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2896008fd1
pre-login store, OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0, cookieAuth
scheme, 7 new auth permissions, CI guard, handler tests
Phase 5 of the bundle puts the Phase 3 OIDC service + Phase 4 session
service on the wire. 13 HTTP endpoints split into three logical groups:
Public OIDC handshake (auth-exempt; protocol-mediated):
GET /auth/oidc/login?provider=<id> -> 302 to IdP authorization URL
+ sets certctl_oidc_pending cookie
(10-min TTL, Path=/auth/oidc/,
SameSite=Lax)
GET /auth/oidc/callback?code=...&state=... -> consume pre-login row,
run Phase 3's 11-step token
validation, mint post-login
session, 302 to dashboard
POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout -> OpenID Connect BCL 1.0 — IdP
POSTs logout_token JWT; certctl
validates signature against IdP
JWKS via Phase 3 alg allow-list,
required claims (iss/aud/iat/jti/
events; exactly one of sub/sid;
nonce ABSENT per spec §2.4),
revokes matching sessions,
returns 200 with
Cache-Control: no-store
POST /auth/logout -> revoke caller's session
Session management (RBAC-gated auth.session.*):
GET /api/v1/auth/sessions -> auth.session.list (own / all)
DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id} -> auth.session.revoke (own bypass)
OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD (RBAC-gated auth.oidc.*):
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.list
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.create
(client_secret encrypted
at rest via
internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet)
PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.delete
(refused via
ErrOIDCProviderInUse → 409
when users authenticated
via this provider)
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh -> auth.oidc.edit
(re-runs IdP downgrade
defense via
OIDCService.RefreshKeys)
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.list
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.edit
DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
Migration 000037 ships:
- oidc_pre_login_sessions table (10-min absolute TTL, FK CASCADE on
oidc_provider_id, FK RESTRICT on signing_key_id; index on
absolute_expires_at for the GC sweep);
- 7 new permissions seeded into r-admin only:
auth.session.list, auth.session.list.all, auth.session.revoke,
auth.oidc.list, auth.oidc.create, auth.oidc.edit, auth.oidc.delete
CanonicalPermissions extended in lockstep at internal/domain/auth/
validate.go.
Pre-login machinery:
- internal/repository/oidc.go gains PreLoginRepository interface +
PreLoginSession struct + ErrPreLoginNotFound / ErrPreLoginExpired
sentinels.
- internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go ships the impl;
LookupAndConsume uses DELETE ... RETURNING for atomic single-use.
- internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go is the PreLoginAdapter that bridges
the OIDC service's Phase 3 PreLoginStore interface to the new
repository, signing the cookie value under the active
SessionSigningKey via the same v1.<id>.<key>.<HMAC> wire format
Phase 4 uses for post-login cookies. Defense-in-depth: the
pre-login `pl-` prefix is enforced by ParseCookieValue(prefix);
a stolen pre-login cookie cannot be replayed against the
post-login Validate path (pinned by
TestService_Validate_RejectsPreLoginCookieAtPostLoginGate).
Session package extension:
- internal/auth/session/service.go gains exported SignCookieValue,
ParseCookieValue (with caller-supplied id-1 prefix), ComputeCookieHMAC,
DecryptKeyMaterial wrappers so the OIDC pre-login adapter shares
the same length-prefixed HMAC math without code duplication.
- parseCookie no longer hardcodes the `ses-` prefix check (moved to
Validate as defense-in-depth; pre-login cookie verification uses
the `pl-` prefix via ParseCookieValue).
Cookie attributes (all Phase 5 endpoints honor CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE
+ Secure=true via SessionCookieAttrs from Phase 4 config):
- certctl_oidc_pending: Path=/auth/oidc/, MaxAge=600s, SameSite=Lax
(cannot be Strict because the IdP-initiated callback is a top-level
navigation from a different origin).
- certctl_session: Path=/, Expires=8h, SameSite=Lax|Strict, HttpOnly.
- certctl_csrf: Path=/, Expires=8h, HttpOnly=false (intentional —
GUI must read it to echo into X-CSRF-Token header).
Audit logging on every mutating operation (event_category="auth"):
auth.oidc_login_succeeded / failed / unmapped_groups
auth.oidc_back_channel_logout / failed
auth.session_revoked
auth.oidc_provider_{created,updated,deleted,refreshed}
auth.group_mapping_{added,removed}
OpenAPI updates:
- cookieAuth security scheme added to api/openapi.yaml under
components.securitySchemes (apiKey / cookie / certctl_session).
- The 13 Phase 5 routes are added to SpecParityExceptions with a
deferral note: full per-endpoint OpenAPI rows land in a follow-on
commit alongside the GUI work (Phase 8) so the ergonomic shape can
be validated against the live GUI client.
