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3ef45e2ad4
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
529 lines
17 KiB
Go
529 lines
17 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
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authsvc "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service/auth"
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)
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// AuthHandler exposes the RBAC primitive over HTTP. Bundle 1 Phase 4 wires
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// the routes registered by HandlerRegistry under /v1/auth/*.
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//
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// Every mutating endpoint runs through the service layer, which enforces
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// the privilege-escalation guard (callers need auth.role.assign for
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// Grant/Revoke, auth.role.create/edit/delete for the role lifecycle,
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// auth.key.* for key management). Read endpoints require auth.role.list.
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//
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// The /v1/auth/me endpoint has no permission requirement (every
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// authenticated caller can read their own permissions); this is the
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// query the GUI uses to gate affordance rendering.
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type AuthHandler struct {
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roles AuthRoleService
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perms AuthPermissionService
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actors AuthActorRoleService
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checker auth.PermissionChecker
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}
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// AuthRoleService is the service-layer dependency the AuthHandler uses
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// for role + role-permission lifecycle. Mirrors internal/service/auth.
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type AuthRoleService interface {
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List(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error)
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Get(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
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Create(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error
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Update(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error
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Delete(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, id string) error
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ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error)
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AddPermission(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error
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RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error
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}
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// AuthPermissionService exposes the canonical permission catalogue.
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type AuthPermissionService interface {
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List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error)
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IsRegistered(name string) bool
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}
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// AuthActorRoleService manages role grants on actors and surfaces the
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// effective-permissions query the GUI's /v1/auth/me handler uses.
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type AuthActorRoleService interface {
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Grant(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
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Revoke(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, roleID string) error
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ListForActor(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
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EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error)
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// ListKeys (Bundle 1 Phase 7) returns every actor in the tenant
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// with at least one role grant. The CLI's `auth keys list` and
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// scope-down helper consume this. The synthetic actor-demo-anon
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// row is included; the CLI filters it out of the interactive
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// prompt loop.
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ListKeys(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error)
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}
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// NewAuthHandler constructs an AuthHandler with the service-layer
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// dependencies wired in cmd/server/main.go.
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func NewAuthHandler(
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roles AuthRoleService,
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perms AuthPermissionService,
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actors AuthActorRoleService,
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checker auth.PermissionChecker,
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) AuthHandler {
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return AuthHandler{
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roles: roles,
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perms: perms,
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actors: actors,
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checker: checker,
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}
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// JSON request / response shapes
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// =============================================================================
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type roleResponse struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Description string `json:"description"`
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CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
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UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
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}
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func roleToResponse(r *authdomain.Role) roleResponse {
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return roleResponse{
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ID: r.ID,
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TenantID: r.TenantID,
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Name: r.Name,
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Description: r.Description,
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CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
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UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
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}
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}
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type permissionResponse struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Namespace string `json:"namespace"`
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}
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func permToResponse(p *authdomain.Permission) permissionResponse {
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return permissionResponse{ID: p.ID, Name: p.Name, Namespace: p.Namespace}
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}
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type rolePermissionResponse struct {
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RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
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PermissionID string `json:"permission_id"`
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ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
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ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
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}
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func rolePermToResponse(g *authdomain.RolePermission) rolePermissionResponse {
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return rolePermissionResponse{
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RoleID: g.RoleID,
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PermissionID: g.PermissionID,
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ScopeType: string(g.ScopeType),
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ScopeID: g.ScopeID,
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}
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}
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type createRoleRequest struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Description string `json:"description"`
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}
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type updateRoleRequest struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Description string `json:"description"`
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}
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type addPermissionRequest struct {
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Permission string `json:"permission"`
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ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty"` // defaults to "global"
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ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
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}
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type assignRoleRequest struct {
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RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
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}
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type meResponse struct {
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ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
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ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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Admin bool `json:"admin"` // back-compat with /v1/auth/check
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Roles []string `json:"roles"`
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EffectivePermissions []effectivePermissionPayload `json:"effective_permissions"`
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}
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type effectivePermissionPayload struct {
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Permission string `json:"permission"`
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ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
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ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// Handlers
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// =============================================================================
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// ListRoles handles GET /api/v1/auth/roles.
