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shankar0123
9039cef390
This is a load-bearing internal refactor with no user-visible behavior
change. The new internal/crypto/signer package abstracts CA private-key
signing behind a Signer interface (embeds stdlib crypto.Signer + adds
Algorithm()). The local issuer now consumes this interface; the
historical c.caKey crypto.Signer field is renamed c.caSigner signer.Signer.
What landed:
* internal/crypto/signer/ — new stdlib-only package
- Signer interface: crypto.Signer + Algorithm()
- Algorithm enum: RSA-2048, RSA-3072, RSA-4096, ECDSA-P256, ECDSA-P384
- Driver interface: Load / Generate / Name
- FileDriver: production driver, wraps file-on-disk PEM, hooks for
DirHardener + Marshaler so the local package can inject Bundle 9
keystore.ensureKeyDirSecure + keymem.marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize
- MemoryDriver: in-memory test driver; safe for concurrent use
- parse.go: ParsePrivateKey moved here from local.go (PKCS#1, SEC 1, PKCS#8)
- 91.6% coverage (gate ≥85)
* internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go — refactor
- Rename c.caKey crypto.Signer → c.caSigner signer.Signer
- Rewire 4 signing call sites: leaf cert (line ~613), CRL (~849),
OCSP response (~887), CA bootstrap (~482) — all access the
interface; the bootstrap also switches to interface-level
Public() + Signer
- Wrap freshly-generated and freshly-loaded keys; reject Ed25519
and other unsupported algorithms at load time (was silently
accepted before, would have failed at first sign)
- Delete the duplicated parsePrivateKey helper (single source of
truth now lives in the signer package)
- Update the L-014 threat-model comment block (lines 1-29) with a
forward-reference paragraph: file-on-disk caveats apply only to
FileDriver-backed signers; alternative drivers close that leg
- Coverage 86.7 → 86.5 (above CI floor of 86); the 0.2pp drop is
mechanical from deleting parsePrivateKey, partially recovered by
a new test pinning the Wrap error path
* internal/crypto/signer/equivalence_test.go — Phase 3 safety net
- RSA byte-strict equality for leaf certs / CRLs / OCSP responses
(PKCS#1 v1.5 is deterministic)
- ECDSA TBS-strict equality (signature differs because of random k)
- Both signatures independently validate against the CA
- Negative sentinel proves the equivalence checker isn't trivially-
passing
* docs/architecture.md — new 'CA Signing Abstraction' section under
Security Model, with ASCII diagram of FileDriver / MemoryDriver /
future PKCS11Driver / future CloudKMSDriver
* Test file mechanical edits (only):
- bundle9_coverage_test.go: parsePrivateKey → signer.ParsePrivateKey
(function moved, not behavior changed)
- local_test.go: append one targeted test
(TestSubCA_LoadCAFromDisk_RejectsUnsupportedKeyAlgorithm) that
pins the new Wrap error path I introduced — recovers coverage
cost of the deletion above
What did NOT change (verified empty diffs):
* api/openapi.yaml
* migrations/
* internal/connector/issuer/interface.go
* go.mod / go.sum (no new dependencies; stdlib only)
This refactor is the prerequisite for three downstream items:
- PKCS#11/HSM driver (V3-Pro)
- CRL/OCSP responder (V2)
- SSH CA lifecycle (V2)
Each of those adds a new signing call site. Doing the abstraction now
costs once; deferring would cost three times.
55 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
55 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
package signer
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import "context"
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// Driver knows how to materialize a Signer from some external reference
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// (a file path, a PKCS#11 URI, a cloud KMS key ID, etc.) and how to
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// generate a fresh key with a given algorithm.
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//
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// Drivers are responsible for any side-effect storage: FileDriver writes
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// generated keys to disk via the keystore.ensureKeyDirSecure +
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// keymem.marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize discipline (injected via the
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// FileDriver's hooks); future PKCS11Driver delegates key generation to
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// the token; cloud-KMS drivers call the provider API.
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//
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// All Driver methods take a context.Context for cancellation/deadline
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// propagation. Drivers MUST honor ctx.Done() for any I/O they perform;
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// purely-in-memory drivers (MemoryDriver) may return immediately
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// regardless of ctx state.
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//
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// Adding a new driver does NOT require changing this interface or any
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// existing driver. The driver lives in its own package
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// (internal/crypto/signer/<name>) and is constructed by a typed
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// factory (e.g., pkcs11.New(config)).
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type Driver interface {
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// Load resolves an existing key from ref and returns a Signer.
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// ref interpretation is driver-specific:
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//
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// - FileDriver: filesystem path to a PEM-encoded private key
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// - PKCS11Driver (future): pkcs11: URI per RFC 7512
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// - CloudKMSDriver (future): provider-specific resource name
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//
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// Drivers MUST NOT log the contents of the loaded key (only the
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// ref + Algorithm). Callers wrap the returned Signer's Sign method
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// in their own logging if they need per-signature audit trail.
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Load(ctx context.Context, ref string) (Signer, error)
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// Generate creates a new key with the given algorithm and persists
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// it to driver-specific storage (or in-memory for MemoryDriver).
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// Returns a Signer wrapping the new key plus a ref string the
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// caller passes to a subsequent Load call (e.g., the file path
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// for FileDriver, the PKCS#11 URI for PKCS11Driver).
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//
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// If alg is not in the supported enum, Generate returns
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// ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm without side effects (no file written,
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// no token slot consumed).
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Generate(ctx context.Context, alg Algorithm) (Signer, string, error)
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// Name returns a stable identifier for the driver type. Used in
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// structured logs and (eventually) in CRL distribution-point URLs
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// when the URL embeds the signer kind. MUST be a single
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// lowercase token without spaces ("file", "memory", "pkcs11",
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// "aws-kms", "gcp-kms", "azure-kv").
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Name() string
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}
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