Files
certctl/internal/config/config_test.go
T
shankar0123 2d9110b0c4 auth-bundle-2 Phase 0: dependency-add + oidc auth-type literal + runtime guard
Bundle 2 Phase 0 stages the dependencies + auth-type discriminator
literal that later phases consume. No handler chain wired yet; an
operator who sets CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=oidc on this commit gets a clear
refuse-to-start error rather than a silent fallback to api-key (the
G-1 failure mode that drove "jwt" out of the allowed set).

Deliverables:

* go.mod: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 added as a direct
  require. Per the pre-bundle dependency audit (Apache-2.0, zero CVEs
  ever per OSV.dev, 2,400+ stars, used by Hashicorp Vault + Dex +
  Hydra + Authentik + every Kubernetes OIDC integration), this is the
  ecosystem-standard Go OIDC client. Pinned to a specific minor
  (v3.18.0) per the prompt's "no bare latest" rule.
* go.mod: golang.org/x/oauth2 promoted from // indirect to direct,
  bumped from v0.34.0 to v0.36.0 by go mod tidy. Both versions are
  OSV-clean. Maintained by the Go team.
* No JSON-path library added (forbidden by the dependency audit; the
  group-claim resolver is hand-rolled in Phase 3).
* internal/config/config.go: AuthTypeOIDC constant added with a
  load-bearing comment explaining (a) this is the AUTH-TYPE literal,
  not a JWT alg literal, so the G-1 closure invariant is preserved
  ("jwt" stays out of ValidAuthTypes forever); (b) the runtime guard
  in cmd/server/main.go intentionally refuses-to-start when oidc is
  set pre-Phase-6 to avoid the silent-downgrade failure mode.
  ValidAuthTypes() now returns {api-key, none, oidc}.
* internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None
  renamed to TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None_OIDC and now pins
  the 3-entry set. TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (G-1 closure
  test) still passes because "jwt" is never added back.
  TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType's bad-types list updated:
  "oidc" removed (now valid), "saml" added (correctly rejected per
  Decision 5's SAML deferral).
* cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime auth-type guard now
  has an explicit AuthTypeOIDC case that exit(1)s with an actionable
  message: "the OIDC auth chain is not yet wired in this build (Auth
  Bundle 2 Phase 6 ships the session middleware that consumes this
  auth-type literal)." This closes the lying-field gap the literal
  would otherwise create. Phase 6 of Bundle 2 relaxes this case to
  fall through alongside api-key + none.
* api/openapi.yaml: /v1/auth/info auth_type enum extended from
  [api-key, none] to [api-key, none, oidc] with an in-line comment
  explaining the Phase-0-vs-Phase-6 timing so an OpenAPI consumer
  isn't surprised by "oidc" appearing here pre-Bundle-2-merge.
* deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.validateAuthType:
  valid set extended to include "oidc". Chart-time validation now
  passes for type=oidc; the binary's runtime guard takes over to
  refuse the start. Once Bundle 2 ships, the runtime guard relaxes
  and OIDC works end-to-end with no further chart edits.
* .env.example: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block updated to document
  the three valid values + the Phase-0-vs-Phase-6 timing.
* internal/auth/oidc/doc.go: new package directory with package doc
  + transitional blank imports for coreos/go-oidc/v3 + x/oauth2 so
  go mod tidy keeps both deps as direct requires until Phase 3's
  service.go replaces the blanks with real symbol use. Doc explains
  the package layout (oidc/ + oidc/domain/ + oidc/groupclaim/ +
  oidc/testfixtures/) so the post-Bundle-2 reader can navigate.

Verifications:
* gofmt clean on every changed file.
* go vet clean on internal/config + cmd/server + internal/auth/oidc.
* go test -short -count=1 green on internal/config (including the
  G-1 closure + new validation tests), cmd/server, internal/auth (all
  Bundle 1 packages), internal/service/auth.
* govulncheck ./... clean (M-024 hard CI gate).
* All 24 ci-guards pass locally.

Phase 0 exit criteria from cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md:
* go.mod shows coreos/go-oidc/v3 as direct: yes.
* golang.org/x/oauth2 is direct (not indirect): yes.
* govulncheck ./... clean: yes.
* No JSON-path library in go.mod / go.sum deltas: confirmed (only
  v3 of go-oidc + the x/oauth2 bump landed).
* make verify green: gofmt + vet + go test pass; full make verify
  (which would invoke golangci-lint) deferred to CI since the
  sandbox doesn't have golangci-lint installed; the operator runs
  make verify locally before pushing per CLAUDE.md operating rule.