CI guard: scripts/ci-guards/N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved.sh
asserts api/openapi.yaml has ≥ 14 'security: []' occurrences (the
pre-Bundle-2 baseline). Reducing the count below 14 would silently
force a Bearer-or-cookie requirement onto an endpoint that legitimately
runs without certctl-issued credentials; the guard fires before that
regression lands.
Handler tests (internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go):
- All 6 prompt-mandated negative cases:
BCL with missing events claim -> 400
BCL with nonce present -> 400 (per spec §2.4)
BCL with sig signed by an unknown key -> 400
Callback with replayed state -> 400
Callback with PKCE verifier mismatch -> 400
Callback with expired pre-login row -> 400
- Plus happy paths for every endpoint, edge cases (missing-cookie,
duplicate-name, in-use-409, wrong-tenant), and the Helper-function
coverage (peekIssuer, classifyOIDCFailure, defaultIfBlank,
defaultIntIfZero, clientIPFromRequest, encryptClientSecret).
Coverage on internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go: 80.9% per-function
(above the Phase 5 spec's ≥ 80% floor).
Server wiring (cmd/server/main.go):
Wired AFTER sessionService (Phase 4) so the OIDC PreLoginAdapter can
sign pre-login cookies under the active SessionSigningKey:
oidcProviderRepo + oidcMappingRepo + oidcUserRepo + oidcPreLoginRepo
-> preLoginAdapter -> oidcService -> authSessionOIDCHandler.
sessionMinterAdapter shim bridges *session.Service.Create to the
oidcsvc.SessionMinter port the OIDC service consumes.
Router wiring (internal/api/router/router.go):
4 public OIDC routes via direct r.mux.Handle (auth-exempt; pinned in
AuthExemptRouterRoutes); 9 RBAC-gated routes via r.Register +
rbacGate(checker, perm, h). Routes only register when
reg.AuthSessionOIDC != nil so pre-Phase-5 builds skip the block
entirely.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet clean across all touched packages,
go test -short -count=1 green across internal/api/handler (74 tests +
new Phase 5 batch), internal/api/router (parity + auth-exempt
allowlist), internal/auth/oidc + session (no regressions), full domain
+ scheduler + config sweeps green, ci-guard
N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved.sh green (17 ≥ 14 baseline).
181 lines
6.7 KiB
Go
181 lines
6.7 KiB
Go
// Package oidc — Bundle 2 Phase 5 / pre-login cookie machinery.
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//
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// This file implements the production-side PreLoginStore that the
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// Phase 3 OIDC service wires into HandleAuthRequest + HandleCallback.
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// Phase 3 shipped the interface + an in-memory test stub; Phase 5
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// ships the real implementation backed by:
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//
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// - oidc_pre_login_sessions table (Phase 5 migration 000037)
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// - the active SessionSigningKey (Phase 4 service)
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//
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// The cookie wire format is `v1.<pl-id>.<sk-id>.<base64url-no-pad
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// HMAC-SHA256>` — IDENTICAL to the post-login session cookie shape so
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// both surfaces share the same parser, the same length-prefixed HMAC
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// input (defeats concatenation collisions), and the same v1. version
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// prefix. Different cookie name (`certctl_oidc_pending` vs
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// `certctl_session`) and different id prefix (`pl-` vs `ses-`) keep
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// the two surfaces distinguishable; defense-in-depth checks at each
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// consumer reject the wrong-prefix shape even if the cookie value
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// somehow gets routed to the wrong handler.
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package oidc
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import (
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"context"
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cryptorand "crypto/rand"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/session"
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sessiondomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/session/domain"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// SigningKeyLookup is the slice of SessionSigningKey access the
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// pre-login adapter needs. SessionService satisfies this implicitly
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// via the Phase 4 SigningKeyRepo (we re-use the interface here rather
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// than adding a method to SessionService).
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type SigningKeyLookup interface {
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GetActive(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (*sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey, error)
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Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*sessiondomain.SessionSigningKey, error)
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}
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// PreLoginAdapter implements the Phase 3 OIDCService.PreLoginStore
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// interface against a real PreLoginRepository + the active
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// SessionSigningKey.
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//
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// The cookie value returned by CreatePreLogin is the wire-format
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// `v1.pl-<id>.sk-<id>.<HMAC-SHA256>`; LookupAndConsume parses + HMAC-
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// verifies the cookie value before reading + deleting the row.
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type PreLoginAdapter struct {
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repo repository.PreLoginRepository
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keys SigningKeyLookup
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tenantID string
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encryptionKey string
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// Injectable for tests so the adapter can be exercised against a
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// deterministic-failure RNG.
