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CodeQL alert #11 (go/email-injection, CWE-640 / OWASP Content Spoofing)
flagged the wc.Write(message) sink at internal/connector/notifier/email/
email.go:208 because attacker-controllable fields flow into the email
body unchecked.
Threat model:
Headers (From, To, Subject) were already protected by
validation.ValidateHeaderValue (CWE-113 SMTP header injection,
closed in commit 3853b74). The remaining gap was the body.
An attacker controls multiple fields that surface to the body of
alert/event notifications:
- alert.Subject, alert.Message
- event.Subject, event.Body, *event.CertificateID
- alert.Metadata + event.Metadata key/value pairs
These can carry CR/LF (forged 'Reply-To: attacker@evil.com' inside
the body that recipients skim), NUL bytes (RFC 5321 4.5.2 violation
that some MTAs truncate at), bidi-override Unicode (visually-
spoofable URLs), zero-width / invisible Unicode (phishing), or
malformed UTF-8 (Go emits U+FFFD which becomes a glyph in mail
clients).
The HTML email path (digest service) already uses html/template
upstream and is safe via contextual auto-escape. This commit
closes the plaintext path.
Fix:
internal/validation/headers.go gains SanitizeEmailBodyValue —
a sanitizer that NEVER errors (the right contract for body
content; over-eager rejection drops operator notifications) and
scrubs:
- NUL bytes (stripped entirely)
- bare CR / LF (replaced with space — single fields should never
carry their own line breaks; the surrounding template handles
legitimate CRLFs)
- C0 control chars < 0x20 except TAB
- DEL (0x7F) + C1 control chars (0x80-0x9F)
- U+FFFD (defense in depth: malformed UTF-8 -> Go emits this;
strip so attacker-planted invalid bytes don't survive as an
arbitrary glyph)
- Bidi-override Unicode (U+202A..U+202E, U+2066..U+2069)
- Zero-width / invisible Unicode (U+200B..U+200D, U+2060..U+2063,
U+FEFF, U+180E)
- Catch-all unicode.IsControl for anything not enumerated above
Codepoint table uses numeric ranges rather than rune-literal switch
cases — Go source rejects literal invisible characters (BOM U+FEFF)
mid-file, so the table compares against numeric values.
internal/connector/notifier/email/email.go applies the sanitizer
at every interpolation site:
- formatAlertBody: alert.ID/Type/Severity/Subject/Message
(CreatedAt is time.Time -> RFC3339, structural, not sanitized)
- formatEventBody: event.ID/Type/Subject/Body, *CertificateID
(CreatedAt structural, not sanitized)
- formatMetadata: both keys and values
The sendEmail / formatEmailMessage call sites continue to validate
headers (From / To / Subject) via the existing ValidateHeaderValue
fail-closed gate; the new sanitizer is body-side only.
Tests (internal/validation/headers_test.go):
TestSanitizeEmailBodyValue_PreservesSafeInput
Pin: ordinary ASCII, UTF-8 multibyte (résumé / 日本語 / مرحبا),
tabs, common cert DNs, URLs all flow through unchanged.
TestSanitizeEmailBodyValue_StripsControlChars
Table-driven across NUL, bare LF/CR, CRLF, BEL, backspace, DEL,
C1 (U+0080 / U+009F), U+FFFD, TAB-preserve.
TestSanitizeEmailBodyValue_StripsBidiOverride
7 attacker payloads (RLO, LRO, LRI, zero-width space, ZWNJ, BOM,
MVS) — each must produce a non-identity output.
TestSanitizeEmailBodyValue_ContentSpoofingScenario
The CodeQL example case: 'alert\r\nReply-To: attacker@evil.com\r\n
Click https://evil.example.com/reset' — verify NO CR/LF survives.
Verified locally:
gofmt: clean.
go vet ./...: exit 0.
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/validation/...: ok 0.374s
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/notifier/email/...: ok 0.186s
Reference: https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/security/code-scanning/11
Closes CodeQL alert #11 (go/email-injection).