Files
certctl/internal/service/approval.go
T
shankar0123 69a508dfcf auth-bundle-1 Phase 9 + 10: approval-bypass closure + RBAC GUI
# Phase 9 — approval-bypass closure (Decision 9, option a)

* Migration 000033_approval_kinds.up.sql: ALTER TABLE
  issuance_approval_requests ADD COLUMN approval_kind +
  payload JSONB; relax certificate_id + job_id to nullable;
  CHECK (approval_kind IN ('cert_issuance','profile_edit'))
  + CHECK (per-kind nullability invariant) + index on
  approval_kind. Idempotent throughout via DO blocks.
* domain.ApprovalKind enum (cert_issuance / profile_edit) +
  IsValidApprovalKind. ApprovalRequest gains Kind +
  Payload []byte for the pending profile diff.
* postgres.ApprovalRepository.Create + scanApprovalRow extended
  to round-trip the new columns; certificate_id + job_id
  switched to sql.NullString so profile_edit rows persist
  cleanly. Default Kind=cert_issuance preserves back-compat
  for every Phase-7-2026-05-03 caller.
* ApprovalService.RequestProfileEditApproval: new entry point
  that creates a pending profile-edit row carrying the
  serialized profile diff. Bypass mode (CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS)
  short-circuits the same way it does for cert_issuance.
* ApprovalService.SetProfileEditApply hook: cmd/server/main.go
  registers a closure that deserializes req.Payload + persists
  via profileRepo.Update + emits a profile.edit_applied audit
  row with category=auth. The hook avoids the Approval ↔
  Profile import cycle.
* ProfileService.UpdateProfile: gates when (a) the live
  profile carries RequiresApproval=true, OR (b) the proposed
  edit would set it true. Returns ErrProfileEditPendingApproval
  with the new approval ID; ProfileHandler maps to HTTP 202
  Accepted + {pending_approval_id}. Both arms close the
  flip-flop loophole because every transition through an
  approval-tier profile fires the gate.
* TestProfileEdit_RequiresApprovalLoopholeClosed pins all 3
  bypass attempts (flip-off / kept-on / flip-on) gated; nil-
  approval-service preserves pre-Phase-9 direct-apply for
  test fixtures.
* Approval service tests gain 4 profile_edit rows: pending row
  shape; same-actor self-approve rejected with
  ErrApproveBySameActor (load-bearing two-person integrity);
  approve fails-closed when apply callback unwired;
  apply callback invoked on approve.
* docs/reference/profiles.md (new) explains the gate +
  edit response shape (202) + same-actor invariant + bypass
  + audit hooks.

# Phase 10 — RBAC management GUI

* useAuthMe hook (web/src/hooks/useAuthMe.ts): TanStack Query
  fetches /api/v1/auth/me on app boot, caches for 60s, exposes
  hasPerm(p) + hasAnyPerm + isAdmin predicates. Every Phase-10
  page consumes this on mount + gates affordances against the
  cached effective_permissions slice. Server-side enforcement
  is the load-bearing gate; client-side hide/disable is UX.
* New routes:
   - /auth/roles — list (auth.role.list); create-role modal
     (auth.role.create) hidden when missing.
   - /auth/roles/:id — detail + permissions; edit
     (auth.role.edit), delete (auth.role.delete), add/remove
     permission affordances each gated.
   - /auth/keys — list of every actor with role grants; assign
     + revoke modals (auth.role.assign). actor-demo-anon
     flagged system-managed; mutation buttons hidden for it.
   - /auth/settings — stub showing /v1/auth/me identity +
     bootstrap-endpoint availability via /v1/auth/bootstrap.
* AuditPage extended with category filter ('All categories'
  + the 3 enum values from migration 000032). Selection flows
  to the API call params + the URL-driven query state.
* Layout: 3 new nav entries (Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings).
* api/client.ts: 12 new exported functions for the RBAC
  surface (authMe, list/get/create/update/delete role,
  list/add/remove role permissions, list keys, assign/revoke
  key role, bootstrap-availability probe).
* data-testid attributes on every interactive element so a
  future Playwright suite can assert behavior without brittle
  CSS selectors.
* Empty state, error state, and unsaved-changes warnings on
  every form per the prompt's implementation rules.