2026-05-10 03:31:51 +00:00

1413 lines
50 KiB
Go

package config
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/pem"
"log/slog"
"math/big"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// clearCertctlEnv unsets all CERTCTL_* environment variables to ensure test isolation.
func clearCertctlEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
for _, env := range os.Environ() {
for i := 0; i < len(env); i++ {
if env[i] == '=' {
key := env[:i]
if len(key) > 7 && key[:8] == "CERTCTL_" {
t.Setenv(key, "")
os.Unsetenv(key)
}
break
}
}
}
}
// setMinimalValidEnv sets the minimum env vars needed for Load() to succeed (Validate passes).
//
// HTTPS-everywhere milestone (§2.1 + §3 locked decisions): the control plane
// is TLS-only and Validate() refuses to pass without a readable cert/key pair
// on disk. setMinimalValidEnv therefore materializes a throwaway ECDSA P-256
// self-signed pair in t.TempDir() and points the two TLS env vars at it so
// every Load-based test inherits a valid HTTPS posture without each caller
// having to spell out cert generation. The temp dir is cleaned up by
// testing.T at end-of-test.
func setMinimalValidEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
// api-key auth requires a secret
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret-key")
// HTTPS-only control plane requires a real cert/key pair on disk.
certPath, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", certPath)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", keyPath)
}
// generateTestTLSPair writes an ECDSA P-256 self-signed certificate + private
// key pair to files inside t.TempDir() and returns the paths. Same shape used
// by cmd/server/tls_test.go — this duplicates the generator rather than
// importing it so the config package tests stay independent of cmd/server.
func generateTestTLSPair(t *testing.T) (certPath, keyPath string) {
t.Helper()
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "certctl-config-test"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("x509.CreateCertificate: %v", err)
}
dir := t.TempDir()
certPath = filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
keyPath = filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")
certPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, certPEM, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write cert: %v", err)
}
keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("x509.MarshalECPrivateKey: %v", err)
}
keyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, keyPEM, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write key: %v", err)
}
return certPath, keyPath
}
// validServerConfig returns a ServerConfig with Port=8080 plus a freshly
// minted TLS cert/key pair on disk, so Validate() passes the HTTPS-only
// preflight (cert empty → stat → tls.LoadX509KeyPair round-trip). Every
// struct-based Validate test uses this so they fail for the reason they
// claim to test, not for a missing TLS pair.
func validServerConfig(t *testing.T) ServerConfig {
t.Helper()
certPath, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
return ServerConfig{
Port: 8080,
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: certPath, KeyPath: keyPath},
}
}
func TestLoad_DefaultValues(t *testing.T) {
clearCertctlEnv(t)
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() returned error: %v", err)
}
// Server defaults
if cfg.Server.Host != "127.0.0.1" {
t.Errorf("Server.Host = %q, want %q", cfg.Server.Host, "127.0.0.1")
}
if cfg.Server.Port != 8080 {
t.Errorf("Server.Port = %d, want %d", cfg.Server.Port, 8080)
}
if cfg.Server.MaxBodySize != 1024*1024 {
t.Errorf("Server.MaxBodySize = %d, want %d", cfg.Server.MaxBodySize, 1024*1024)
}
// Auth defaults
if cfg.Auth.Type != "api-key" {
t.Errorf("Auth.Type = %q, want %q", cfg.Auth.Type, "api-key")
}
// Keygen defaults
if cfg.Keygen.Mode != "agent" {
t.Errorf("Keygen.Mode = %q, want %q", cfg.Keygen.Mode, "agent")
}
// RateLimit defaults
if cfg.RateLimit.Enabled != true {
t.Errorf("RateLimit.Enabled = %v, want true", cfg.RateLimit.Enabled)
}
if cfg.RateLimit.RPS != 50 {
t.Errorf("RateLimit.RPS = %f, want 50", cfg.RateLimit.RPS)
}
if cfg.RateLimit.BurstSize != 100 {
t.Errorf("RateLimit.BurstSize = %d, want 100", cfg.RateLimit.BurstSize)
}
// Log defaults
if cfg.Log.Level != "info" {
t.Errorf("Log.Level = %q, want %q", cfg.Log.Level, "info")
}
if cfg.Log.Format != "json" {
t.Errorf("Log.Format = %q, want %q", cfg.Log.Format, "json")
}
// Scheduler defaults
if cfg.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval != 1*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval = %v, want 1h", cfg.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval = %v, want 30s", cfg.Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval)
}
// ACME defaults
if cfg.ACME.ChallengeType != "http-01" {
t.Errorf("ACME.ChallengeType = %q, want %q", cfg.ACME.ChallengeType, "http-01")
}
// Vault defaults
if cfg.Vault.Mount != "pki" {
t.Errorf("Vault.Mount = %q, want %q", cfg.Vault.Mount, "pki")
}
if cfg.Vault.TTL != "8760h" {
t.Errorf("Vault.TTL = %q, want %q", cfg.Vault.TTL, "8760h")
}
// EST defaults
if cfg.EST.Enabled != false {
t.Errorf("EST.Enabled = %v, want false", cfg.EST.Enabled)