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// Permission: auth.role.list (enforced at the service layer).
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func (h AuthHandler) ListRoles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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roles, err := h.roles.List(r.Context(), caller)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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out := make([]roleResponse, 0, len(roles))
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for _, role := range roles {
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out = append(out, roleToResponse(role))
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"roles": out})
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}
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// GetRole handles GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
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func (h AuthHandler) GetRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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id := r.PathValue("id")
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role, err := h.roles.Get(r.Context(), caller, id)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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perms, err := h.roles.ListPermissions(r.Context(), caller, id)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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permResponses := make([]rolePermissionResponse, 0, len(perms))
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for _, p := range perms {
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permResponses = append(permResponses, rolePermToResponse(p))
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
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"role": roleToResponse(role),
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"permissions": permResponses,
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})
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}
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// CreateRole handles POST /api/v1/auth/roles.
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func (h AuthHandler) CreateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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var req createRoleRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
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return
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(req.Name) == "" {
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Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role name is required")
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return
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}
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role := &authdomain.Role{Name: req.Name, Description: req.Description}
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if err := h.roles.Create(r.Context(), caller, role); err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, roleToResponse(role))
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}
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// UpdateRole handles PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
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func (h AuthHandler) UpdateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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id := r.PathValue("id")
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var req updateRoleRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
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return
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}
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role := &authdomain.Role{ID: id, Name: req.Name, Description: req.Description}
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if err := h.roles.Update(r.Context(), caller, role); err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, roleToResponse(role))
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}
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// DeleteRole handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
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func (h AuthHandler) DeleteRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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id := r.PathValue("id")
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if err := h.roles.Delete(r.Context(), caller, id); err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// ListPermissions handles GET /api/v1/auth/permissions.
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func (h AuthHandler) ListPermissions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if _, err := callerFromRequest(r); err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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perms, err := h.perms.List(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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out := make([]permissionResponse, 0, len(perms))
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for _, p := range perms {
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out = append(out, permToResponse(p))
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"permissions": out})
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}
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// ListKeys handles GET /api/v1/auth/keys (Bundle 1 Phase 7).
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// Permission: auth.role.list. Returns every distinct actor in the
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// tenant with at least one role grant — the CLI's `auth keys list`
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// and scope-down flow consume this.
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func (h AuthHandler) ListKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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keys, err := h.actors.ListKeys(r.Context(), caller)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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type keyEntry struct {
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ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
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ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
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TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
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RoleIDs []string `json:"role_ids"`
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}
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out := make([]keyEntry, 0, len(keys))
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for _, k := range keys {
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out = append(out, keyEntry{
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ActorID: k.ActorID,
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ActorType: string(k.ActorType),
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TenantID: k.TenantID,
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RoleIDs: k.RoleIDs,
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})
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"keys": out})
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}
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// AddRolePermission handles POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions.
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func (h AuthHandler) AddRolePermission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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roleID := r.PathValue("id")
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var req addPermissionRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
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return
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}
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if req.Permission == "" {
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Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "permission is required")
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return
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}
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scopeType := authdomain.ScopeType(req.ScopeType)
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if scopeType == "" {
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scopeType = authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal
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}
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if err := h.roles.AddPermission(r.Context(), caller, roleID, req.Permission, scopeType, req.ScopeID); err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// RemoveRolePermission handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}.
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func (h AuthHandler) RemoveRolePermission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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roleID := r.PathValue("id")
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permName := r.PathValue("perm")
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scopeType := authdomain.ScopeType(r.URL.Query().Get("scope_type"))
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if scopeType == "" {
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scopeType = authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal
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}
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var scopeID *string
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if v := r.URL.Query().Get("scope_id"); v != "" {
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scopeID = &v
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}
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if err := h.roles.RemovePermission(r.Context(), caller, roleID, permName, scopeType, scopeID); err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// AssignRoleToKey handles POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles.
