Files
certctl/docs/certctl-for-cert-manager-users.md
T
shankar0123 52248be717 v2.0.47: HTTPS Everywhere — TLS-only control plane, agents/CLI/MCP
Breaking change release. Plaintext HTTP listener removed. The certctl
control plane now terminates TLS 1.3 on :8443 via
http.Server.ListenAndServeTLS. No CERTCTL_TLS_ENABLED=false escape
hatch. No dual-listener mode. One-step cutover per docs/upgrade-to-tls.md.

Server
- cmd/server/tls.go: certHolder with SIGHUP hot-reload + atomic cert
  swap, buildServerTLSConfig (TLS 1.3 min, GetCertificate callback),
  preflightServerTLS validation
- cmd/server/main.go: ListenAndServeTLS in place of ListenAndServe,
  watchSIGHUP wiring, cert/key path config threading
- tls_test.go: 418-line regression coverage of reload, preflight,
  callback behavior, SAN validation

Config
- CERTCTL_TLS_CERT_PATH / CERTCTL_TLS_KEY_PATH (required)
- Plaintext rejection: agents/CLI/MCP pre-flight-fail on http://
  URLs with a pointer to docs/upgrade-to-tls.md

Agents, CLI, MCP
- All three pre-flight-reject http:// URLs with fail-loud diagnostic
- CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH for private-CA trust
- CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY for dev-only bypass
  (loud warning on startup)
- install-agent.sh emits both vars as commented template lines

docker-compose
- certctl-tls-init sidecar generates SAN-valid self-signed cert into
  deploy/test/certs/ on first boot
- All demo-stack curls pin against ca.crt with --cacert

Helm chart
- Three TLS provisioning modes, exactly one required:
  - server.tls.existingSecret (operator-supplied)
  - server.tls.certManager.enabled (cert-manager integration)
  - server.tls.selfSigned.enabled (eval only — not for production)
- server-certificate.yaml template for cert-manager mode
- helm install without a TLS source fails at template render with
  a pointer to docs/tls.md

CI
- .github/workflows/ci.yml Helm Chart Validation step renders the
  chart in both existingSecret and cert-manager modes, plus an
  inverse guard-regression test that asserts helm template MUST
  refuse to render when no TLS source is configured. Previously
  the single `helm template` invocation hit the certctl.tls.required
  fail-loud guard and exit-1'd CI. Four invocations now: lint
  (existingSecret), template (existingSecret), template
  (cert-manager), template (no args — must fail).

Integration tests
- deploy/test/integration_test.go stands up the Compose stack over
  HTTPS, extracts the CA bundle, and exercises every certctl API
  over https://localhost:8443
- All 34 integration subtests green (per Phase 8 local CI-parity)

Documentation
- New: docs/tls.md (provisioning patterns, rotation, SIGHUP reload)
- New: docs/upgrade-to-tls.md (one-step cutover, no-downgrade
  warnings, fleet-roll sequencing)
- CHANGELOG.md: v2.2.0 "HTTPS Everywhere — The Irony" entry
  (file heading unchanged; release tag is v2.0.47)
- All curls in docs/, examples/, deploy/helm/ guides use
  https://localhost:8443 --cacert

Verification
- grep -rn "ListenAndServe[^T]" cmd/ internal/ → 0 hits
- grep -rn "\"http://" cmd/ internal/ → 2 benign hits (Caddy admin
  API default, SSRF doc comment) — zero certctl endpoints
- Tasks #197–#206 (Phases 0–8) all closed in the tracker

Files: 65 changed, 3489 insertions, 372 deletions (pre-CI-fix).
2026-04-20 03:43:10 +00:00

6.9 KiB

certctl for cert-manager Users

You run cert-manager inside Kubernetes and it works well for in-cluster certificates. But you also have VMs, bare-metal servers, network appliances, and legacy systems outside the cluster. cert-manager can't reach those. This guide shows how certctl complements cert-manager to give you unified certificate visibility and automation across your entire infrastructure.

Not a Replacement

cert-manager is the right tool for in-cluster certs. It's tightly integrated with Kubernetes:

  • Native CRDs (Certificate, ClusterIssuer, Issuer)
  • Automatic cert injection into Ingress and Service objects
  • Controller-driven renewal within the cluster

certctl does not replace this. Instead, it extends your certificate management to everything outside Kubernetes: VMs, bare metal, network appliances, Windows servers, and legacy systems.

The Problem

Your setup:

  • cert-manager: handles all certs in Kubernetes (TLS for Ingress, service-to-service, internal services)
  • Everything else: NGINX/Apache on VMs, HAProxy load balancers on bare metal, network appliances, Windows servers with IIS — these are managed inconsistently. Maybe Certbot cron jobs, maybe manual renewal, maybe deprecated cert files sitting around.