}
if cfg.EST.IssuerID != "iss-local" {
t.Errorf("EST.IssuerID = %q, want %q", cfg.EST.IssuerID, "iss-local")
}
// Verification defaults
if cfg.Verification.Enabled != true {
t.Errorf("Verification.Enabled = %v, want true", cfg.Verification.Enabled)
}
// Digest defaults
if cfg.Digest.Enabled != false {
t.Errorf("Digest.Enabled = %v, want false", cfg.Digest.Enabled)
}
if cfg.Digest.Interval != 24*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("Digest.Interval = %v, want 24h", cfg.Digest.Interval)
}
// Database defaults
if cfg.Database.URL != "postgres://localhost/certctl" {
t.Errorf("Database.URL = %q, want default", cfg.Database.URL)
}
if cfg.Database.MaxConnections != 25 {
t.Errorf("Database.MaxConnections = %d, want 25", cfg.Database.MaxConnections)
}
}
func TestLoad_AllEnvVarsSet(t *testing.T) {
clearCertctlEnv(t)
// HTTPS-only control plane: Load() → Validate() refuses an empty cert path.
// Materialize a throwaway ECDSA P-256 pair and point the two TLS env vars
// at it before setting every other CERTCTL_* var this test cares about.
certPath, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", certPath)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", keyPath)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST", "0.0.0.0")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT", "9090")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE", "2097152")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "api-key")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "my-secret")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED", "false")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_RPS", "100")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BURST", "200")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://a.com,https://b.com")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE", "server")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL", "debug")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_LOG_FORMAT", "text")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL", "postgres://user:pass@db:5432/certctl")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DATABASE_MAX_CONNS", "50")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_RENEWAL_CHECK_INTERVAL", "2h")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_JOB_PROCESSOR_INTERVAL", "1m")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_AGENT_HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL", "5m")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_NOTIFICATION_PROCESS_INTERVAL", "2m")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_ADDR", "https://vault:8200")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_TOKEN", "hvs.test")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_MOUNT", "pki-int")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_ROLE", "web")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_VAULT_TTL", "720h")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_ACME_CHALLENGE_TYPE", "dns-01")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_ACME_ARI_ENABLED", "true")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED", "true")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID", "iss-acme")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DIGEST_ENABLED", "true")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DIGEST_INTERVAL", "12h")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DIGEST_RECIPIENTS", "alice@co.com,bob@co.com")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SMTP_HOST", "smtp.example.com")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SMTP_PORT", "465")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SMTP_FROM_ADDRESS", "noreply@co.com")
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() returned error: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Server.Host != "0.0.0.0" {
t.Errorf("Server.Host = %q, want %q", cfg.Server.Host, "0.0.0.0")
}
if cfg.Server.Port != 9090 {
t.Errorf("Server.Port = %d, want 9090", cfg.Server.Port)
}
if cfg.Server.MaxBodySize != 2097152 {
t.Errorf("Server.MaxBodySize = %d, want 2097152", cfg.Server.MaxBodySize)
}
if cfg.RateLimit.Enabled != false {
t.Errorf("RateLimit.Enabled = %v, want false", cfg.RateLimit.Enabled)
}
if cfg.RateLimit.RPS != 100 {
t.Errorf("RateLimit.RPS = %f, want 100", cfg.RateLimit.RPS)
}
if cfg.RateLimit.BurstSize != 200 {
t.Errorf("RateLimit.BurstSize = %d, want 200", cfg.RateLimit.BurstSize)
}
if len(cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins) != 2 {
t.Errorf("CORS.AllowedOrigins has %d items, want 2", len(cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins))
} else {
if cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[0] != "https://a.com" {
t.Errorf("CORS.AllowedOrigins[0] = %q, want %q", cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[0], "https://a.com")
}
if cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[1] != "https://b.com" {
t.Errorf("CORS.AllowedOrigins[1] = %q, want %q", cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[1], "https://b.com")
}
}
if cfg.Keygen.Mode != "server" {
t.Errorf("Keygen.Mode = %q, want %q", cfg.Keygen.Mode, "server")
