mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 19:11:30 +00:00
9039cef390
This is a load-bearing internal refactor with no user-visible behavior
change. The new internal/crypto/signer package abstracts CA private-key
signing behind a Signer interface (embeds stdlib crypto.Signer + adds
Algorithm()). The local issuer now consumes this interface; the
historical c.caKey crypto.Signer field is renamed c.caSigner signer.Signer.
What landed:
* internal/crypto/signer/ — new stdlib-only package
- Signer interface: crypto.Signer + Algorithm()
- Algorithm enum: RSA-2048, RSA-3072, RSA-4096, ECDSA-P256, ECDSA-P384
- Driver interface: Load / Generate / Name
- FileDriver: production driver, wraps file-on-disk PEM, hooks for
DirHardener + Marshaler so the local package can inject Bundle 9
keystore.ensureKeyDirSecure + keymem.marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize
- MemoryDriver: in-memory test driver; safe for concurrent use
- parse.go: ParsePrivateKey moved here from local.go (PKCS#1, SEC 1, PKCS#8)
- 91.6% coverage (gate ≥85)
* internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go — refactor
- Rename c.caKey crypto.Signer → c.caSigner signer.Signer
- Rewire 4 signing call sites: leaf cert (line ~613), CRL (~849),
OCSP response (~887), CA bootstrap (~482) — all access the
interface; the bootstrap also switches to interface-level
Public() + Signer
- Wrap freshly-generated and freshly-loaded keys; reject Ed25519
and other unsupported algorithms at load time (was silently
accepted before, would have failed at first sign)
- Delete the duplicated parsePrivateKey helper (single source of
truth now lives in the signer package)
- Update the L-014 threat-model comment block (lines 1-29) with a
forward-reference paragraph: file-on-disk caveats apply only to
FileDriver-backed signers; alternative drivers close that leg
- Coverage 86.7 → 86.5 (above CI floor of 86); the 0.2pp drop is
mechanical from deleting parsePrivateKey, partially recovered by
a new test pinning the Wrap error path
* internal/crypto/signer/equivalence_test.go — Phase 3 safety net
- RSA byte-strict equality for leaf certs / CRLs / OCSP responses
(PKCS#1 v1.5 is deterministic)
- ECDSA TBS-strict equality (signature differs because of random k)
- Both signatures independently validate against the CA
- Negative sentinel proves the equivalence checker isn't trivially-
passing
* docs/architecture.md — new 'CA Signing Abstraction' section under
Security Model, with ASCII diagram of FileDriver / MemoryDriver /
future PKCS11Driver / future CloudKMSDriver
* Test file mechanical edits (only):
- bundle9_coverage_test.go: parsePrivateKey → signer.ParsePrivateKey
(function moved, not behavior changed)
- local_test.go: append one targeted test
(TestSubCA_LoadCAFromDisk_RejectsUnsupportedKeyAlgorithm) that
pins the new Wrap error path I introduced — recovers coverage
cost of the deletion above
What did NOT change (verified empty diffs):
* api/openapi.yaml
* migrations/
* internal/connector/issuer/interface.go
* go.mod / go.sum (no new dependencies; stdlib only)
This refactor is the prerequisite for three downstream items:
- PKCS#11/HSM driver (V3-Pro)
- CRL/OCSP responder (V2)
- SSH CA lifecycle (V2)
Each of those adds a new signing call site. Doing the abstraction now
costs once; deferring would cost three times.
