mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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7612da783a
Phase 8 of the SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle. Wires the internal/scep/intune validator from Phase 7 into the SCEPService dispatch path, with a SIGHUP-reloadable trust anchor holder, a per-(Subject, Issuer) sliding-window rate limiter, and a nil-default ComplianceCheck seam for V3-Pro. Operator-visible surface (per-profile, all default to off): CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_ENABLED=true CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_CONNECTOR_CERT_PATH=/etc/certctl/intune.pem CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_AUDIENCE=https://certctl.example.com/scep/corp CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_CHALLENGE_VALIDITY=60m CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_PER_DEVICE_RATE_LIMIT_24H=3 Per-profile dispatch (Phase 8.8): an operator running corp-laptops through Intune AND IoT devices through static challenge configures INTUNE_ENABLED=true on the corp profile only — the IoT profile's PKCSReq path skips the dispatcher entirely. Mirrors the per-profile shape established by Phase 1.5. Wire-in surfaces: * config.go (Phase 8.1): SCEPProfileConfig.Intune sub-config of type SCEPIntuneProfileConfig (Enabled/ConnectorCertPath/Audience/ ChallengeValidity/PerDeviceRateLimit24h). Loaded from the indexed CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_* env-var family. Per-profile Validate gate refuses INTUNE_ENABLED=true with empty ConnectorCertPath OR negative PerDeviceRateLimit24h. * cmd/server/main.go (Phase 8.2 + wire-in): preflightSCEPIntuneTrustAnchor helper mirrors preflightSCEPRACertKey/preflightSCEPMTLSTrustBundle shape — fail-loud at boot when the trust anchor file is missing / unreadable / empty / contains an expired cert. The per-profile loop builds the holder + replay cache + rate limiter, calls SetIntuneIntegration on the SCEPService, and starts the SIGHUP watcher. A deferred sweep stops every watcher at shutdown. * internal/scep/intune/trust_anchor_holder.go (Phase 8.5): TrustAnchorHolder mirrors cmd/server/tls.go::certHolder. RWMutex- guarded pool + Reload that swaps a fresh slice on success + WatchSIGHUP goroutine that responds to the same SIGHUP the existing TLS-cert watcher uses. A bad reload (parse error, expired cert) keeps the OLD pool in place so a half-rotation doesn't take Intune enrollment down — same fail-safe pattern. Operators rotate via the on-disk file then 'kill -HUP <certctl-pid>'. * internal/scep/intune/rate_limit.go (Phase 8.6): hand-rolled sliding-window-log limiter keyed by (Subject, Issuer). 100k-entry map cap (matches replay cache); at-cap drops the bucket whose newest timestamp is the oldest. Default 3 enrollments per 24h covers legitimate first-cert + recovery + post-wipe re-enrollment but blocks bulk enumeration from a compromised Connector signing key. maxN <= 0 disables the limiter for tests + the rare operator who wants no per-device cap. Empty subject short-circuits to allow (defense-in-depth: caller's claim validation rejects empty-subject upstream; no shared bucket on ''). Why hand-rolled instead of golang.org/x/time/rate: the rate package is in go.sum as an indirect transitive but not a direct dep. ~30 LoC of stdlib avoids creating a new direct dep. * internal/service/scep.go (Phase 8.3 + 8.4 + 8.7): - SCEPService gains intuneEnabled / intuneTrust / intuneAudience / intuneValidity / intuneReplayCache / intuneRateLimiter / complianceCheck fields. - SetIntuneIntegration() constructor-time injection wires the per-profile state. Profiles with INTUNE_ENABLED=false never call this method, so they pay zero overhead. - SetComplianceCheck() installs the V3-Pro plug-in (see Phase 8.7). - looksIntuneShaped(): JWT-shape pre-check (length > 200 + exactly two dots). Allowed to false-positive (validator catches malformed → ErrChallengeMalformed); MUST NOT false-negative on real Intune challenges. - dispatchIntuneChallenge(): the load-bearing core. Runs ValidateChallenge → CSR-binding via DeviceMatchesCSR → replay cache CheckAndInsert → per-device Allow → optional ComplianceCheck. Each failure leg increments a typed metric label and emits an audit-friendly Warn log line. - PKCSReq + PKCSReqWithEnvelope + RenewalReqWithEnvelope all call dispatchIntuneChallenge first; on outcome.decided=true they either short-circuit (with a typed-error → SCEPFailInfo mapping) or call processEnrollment with action='scep_pkcsreq_intune' (so audit greps can count Intune-vs-static enrollments). - mapIntuneErrorToFailInfo(): typed-error → SCEPFailInfo per RFC 8894 §3.2.1.4.5 (signature/replay/expired → BadMessageCheck; claim-mismatch → BadRequest; default → BadRequest). - intuneFailReason(): typed-error → metric label ('signature_invalid' / 'expired' / 'rate_limited' / etc.). Default 'malformed' so a previously-unseen error category still surfaces in the metric for follow-up. - ComplianceCheck (Phase 8.7): nil-default no-op gate. V3-Pro plugs in via SetComplianceCheck to call Microsoft Graph's compliance API. Returns (compliant, reason, err). nil-err + compliant=false → CertRep FAILURE + 'compliance' reason in audit. err != nil → fail-safe deny (V3-Pro module is responsible for any 'permit on API failure' policy). * internal/service/scep.go also gains parseCSRForIntune() — small private wrapper around encoding/pem + x509 used by the dispatcher for the claim ↔ CSR binding check (separated from the broader processEnrollment because we want to bind BEFORE consuming the replay-cache slot). Tests (gates: ≥85% coverage on intune package, ≥70% on service): * scep_intune_test.go (in internal/service): 14 dispatcher tests covering happy-path Intune enrollment + static-challenge fallback + tampered-challenge reject + claim-mismatch reject + replay detected + rate-limited + compliance-hook nil-default + compliance- hook denies non-compliant + compliance-hook error fails