# Frontend tests

* RolesPage.test.tsx (6 tests): list render, empty state,
  error state, hide-create-button-without-perm,
  show-create-button-with-perm, submit-create-modal.
* KeysPage.test.tsx (3 tests): demo-anon flagged
  system-managed (no buttons), permission-gated affordance
  hide for auditor caller, assign-modal-POST contract.
* AuthSettingsPage.test.tsx (2 tests): identity surface,
  bootstrap-OPEN-status surface.
* AuditPage.test.tsx (+1): category-filter select renders
  with the 4 documented options.

15 frontend tests total in src/pages/auth/ + the audit
category-filter test; all pass via npx vitest run.

# Verifications

* go vet ./... clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* gofmt -l clean repo-wide.
* go test -short -count=1 green across internal/service,
  internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/auth,
  internal/auth/bootstrap, internal/service/auth,
  internal/domain/auth, cmd/server, cmd/cli, internal/cli.
* npx tsc --noEmit clean.
* npm run build green (vite build produces dist/index.html
  + 946KB JS bundle; chunk-size warning is pre-existing).
* npx vitest run src/pages/auth/ src/pages/AuditPage.test.tsx
  green (15 tests, 4 files).
2026-05-09 21:03:59 +00:00

464 lines
18 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// ApprovalService manages the issuance approval-workflow primitive.
// Rank 7 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable.
//
// Lifecycle: a profile with RequiresApproval=true causes the renewal
// entry points (TriggerRenewal + CheckExpiringCertificates) to call
// RequestApproval; the resulting Job is created at
// JobStatusAwaitingApproval; the scheduler does NOT dispatch until
// Approve transitions the job to Pending.
//
// RBAC contract: the requester cannot approve their own request.
// Approve checks decidedBy != request.RequestedBy and rejects with
// ErrApproveBySameActor otherwise. This is the load-bearing two-
// person integrity check; compliance auditors pattern-match against
// it.
//
// Bypass mode: if CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS=true at boot, every
// RequestApproval call immediately auto-approves with
// decidedBy="system-bypass". Used by dev / CI to keep renewal-
// scheduler tests fast without standing up an approver. Production
// deploys MUST leave this unset; the bypass emits an audit row with
// ActorType=System so a downstream auditor can grep for
// "system-bypass" approvals and confirm none happened in production.
type ApprovalService struct {
approvalRepo repository.ApprovalRepository
jobRepo JobStatusUpdater
auditService *AuditService
metrics *ApprovalMetrics
bypassEnabled bool
// profileEditApply is the Bundle 1 Phase 9 hook the approve
// path invokes when req.Kind=profile_edit. Registered by
// cmd/server/main.go via SetProfileEditApply so the service
// doesn't import internal/service/profile.go (would create a
// cycle: ApprovalService -> ProfileService -> ApprovalService).
profileEditApply ProfileEditApplyFunc
}
// ProfileEditApplyFunc deserializes the pending profile diff stored
// in req.Payload and persists it via the profile repository. The
// caller registers this once at boot via SetProfileEditApply.
type ProfileEditApplyFunc func(ctx context.Context, req *domain.ApprovalRequest) error
// SetProfileEditApply registers the profile-edit apply callback. Called
// from main.go after both the ApprovalService and ProfileService are
// constructed; the closure captures the profile repo + audit service.
func (s *ApprovalService) SetProfileEditApply(f ProfileEditApplyFunc) {
s.profileEditApply = f
}
// JobStatusUpdater is the narrow interface ApprovalService depends on
// from JobRepository. Accepting the small interface (rather than the
// full repository.JobRepository) keeps the test mock surface tiny —
// real JobRepository implementations (postgres + any future) satisfy
// it implicitly because they implement UpdateStatus already.
type JobStatusUpdater interface {
UpdateStatus(ctx context.Context, id string, status domain.JobStatus, errMsg string) error
}
// NewApprovalService constructs an ApprovalService. metrics may be nil
// for tests that don't need Prometheus integration; auditService should
// not be nil in production but is tolerated for unit tests that don't
// care about audit-row emission.
func NewApprovalService(
approvalRepo repository.ApprovalRepository,
jobRepo JobStatusUpdater,
auditService *AuditService,
metrics *ApprovalMetrics,
bypassEnabled bool,
) *ApprovalService {
return &ApprovalService{
approvalRepo: approvalRepo,
jobRepo: jobRepo,
auditService: auditService,
metrics: metrics,
bypassEnabled: bypassEnabled,
}
}
// Sentinels for handler-side dispatch via errors.Is.
var (
// ErrApprovalNotFound is returned when the request ID does not exist.
// Handlers map to HTTP 404.