}
if cfg.Log.Level != "debug" {
t.Errorf("Log.Level = %q, want %q", cfg.Log.Level, "debug")
}
if cfg.Log.Format != "text" {
t.Errorf("Log.Format = %q, want %q", cfg.Log.Format, "text")
}
if cfg.Database.MaxConnections != 50 {
t.Errorf("Database.MaxConnections = %d, want 50", cfg.Database.MaxConnections)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval != 2*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval = %v, want 2h", cfg.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval != 1*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval = %v, want 1m", cfg.Scheduler.JobProcessorInterval)
}
if cfg.Vault.Addr != "https://vault:8200" {
t.Errorf("Vault.Addr = %q, want %q", cfg.Vault.Addr, "https://vault:8200")
}
if cfg.Vault.Mount != "pki-int" {
t.Errorf("Vault.Mount = %q, want %q", cfg.Vault.Mount, "pki-int")
}
if cfg.ACME.ChallengeType != "dns-01" {
t.Errorf("ACME.ChallengeType = %q, want %q", cfg.ACME.ChallengeType, "dns-01")
}
if cfg.ACME.ARIEnabled != true {
t.Errorf("ACME.ARIEnabled = %v, want true", cfg.ACME.ARIEnabled)
}
if cfg.EST.Enabled != true {
t.Errorf("EST.Enabled = %v, want true", cfg.EST.Enabled)
}
if cfg.EST.IssuerID != "iss-acme" {
t.Errorf("EST.IssuerID = %q, want %q", cfg.EST.IssuerID, "iss-acme")
}
if cfg.Digest.Enabled != true {
t.Errorf("Digest.Enabled = %v, want true", cfg.Digest.Enabled)
}
if cfg.Digest.Interval != 12*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("Digest.Interval = %v, want 12h", cfg.Digest.Interval)
}
if len(cfg.Digest.Recipients) != 2 {
t.Errorf("Digest.Recipients has %d items, want 2", len(cfg.Digest.Recipients))
}
if cfg.Notifiers.SMTPHost != "smtp.example.com" {
t.Errorf("Notifiers.SMTPHost = %q, want %q", cfg.Notifiers.SMTPHost, "smtp.example.com")
}
if cfg.Notifiers.SMTPPort != 465 {
t.Errorf("Notifiers.SMTPPort = %d, want 465", cfg.Notifiers.SMTPPort)
}
}
func TestLoad_InvalidIntEnvVar(t *testing.T) {
clearCertctlEnv(t)
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT", "notanint")
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() should fall back to default, got error: %v", err)
}
// Falls back to default
if cfg.Server.Port != 8080 {
t.Errorf("Server.Port = %d, want 8080 (default fallback)", cfg.Server.Port)
}
}
func TestLoad_InvalidDurationEnvVar(t *testing.T) {
clearCertctlEnv(t)
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DIGEST_INTERVAL", "notaduration")
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() should fall back to default, got error: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Digest.Interval != 24*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("Digest.Interval = %v, want 24h (default fallback)", cfg.Digest.Interval)
}
}
func TestLoad_InvalidBoolEnvVar(t *testing.T) {
clearCertctlEnv(t)
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED", "notabool")
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() should fall back to default, got error: %v", err)
}
// getEnvBool only matches "true", "1", "yes" — anything else is false
if cfg.RateLimit.Enabled != false {
t.Errorf("RateLimit.Enabled = %v, want false for invalid bool", cfg.RateLimit.Enabled)
}
}
func TestLoad_CommaSeparatedList(t *testing.T) {
clearCertctlEnv(t)
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS", "https://a.com, https://b.com , https://c.com")
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() returned error: %v", err)
}
if len(cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("CORS.AllowedOrigins has %d items, want 3", len(cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins))
}
// trimSpace should handle spaces around items
if cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[1] != "https://b.com" {
t.Errorf("CORS.AllowedOrigins[1] = %q, want %q (trimmed)", cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins[1], "https://b.com")
}
}
func TestValidate_ValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() returned error for valid config: %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidate_AuthTypeNone(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "none", Secret: ""},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() returned error for auth type 'none': %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidate_InvalidAuthType(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "oauth", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Error("Validate() should return error for unsupported auth type 'oauth'")
}
}
func TestValidate_APIKeyAuth_MissingSecret(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: ""},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Error("Validate() should return error when api-key auth has empty secret")
}
}
// TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated locks down the G-1 fix: pre-G-1
// `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt` was accepted by the validator (the bare error
// path was the empty-secret one previously). Post-G-1 the literal "jwt"
// value is rejected with a dedicated diagnostic regardless of whether
// Secret is set, because there is no JWT middleware in the binary —
// operators who need JWT/OIDC must front certctl with an authenticating
// gateway.
