Files
certctl/internal/auth/rotation_test.go
T
shankar0123 99a012e3be auth-bundle-1 Phase 0: extract internal/auth/ from middleware package
Bundle 1 / Phase 0: pure refactor splitting auth surface out of internal/api/middleware so Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) and the broader RBAC primitive (roles, permissions, scoped grants) have a clean home.

Moved to internal/auth/: NamedAPIKey, HashAPIKey, AuthConfig, NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewAuth, UserKey, AdminKey, GetUser, IsAdmin. Added testfixtures.go (WithActor / WithAdmin / WithActorAdmin) so handler tests don't construct context manually.

Stayed in internal/api/middleware/: RequestID, Logging, NewLogging, Recovery, RateLimitConfig, NewRateLimiter (now imports auth.GetUser for per-user keying per audit Category C), CORSConfig, NewCORS, ContentType, CORS, GetRequestID, responseWriter, Chain, audit middleware (now imports auth.GetUser).

Updated 22 caller files across cmd/, internal/api/handler/, internal/api/middleware/, internal/mcp/. Existing m008_admin_gate_test.go now scans for auth.IsAdmin( substring; Phase 3 will further evolve to track auth.RequirePermission. Behavior unchanged: all handler / middleware / service / connector / cmd / mcp tests pass with no test-logic edits, only import-path renames.

Phase 0 exit criteria: internal/auth/ exists with 6 files; middleware.go went 575 -> 422 lines (auth-related ~150 lines moved out); grep -rE 'middleware\.(GetUser|IsAdmin|UserKey|AdminKey|NamedAPIKey|HashAPIKey|NewAuth)' returns 0 hits; context.WithValue(.*middleware.UserKey/AdminKey) returns 0 hits; go vet ./... clean; go test -short ./... green across all packages tested.

Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Per cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md, do not merge to master without (1) make verify green, (2) >= 2 external testers confirm, (3) >= 90% coverage on internal/auth/ in .github/coverage-thresholds.yml.
2026-05-09 15:51:31 +00:00

98 lines
3.3 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
// Audit L-004 (CWE-924) — auth-middleware side of the dual-key rotation
// contract. ParseNamedAPIKeys allows two entries to share a name during
// the overlap window; NewAuthWithNamedKeys must accept either bearer
// token and produce the same UserKey + Admin context value either way.
func TestL004_AuthMiddleware_BothKeysValidate(t *testing.T) {
mw := NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]NamedAPIKey{
{Name: "alice", Key: "OLDKEY", Admin: true},
{Name: "alice", Key: "NEWKEY", Admin: true},
})
makeReq := func(token string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/anything", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
return req
}
for _, tok := range []string{"OLDKEY", "NEWKEY"} {
t.Run("token="+tok, func(t *testing.T) {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if got := GetUser(r.Context()); got != "alice" {
t.Errorf("UserKey = %q, want alice (rotation must preserve identity across both keys)", got)
}
if !IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
t.Errorf("Admin flag lost — both rotation entries carry admin=true, context must reflect that")
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, makeReq(tok))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("token %s should validate during rotation overlap; got %d", tok, rec.Code)
}
})
}
}
func TestL004_AuthMiddleware_PostRotationOldKeyRejected(t *testing.T) {
// Operator has completed the rotation: old key removed from
// CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED, only new key remains. Old bearer must
// now fail.
mw := NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]NamedAPIKey{
{Name: "alice", Key: "NEWKEY", Admin: true},
})
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/anything", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer OLDKEY")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("OLDKEY post-rotation should be rejected; got %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestL004_AuthMiddleware_DualUserKeyedRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
// Bundle B's rate limiter keys on the UserKey. Both rotation
// entries must produce the SAME UserKey value so the per-user
// bucket stays consistent across the overlap window — otherwise
// a client rotating its key would get a fresh bucket and bypass
// the rate limit. Pin the invariant.
mw := NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]NamedAPIKey{
{Name: "alice", Key: "OLDKEY", Admin: false},
{Name: "alice", Key: "NEWKEY", Admin: false},
})
captured := []string{}
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
captured = append(captured, GetUser(r.Context()))
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
for _, tok := range []string{"OLDKEY", "NEWKEY"} {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
}
if len(captured) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 captured UserKey values, got %d", len(captured))
}
if captured[0] != captured[1] {
t.Errorf("UserKey diverged across rotation: OLDKEY=%q NEWKEY=%q — rate-limit bucket would split",
captured[0], captured[1])
}
}