closed + IntuneEnabled accessor + 'no IntuneEnabled = static path unchanged' regression pin + intuneFailReason mapping for every typed error + looksIntuneShaped boundary cases. * trust_anchor_holder_test.go (in internal/scep/intune): NewLoadsBundle, NewRequiresLogger, NewSurfacesLoadError, ReloadHappyPath, ReloadKeepsOldOnFailure, ReloadKeepsOldOnExpired (the fail-safe semantics that make the SIGHUP path operator-friendly), WatchSIGHUPReloadsPool (real SIGHUP to self with poll-for-swap pattern mirroring cmd/server/tls_test.go), WatchSIGHUPStopIsClean (does NOT fire SIGHUP after stop — same caveat as the TLS test: the Go runtime would otherwise terminate the test runner on the next SIGHUP since signal.Stop has removed the handler). * rate_limit_test.go (in internal/scep/intune): AllowsUpToCap, DistinctKeysIndependent, WindowExpiry, DisabledBypass (maxN=0), NegativeCapDisabled, EmptySubjectShortCircuits (defense-in-depth against an empty-subject DoS chokepoint), DefaultCapsHonored, MapCapEvictsOldest (at-cap eviction branch), ConcurrentRaceFree (50 goroutines × 200 inserts), pruneOlderThan + the no-op case. Verification: * gofmt -l on all touched files: clean * go vet ./... : clean * staticcheck on intune/service/config/cmd-server: clean * go test -count=1 -cover ./internal/scep/intune/...: 94.8% (target ≥85%) * go test -short across intune+service+config+handler+cmd-server: all green * G-3 docs-drift CI guard reproduced locally: docs-only filtered= empty, config-only=empty. The new env vars match the existing CERTCTL_SCEP_ allowlist prefix. Refs: cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune-master-prompt.md::Phase 8 cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md Constitutional rule: 'Always take the complete path, not the easy path' (cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules) — operator can flip CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_ENABLED=true and observe the dispatcher pick up Intune-shaped challenges end-to-end with no further code changes. Foundation + plumbing ship together.
488 lines
18 KiB
Go
488 lines
18 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"math/big"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/scep/intune"
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)
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// SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 8.9 — service-layer dispatcher
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// tests. Exercises the looksIntuneShaped pre-check, the validator + claim
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// binding, the replay cache + per-device rate limiter integration, and the
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// nil-default compliance hook seam.
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// ------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test plumbing.
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// ------------------------------------------------------------------
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func newTestSCEPLogger() *slog.Logger {
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return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError}))
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}
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// intuneTestConn manufactures an ephemeral RSA Connector signing cert + key
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// for tests that build challenges by hand. Mirrors challenge_test.go's
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// helper but lives in the service package so tests can exercise the full
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// dispatcher path.
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type intuneTestConn struct {
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key *rsa.PrivateKey
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cert *x509.Certificate
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}
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func newIntuneTestConn(t *testing.T) intuneTestConn {
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t.Helper()
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key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("rsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
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}
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tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
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SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
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Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "test-intune-connector"},
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NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour),
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NotAfter: time.Now().Add(365 * 24 * time.Hour),
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BasicConstraintsValid: true,
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}
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der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("x509.CreateCertificate: %v", err)
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}
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("x509.ParseCertificate: %v", err)
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}
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return intuneTestConn{key: key, cert: cert}
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}
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// signTestChallenge hand-builds a signed Intune-shaped challenge with the
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// caller-supplied claim payload. Returns the wire-format string ready to
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// pass as the "challenge password" argument to PKCSReq.