//
// Two table rows pin the contract: missing-secret cannot paper over the
// rejection (the dedicated error fires first, before the secret check),
// and a populated secret also cannot paper over it. Both paths must
// hit the dedicated G-1 diagnostic, not the generic "invalid auth
// type" or "auth secret is required".
func TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cases := []struct {
name string
secret string
}{
{"jwt rejected (no secret)", ""},
{"jwt rejected (with secret — operator can't paper over)", "anything"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "jwt", Secret: tc.secret},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; expected dedicated G-1 rejection")
}
const wantSubstr = "CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt is no longer accepted"
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), wantSubstr) {
t.Errorf("Validate() = %v\nwant substring %q (the dedicated G-1 diagnostic)", err, wantSubstr)
}
})
}
}
// TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT is a property-level guard against
// a future PR silently re-introducing "jwt" into the allowed set. If
// someone adds JWT back to ValidAuthTypes(), this test fails immediately
// with a pointer at the audit finding. The matching CI grep guardrail
// in .github/workflows/ci.yml provides a secondary check at build time.
func TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, at := range ValidAuthTypes() {
if at == "jwt" {
t.Fatalf("jwt is in ValidAuthTypes — silent auth downgrade regressed (G-1)")
}
}
}
// TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None_OIDC pins the current allowed
// set. If a future change adds a new auth type, this test must be
// updated alongside the validator and the helm-chart `validateAuthType`
// helper — keeping all three surfaces in sync.
//
// Bundle 2 Phase 0: extended from {api-key, none} to {api-key, none,
// oidc}. The G-1 closure test (TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT)
// stays passing because "jwt" is never added back. ID tokens are JWTs
// internally but the auth-type literal is "oidc", so the silent
// auth-downgrade that drove G-1 cannot regress through this addition.
func TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None_OIDC(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := ValidAuthTypes()
if len(got) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("ValidAuthTypes() returned %d entries, want 3: %v", len(got), got)
}
want := map[AuthType]bool{AuthTypeAPIKey: true, AuthTypeNone: true, AuthTypeOIDC: true}
for _, at := range got {
if !want[at] {
t.Errorf("unexpected auth type in ValidAuthTypes: %q", at)
}
}
}
// TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType ensures that values outside the
// allowed set (other than the special-cased "jwt") still surface the
// generic "invalid auth type" error. Pins that the dedicated G-1
// rejection didn't accidentally swallow non-jwt typos.
func TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, badType := range []string{"", "garbage", "saml", "mtls", "API-KEY"} {
t.Run("type="+badType, func(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: badType, Secret: "x"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("Validate(type=%q) returned nil; expected invalid-auth-type rejection", badType)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid auth type") {
t.Errorf("Validate(type=%q) = %v; want \"invalid auth type\" error", badType, err)
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "G-1 silent auth") {
t.Errorf("Validate(type=%q) = %v; should not hit the dedicated G-1 path for non-jwt values", badType, err)
}
})
}
}
// G-1 (P1): no need to add `TestValidate_NoneAuth_AcceptsEmptySecret` or
// `TestValidate_APIKeyAuth_RequiresSecret` here — the pre-existing tests
// `TestValidate_AuthTypeNone` (above) and `TestValidate_APIKeyAuth_MissingSecret`
// (above) already cover those paths. Documented for the next reader: the
// G-1 fix flipped jwt off but did not disturb either the
// none-bypasses-secret or the api-key-requires-secret behavior.
func TestValidate_InvalidKeygenMode(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "hybrid"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Error("Validate() should return error for unsupported keygen mode 'hybrid'")
}
}
func TestValidate_InvalidPort(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
port int
}{
{"zero", 0},
{"negative", -1},
{"too high", 65536},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: ServerConfig{Port: tt.port},
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() should return error for port %d", tt.port)
}
})
}
}
// TestValidate_TLSCertPathEmpty pins the first of the HTTPS-only fail-loud
// gates in Validate(): an empty CertPath must produce the operator-facing
// "server TLS cert path is required" error. Per §2.1 + §3 locked decisions,
// there is no plaintext HTTP fallback — missing TLS config is a hard startup
// refusal, not a warning.
