Files
certctl/internal/scep/intune/trust_anchor_test.go
T
shankar0123 7e4d423561 feat(scep-intune): parser + validator for Microsoft Intune Connector challenge format
Phase 7 of the SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle. Adds the
internal/scep/intune package that validates Microsoft Intune Certificate
Connector signed challenges embedded in SCEP CSR challengePassword
attributes. This is the parsing/validation foundation; Phase 8 wires it
into the SCEP service dispatcher.

What's included:

  * doc.go — package architecture (Intune cloud → Connector → certctl
    SCEP server) + 'what this package is NOT' guard rails. We do NOT
    implement full JOSE: no JKU / kid / x5c trust, no JWKS fetch.
    Trust anchor is operator-supplied at startup and pinned. The
    package does NOT call Microsoft's API directly — the Connector
    already did that; we validate its signed attestation.

  * trust_anchor.go — LoadTrustAnchor(path) reads a PEM bundle of
    Intune Connector signing certs. Skips non-CERTIFICATE PEM blocks
    (operators sometimes paste chains with the priv key by mistake).
    Rejects empty bundles + expired certs at startup with an
    operator-actionable message including the cert subject. SIGHUP
    reload lands in Phase 8.5; today it's load-once-at-boot.

  * claim.go — ChallengeClaim struct + DeviceMatchesCSR helper.
    Set-equality semantics for SAN-DNS/SAN-RFC822/SAN-UPN: the CSR
    must carry EXACTLY the claim's elements, no extras and no missing.
    Empty claim slice = no constraint on that dimension.
    Per-dimension typed errors (ErrClaimCNMismatch /
    ErrClaimSANDNSMismatch / ErrClaimSANRFC822Mismatch /
    ErrClaimSANUPNMismatch) so audit logs surface the failure
    dimension without string-matching. extractUPNSans is stubbed to
    return nil with documented fail-closed behavior — non-empty UPN
    claims fail the equalSets check (correct behavior; the rare deploy
    that pins UPN SANs hot-fixes the ASN.1 walker per the inline
    comment).

  * replay.go — ReplayCache: bounded in-memory cache of seen nonces
    with TTL. Sized for 100,000 entries (60-min Connector validity ×
    25 RPS Intune fleet steady-state ≈ 90,000 challenges/hour with
    headroom). sync.Map for concurrent read/write; janitor goroutine
    wakes every TTL/4 to evict expired entries; at-cap O(N)
    oldest-eviction (rarely fires; janitor keeps the cache below
    cap). Redis-backed variant deferred to V3-Pro.

  * challenge.go — the load-bearing piece:

    - ParseChallenge(raw) splits the JWT-like compact serialization
      into header/payload/signature and base64url-decodes each.
      Tolerates both padded + unpadded encodings (some Connector
      builds emit padded; RFC 7515 §2 says unpadded; we accept both).
      Validates the header parses as JSON before returning so the
      malformed-signal lands earlier in the pipeline.

    - ValidateChallenge(raw, trust, expectedAudience, now):
        1. ParseChallenge
        2. JWS signature verify over (segment0 || '.' || segment1)
           — re-derived from the raw on-wire bytes, NOT
           re-base64-encoded, per RFC 7515 §3.1 (re-encoding could
           produce a byte-different input than what was signed)
        3. Signature alg dispatch:
             RS256: rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(SHA-256)
             ES256: tries fixed-width r||s (JOSE-canonical) first,
                    falls back to ASN.1 DER (older Connectors)
             alg=none: explicit reject with audit-log-friendly
                       message (RFC 7515 §3.6 attack vector)
             HS*/PS*: rejected as 'unsupported alg' (no shared
                      secret in our threat model)
        4. Version-detection prelude (versionedChallenge struct +
           versionUnmarshalers map). Today's format is v1 (no
           explicit version field; absence IS the v1 signal). Adding
           v2 = adding a parser + a registration line; v1 path stays
           untouched. Defends against the inevitable Microsoft format
           change at ~30 LoC + 2 tests cost vs. a P0 incident.
        5. Time bounds (iat / exp); audience pin (skipped when
           expectedAudience == "").

