Files
certctl/cmd/server/preflight_demo_residual.go
T
shankar0123 a923cf697c harden(auth): demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard (A-8)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 closure. Closes the deferred Phase 2 leg of the
2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure (2e97cc1) — production-startup observability
for actor-demo-anon residual grants + CI guard banning new synthetic-
admin code paths.

What this changes:

* cmd/server/preflight_demo_residual.go (new) runs after the DB pool +
  audit service are constructed and before the HTTPS listener starts.
  Under any non-'none' auth type it queries actor_roles for the
  synthetic actor-demo-anon and emits a WARN log + a categorized audit
  row (auth.demo_residual_grants_detected) listing every grant
  present. Migration 000029 unconditionally seeds the ar-demo-anon-admin
  row at install time, so EVERY production deploy will see this WARN
  on first boot; the intended cutover workflow is cleanup-once at
  production handover.

* CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_RESIDUAL_STRICT (new env var on AuthConfig,
  default false) pivots the WARN to fail-closed startup refusal for
  operators who want a paranoid posture against re-seeding.

* POST /api/v1/auth/demo-residual/cleanup (new handler at
  internal/api/handler/demo_residual.go) is an admin-class
  (auth.role.assign) endpoint that removes every actor-demo-anon row
  from actor_roles and returns {removed: int64}. Idempotent; refuses
  503 under Auth.Type=none (deleting the row would break the demo
  path); audit-logs every invocation including no-op zero-removed
  calls so the admin's action is always recorded.

* scripts/ci-guards/no-new-synthetic-admin.sh pins the 17-entry
  allowlist of source files that legitimately reference the
  actor-demo-anon literal. New runtime code paths that resolve to the
  synthetic actor (the same pattern that produced the original CRIT
  class) are rejected at PR time. CI workflow auto-picks the script
  via the existing scripts/ci-guards/*.sh loop in .github/workflows/
  ci.yml; no workflow edit needed.

Regression matrix:

* cmd/server/preflight_demo_residual_test.go — 7 tests covering the
  4 main behaviour branches (testcontainers-backed, testing.Short()-
  skipped: DemoModeActive_Skips, NoResidue_Passes, HasResidue_LogsAnd
  Audits, StrictMode_RefusesStartup, DeleteDemoAnonResidue_Idempotent)
  plus 3 pure-Go stdlib unit tests for the row-string formatter +
  nil-safety contracts on both helpers.

* internal/api/handler/demo_residual_test.go — 7 stdlib+httptest
  cases: HappyPath, Idempotent_ReturnsZero, RejectsInDemoMode (503),
  CleanupError_Surfaces500, NilCleanupFn (defensive 500),
  NilAuditWriter_DoesNotPanic, MissingActorContext (falls back to
  'unknown' actor in the audit row).

* internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go — new
  POST /api/v1/auth/demo-residual/cleanup entry plus 6 pre-existing
  pre-A-8 entries (oidc/test, jwks-status, users CRUD, runtime-config)
  that had drifted out of SpecParityExceptions; the parity test was
  red on dev/auth-bundle-2 before my work; this commit returns it to
  green with full per-entry justifications + parity-debt notes.

Docs:

* docs/operator/security.md — new 'Demo-to-production cutover (Audit
  2026-05-11 A-8)' section explaining the WARN message, the cleanup
  curl one-liner, the equivalent SQL, the strict-mode env var, and
  the CI guard.

* docs/operator/rbac.md — Last-reviewed bump + pointer to the new
  env var + the security.md section.

* cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md — HIGH-12 row gains an
  'A-8 follow-on CLOSED 2026-05-11' annotation describing the
  deferred Phase 2 leg now landed.

* CHANGELOG.md — Unreleased ### Security entry summarizing the four
  legs (detector + cleanup + strict-mode flag + CI guard) and the
  acquisition-readiness narrative this closes.

Operator-facing impact: this closes a credibility gap, not an
exploitable vulnerability. The residue requires a regression
elsewhere in the middleware chain to be exploitable. After this
fix, the canonical narrative ('RBAC primitive with no synthetic-
admin fallback') is fully true.

Refs cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/08-high-demo-mode-residual-
cleanup.md.
2026-05-11 11:45:54 +00:00