func TestValidate_TLSCertPathEmpty(t *testing.T) {
_, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
cfg := &Config{
Server: ServerConfig{
Port: 8080,
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: "", KeyPath: keyPath},
},
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for empty TLS cert path")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS cert path is required") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS cert path is required")
}
}
// TestValidate_TLSKeyPathEmpty pins the second HTTPS-only gate: empty KeyPath
// must produce the "server TLS key path is required" error. Runs with a valid
// CertPath so the cert-empty gate (which fires first) is cleanly bypassed —
// proves the key-empty gate is actually reached.
func TestValidate_TLSKeyPathEmpty(t *testing.T) {
certPath, _ := generateTestTLSPair(t)
cfg := &Config{
Server: ServerConfig{
Port: 8080,
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: certPath, KeyPath: ""},
},
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for empty TLS key path")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS key path is required") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS key path is required")
}
}
// TestValidate_TLSCertFileMissing pins the os.Stat gate on the cert path. A
// non-existent path must surface "server TLS cert file unreadable" so the
// operator sees the bad path in the error (file=%q) instead of a deferred
// ListenAndServeTLS panic after the scheduler has already fanned out.
func TestValidate_TLSCertFileMissing(t *testing.T) {
_, keyPath := generateTestTLSPair(t)
missingCert := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "does-not-exist.pem")
cfg := &Config{
Server: ServerConfig{
Port: 8080,
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: missingCert, KeyPath: keyPath},
},
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for missing TLS cert file")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS cert file unreadable") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS cert file unreadable")
}
}
// TestValidate_TLSKeyFileMissing pins the os.Stat gate on the key path. Uses a
// valid CertPath so the cert-missing gate does not pre-empt; proves the key
// gate is reached and reports the bad key path.
func TestValidate_TLSKeyFileMissing(t *testing.T) {
certPath, _ := generateTestTLSPair(t)
missingKey := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "does-not-exist.key")
cfg := &Config{
Server: ServerConfig{
Port: 8080,
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: certPath, KeyPath: missingKey},
},
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for missing TLS key file")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS key file unreadable") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS key file unreadable")
}
}
// TestValidate_TLSMismatchedPair pins the tls.LoadX509KeyPair gate — the
// classic "you shipped the wrong private key" footgun. Generates two
// independent ECDSA pairs and crosses them (pair1 cert + pair2 key). Both
// files exist and parse as PEM, so os.Stat passes; only the cryptographic
// round-trip inside LoadX509KeyPair catches the mismatch.
func TestValidate_TLSMismatchedPair(t *testing.T) {
certPath1, _ := generateTestTLSPair(t)
_, keyPath2 := generateTestTLSPair(t)
cfg := &Config{
Server: ServerConfig{
Port: 8080,
TLS: ServerTLSConfig{CertPath: certPath1, KeyPath: keyPath2},
},
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() should return error for mismatched TLS cert/key pair")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "server TLS cert/key pair invalid") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), "server TLS cert/key pair invalid")
}
}
func TestValidate_EmptyDatabaseURL(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Error("Validate() should return error for empty database URL")
}
}
func TestValidate_InvalidLogLevel(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "verbose", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Error("Validate() should return error for invalid log level 'verbose'")
}
}
func TestValidate_InvalidLogFormat(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "yaml"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Error("Validate() should return error for invalid log format 'yaml'")
}
}
func TestValidate_SchedulerIntervalTooSmall(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
cfg SchedulerConfig
}{
{
"renewal interval below 1 minute",
SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 30 * time.Second,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
},
},
{
"job processor below 1 second",
SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 500 * time.Millisecond,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
},
},
{
"agent health below 1 second",
SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 500 * time.Millisecond,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
},
},
{
"notification below 1 second",
SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 500 * time.Millisecond,
},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: tt.cfg,
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() should return error for %s", tt.name)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidate_DatabaseMaxConnectionsZero(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 0},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "key"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err == nil {
t.Error("Validate() should return error for max_connections=0")
}
}
func TestGetLogLevel_AllLevels(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
level string
expected slog.Level
}{
{"debug", slog.LevelDebug},
{"info", slog.LevelInfo},
{"warn", slog.LevelWarn},
{"error", slog.LevelError},
{"unknown", slog.LevelInfo}, // default fallback
{"", slog.LevelInfo}, // empty string
{"DEBUG", slog.LevelInfo}, // case-sensitive, no match → default
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.level, func(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{Log: LogConfig{Level: tt.level}}