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func (c intuneTestConn) signTestChallenge(t *testing.T, payload any) string {
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t.Helper()
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hdr, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"alg": "RS256", "typ": "JWT"})
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pl, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
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signingInput := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hdr) + "." +
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base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pl)
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(signingInput))
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sig, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, c.key, crypto.SHA256, h[:])
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("rsa.SignPKCS1v15: %v", err)
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}
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return signingInput + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
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}
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// holderFromCerts wraps a static slice of certs as a TrustAnchorHolder
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// without going through the on-disk loader. Used for tests that drive
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// validation without writing a temp PEM file.
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func holderFromCerts(t *testing.T, certs []*x509.Certificate) *intune.TrustAnchorHolder {
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t.Helper()
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dir := t.TempDir()
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path := dir + "/intune-trust.pem"
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// Write a real bundle so the holder can Reload later if the test wants.
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body := []byte{}
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for _, c := range certs {
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body = append(body, []byte("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n")...)
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b64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(c.Raw)
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// Wrap to 64-char lines per PEM convention.
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for len(b64) > 64 {
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body = append(body, []byte(b64[:64]+"\n")...)
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b64 = b64[64:]
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}
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body = append(body, []byte(b64+"\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n")...)
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(path, body, 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("WriteFile trust bundle: %v", err)
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}
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holder, err := intune.NewTrustAnchorHolder(path, newTestSCEPLogger())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewTrustAnchorHolder: %v", err)
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}
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return holder
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}
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// validIntunePayload returns a v1 challenge payload whose claim matches a
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// CSR generated via generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{...}).
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// Tests can mutate it before signing to exercise individual failure modes.
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func validIntunePayload(now time.Time) map[string]any {
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return map[string]any{
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"iss": "test-intune-connector-installation",
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"sub": "device-guid-001",
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"aud": "https://certctl.example.com/scep/corp",
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"iat": now.Add(-1 * time.Minute).Unix(),
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"exp": now.Add(59 * time.Minute).Unix(),
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"nonce": "nonce-001",
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"device_name": "device.example.com",
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"san_dns": []string{"device.example.com"},
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}
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}
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// ------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Dispatcher behavior.
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// ------------------------------------------------------------------
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func TestSCEPService_LooksIntuneShaped(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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in string
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want bool
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}{
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{"empty", "", false},
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{"short static password", "secret123", false},
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{"long but no dots", strings.Repeat("a", 300), false},
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{"long with two dots (intune-shaped)", strings.Repeat("a", 80) + "." + strings.Repeat("b", 80) + "." + strings.Repeat("c", 80), true},
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{"long with three dots (not intune)", "a.b.c.d", false},
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{"exactly 200 bytes (boundary, not intune)", strings.Repeat("a", 100) + "." + strings.Repeat("a", 99), false},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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if got := looksIntuneShaped(tc.in); got != tc.want {
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t.Errorf("looksIntuneShaped(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.in[:min(40, len(tc.in))]+"…", got, tc.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_Success(t *testing.T) {
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conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
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mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
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auditRepo := newMockAuditRepository()
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auditSvc := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
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// Service has the legacy challenge password set (we want to verify the
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// dispatcher takes precedence over the static path when intune-shaped).
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svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", mockIssuer, auditSvc, newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
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holder := holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert})
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svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
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holder,
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"https://certctl.example.com/scep/corp",
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60*time.Minute,
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intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
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intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 100),
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)
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csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
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challenge := conn.signTestChallenge(t, validIntunePayload(time.Now()))
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result, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, challenge, "txn-intune-001")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PKCSReq: %v", err)
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}
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if result == nil || result.CertPEM == "" {
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t.Fatalf("expected non-empty cert; got %#v", result)
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}
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// The audit event should carry the Intune-specific action code so
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// operators can grep the audit log to count Intune enrollments
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// distinct from static-challenge enrollments.
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if len(auditRepo.Events) == 0 {
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t.Fatalf("expected an audit event")
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}
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if got := auditRepo.Events[0].Action; got != "scep_pkcsreq_intune" {
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t.Errorf("audit action = %q, want scep_pkcsreq_intune (Phase 8.4)", got)
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}
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}
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func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_StaticChallengeStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
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// Operator deploy that has Intune enabled on a profile but a device
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// sends a SHORT static challenge — must still work via the fallback path.
