plaintext HTTP listener removed. The certctl
control plane now terminates TLS 1.3 on :8443 via
http.Server.ListenAndServeTLS. No CERTCTL_TLS_ENABLED=false escape
hatch. No dual-listener mode. One-step cutover per docs/upgrade-to-tls.md.

Server
- cmd/server/tls.go: certHolder with SIGHUP hot-reload + atomic cert
  swap, buildServerTLSConfig (TLS 1.3 min, GetCertificate callback),
  preflightServerTLS validation
- cmd/server/main.go: ListenAndServeTLS in place of ListenAndServe,
  watchSIGHUP wiring, cert/key path config threading
- tls_test.go: 418-line regression coverage of reload, preflight,
  callback behavior, SAN validation

Config
- CERTCTL_TLS_CERT_PATH / CERTCTL_TLS_KEY_PATH (required)
- Plaintext rejection: agents/CLI/MCP pre-flight-fail on http://
  URLs with a pointer to docs/upgrade-to-tls.md

Agents, CLI, MCP
- All three pre-flight-reject http:// URLs with fail-loud diagnostic
- CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH for private-CA trust
- CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY for dev-only bypass
  (loud warning on startup)
- install-agent.sh emits both vars as commented template lines

docker-compose
- certctl-tls-init sidecar generates SAN-valid self-signed cert into
  deploy/test/certs/ on first boot
- All demo-stack curls pin against ca.crt with --cacert

Helm chart
- Three TLS provisioning modes, exactly one required:
  - server.tls.existingSecret (operator-supplied)
  - server.tls.certManager.enabled (cert-manager integration)
  - server.tls.selfSigned.enabled (eval only — not for production)
- server-certificate.yaml template for cert-manager mode
- helm install without a TLS source fails at template render with
  a pointer to docs/tls.md

CI
- .github/workflows/ci.yml Helm Chart Validation step renders the
  chart in both existingSecret and cert-manager modes, plus an
  inverse guard-regression test that asserts helm template MUST
  refuse to render when no TLS source is configured. Previously
  the single `helm template` invocation hit the certctl.tls.required
  fail-loud guard and exit-1'd CI. Four invocations now: lint
  (existingSecret), template (existingSecret), template
  (cert-manager), template (no args — must fail).

Integration tests
- deploy/test/integration_test.go stands up the Compose stack over
  HTTPS, extracts the CA bundle, and exercises every certctl API
  over https://localhost:8443
- All 34 integration subtests green (per Phase 8 local CI-parity)

Documentation
- New: docs/tls.md (provisioning patterns, rotation, SIGHUP reload)
- New: docs/upgrade-to-tls.md (one-step cutover, no-downgrade
  warnings, fleet-roll sequencing)
- CHANGELOG.md: v2.2.0 "HTTPS Everywhere — The Irony" entry
  (file heading unchanged; release tag is v2.0.47)
- All curls in docs/, examples/, deploy/helm/ guides use
  https://localhost:8443 --cacert

Verification
- grep -rn "ListenAndServe[^T]" cmd/ internal/ → 0 hits
- grep -rn "\"http://" cmd/ internal/ → 2 benign hits (Caddy admin
  API default, SSRF doc comment) — zero certctl endpoints
- Tasks #197–#206 (Phases 0–8) all closed in the tracker

Files: 65 changed, 3489 insertions, 372 deletions (pre-CI-fix).
2026-04-20 03:43:10 +00:00

97 lines
2.8 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// TestValidateHTTPSScheme pins the pre-flight URL-scheme guard that the
// HTTPS-Everywhere milestone (v2.2, §3.2) requires on the certctl-cli binary
// startup path. The CLI's diagnostic is distinct from the agent and MCP server
// because it surfaces the --server flag alongside CERTCTL_SERVER_URL — so the
// empty-URL case pins that flag-name substring separately. Every other case
// mirrors the dispatch arms in cmd/cli/main.go:validateHTTPSScheme; drifting
// the substrings is what this test is here to catch.
func TestValidateHTTPSScheme(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
serverURL string
wantErr bool
wantErrSub string // substring that MUST appear in the error message
}{
{
name: "https URL passes",
serverURL: "https://certctl-server:8443",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "https URL with path passes",
serverURL: "https://certctl.example.com/api/v1",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "uppercase HTTPS scheme passes (url.Parse lowercases)",
serverURL: "HTTPS://certctl-server:8443",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "empty URL rejected mentions --server flag",
serverURL: "",
wantErr: true,
wantErrSub: "--server",
},
{
name: "empty URL rejected also mentions CERTCTL_SERVER_URL",
serverURL: "",
wantErr: true,
wantErrSub: "CERTCTL_SERVER_URL",
},
{
name: "plaintext http rejected",
serverURL: "http://certctl-server:8443",
wantErr: true,
wantErrSub: "plaintext http://",
},
{
name: "bare host missing scheme rejected",
serverURL: "localhost:8443",
wantErr: true,
// url.Parse treats "localhost:8443" as scheme=localhost, opaque=8443
// — exercises the default arm (unsupported scheme) rather than the
// empty-scheme arm. Both are fail-closed, which is what we care about.
wantErrSub: "unsupported scheme",
},
{
name: "path-only URL rejected",
serverURL: "//certctl-server:8443",
wantErr: true,
wantErrSub: "missing a scheme",
},
{
name: "unsupported scheme rejected",
serverURL: "ftp://certctl-server:8443",
wantErr: true,
wantErrSub: "unsupported scheme",
},
{
name: "ws scheme rejected",
serverURL: "ws://certctl-server:8443",
wantErr: true,
wantErrSub: "unsupported scheme",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateHTTPSScheme(tt.serverURL)
if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("validateHTTPSScheme(%q) err=%v wantErr=%v", tt.serverURL, err, tt.wantErr)
}
if tt.wantErr && tt.wantErrSub != "" && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrSub) {
t.Errorf("validateHTTPSScheme(%q) err=%q must contain %q so operators see the right diagnostic",
tt.serverURL, err.Error(), tt.wantErrSub)
}
})
}
}