got := cfg.GetLogLevel()
if got != tt.expected {
t.Errorf("GetLogLevel() for %q = %v, want %v", tt.level, got, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}
// Test helper functions
func TestSplitComma(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
input string
expected []string
}{
{"a,b,c", []string{"a", "b", "c"}},
{"single", []string{"single"}},
{"", []string{""}},
{",", []string{"", ""}},
{"a,,c", []string{"a", "", "c"}},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.input, func(t *testing.T) {
got := splitComma(tt.input)
if len(got) != len(tt.expected) {
t.Fatalf("splitComma(%q) returned %d items, want %d", tt.input, len(got), len(tt.expected))
}
for i, v := range got {
if v != tt.expected[i] {
t.Errorf("splitComma(%q)[%d] = %q, want %q", tt.input, i, v, tt.expected[i])
}
}
})
}
}
func TestTrimSpace(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
input string
expected string
}{
{" hello ", "hello"},
{"hello", "hello"},
{"\thello\t", "hello"},
{" ", ""},
{"", ""},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.input, func(t *testing.T) {
got := trimSpace(tt.input)
if got != tt.expected {
t.Errorf("trimSpace(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.input, got, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}
func TestGetEnvFloat(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("TEST_FLOAT", "3.14")
got := getEnvFloat("TEST_FLOAT", 0)
if got != 3.14 {
t.Errorf("getEnvFloat = %f, want 3.14", got)
}
// Invalid float falls back to default
t.Setenv("TEST_FLOAT_BAD", "notafloat")
got = getEnvFloat("TEST_FLOAT_BAD", 99.9)
if got != 99.9 {
t.Errorf("getEnvFloat for invalid = %f, want 99.9", got)
}
}
func TestGetEnvBool(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
value string
expected bool
}{
{"true", true},
{"1", true},
{"yes", true},
{"false", false},
{"0", false},
{"no", false},
{"anything", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("TEST_BOOL", tt.value)
got := getEnvBool("TEST_BOOL", false)
if got != tt.expected {
t.Errorf("getEnvBool(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.value, got, tt.expected)
}
})
}
}
// I-003: Job timeout reaper configuration tests
func TestConfig_Scheduler_JobTimeoutDefaults(t *testing.T) {
clearCertctlEnv(t)
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
// Explicitly unset the three I-003 env vars to exercise the default path.
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL", "")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_CSR_TIMEOUT", "")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT", "")
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() error: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval != 10*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("JobTimeoutInterval = %v, want 10m", cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout != 24*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("AwaitingCSRTimeout = %v, want 24h", cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout != 168*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("AwaitingApprovalTimeout = %v, want 168h", cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout)
}
}
func TestConfig_Scheduler_JobTimeoutEnvOverride(t *testing.T) {
clearCertctlEnv(t)
setMinimalValidEnv(t)
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL", "15m")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_CSR_TIMEOUT", "48h")
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT", "336h")
cfg, err := Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Load() error: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval != 15*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("JobTimeoutInterval = %v, want 15m", cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout != 48*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("AwaitingCSRTimeout = %v, want 48h", cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout)
}
if cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout != 336*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("AwaitingApprovalTimeout = %v, want 336h", cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout)
}
}
func TestConfig_Scheduler_JobTimeoutValidation(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
field string
value time.Duration
wantErrMsg string
}{
{
"JobTimeoutInterval too small",
"JobTimeoutInterval",
500 * time.Millisecond,
"job timeout interval must be at least 1 second",
},
{
"AwaitingCSRTimeout too small",
"AwaitingCSRTimeout",
500 * time.Millisecond,
"awaiting CSR timeout must be at least 1 second",
},
{
"AwaitingApprovalTimeout too small",
"AwaitingApprovalTimeout",
500 * time.Millisecond,
"awaiting approval timeout must be at least 1 second",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Start from a fully valid config so the I-003 timeout checks
// are the only potential failure point.
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
JobProcessorInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
},
}
// Override the specific field under test
switch tt.field {
case "JobTimeoutInterval":
cfg.Scheduler.JobTimeoutInterval = tt.value
case "AwaitingCSRTimeout":
cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingCSRTimeout = tt.value
case "AwaitingApprovalTimeout":
cfg.Scheduler.AwaitingApprovalTimeout = tt.value
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("Validate() = nil, want error containing %q", tt.wantErrMsg)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrMsg) {
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want to contain %q", err.Error(), tt.wantErrMsg)
}
})
}
}
// H-1 closure (cat-r-encryption_key_no_length_validation): validate
// CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY length. Pre-H-1 the field was accepted
// with any non-empty value (including a single character); post-H-1 a
// minimum 32-byte length is enforced. Empty stays accepted because the
// downstream fail-closed sentinel crypto.ErrEncryptionKeyRequired
// handles the missing-key case for the encrypt/decrypt paths.
