mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 12:21:31 +00:00
21aeed4f4e
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):
addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:
// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).
Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.
Generated via:
addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
-f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
-ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
cmd/ internal/
Verification:
find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
-not -path '*/testdata/*' \
-exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l
Returns: 0
gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
193 lines
8.4 KiB
Go
193 lines
8.4 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
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package oidc
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// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-5 closure — dry-run validator for OIDC provider
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// configuration. Lets operators verify discovery + JWKS reachability +
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// alg-downgrade defense BEFORE persisting a provider row. Mirrors the
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// non-persistence-touching subset of getOrLoad.
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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gooidc "github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/validation"
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)
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// oidcOutboundTimeout bounds every test-discovery HTTP call (discovery
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// document fetch + JWKS reachability probe + userinfo if configured).
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// Shared by the SSRF-safe transport dialer (Bundle 5 R6 closure) and
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// the http.Client so the dial budget and the read/write budget land
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// on the same wall-clock horizon.
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const oidcOutboundTimeout = 10 * time.Second
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// TestDiscoveryResult is the report TestDiscovery returns. The HTTP
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// layer marshals this verbatim. Each field is independently observable
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// so the GUI can render a per-check status row.
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//
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// `Errors` collects every leg that failed; a partial-success case
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// (e.g. discovery OK but alg-downgrade tripped) returns
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// DiscoverySucceeded=true + a non-empty Errors slice.
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type TestDiscoveryResult struct {
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DiscoverySucceeded bool `json:"discovery_succeeded"`
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JWKSReachable bool `json:"jwks_reachable"`
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SupportedAlgValues []string `json:"supported_alg_values"`
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IssParamSupported bool `json:"iss_param_supported"`
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IssuerEcho string `json:"issuer_echo,omitempty"` // the iss value the IdP advertised
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AuthorizationURL string `json:"authorization_url,omitempty"`
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TokenURL string `json:"token_url,omitempty"`
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JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri,omitempty"`
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UserInfoEndpoint string `json:"userinfo_endpoint,omitempty"`
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Errors []string `json:"errors,omitempty"`
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}
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// TestDiscovery runs the read-only subset of getOrLoad against a
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// candidate issuer URL: fetches the discovery doc, runs the
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// alg-downgrade defense, parses the RFC 9207 iss-parameter advert,
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// then fetches the JWKS once to confirm reachability.
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//
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// The function NEVER persists anything; the caller is the
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// /api/v1/auth/oidc/test endpoint that the GUI uses for dry-runs.
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//
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// Service-layer entry point so the handler stays HTTP-shaped only.
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func (s *Service) TestDiscovery(ctx context.Context, issuerURL string) (*TestDiscoveryResult, error) {
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res := &TestDiscoveryResult{}
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// Step 1 — discovery. gooidc.NewProvider fetches
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// `<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration` and runs the iss
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// match check internally; on failure it returns a fmt-style
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// wrapped error.
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provider, err := gooidc.NewProvider(ctx, issuerURL)
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if err != nil {
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res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("discovery fetch failed: %v", err))
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return res, nil // Non-fatal at this layer; the response carries the per-leg failure.
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}
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res.DiscoverySucceeded = true
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res.IssuerEcho = issuerURL
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endpoint := provider.Endpoint()
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res.AuthorizationURL = endpoint.AuthURL
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res.TokenURL = endpoint.TokenURL
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// Step 2 — parse the claims we care about from the discovery doc.
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var advertised struct {
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IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported []string `json:"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported"`
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AuthorizationResponseIssParamSupported bool `json:"authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported"`
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JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri"`
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UserInfoEndpoint string `json:"userinfo_endpoint"`
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}
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if cerr := provider.Claims(&advertised); cerr != nil {
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res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("discovery claims: %v", cerr))
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return res, nil
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}
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res.SupportedAlgValues = advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported
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res.IssParamSupported = advertised.AuthorizationResponseIssParamSupported
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res.JWKSURI = advertised.JWKSURI
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res.UserInfoEndpoint = advertised.UserInfoEndpoint
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// Step 3 — alg-downgrade defense (v2.1.0-relaxed semantics).
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// Pre-v2.1.0 this loop appended an error for ANY HS*/none in the
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// IdP's advertised list. That was strict-deny but incompatible with
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// real IdPs like Keycloak 26.x which list every alg they're capable
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// of, even though the realm only signs with RS256.