204 lines
7.0 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) certctl-io contributors.
//
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 — demo-mode residual-grants detector. Closes the
// deferred Phase 2 leg of HIGH-12 (cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/
// 11-high-12-demo-mode-guard.md). The HIGH-12 closure (`b81588e`) added
// the fail-closed bind-address guard at config.Validate; the deferred
// leg here adds a startup-time WARN (or strict refuse-startup) when
// `actor-demo-anon` has live role grants under a non-`none` auth type.
//
// Why this matters: migration 000029 unconditionally seeds the
// `ar-demo-anon-admin` row granting r-admin to actor-demo-anon. The
// row is dormant under auth_type=api-key|oidc (the middleware chain
// never injects the synthetic actor as the request principal), but
// it represents a security debt: any future regression in the
// middleware chain (a misrouted CORS preflight, a fallback in a new
// auth-exempt route) that resolves to actor-demo-anon would re-elevate
// to admin. The canonical acquisition-readiness narrative — "we have
// an RBAC primitive with no synthetic-admin fallback" — requires this
// row to be either gone or explicitly acknowledged.
package main
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/config"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
)
// preflightDemoModeResidual runs after the DB connection is open and
// the audit service is constructed, before the HTTPS listener starts.
//
// Behaviour:
// - cfg.Auth.Type == "none" (demo mode): no-op. The residual IS the
// runtime state at that auth type.
// - cfg.Auth.Type != "none" + no residue: returns nil silently.
// - cfg.Auth.Type != "none" + residue + strict=false: emits a WARN
// log AND an `auth.demo_residual_grants_detected` audit row
// listing the grant IDs, then returns nil.
// - cfg.Auth.Type != "none" + residue + strict=true: emits the same
// WARN + audit, then returns a non-nil error so the caller can
// refuse startup.
//
// The audit row's actor is `system` / ActorTypeSystem; category is
// EventCategoryAuth so audit consumers filtering on auth events see it.
func preflightDemoModeResidual(
ctx context.Context,
cfg *config.Config,
db *sql.DB,
audit *service.AuditService,
logger *slog.Logger,
) error {
if cfg.Auth.Type == "none" {
// Demo mode itself. The residual is the runtime state at
// this auth type, so warning about it would be noise.
return nil
}
residue, err := queryDemoAnonResidue(ctx, db)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("preflight demo-mode residual: %w", err)
}
if len(residue) == 0 {
return nil
}
formatted := make([]string, 0, len(residue))
for _, r := range residue {
formatted = append(formatted, r.String())
}
msg := fmt.Sprintf(
"production startup warning: actor-demo-anon has %d residual role grant(s) "+
"from the migration 000029 baseline or a prior demo-mode run: %s. "+
"These grants are DORMANT at the current auth_type (%s) but represent a "+
"security debt — any future regression that resolves an unauthenticated "+
"request to actor-demo-anon would re-elevate to admin. Clean up via "+
"POST /api/v1/auth/demo-residual/cleanup (requires auth.role.assign) or "+
"`DELETE FROM actor_roles WHERE actor_id = 'actor-demo-anon';`. Set "+
"CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_RESIDUAL_STRICT=true to refuse startup until cleanup.",
len(residue), strings.Join(formatted, "; "), cfg.Auth.Type,
)
if logger != nil {
logger.Warn(msg, "auth_type", cfg.Auth.Type, "residue_count", len(residue))
} else {
slog.Warn(msg)
}
if audit != nil {
details := map[string]interface{}{
"auth_type": cfg.Auth.Type,
"residue_count": len(residue),
"residue": formatted,
}
if err := audit.RecordEventWithCategory(
ctx, "system", domain.ActorTypeSystem,
"auth.demo_residual_grants_detected",
domain.EventCategoryAuth,
"actor_roles", authdomain.DemoAnonActorID,
details,
); err != nil {
// Don't fail startup over an audit-write error; just log.
if logger != nil {
logger.Warn("preflight demo-mode residual: audit record failed", "error", err)
}
}
}
if cfg.Auth.DemoModeResidualStrict {
return fmt.Errorf(
"startup refused: actor-demo-anon has %d residual role grant(s) and "+
"CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_RESIDUAL_STRICT=true. Remove the rows before restarting",
len(residue),
)
}
return nil
}
// demoAnonResidueRow describes a single live actor_roles row whose
// actor_id matches the synthetic demo-anon ID.
type demoAnonResidueRow struct {
RoleID string
ScopeType string
ScopeID string
GrantedAt time.Time
}
// String renders one row as `role@scope (granted ts)`. Used both in
// the WARN log message and in the audit row's residue list.
func (r demoAnonResidueRow) String() string {
scope := r.ScopeType
if r.ScopeID != "" {
scope = fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", r.ScopeType, r.ScopeID)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s (granted %s)", r.RoleID, scope, r.GrantedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
}
// queryDemoAnonResidue runs the canonical query for the residue
// detector + the cleanup endpoint. Kept in one place so the two
// surfaces can't drift on which rows count as "live".
//
// "Live" = not expired. Rows with expires_at <= NOW() are treated
// as already gone (they have no effect even if the actor were to be
// injected as the principal).
func queryDemoAnonResidue(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) ([]demoAnonResidueRow, error) {
if db == nil {
return nil, errors.New("db is nil")
}
rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT role_id, scope_type, COALESCE(scope_id, '') AS scope_id, granted_at
FROM actor_roles
WHERE actor_id = $1
AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
ORDER BY granted_at ASC, role_id ASC, scope_type ASC, COALESCE(scope_id, '') ASC
`, authdomain.DemoAnonActorID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("query actor_roles: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []demoAnonResidueRow
for rows.Next() {
var r demoAnonResidueRow
if err := rows.Scan(&r.RoleID, &r.ScopeType, &r.ScopeID, &r.GrantedAt); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan actor_roles row: %w", err)
}
out = append(out, r)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("iterate actor_roles rows: %w", err)
}
return out, nil
}
// deleteDemoAnonResidue removes every live actor_roles row for the
// synthetic demo-anon actor. Returns the count removed. Used by the
// POST /api/v1/auth/demo-residual/cleanup handler. Idempotent — a
// follow-up call returns 0.
func deleteDemoAnonResidue(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) (int64, error) {
if db == nil {
return 0, errors.New("db is nil")
}
res, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `
DELETE FROM actor_roles
WHERE actor_id = $1
`, authdomain.DemoAnonActorID)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("delete actor_roles: %w", err)
}
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("rows affected: %w", err)
}
return n, nil
}