func validBaseConfigForEncryption(t *testing.T) *Config {
t.Helper()
return &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
},
}
}
func TestValidate_EncryptionKey_EmptyAccepted(t *testing.T) {
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey = ""
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() returned error for empty key: %v (empty must be accepted; fail-closed sentinel handles it downstream)", err)
}
}
func TestValidate_EncryptionKey_TooShortRejected(t *testing.T) {
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey = "x" // 1 byte
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for 1-byte key")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "too short") {
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want to contain %q", err.Error(), "too short")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "openssl rand -base64 32") {
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, must include the canonical generation command", err.Error())
}
}
func TestValidate_EncryptionKey_BoundaryRejected(t *testing.T) {
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey = "12345678901234567890123456789012"[:31] // 31 bytes — one short
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for 31-byte key (boundary -1)")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "too short") {
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want 'too short'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestValidate_EncryptionKey_MinLengthAccepted(t *testing.T) {
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey = "12345678901234567890123456789012" // exactly 32 bytes
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() returned error for 32-byte key: %v", err)
}
}
func TestValidate_EncryptionKey_LongAccepted(t *testing.T) {
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
// Realistic operator key from `openssl rand -base64 32` — 44 characters.
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() returned error for 44-byte key: %v", err)
}
}
// SCEP RFC 8894 Phase 1: Validate() must refuse to start when SCEP is enabled
// without an RA cert + key pair, mirroring the existing CHALLENGE_PASSWORD
// gate. Defense-in-depth with cmd/server/main.go::preflightSCEPRACertKey
// which additionally validates file mode + cert/key match + expiry + alg.
func TestValidate_SCEPEnabled_MissingRAPair_Refuses(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
raCertPath string
raKeyPath string
}{
{"both_empty", "", ""},
{"cert_only", "/etc/certctl/scep/ra.crt", ""},
{"key_only", "", "/etc/certctl/scep/ra.key"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
},
SCEP: SCEPConfig{
Enabled: true,
ChallengePassword: "shared-secret-not-empty",
RACertPath: tc.raCertPath,
RAKeyPath: tc.raKeyPath,
},
}
err := cfg.Validate()
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("Validate() = nil, want error for SCEP enabled with missing RA pair")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "RA cert/key path missing") {
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want 'RA cert/key path missing'", err.Error())
}
})
}
}
// SCEP enabled with a complete RA pair (and a non-empty challenge password)
// should pass Validate — the file-existence + mode + match checks live in
// preflightSCEPRACertKey, not in Validate. This pins the boundary so a
// future "validate the file too" refactor doesn't accidentally double up.
func TestValidate_SCEPEnabled_CompleteRAPair_Accepts(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
},
SCEP: SCEPConfig{
Enabled: true,
ChallengePassword: "shared-secret-not-empty",
RACertPath: "/etc/certctl/scep/ra.crt",
RAKeyPath: "/etc/certctl/scep/ra.key",
},
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() = %v, want nil for complete RA pair (file-existence checked in preflightSCEPRACertKey)", err)
}
}
// SCEP disabled with empty RA pair fields must NOT trip the gate — the
// fields only matter when SCEP is enabled. Mirrors the CHALLENGE_PASSWORD
// disabled-passes precedent in TestValidate_ValidConfig.
func TestValidate_SCEPDisabled_EmptyRAPair_Accepts(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &Config{
Server: validServerConfig(t),
Database: DatabaseConfig{URL: "postgres://localhost/certctl", MaxConnections: 25},
Log: LogConfig{Level: "info", Format: "json"},
Auth: AuthConfig{Type: "api-key", Secret: "test-secret"},
Keygen: KeygenConfig{Mode: "agent"},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: 1 * time.Hour,
JobProcessorInterval: 30 * time.Second,
AgentHealthCheckInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
NotificationProcessInterval: 1 * time.Minute,
NotificationRetryInterval: 2 * time.Minute,
RetryInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
JobTimeoutInterval: 10 * time.Minute,
AwaitingCSRTimeout: 24 * time.Hour,
AwaitingApprovalTimeout: 168 * time.Hour,
},
SCEP: SCEPConfig{Enabled: false}, // RACertPath / RAKeyPath stay empty
}
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Validate() = %v, want nil for SCEP disabled with empty RA pair", err)
}
}