ErrApprovalNotFound = errors.New("approval request not found")
// ErrApprovalAlreadyDecided is returned when Approve / Reject is called
// on a request whose State is already terminal. Handlers map to HTTP 409.
ErrApprovalAlreadyDecided = errors.New("approval request already decided")
// ErrApproveBySameActor is the load-bearing two-person integrity check.
// Returned when the supplied decidedBy equals request.RequestedBy.
// Handlers map to HTTP 403.
ErrApproveBySameActor = errors.New("approver cannot be the same as requester (two-person integrity)")
)
// RequestApproval creates a pending ApprovalRequest row and is invoked
// from the renewal entry points after they have created the Job at
// Status=AwaitingApproval. Returns the request ID for handler /
// caller use.
//
// If bypassEnabled is true, this method synchronously calls Approve
// internally with decidedBy=ApprovalActorSystemBypass and returns the
// resulting (now-approved) request ID. The audit row records
// ActorType=System so a downstream auditor can confirm bypass-mode
// was off in production via a single SQL query.
func (s *ApprovalService) RequestApproval(
ctx context.Context,
cert *domain.ManagedCertificate,
jobID, profileID, requestedBy string,
metadata map[string]string,
) (string, error) {
if cert == nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: nil certificate")
}
if jobID == "" || profileID == "" || requestedBy == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: jobID, profileID, requestedBy required")
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
req := &domain.ApprovalRequest{
CertificateID: cert.ID,
JobID: jobID,
ProfileID: profileID,
RequestedBy: requestedBy,
State: domain.ApprovalStatePending,
Metadata: metadata,
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
if err := s.approvalRepo.Create(ctx, req); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: create request: %w", err)
}
// Audit the request creation. Bypass-mode logs both the request and
// the auto-approval as separate rows so the timeline is honest.
s.recordAudit(ctx, requestedBy, domain.ActorTypeUser, "approval_requested", req, nil)
if s.bypassEnabled {
if err := s.approveInternal(ctx, req.ID, domain.ApprovalActorSystemBypass,
"auto-approved by CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS — dev/CI mode",
domain.ApprovalOutcomeBypassed, domain.ActorTypeSystem); err != nil {
return req.ID, fmt.Errorf("approval: bypass auto-approve: %w", err)
}
}
return req.ID, nil
}
// RequestProfileEditApproval is the Bundle 1 Phase 9 entry point for
// gated profile mutations. ProfileService.UpdateProfile calls this
// when the live profile (or the proposed update) carries
// RequiresApproval=true. Returns the new pending approval ID.
//
// The pending diff is serialized to req.Payload as JSON; the
// profile-edit-apply callback (registered by main.go) deserializes
// and persists when an approver decides.
//
// In bypass mode (CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS=true) the call short-
// circuits via approveInternal — the same dev/CI escape hatch as
// cert_issuance — so renewal-loop tests remain fast.
func (s *ApprovalService) RequestProfileEditApproval(
ctx context.Context,
profileID, requestedBy string,
payload []byte,
) (string, error) {
if profileID == "" || requestedBy == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: profileID + requestedBy required")
}
if len(payload) == 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: payload required for profile_edit")
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
req := &domain.ApprovalRequest{
Kind: domain.ApprovalKindProfileEdit,
ProfileID: profileID,
RequestedBy: requestedBy,
State: domain.ApprovalStatePending,
Payload: payload,
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
if err := s.approvalRepo.Create(ctx, req); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("approval: create profile_edit request: %w", err)
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, requestedBy, domain.ActorTypeUser, "approval_profile_edit_requested", req, nil)
if s.bypassEnabled {
if err := s.approveInternal(ctx, req.ID, domain.ApprovalActorSystemBypass,
"auto-approved by CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS — dev/CI mode",
domain.ApprovalOutcomeBypassed, domain.ActorTypeSystem); err != nil {
return req.ID, fmt.Errorf("approval: bypass auto-approve profile_edit: %w", err)
}
}
return req.ID, nil
}
// Approve transitions a pending request to approved AND the linked Job
// from AwaitingApproval to Pending so the job processor picks it up.
// RBAC: rejects if decidedBy == request.RequestedBy.
func (s *ApprovalService) Approve(ctx context.Context, requestID, decidedBy, note string) error {
req, err := s.approvalRepo.Get(ctx, requestID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return ErrApprovalNotFound