Result:

  • No unified visibility — you don't know when non-Kubernetes certs expire
  • Renewal failures go unnoticed until the cert is already expired
  • Audit trail fragmented across multiple tools
  • Scaling to hundreds of machines becomes impossible

The Solution

Deploy certctl control plane once (Docker Compose, Kubernetes Helm chart, or self-hosted). Deploy agents on your VMs, bare metal, and network appliances. One dashboard shows:

  • All cert-manager certs via discovery scanning (agents find cert-manager-issued certs copied to target machines, or scan the cluster directly)
  • All certctl-managed certs issued by shared issuers (ACME, step-ca, Vault PKI (planned), private CA)
  • Unified renewal and deployment across both worlds
  • Single pane of glass with expiration timeline, renewal status, deployment verification, audit trail

How to Set Up

1. Install certctl Control Plane

Option A: Docker Compose (quickest for evaluation)

cd /opt/certctl
docker compose up -d
# Dashboard & API: https://localhost:8443 (self-signed cert — pin with --cacert ./deploy/test/certs/ca.crt)

Option B: Kubernetes (recommended for prod)

helm install certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ \
  --set auth.apiKey=YOUR_SECURE_KEY

2. Deploy Agents to Non-Kubernetes Infrastructure

On each VM, bare-metal server, or appliance (via proxy agent):

# Linux amd64
curl -sSL https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl/releases/download/v2.1.0/certctl-agent-linux-amd64 \
  -o /usr/local/bin/certctl-agent
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/certctl-agent

# Config
sudo tee /etc/certctl/agent.env > /dev/null <<EOF
CERTCTL_SERVER_URL=https://certctl-control-plane:8443
CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH=/etc/certctl/tls/ca.crt
CERTCTL_API_KEY=your-api-key
CERTCTL_DISCOVERY_DIRS=/etc/nginx/certs,/etc/ssl,/etc/letsencrypt/live
CERTCTL_KEY_DIR=/var/lib/certctl/keys
EOF
sudo chmod 600 /etc/certctl/agent.env

# Start
sudo systemctl start certctl-agent

3. Enable Discovery Scanning

Agents scan configured directories and report back all existing certs. In the dashboard:

  • Discovery page: all found certs grouped by agent
  • Claim cert-manager certs to link them with Kubernetes metadata
  • Dismiss obsolete certs

4. Configure Shared Issuers

Set up the same issuer certctl uses for non-Kubernetes certs:

  • ACME (Let's Encrypt, for public certs)
  • step-ca (Smallstep, for internal certs)
  • Vault PKI (HashiCorp Vault, for enterprise PKI)
  • Private CA (your own internal root CA)

No new CA infrastructure needed. If cert-manager already uses your CA, certctl points to the same one.

5. Create Policies for Non-Kubernetes Certs

Go to Policies+ New Policy to create enforcement rules:

  • Name: e.g., "VM Certificate Policy"
  • Type: expiration_window or key_algorithm (enforce renewal thresholds or crypto requirements)
  • Severity: high
  • Config: set your enforcement parameters

Certificates are linked to issuers and profiles when created or claimed from discovery. Policies add guardrails — enforcing key algorithm requirements, expiration windows, and other compliance rules across your fleet.

6. View Unified Inventory

Dashboard shows:

  • Certificate status heatmap (all 1000 certs: cert-manager + certctl)
  • Renewal job trends (both types)
  • Expiration timeline (30/60/90 days)
  • Agent fleet status (all infrastructure)

Certificates page filters by issuer (show me all ACME certs, or all step-ca certs):

  • cert-manager certs discovered from Kubernetes nodes
  • certctl-managed certs on VMs
  • Network appliance certs auto-discovered

Shared Infrastructure

If cert-manager and certctl both use the same CA:

  • ACME: cert-manager uses ClusterIssuer + certctl uses ACME connector → same Let's Encrypt account, transparent coexistence
  • step-ca: cert-manager uses external issuer CRD + certctl uses step-ca connector → same provisioner, shared certificate inventory
  • Vault PKI: cert-manager uses external issuer CRD + certctl uses Vault connector → same mount, same audit trail

No conflict. They just issue certs through the same CA. certctl's discovery scanning finds cert-manager-issued certs and shows them alongside certctl-managed ones.

Key Differences from cert-manager

Feature cert-manager certctl
Target In-cluster (Kubernetes) Out-of-cluster (VMs, bare metal, appliances)
Configuration CRDs (Certificate, ClusterIssuer, Issuer) API + Dashboard (JSON REST)
Deployment Injected into Secret objects, mounted by pods Agent pulls work, deploys via target-specific API (file, service restart, proxy agent)
Renewal Controller watches Certificate CRDs, triggers renewal when needed Scheduler checks thresholds, agents poll for work
Audit Kubernetes event log Immutable append-only audit trail
Visibility Per-namespace, per-resource Fleet-wide, unified inventory

Future Integration

On the roadmap (V4): cert-manager external issuer — certctl acts as a ClusterIssuer backend for Kubernetes. This would allow cert-manager to request certificates from certctl, which could issue them via any of its connectors (step-ca, Vault, private CA, etc.). Pure integration play; no breaking changes.

For now: cert-manager handles Kubernetes, certctl handles everything else. They coexist seamlessly.

Next Steps

  1. Run through the Quick Start for a 5-minute demo
  2. Try the Multi-Issuer example — manages public and internal certs from one dashboard
  3. Explore Architecture for deployment patterns
  4. Check the Helm Chart for production Kubernetes deployment