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conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
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mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
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svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", mockIssuer, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
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svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
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holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
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"https://certctl.example.com/scep/corp",
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60*time.Minute,
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intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
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intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 100),
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)
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csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
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if _, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, "static-secret", "txn-static-001"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("static-challenge fallback should still work when Intune enabled: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_TamperedChallengeRejected(t *testing.T) {
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conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
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svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", &mockIssuerConnector{}, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
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svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
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holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
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"",
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60*time.Minute,
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intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
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intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 100),
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)
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csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
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good := conn.signTestChallenge(t, validIntunePayload(time.Now()))
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parts := strings.Split(good, ".")
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sig, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
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sig[0] ^= 0xFF
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parts[2] = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
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tampered := strings.Join(parts, ".")
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_, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, tampered, "txn-tamper-001")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected tampered challenge to be rejected")
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}
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if !errors.Is(err, intune.ErrChallengeSignature) {
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t.Errorf("got %v, want errors.Is(ErrChallengeSignature)", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_ClaimMismatchRejected(t *testing.T) {
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conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
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svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", &mockIssuerConnector{}, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
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svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
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holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
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"",
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60*time.Minute,
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intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
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intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 100),
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)
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// CSR's CN ("attacker-host.example.com") does NOT match the claim's
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// device_name ("device.example.com").
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csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "attacker-host.example.com", []string{"attacker-host.example.com"})
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challenge := conn.signTestChallenge(t, validIntunePayload(time.Now()))
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_, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, challenge, "txn-mismatch-001")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected claim mismatch to be rejected")
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}
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if !errors.Is(err, intune.ErrClaimCNMismatch) {
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t.Errorf("got %v, want ErrClaimCNMismatch", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_ReplayDetected(t *testing.T) {
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conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
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svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", &mockIssuerConnector{}, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
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svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
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holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
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"",
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60*time.Minute,
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intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
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intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(0, 24*time.Hour, 100), // disable rate limit so we don't trip THAT first
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)
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csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
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challenge := conn.signTestChallenge(t, validIntunePayload(time.Now()))
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if _, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, challenge, "txn-001"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("first call should succeed: %v", err)
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}
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_, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, challenge, "txn-002")
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if !errors.Is(err, intune.ErrChallengeReplay) {
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t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrChallengeReplay on the second call", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_RateLimited(t *testing.T) {
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conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
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svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", &mockIssuerConnector{}, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
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svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
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holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
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"",
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60*time.Minute,
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// Replay cache must not block us — use disjoint nonces per call.
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intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
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intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(2, 24*time.Hour, 100), // limit = 2
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
|
|
|
|
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
|
|
pl := validIntunePayload(time.Now())
|
|
pl["nonce"] = "nonce-" + string(rune('a'+i))
|
|
ch := conn.signTestChallenge(t, pl)
|
|
if _, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, ch, "txn-allow"); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("call %d should succeed: %v", i+1, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// 3rd call same (Subject, Issuer) → rate limited.
|
|
pl := validIntunePayload(time.Now())
|
|
pl["nonce"] = "nonce-third"
|
|
third := conn.signTestChallenge(t, pl)
|
|
_, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, third, "txn-block")
|
|
if !errors.Is(err, intune.ErrRateLimited) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrRateLimited on 3rd call (cap=2)", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Compliance-hook seam (Phase 8.7).
|
|
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_ComplianceHookNilDefault(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Default state: no hook installed, enrollments proceed.
|
|
conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
|
|
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", &mockIssuerConnector{}, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
|
|
svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
|
|
holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
|
|
"",
|
|
60*time.Minute,
|
|
intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
|
|
intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 100),
|
|
)
|
|
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
|
|
challenge := conn.signTestChallenge(t, validIntunePayload(time.Now()))
|
|
if _, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, challenge, "txn-nil-hook"); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("nil-default compliance hook should be a no-op: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_ComplianceHookDeniesNonCompliant(t *testing.T) {
|
|
conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
|
|
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", &mockIssuerConnector{}, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
|
|
svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
|
|
holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
|
|
"",
|
|
60*time.Minute,
|
|
intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
|
|
intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 100),
|
|
)
|
|
svc.SetComplianceCheck(func(ctx context.Context, claim *intune.ChallengeClaim) (bool, string, error) {
|
|
return false, "device under remediation", nil
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
|
|
challenge := conn.signTestChallenge(t, validIntunePayload(time.Now()))
|
|
_, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, challenge, "txn-noncompliant")
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("non-compliant device must be rejected")
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "intune compliance") {
|
|
t.Errorf("error should reference compliance reason: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "device under remediation") {
|
|
t.Errorf("error should preserve compliance reason for audit: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDispatcher_ComplianceHookErrorFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
|
conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
|
|
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", &mockIssuerConnector{}, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
|
|
svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
|
|
holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
|
|
"",
|
|
60*time.Minute,
|
|
intune.NewReplayCache(60*time.Minute, 100),
|
|
intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(3, 24*time.Hour, 100),
|
|
)
|
|
svc.SetComplianceCheck(func(ctx context.Context, claim *intune.ChallengeClaim) (bool, string, error) {
|
|
return false, "", errors.New("graph API down")
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
|
|
challenge := conn.signTestChallenge(t, validIntunePayload(time.Now()))
|
|
_, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, challenge, "txn-compl-err")
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("compliance API error must fail closed (deny)")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// IntuneEnabled accessor + miscellaneous wiring.