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// {id} is the API-key actor name (e.g. "alice", "ops-admin"); the
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// service layer resolves to the actor_roles row.
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func (h AuthHandler) AssignRoleToKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
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if err != nil {
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writeAuthError(w, err)
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return
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}
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keyID := r.PathValue("id")
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var req assignRoleRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
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return
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}
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if req.RoleID == "" {
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Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
ar := &authdomain.ActorRole{
|
|
ActorID: keyID,
|
|
ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey),
|
|
RoleID: req.RoleID,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := h.actors.Grant(r.Context(), caller, ar); err != nil {
|
|
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeRoleFromKey handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}.
|
|
func (h AuthHandler) RevokeRoleFromKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
keyID := r.PathValue("id")
|
|
roleID := r.PathValue("role_id")
|
|
if err := h.actors.Revoke(r.Context(), caller, keyID, domain.ActorTypeAPIKey, roleID); err != nil {
|
|
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Me handles GET /api/v1/auth/me. Returns the current actor's effective
|
|
// permissions plus admin flag (back-compat with /v1/auth/check). No
|
|
// permission required: every authenticated caller can read their own.
|
|
func (h AuthHandler) Me(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
roles, err := h.actors.ListForActor(r.Context(), caller, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
roleIDs := make([]string, 0, len(roles))
|
|
hasAdmin := false
|
|
for _, role := range roles {
|
|
roleIDs = append(roleIDs, role.RoleID)
|
|
if role.RoleID == authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
|
|
hasAdmin = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
effective, err := h.actors.EffectivePermissions(r.Context(), caller, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeAuthError(w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
payload := make([]effectivePermissionPayload, 0, len(effective))
|
|
for _, p := range effective {
|
|
payload = append(payload, effectivePermissionPayload{
|
|
Permission: p.PermissionName,
|
|
ScopeType: string(p.ScopeType),
|
|
ScopeID: p.ScopeID,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResponse{
|
|
ActorID: caller.ActorID,
|
|
ActorType: string(caller.ActorType),
|
|
TenantID: caller.TenantID,
|
|
Admin: hasAdmin,
|
|
Roles: roleIDs,
|
|
EffectivePermissions: payload,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Helpers
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// callerFromRequest builds an authsvc.Caller from request context. The
|
|
// auth middleware (Phase 3) populates ActorIDKey / ActorTypeKey /
|
|
// TenantIDKey on every authenticated request. Returns auth.ErrNoActor
|
|
// when no actor is in context (handler returns 401).
|
|
func callerFromRequest(r *http.Request) (*authsvc.Caller, error) {
|
|
ctx := r.Context()
|
|
actorID := auth.GetActorID(ctx)
|
|
if actorID == "" {
|
|
return nil, auth.ErrNoActor
|
|
}
|
|
actorType := auth.GetActorType(ctx)
|
|
if actorType == "" {
|
|
actorType = auth.ActorTypeAPIKey
|
|
}
|
|
tenantID := auth.GetTenantID(ctx)
|
|
return &authsvc.Caller{
|
|
ActorID: actorID,
|
|
ActorType: domain.ActorType(actorType),
|
|
TenantID: tenantID,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// writeAuthError translates service-layer + repository sentinel errors
|
|
// into HTTP status codes. Any non-mapped error is 500.
|
|
func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrNoActor), errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrUnauthenticated):
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Authentication required")
|
|
case errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrForbidden), errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrSelfRoleAssignment):
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, err.Error())
|
|
case errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrInvalidPermission):
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
|
|
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthNotFound):
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Not found")
|
|
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName), errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse), errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthReservedActor):
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusConflict, err.Error())
|
|
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthUnknownPermission):
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
|
|
default:
|
|
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v interface{}) {
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
|
|
w.WriteHeader(status)
|
|
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
|
|
}
|