126 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
126 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package signer
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"crypto"
|
|
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"crypto/rsa"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"sync"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// MemoryDriver holds keys in process memory. It is intended for tests
|
|
// that need a Signer-shaped object without touching the filesystem
|
|
// or any external infrastructure. It is NOT for production use:
|
|
// keys disappear when the process exits, no hardening of any kind is
|
|
// applied, and concurrent Generate calls have no rate limit.
|
|
//
|
|
// The driver is safe for concurrent use; an internal mutex guards the
|
|
// keys map.
|
|
type MemoryDriver struct {
|
|
mu sync.Mutex
|
|
keys map[string]crypto.Signer
|
|
// nextID is incremented on every successful Generate; the returned
|
|
// ref string is "mem-<nextID>" so multiple Generates produce
|
|
// distinct refs even when callers don't supply one.
|
|
nextID int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewMemoryDriver returns a freshly initialized MemoryDriver. Callers
|
|
// holding multiple drivers can rely on each one being independent —
|
|
// keys from driver A are not visible to driver B.
|
|
func NewMemoryDriver() *MemoryDriver {
|
|
return &MemoryDriver{keys: map[string]crypto.Signer{}}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Name implements Driver.
|
|
func (d *MemoryDriver) Name() string { return "memory" }
|
|
|
|
// Load implements Driver. Returns the Signer for the given ref, or an
|
|
// error if the ref was never produced by Generate / Adopt.
|
|
func (d *MemoryDriver) Load(ctx context.Context, ref string) (Signer, error) {
|
|
if ref == "" {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("signer.MemoryDriver.Load: empty ref")
|
|
}
|
|
d.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer d.mu.Unlock()
|
|
key, ok := d.keys[ref]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("signer.MemoryDriver.Load: unknown ref %q", ref)
|
|
}
|
|
return Wrap(key)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate implements Driver. Creates a fresh in-memory key with the
|
|
// requested algorithm and returns the wrapped Signer plus the ref
|
|
// string callers can pass to a subsequent Load.
|
|
func (d *MemoryDriver) Generate(ctx context.Context, alg Algorithm) (Signer, string, error) {
|
|
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("signer.MemoryDriver.Generate: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var key crypto.Signer
|
|
switch alg {
|
|
case AlgorithmRSA2048, AlgorithmRSA3072, AlgorithmRSA4096:
|
|
bits := rsaBitsFor(alg)
|
|
k, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, bits)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("signer.MemoryDriver.Generate: rsa keygen %d: %w", bits, err)
|
|
}
|
|
key = k
|
|
case AlgorithmECDSAP256, AlgorithmECDSAP384:
|
|
curve := ecCurveFor(alg)
|
|
k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(curve, rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("signer.MemoryDriver.Generate: ecdsa keygen %s: %w", curve.Params().Name, err)
|
|
}
|
|
key = k
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("signer.MemoryDriver.Generate: %w: %s", ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm, alg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d.mu.Lock()
|
|
d.nextID++
|
|
ref := fmt.Sprintf("mem-%d", d.nextID)
|
|
d.keys[ref] = key
|
|
d.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
wrapped, err := Wrap(key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("signer.MemoryDriver.Generate: wrap: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return wrapped, ref, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Adopt registers an externally-generated crypto.Signer under ref so
|
|
// subsequent Load calls return it. Returns an error if ref is already
|
|
// taken — keep refs unique to avoid silent override surprises.
|
|
//
|
|
// Useful in tests that want a deterministic key (generated outside
|
|
// the driver, e.g. from a fixed PEM fixture) reachable through the
|
|
// driver.
|
|
func (d *MemoryDriver) Adopt(ref string, key crypto.Signer) error {
|
|
if ref == "" {
|
|
return errors.New("signer.MemoryDriver.Adopt: empty ref")
|
|
}
|
|
if key == nil {
|
|
return errors.New("signer.MemoryDriver.Adopt: nil key")
|
|
}
|
|
d.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer d.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if _, exists := d.keys[ref]; exists {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("signer.MemoryDriver.Adopt: ref %q already exists", ref)
|
|
}
|
|
d.keys[ref] = key
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// _ guards that MemoryDriver implements Driver (catch interface drift
|
|
// at build time, not test time).
|
|
var _ Driver = (*MemoryDriver)(nil)
|
|
|
|
// _ guards that FileDriver implements Driver.
|
|
var _ Driver = (*FileDriver)(nil)
|