|
|
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
func TestSCEPService_IntuneEnabled_AccessorReflectsState(t *testing.T) {
|
|
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", &mockIssuerConnector{}, nil, newTestSCEPLogger(), "static")
|
|
if svc.IntuneEnabled() {
|
|
t.Fatal("freshly-built service must report IntuneEnabled=false")
|
|
}
|
|
conn := newIntuneTestConn(t)
|
|
svc.SetIntuneIntegration(
|
|
holderFromCerts(t, []*x509.Certificate{conn.cert}),
|
|
"",
|
|
0,
|
|
nil,
|
|
nil,
|
|
)
|
|
if !svc.IntuneEnabled() {
|
|
t.Fatal("after SetIntuneIntegration, IntuneEnabled() must report true")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_IntuneDisabled_StaticPathUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Sanity: a service that NEVER had SetIntuneIntegration called must
|
|
// behave exactly like the pre-Phase-8 service. This pins the no-regression
|
|
// guarantee for the broad set of profiles that won't enable Intune.
|
|
mockIssuer := &mockIssuerConnector{}
|
|
svc := NewSCEPService("iss-local", mockIssuer, NewAuditService(newMockAuditRepository()), newTestSCEPLogger(), "static-secret")
|
|
|
|
csrPEM := generateCSRPEM(t, "device.example.com", []string{"device.example.com"})
|
|
// Submit something Intune-shaped — without SetIntuneIntegration this
|
|
// must NOT route through the dispatcher (looksIntuneShaped + intuneEnabled
|
|
// are AND-gated). It will fall through to the static compare and reject.
|
|
intuneShaped := strings.Repeat("a", 80) + "." + strings.Repeat("b", 80) + "." + strings.Repeat("c", 80)
|
|
if _, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, intuneShaped, "txn-noop"); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("static path with wrong password must reject (we passed an intune-shaped string but Intune is off)")
|
|
}
|
|
// Now submit the right static password — must succeed.
|
|
if _, err := svc.PKCSReq(context.Background(), csrPEM, "static-secret", "txn-noop-2"); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("static path with right password must work: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// IntuneFailReason mapping.
|
|
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
func TestIntuneFailReason_AllTypedErrorsMapped(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
err error
|
|
want string
|
|
}{
|
|
{nil, "success"},
|
|
{intune.ErrChallengeSignature, "signature_invalid"},
|
|
{intune.ErrChallengeExpired, "expired"},
|
|
{intune.ErrChallengeNotYetValid, "not_yet_valid"},
|
|
{intune.ErrChallengeWrongAudience, "wrong_audience"},
|
|
{intune.ErrChallengeReplay, "replay"},
|
|
{intune.ErrChallengeUnknownVersion, "unknown_version"},
|
|
{intune.ErrChallengeMalformed, "malformed"},
|
|
{intune.ErrRateLimited, "rate_limited"},
|
|
{intune.ErrClaimCNMismatch, "claim_mismatch"},
|
|
{intune.ErrClaimSANDNSMismatch, "claim_mismatch"},
|
|
{intune.ErrClaimSANRFC822Mismatch, "claim_mismatch"},
|
|
{intune.ErrClaimSANUPNMismatch, "claim_mismatch"},
|
|
{errors.New("something else"), "malformed"}, // default bucket
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tc := range cases {
|
|
got := intuneFailReason(tc.err)
|
|
if got != tc.want {
|
|
t.Errorf("intuneFailReason(%v) = %q, want %q", tc.err, got, tc.want)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// asn1 unused but imported by sibling tests; this package-level guard keeps
|
|
// future changes that introduce ASN.1 fixtures here from breaking the build.
|
|
func init() {
|
|
_ = ecdsa.GenerateKey
|
|
_ = elliptic.P256
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func min(a, b int) int {
|
|
if a < b {
|
|
return a
|
|
}
|
|
return b
|
|
}
|