}
return fmt.Errorf("approval: get for approve: %w", err)
}
if req.State.IsTerminal() {
return ErrApprovalAlreadyDecided
}
if decidedBy == req.RequestedBy {
return ErrApproveBySameActor
}
return s.approveInternal(ctx, requestID, decidedBy, note,
domain.ApprovalOutcomeApproved, domain.ActorTypeUser)
}
// approveInternal is the shared transition path for both human-Approve
// and bypass-mode auto-approve. Same DB transition + audit + metric
// recording, but the outcome label + actorType differ.
func (s *ApprovalService) approveInternal(
ctx context.Context, requestID, decidedBy, note, outcome string,
actorType domain.ActorType,
) error {
now := time.Now().UTC()
// Re-fetch the request after the state-transition guards in Approve so
// we can stamp the metric's pending-age + transition the job. For the
// bypass path, this is the first read.
req, err := s.approvalRepo.Get(ctx, requestID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return ErrApprovalNotFound
}
return fmt.Errorf("approval: get for transition: %w", err)
}
if req.State.IsTerminal() {
return ErrApprovalAlreadyDecided
}
if err := s.approvalRepo.UpdateState(ctx, requestID,
domain.ApprovalStateApproved, decidedBy, now, note); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return ErrApprovalNotFound
}
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAlreadyExists) {
return ErrApprovalAlreadyDecided
}
return fmt.Errorf("approval: update state to approved: %w", err)
}
// Bundle 1 Phase 9: profile_edit kind requires the apply
// callback to deserialize req.Payload + persist the profile
// diff. cert_issuance kind continues through the existing job-
// transition path. The kind discriminator is the load-bearing
// dispatch — adding a future ApprovalKind goes here.
if req.Kind == domain.ApprovalKindProfileEdit {
if s.profileEditApply == nil {
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, actorType, "approval_profile_apply_missing", req,
map[string]interface{}{"error": "profileEditApply callback not wired"})
return fmt.Errorf("approval: profile-edit apply callback not registered")
}
if err := s.profileEditApply(ctx, req); err != nil {
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, actorType, "approval_profile_apply_failed", req,
map[string]interface{}{"error": err.Error()})
return fmt.Errorf("approval: apply profile edit: %w", err)
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, actorType, "approval_"+outcome, req,
map[string]interface{}{"note": note, "outcome": outcome, "kind": string(req.Kind)})
if s.metrics != nil {
s.metrics.RecordDecision(outcome, req.ProfileID)
s.metrics.ObservePendingAge(now.Sub(req.CreatedAt).Seconds())
}
return nil
}
// Transition the linked Job from AwaitingApproval to Pending so the
// scheduler picks it up. Best-effort — if the Job has already been
// cancelled or otherwise mutated externally, log via audit and move on.
if err := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, req.JobID, domain.JobStatusPending, ""); err != nil {
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, actorType, "approval_job_transition_failed", req,
map[string]interface{}{"target_status": string(domain.JobStatusPending), "error": err.Error()})
return fmt.Errorf("approval: transition job to Pending: %w", err)
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, actorType, "approval_"+outcome, req,
map[string]interface{}{"note": note, "outcome": outcome})
if s.metrics != nil {
s.metrics.RecordDecision(outcome, req.ProfileID)
s.metrics.ObservePendingAge(now.Sub(req.CreatedAt).Seconds())
}
return nil
}
// Reject transitions a pending request to rejected AND the linked Job
// from AwaitingApproval to Cancelled. RBAC: same-actor check applies.
func (s *ApprovalService) Reject(ctx context.Context, requestID, decidedBy, note string) error {
req, err := s.approvalRepo.Get(ctx, requestID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return ErrApprovalNotFound
}
return fmt.Errorf("approval: get for reject: %w", err)
}
if req.State.IsTerminal() {
return ErrApprovalAlreadyDecided
}
if decidedBy == req.RequestedBy {
return ErrApproveBySameActor
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
if err := s.approvalRepo.UpdateState(ctx, requestID,
domain.ApprovalStateRejected, decidedBy, now, note); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return ErrApprovalNotFound
}
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAlreadyExists) {
return ErrApprovalAlreadyDecided
}
return fmt.Errorf("approval: update state to rejected: %w", err)
}
if err := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, req.JobID, domain.JobStatusCancelled,
"approval rejected: "+note); err != nil {
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, domain.ActorTypeUser, "approval_job_transition_failed", req,