      Replay protection is the CALLER's job (handler glues parser +
      cache; validator stays stateless + testable).

  * Typed errors: ErrChallengeMalformed / ErrChallengeSignature /
    ErrChallengeExpired / ErrChallengeNotYetValid /
    ErrChallengeWrongAudience / ErrChallengeReplay /
    ErrChallengeUnknownVersion. errors.Is-friendly so the handler
    can audit failure dimension.

Tests (94.8% coverage):

  * challenge_test.go (18 tests): happy-path RS256 + ES256
    fixed-width + ES256 DER; TamperedSignature; TamperedPayload;
    Expired; NotYetValid; WrongAudience; EmptyExpectedAudience
    disables check; RotatedTrustAnchor; EmptyTrustBundle;
    AlgNoneRejected; UnsupportedAlg (HS256); MissingAlg;
    VersionV1ExplicitOK; VersionUnknownRejected;
    MixedTrustBundle iter (skip key-type mismatches without
    surfacing as Signature err); NonJSONPayloadButValidSignature;
    Malformed cases (empty, missing dots, bad base64, non-JSON
    header — 9 sub-cases); PaddedBase64Tolerated.

  * claim_test.go (13 tests): per-dimension matching across CN +
    SAN-DNS + SAN-RFC822 + SAN-UPN; nil guards; case-insensitive DNS
    (RFC 4343); dedupe set-equality; empty claim = no constraint;
    UPN stub canary; normaliseSet edge cases; equalSets length
    mismatch.

  * replay_test.go (11 tests): first-fresh; duplicate-rejected;
    past-TTL-fresh; Sweep-evicts-expired; empty-nonce
    short-circuits; at-cap LRU eviction; default-cap=100k;
    Close-idempotent; TTL=0 disables janitor; concurrent-race-free
    (50 goroutines × 200 inserts); empty-nonce twice is fresh both
    times (we don't cache empties).

  * trust_anchor_test.go: HappyPath single + multi cert; SkipsNonCertBlocks
    (priv key + cert mix); EmptyBundleRejected; OnlyKeyBlocksRejected;
    ExpiredCertRejected (with subject CN in error); MalformedCertRejected;
    LoadTrustAnchor disk + EmptyPath + MissingFile.

  * fuzz_test.go: FuzzParseChallenge with seed corpus covering both
    the well-formed and the obvious-malformed shapes. Survived 187k
    execs in 21s without panic on the local burst; CI runs 5 min.

Verification:

  * gofmt -l ./internal/scep/intune: clean
  * go vet ./internal/scep/intune/...: clean
  * staticcheck ./internal/scep/intune/...: clean
  * go test -count=1 -cover ./internal/scep/intune/...: 94.8%
    (target was ≥85%)
  * go vet ./internal/... ./cmd/...: clean (no rest-of-repo regressions)
  * No new CERTCTL_* env vars (those land in Phase 8 with the
    config gate); G-3 docs-drift CI guard not triggered.
  * No new HTTP routes; openapi-parity guard not triggered.

Phase 8 will:
  - Add SCEPProfileConfig.Intune* env vars + preflight gate
  - Wire the validator into the SCEP service dispatcher
    (Intune-shaped challenges → validator; static → existing path)
  - Trust-anchor SIGHUP reload mirroring cmd/server/tls.go::watchSIGHUP
  - Per-claim rate limit + audit metrics

Refs: cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune-master-prompt.md::Phase 7
      cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md
2026-04-29 14:38:35 +00:00