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// New semantics: only flag the IdP if the intersection of advertised
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// vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is empty (a pathological all-weak IdP). Each
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// HS*/none advertisement is still surfaced as an informational note
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// so operators can ask their IdP team to tighten the list, but it's
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// no longer a hard fail. The per-token alg check at sig-verify time
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// (isDisallowedAlg in service.go ~L1177) is the load-bearing defense.
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allowedSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(DefaultAllowedAlgs))
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for _, a := range DefaultAllowedAlgs {
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allowedSet[a] = struct{}{}
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}
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hasAcceptable := false
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weak := []string{}
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for _, a := range advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported {
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if _, ok := allowedSet[a]; ok {
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hasAcceptable = true
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}
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if _, deny := disallowedAlgs[a]; deny {
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weak = append(weak, a)
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}
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}
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if len(advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported) > 0 && !hasAcceptable {
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res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("alg-downgrade defense tripped: IdP advertises only weak algorithms (%v) — no acceptable alg from %v present", advertised.IDTokenSigningAlgValuesSupported, DefaultAllowedAlgs))
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} else if len(weak) > 0 {
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// Informational only — RS/ES present alongside HS, so the
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// IdP binds successfully but the operator should know.
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res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("note: IdP advertises weak algorithms %v alongside acceptable ones — verifier-side alg pin prevents downgrade, but tightening the IdP's advertised list is recommended", weak))
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}
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// Step 4 — JWKS reachability. The go-oidc Verifier defers JWKS
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// fetch until first token-verify; for the dry-run we explicitly
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// HEAD/GET the JWKS endpoint to confirm network reachability.
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if advertised.JWKSURI == "" {
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res.Errors = append(res.Errors, "discovery doc omits jwks_uri")
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} else if ok, herr := jwksReachable(ctx, advertised.JWKSURI); !ok {
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if herr != nil {
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res.Errors = append(res.Errors, fmt.Sprintf("JWKS fetch failed: %v", herr))
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} else {
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res.Errors = append(res.Errors, "JWKS endpoint returned non-200")
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}
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} else {
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res.JWKSReachable = true
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}
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return res, nil
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}
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// jwksReachable issues a GET against the JWKS URI and returns ok=true
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// when the response status is 2xx. Used by TestDiscovery for the
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// reachability leg of the dry-run.
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//
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// Kept distinct from go-oidc's internal JWKS fetcher because we want
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// to surface the HTTP status to the operator without requiring a
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// token-verify round-trip.
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//
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// Bundle 5 closure (audit R6): the GET runs through an SSRF-safe
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// http.Client whose transport's DialContext is wrapped in
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// validation.SafeHTTPDialContext. Pre-Bundle-5 the discovery probe
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// used http.DefaultClient and could be pointed at reserved-address
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// ranges via DNS rebinding (operator pastes a JWKS URI from the
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// dynamic-config GUI; admin RBAC for OIDC providers is sensitive but
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// not a system-wide super-admin gate). Now the dial-time guard re-
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// resolves the target host and rejects loopback / link-local /
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// private + cloud-metadata before any HTTP byte goes out. The
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// 10-second timeout matches the package-wide oidcOutboundTimeout
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// budget so token endpoint + JWKS + userinfo probes share the same
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// wall-clock horizon.
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// jwksProbeClient is the *http.Client used by jwksReachable. Package-
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// level var so the test suite can swap it for an SSRF-guard-bypassed
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// client when exercising jwksReachable against httptest.NewServer
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// (which binds to 127.0.0.1 and would otherwise be refused by
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// validation.SafeHTTPDialContext). Mirrors the
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// internal/connector/notifier/webhook + slack + teams test-seam
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// pattern. Production code never reassigns this var.
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var jwksProbeClient = &http.Client{
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Timeout: oidcOutboundTimeout,
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Transport: &http.Transport{
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DialContext: validation.SafeHTTPDialContext(oidcOutboundTimeout),
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MaxIdleConns: 10,
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IdleConnTimeout: 90 * time.Second,
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TLSHandshakeTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
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ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
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},
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}
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var jwksReachable = func(ctx context.Context, jwksURI string) (bool, error) {
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, jwksURI, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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resp, err := jwksProbeClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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return resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300, nil
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}
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