map[string]interface{}{"target_status": string(domain.JobStatusCancelled), "error": err.Error()})
return fmt.Errorf("approval: transition job to Cancelled: %w", err)
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, decidedBy, domain.ActorTypeUser, "approval_rejected", req,
map[string]interface{}{"note": note, "outcome": domain.ApprovalOutcomeRejected})
if s.metrics != nil {
s.metrics.RecordDecision(domain.ApprovalOutcomeRejected, req.ProfileID)
s.metrics.ObservePendingAge(now.Sub(req.CreatedAt).Seconds())
}
return nil
}
// ListPending returns approval requests in state=pending, paginated.
// Operators reading the dashboard call this on every page load.
func (s *ApprovalService) ListPending(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]*domain.ApprovalRequest, error) {
return s.approvalRepo.List(ctx, &repository.ApprovalFilter{
State: string(domain.ApprovalStatePending),
Page: page,
PerPage: perPage,
})
}
// List returns approval requests filtered by the supplied filter. Used
// by handler GET /api/v1/approvals with arbitrary state.
func (s *ApprovalService) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.ApprovalFilter) ([]*domain.ApprovalRequest, error) {
return s.approvalRepo.List(ctx, filter)
}
// Get returns a single approval request by ID, or ErrApprovalNotFound.
func (s *ApprovalService) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.ApprovalRequest, error) {
req, err := s.approvalRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, ErrApprovalNotFound
}
return nil, err
}
return req, nil
}
// ExpireStale runs from the scheduler's reaper loop. Calls the
// repository's ExpireStale (bulk pending→expired transition) +
// transitions matching jobs from AwaitingApproval to Cancelled.
// Records one audit row per expiry. Returns the count expired.
//
// Operators alert when this is non-zero — it means an approval
// request timed out without human review.
func (s *ApprovalService) ExpireStale(ctx context.Context, before time.Time) (int, error) {
// Find pending requests older than `before` so we can record the
// audit + metric per expiry. ExpireStale on the repo bulk-mutates
// the rows; we read first to capture the per-row metadata for
// auditing, then call the repo's bulk update.
pending, err := s.approvalRepo.List(ctx, &repository.ApprovalFilter{
State: string(domain.ApprovalStatePending),
PerPage: 500,
})
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("approval: list pending for expiry: %w", err)
}
var stale []*domain.ApprovalRequest
for _, req := range pending {
if req.CreatedAt.Before(before) || req.CreatedAt.Equal(before) {
stale = append(stale, req)
}
}
if len(stale) == 0 {
return 0, nil
}
count, err := s.approvalRepo.ExpireStale(ctx, before)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("approval: bulk expire: %w", err)
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
for _, req := range stale {
// Cancel the linked job — best-effort. The scheduler's existing
// ReapTimedOutJobs already handles AwaitingApproval timeouts on
// the job side; this is a defensive double-cancel that's
// idempotent if the scheduler already ran.
if err := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, req.JobID, domain.JobStatusCancelled,
"approval expired: timed out without review"); err != nil {
// Log via audit and continue — don't fail the whole sweep on
// one bad job.
s.recordAudit(ctx, "system-reaper", domain.ActorTypeSystem, "approval_job_transition_failed", req,
map[string]interface{}{"target_status": string(domain.JobStatusCancelled), "error": err.Error()})
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, "system-reaper", domain.ActorTypeSystem, "approval_expired", req,
map[string]interface{}{"outcome": domain.ApprovalOutcomeExpired, "before_cutoff": before.Format(time.RFC3339)})
if s.metrics != nil {
s.metrics.RecordDecision(domain.ApprovalOutcomeExpired, req.ProfileID)
s.metrics.ObservePendingAge(now.Sub(req.CreatedAt).Seconds())
}
}
return count, nil
}
// recordAudit is the shared audit-emission helper. Tolerates a nil
// AuditService (unit tests that don't wire it) and discards errors —
// audit failures must not block the primary state transition.
func (s *ApprovalService) recordAudit(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType,
action string, req *domain.ApprovalRequest, extra map[string]interface{}) {
if s.auditService == nil || req == nil {
return
}
details := map[string]interface{}{
"approval_id": req.ID,
"certificate_id": req.CertificateID,
"job_id": req.JobID,
"profile_id": req.ProfileID,
"requested_by": req.RequestedBy,
"state": string(req.State),
}
for k, v := range req.Metadata {
details["metadata_"+k] = v
}
for k, v := range extra {
details[k] = v
}
_ = s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, actorType, action,
"approval_request", req.ID, details)
}