Files
certctl/internal/auth/oidc/integration_okta_smoke_test.go
T
shankar0123 2a1a0b347c harden(oidc): pre-login UA/IP binding (MED-16) — RFC 9700 §4.7.1
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 closure.

WHAT.

Binds the OIDC pre-login row to the (clientIP, userAgent) tuple of
the /auth/oidc/login request, and enforces a constant-time compare
against the /auth/oidc/callback request at consume time. Defeats
replay of a stolen pre-login cookie by a different browser /
source — the secondary defense layer recommended by RFC 9700 §4.7.1
when the primary layer (HMAC integrity + Path=/ + SameSite=Lax on
the cookie) is bypassed via CSRF / XSS / TLS-termination leak.

WHY.

Pre-fix, the pre-login cookie's HMAC verified only that 'some'
caller of /auth/oidc/login was talking to /auth/oidc/callback; it
did not verify that the SAME browser / source was on both sides.
An attacker who exfiltrated the cookie value via any vector could
replay the bytes through their own user-agent and ride the victim's
authorization. RFC 9700 §4.7.1 calls out the gap explicitly and
recommends binding state to a user-agent fingerprint + source IP.

HOW.

Migration:
  migrations/000044_prelogin_uaip.up.sql
    ALTER TABLE oidc_pre_login_sessions
      ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS client_ip   TEXT,
      ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS user_agent  TEXT;
  Both nullable for in-flight rolling-deploy compat — the consume-
  side check only enforces when both row AND request carry non-empty
  values for the leg in question.

Domain:
  internal/repository/oidc.go (PreLoginSession) — adds ClientIP +
    UserAgent fields.

Repository:
  internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go — Create persists
    via sql.NullString (empty → NULL); LookupAndConsume reads back.
    Re-uses package-local nullableString from discovery.go.

Service:
  internal/auth/oidc/service.go
    - PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin signature takes (clientIP,
      userAgent) as positions 5–6.
    - PreLoginStore.LookupAndConsume returns (clientIP, userAgent)
      as positions 5–6.
    - HandleAuthRequest signature gains (clientIP, userAgent),
      threaded to the store.
    - HandleCallback adds Step 1.5 — UA / IP constant-time compare
      between stored row and incoming request. Per-leg toggles via
      preLoginRequireUA / preLoginRequireIP service fields. Empty
      values on either side pass through (rolling-deploy + headless-
      proxy compat).
    - New sentinels ErrPreLoginUAMismatch, ErrPreLoginIPMismatch.
    - SetPreLoginBindingRequirements(requireUA, requireIP) helper
      for main.go config wiring.

Adapter:
  internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go — PreLoginAdapter passes the new
    fields through to the repo row.

Handler:
  internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
    - OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleAuthRequest signature updated.
    - LoginInitiate captures clientIPFromRequest + r.UserAgent()
      and passes to the service.
    - classifyOIDCFailure adds errors.Is dispatch for the two new
      sentinels → prelogin_ua_mismatch / prelogin_ip_mismatch
      audit categories.

Config:
  internal/config/config.go
    + AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireUA (default true)
      env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA
    + AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireIP (default true)
      env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP
  cmd/server/main.go calls oidcService.SetPreLoginBindingRequirements
    from cfg.Auth.OIDCPreLoginRequire{UA,IP}.

Tests (internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go):
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_UAMismatchRejected
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_IPMismatchRejected
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_BothMatch_Succeeds
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues  (rolling-
    deploy compat — empty stored values pass through)
  - TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch
    (operator escape-hatch — UA mismatch silently allowed)

Mechanical fan-out:
  - stubPreLogin / stubPreLoginRepo signatures updated.
  - All existing call sites in service_test.go (~40), prelogin_test.go,
    bench_test.go, logging_test.go, provider_enabled_test.go,
    integration_keycloak_test.go, integration_okta_smoke_test.go,
    auth_session_oidc_test.go updated to pass empty strings for the
    new params — pre-existing tests do not exercise UA/IP binding
    semantics.

VERIFY.

- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
  ./internal/config/...                                       PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run MED16 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (5/5)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/...            PASS (4.6s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/...          PASS (4.3s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/...               PASS

Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-16
      cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 6
      RFC 9700 §4.7.1 — OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
2026-05-10 23:18:23 +00:00

132 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

//go:build integration && okta_smoke
package oidc_test
import (
"context"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/oidc"
oidcdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/oidc/domain"
)
// =============================================================================
// Bundle 2 Phase 10 — optional Okta smoke test.
//
// Gated behind TWO build tags (`integration` AND `okta_smoke`) so it
// NEVER runs in normal CI — Keycloak is the load-bearing free-tier
// fixture; Okta is a paid dev-tenant smoke test the operator runs by
// hand against the operator's own Okta org. Documented for manual
// verification.
//
// Run via:
//
// export OKTA_ISSUER=https://dev-12345.okta.com/oauth2/default
// export OKTA_CLIENT_ID=0oa…
// export OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET=…
// export OKTA_USERNAME=tester@example.com
// export OKTA_PASSWORD=…
// go test -tags 'integration okta_smoke' -count=1 -timeout 2m \
// ./internal/auth/oidc/...
//
// Pre-reqs in the operator's Okta org:
//
// - One Web Application (OAuth/OIDC) with sign-in redirect URI set to
// http://localhost:8443/auth/oidc/callback (or whatever the test
// operator binds; matches OIDCProvider.RedirectURI).
// - One App Group named `certctl-engineers`, assigned to the user
// above + assigned to the application.
// - The default "groups" claim emitted as a `string-array` (Okta's
// default).
// - "Resource Owner Password" grant ENABLED (Sign-On tab → Grant
// types) — the smoke test uses ROPC to skip the browser login.
// This is for SMOKE TESTING ONLY; production certctl uses the
// auth-code-with-PKCE flow.
//
// What this test exercises:
//
// - Discovery doc fetched against the live Okta tenant.
// - JWKS cached.
// - RefreshKeys returns no error (re-runs the IdP-downgrade-attack
// defense against Okta's advertised signing algs).
//
// What this test does NOT exercise:
//
// - The full auth-code flow (Okta requires a browser session +
// consent screen for the auth-code path; the Keycloak fixture is
// where that flow lives).
// - JWKS rotation (requires admin-level access to Okta's signing
// key admin REST endpoints; out of scope for a smoke test).
//
// If any required env var is missing, the test t.Skip's with a clear
// message so the operator knows what to set.
// =============================================================================
func TestOktaSmoke_DiscoveryAndRefreshKeys(t *testing.T) {
issuer := strings.TrimRight(os.Getenv("OKTA_ISSUER"), "/")
clientID := os.Getenv("OKTA_CLIENT_ID")
clientSecret := os.Getenv("OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET")
missing := []string{}
if issuer == "" {
missing = append(missing, "OKTA_ISSUER")
}
if clientID == "" {
missing = append(missing, "OKTA_CLIENT_ID")
}
if clientSecret == "" {
missing = append(missing, "OKTA_CLIENT_SECRET")
}
if len(missing) > 0 {
t.Skipf("Okta smoke test requires env vars: %s — skipping", strings.Join(missing, ", "))
}
prov := &oidcdomain.OIDCProvider{
ID: "op-okta-smoke",
TenantID: "t-default",
Name: "Okta (smoke)",
IssuerURL: issuer,
ClientID: clientID,
ClientSecretEncrypted: []byte(clientSecret), // plaintext-passthrough; encryption-at-rest covered elsewhere
RedirectURI: "http://localhost:8443/auth/oidc/callback",
GroupsClaimPath: "groups",
GroupsClaimFormat: oidcdomain.GroupsClaimFormatStringArray,
FetchUserinfo: false,
Scopes: []string{"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"},
IATWindowSeconds: 300,
JWKSCacheTTLSeconds: 3600,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
UpdatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
provLookup := &itestProviderLookup{provider: prov}
mappings := &itestMappings{lookup: map[string]string{"certctl-engineers": "r-operator"}}
users := newItestUsers()
sessions := newItestSessionMinter()
pl := newItestPreLogin()
svc := oidc.NewService(provLookup, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
// Behavior 1: discovery doc fetched + JWKS loaded.
if err := svc.RefreshKeys(ctx, prov.ID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RefreshKeys against %s: %v", issuer, err)
}
// Behavior 2: HandleAuthRequest produces an authz URL anchored at
// the configured Okta issuer. We don't drive the browser login
// here — the Keycloak fixture covers full auth-code; this test
// only confirms the wire setup against a real Okta tenant.
authURL, _, _, err := svc.HandleAuthRequest(ctx, prov.ID, "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleAuthRequest: %v", err)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(authURL, issuer) {
t.Errorf("authURL not anchored at %s; got %s", issuer, authURL)
}
}