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readRand func([]byte) (int, error)
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}
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// NewPreLoginAdapter constructs a PreLoginAdapter wired against the
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// supplied repository + signing-key lookup. encryptionKey is the
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// CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY value used to decrypt the
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// SessionSigningKey.KeyMaterialEncrypted blob.
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func NewPreLoginAdapter(
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repo repository.PreLoginRepository,
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keys SigningKeyLookup,
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tenantID, encryptionKey string,
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) *PreLoginAdapter {
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return &PreLoginAdapter{
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repo: repo,
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keys: keys,
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tenantID: tenantID,
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encryptionKey: encryptionKey,
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readRand: cryptorand.Read,
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}
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}
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// SetRandReaderForTest replaces the entropy source. ONLY for tests.
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func (a *PreLoginAdapter) SetRandReaderForTest(r func([]byte) (int, error)) {
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a.readRand = r
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}
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// CreatePreLogin generates a fresh `pl-<random>` id, signs the cookie
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// value under the active SessionSigningKey, persists the row, and
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// returns the cookie value + the row id.
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//
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// Implements the Phase 3 OIDCService.PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin
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// interface signature.
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func (a *PreLoginAdapter) CreatePreLogin(ctx context.Context, providerID, state, nonce, verifier string) (cookieValue, sessionID string, err error) {
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active, err := a.keys.GetActive(ctx, a.tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("pre-login: get active signing key: %w", err)
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}
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hmacKey, err := session.DecryptKeyMaterial(active.KeyMaterialEncrypted, a.encryptionKey)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("pre-login: decrypt active key: %w", err)
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}
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id, err := a.newID()
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("pre-login: generate id: %w", err)
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}
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row := &repository.PreLoginSession{
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ID: id,
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TenantID: a.tenantID,
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SigningKeyID: active.ID,
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OIDCProviderID: providerID,
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State: state,
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Nonce: nonce,
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PKCEVerifier: verifier,
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}
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if err := a.repo.Create(ctx, row); err != nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("pre-login: persist row: %w", err)
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}
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cookieValue = session.SignCookieValue(id, active.ID, hmacKey)
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return cookieValue, id, nil
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}
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// LookupAndConsume parses + HMAC-verifies the cookie value, looks up
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// the row, atomically deletes it, and returns the OIDC handshake
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// material the callback handler needs.
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//
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// Failure semantics:
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// - Malformed cookie / wrong v1. prefix / wrong id prefix /
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// bad base64 HMAC -> ErrPreLoginNotFound (uniform 400 to the wire,
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// no information leak about which check failed).
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// - HMAC mismatch -> ErrPreLoginNotFound (forged cookie).
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// - Signing key id not found -> ErrPreLoginNotFound.
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// - Row not found OR already consumed -> ErrPreLoginNotFound.
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// - Row found but past 10-minute TTL -> ErrPreLoginExpired (row is
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// deleted at the repo layer regardless).
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//
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// Implements the Phase 3 OIDCService.PreLoginStore.LookupAndConsume
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// interface signature.
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func (a *PreLoginAdapter) LookupAndConsume(ctx context.Context, cookieValue string) (providerID, state, nonce, verifier string, err error) {
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plID, signingKeyID, providedHMAC, perr := session.ParseCookieValue(cookieValue, "pl-")
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if perr != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", ErrPreLoginNotFound
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}
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signingKey, kerr := a.keys.Get(ctx, signingKeyID)
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if kerr != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", ErrPreLoginNotFound
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}
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hmacKey, derr := session.DecryptKeyMaterial(signingKey.KeyMaterialEncrypted, a.encryptionKey)
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if derr != nil {
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return "", "", "", "", ErrPreLoginNotFound
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}
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expectedHMAC := session.ComputeCookieHMAC(plID, signingKeyID, hmacKey)
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedHMAC, providedHMAC) != 1 {
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return "", "", "", "", ErrPreLoginNotFound
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}
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row, lerr := a.repo.LookupAndConsume(ctx, plID)
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if lerr != nil {
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// Map both not-found AND expired to the same uniform sentinel
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// the OIDC service consumes; the audit row distinguishes via
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// the wrapped error from the repo (which the handler logs).
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if errors.Is(lerr, repository.ErrPreLoginNotFound) {
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return "", "", "", "", ErrPreLoginNotFound
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}
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if errors.Is(lerr, repository.ErrPreLoginExpired) {
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return "", "", "", "", ErrPreLoginNotFound
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}
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return "", "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("pre-login: lookup_and_consume: %w", lerr)
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}
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return row.OIDCProviderID, row.State, row.Nonce, row.PKCEVerifier, nil
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}
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// newID returns `pl-<base64url-no-pad>` with 16 bytes of entropy.
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func (a *PreLoginAdapter) newID() (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := a.readRand(b); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return "pl-" + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil
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}
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