172 lines
5.4 KiB
Go

package intune
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"math/big"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// pemEncodeCert is a small DRY helper for the PEM bundle fixtures.
func pemEncodeCert(t *testing.T, der []byte) []byte {
t.Helper()
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: der})
}
// freshConnectorCertDER returns a freshly-minted EC P-256 cert as raw DER
// + the matching key. Lifetime is parameterised so the same factory drives
// both the happy-path and expired-cert cases.
func freshConnectorCertDER(t *testing.T, notAfter time.Time) ([]byte, *ecdsa.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(time.Now().UnixNano()),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "intune-connector-test"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour),
NotAfter: notAfter,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("x509.CreateCertificate: %v", err)
}
return der, key
}
func TestParseTrustAnchorPEM_HappyPath_SingleCert(t *testing.T) {
der, _ := freshConnectorCertDER(t, time.Now().Add(365*24*time.Hour))
body := pemEncodeCert(t, der)
certs, err := parseTrustAnchorPEM(body, "test", time.Now())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTrustAnchorPEM: %v", err)
}
if len(certs) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("len(certs) = %d, want 1", len(certs))
}
if certs[0].Subject.CommonName != "intune-connector-test" {
t.Errorf("Subject.CommonName = %q", certs[0].Subject.CommonName)
}
}
func TestParseTrustAnchorPEM_HappyPath_MultiCert(t *testing.T) {
d1, _ := freshConnectorCertDER(t, time.Now().Add(30*24*time.Hour))
d2, _ := freshConnectorCertDER(t, time.Now().Add(60*24*time.Hour))
body := append(pemEncodeCert(t, d1), pemEncodeCert(t, d2)...)
certs, err := parseTrustAnchorPEM(body, "test", time.Now())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTrustAnchorPEM: %v", err)
}
if len(certs) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("len(certs) = %d, want 2", len(certs))
}
}
func TestParseTrustAnchorPEM_SkipsNonCertBlocks(t *testing.T) {
der, key := freshConnectorCertDER(t, time.Now().Add(30*24*time.Hour))
keyDER, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("MarshalECPrivateKey: %v", err)
}
keyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
body := append(keyPEM, pemEncodeCert(t, der)...) // priv key first, cert second
certs, err := parseTrustAnchorPEM(body, "test", time.Now())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parseTrustAnchorPEM should ignore non-CERTIFICATE blocks: %v", err)
}
if len(certs) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("len(certs) = %d, want 1 (priv key block must be skipped)", len(certs))
}
}
func TestParseTrustAnchorPEM_EmptyBundleRejected(t *testing.T) {
_, err := parseTrustAnchorPEM([]byte("nothing here"), "test", time.Now())
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no CERTIFICATE PEM blocks") {
t.Fatalf("expected 'no CERTIFICATE PEM blocks' error, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestParseTrustAnchorPEM_OnlyKeyBlocksRejected(t *testing.T) {
key, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
keyDER, _ := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
body := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
_, err := parseTrustAnchorPEM(body, "test", time.Now())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for bundle with no certs, got nil")
}
}
func TestParseTrustAnchorPEM_ExpiredCertRejected(t *testing.T) {
der, _ := freshConnectorCertDER(t, time.Now().Add(-1*time.Hour)) // already expired
body := pemEncodeCert(t, der)
_, err := parseTrustAnchorPEM(body, "expired-bundle", time.Now())
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "expired") {
t.Fatalf("expected expiry error, got %v", err)
}
// Operator-actionable message must include the subject so the audit
// log says exactly which cert to rotate.
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "intune-connector-test") {
t.Errorf("error must include subject CN for operator action: %v", err)
}
}
func TestParseTrustAnchorPEM_MalformedCertRejected(t *testing.T) {
bad := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: []byte("not-a-real-asn1-cert")})
_, err := parseTrustAnchorPEM(bad, "test", time.Now())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected x509 parse error, got nil")
}
}
func TestLoadTrustAnchor_FromDisk(t *testing.T) {
der, _ := freshConnectorCertDER(t, time.Now().Add(30*24*time.Hour))
body := pemEncodeCert(t, der)
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "intune-trust.pem")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, body, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("WriteFile: %v", err)
}
certs, err := LoadTrustAnchor(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadTrustAnchor: %v", err)
}
if len(certs) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("len(certs) = %d, want 1", len(certs))
}
}
func TestLoadTrustAnchor_EmptyPath(t *testing.T) {
_, err := LoadTrustAnchor("")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty") {
t.Fatalf("expected empty-path error, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestLoadTrustAnchor_MissingFile(t *testing.T) {
_, err := LoadTrustAnchor("/tmp/does-not-exist-intune-trust.pem")
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected file-not-found error, got nil")
}
// Don't string-assert on the OS error — just make sure it's surfaced.
if errors.Is(err, nil) {
t.Fatalf("error must be non-nil")
}
}