shankar0123
e6bb10afb6
CI run #484's Go Build & Test job failed govulncheck (M-024 hard gate). Six standard-library CVEs land in go1.25.9 + one golang.org/x/net CVE in v0.49.0; all are fixed in go1.25.10 + x/net v0.53.0 respectively. The advisories that fired were: GO-2026-4986 Quadratic string concat in net/mail.consumeComment — called via internal/api/handler/validation.go's ValidateCommonName -> mail.ParseAddress GO-2026-4977 Quadratic string concat in net/mail.consumePhrase — same call site GO-2026-4982 Bypass of meta-content URL escaping in html/template — called via internal/service/digest.go's RenderDigestHTML -> Template.Execute GO-2026-4980 Escaper bypass in html/template — same call site GO-2026-4971 Panic in net.Dial / LookupPort on Windows NUL bytes — many call sites (email notifier, SSH connector, ACME validators, validation.ValidateSafeURL, ...) GO-2026-4918 Infinite loop in net/http2 transport on bad SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE — called via internal/connector/target/f5.go's F5Client.Authenticate -> http.Client.Do Bumps applied: * `go.mod`: `go 1.25.9` -> `go 1.25.10`; `golang.org/x/net v0.49.0` -> `v0.53.0` (kept indirect — the upgrade is force-pulled by the module-version directive; transitive deps will pick the higher). * `.github/workflows/{ci,codeql,release}.yml`: setup-go pin and the release.yml `GO_VERSION` env var bumped to 1.25.10. The security-deep-scan.yml workflow uses the major-minor `1.25` pin which auto-resolves to the latest 1.25.x and is unaffected. * `Dockerfile` + `Dockerfile.agent`: `golang:1.25-alpine@sha256:5caa...` re-pinned to `golang:1.25.10-alpine@sha256:8d22e29d960bc50cd0...` (digest looked up against `registry-1.docker.io/v2/library/golang/ manifests/1.25.10-alpine`; verified by the digest-validity ci-guard). The explicit `1.25.10-alpine` tag form replaces the moving `1.25-alpine` pin so the image-spec is reproducible end-to-end even without the digest reference. * `deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/Dockerfile`: `golang:1.25.9-bookworm @sha256:1a14...` re-pinned to `golang:1.25.10-bookworm@sha256: e3a54b77385b4f8a31c1...` (looked up the same way). * `deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/go.mod`: `go 1.25.9` -> `go 1.25.10`. * `internal/api/handler/version.go` + `api/openapi.yaml`: the `runtime.Version()`-shape comment + OpenAPI `example: go1.25.9` bumped to keep doc/example freshness. * `docs/contributor/ci-pipeline.md` + `docs/reference/connectors/ iis.md`: doc-only `Go 1.25.9` -> `Go 1.25.10` references. Verification done in-tree: * All `scripts/ci-guards/*.sh` pass locally including `digest-validity.sh` (the new digests resolve cleanly against Docker Hub). * `S-1-hardcoded-source-counts.sh` clean (the false-positive on "Bundle 1 migrations" was fixed in the prior commit). Operator step required post-push (sandbox has no Go toolchain): cd certctl && go mod tidy This regenerates go.sum's `golang.org/x/net v0.49.0` h1: lines into v0.53.0 ones. CI's `go mod tidy && git diff --exit-code go.mod go.sum` step will catch the drift if missed; in that case run the command, commit, and push the go.sum-only delta.
certctl Documentation
Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
The full docs index, organized by audience. Pick the section that matches what you need to do; each link below opens a focused doc rather than a wall of text.
For the elevator pitch and quickstart commands, see the repo README.md at the root. For the marketing site, see certctl.io.
Getting Started
You're new to certctl, just cloned the repo, or want to understand what it does before installing.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Concepts | TLS certificates explained for beginners — CAs, ACME, EST, private keys, the full glossary |
| Quickstart | Five-minute setup with Docker Compose, dashboard tour, API tour |
| Examples | Five turnkey scenarios — ACME+NGINX, wildcard DNS-01, private CA+Traefik, step-ca+HAProxy, multi-issuer |
| Advanced demo | End-to-end certificate lifecycle with technical depth at each step |
| Why certctl | Positioning vs ACME clients, agent-based SaaS, enterprise platforms; when to look elsewhere |
Reference
You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authoritative technical detail.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Architecture | System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies |
| Profiles | CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (Phase 9 closure) |
| API | OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation |
| CLI | certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns |
| Configuration | CERTCTL_* environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent) |
| MCP server | Model Context Protocol integration for AI assistants |
| Release verification | Cosign / SLSA / SBOM verification procedure |
| Intermediate CA hierarchy | Multi-level CA tree management — RFC 5280 §3.2/§4.2.1.9/§4.2.1.10 enforcement |
| Deployment model | Atomic write, post-deploy verify, rollback semantics across all targets |
| Vendor matrix | Tested vendor versions per target connector |
Connectors
The connector index is the canonical catalog (interfaces, registry, scanners, plus an inline reference per built-in). Per-connector deep-dive siblings cover operator-grade material — vendor edges, troubleshooting, rotation playbooks, when-to-use vs alternatives.
Issuers (13 deep-dives): ACME · ADCS · AWS ACM Private CA · DigiCert · EJBCA / Keyfactor · Entrust · GlobalSign Atlas HVCA · Google CAS · Local CA · OpenSSL / Custom CA · Sectigo SCM · step-ca / Smallstep · Vault PKI
Targets (15 deep-dives): Apache · AWS Certificate Manager · Azure Key Vault · Caddy · Envoy · F5 BIG-IP · HAProxy · IIS · Java Keystore · Kubernetes Secrets · NGINX · Postfix / Dovecot · SSH (agentless) · Traefik · Windows Certificate Store
Protocols
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| ACME server | Run certctl as an RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI ACME server |
| ACME server threat model | Security posture for the ACME server endpoint |
| SCEP server | RFC 8894 native SCEP server — RA cert config, multi-profile dispatch, must-staple, mTLS sibling route |
| SCEP for Microsoft Intune | Intune-specific deployment guide — NDES replacement playbook |
| EST server | RFC 7030 EST server — 802.1X / Wi-Fi enrollment, IoT bootstrap, channel binding |
| CRL & OCSP | RFC 5280 CRL + RFC 6960 OCSP responder for relying parties |
| Async CA polling | Bounded polling for async-CA issuer connectors |
Operator
You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Security posture | Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC primitive (Bundle 1), bootstrap |
| RBAC operator reference | Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + bootstrap flow (Bundle 1) |
| Auth threat model | API-key compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation, compliance mapping (Bundle 1) |
| Control plane TLS | Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR |
| Database TLS | PostgreSQL transport encryption |
| Approval workflow | Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + Phase 9 profile-edit closure |
| Helm deployment | Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart |
| Performance baselines | Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks |
| Legacy clients (TLS 1.2) | Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2 |
Runbooks
| Runbook | When |
|---|---|
| Cloud targets | AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault deployment, debugging, rollback |
| Expiry alerts | Per-policy multi-channel routing matrix, severity tiers |
| Disaster recovery | CRL cache, OCSP responder cert, CA private-key rotation, Postgres restore |
Migration
You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in parallel.
| From | Doc |
|---|---|
| Certbot | migration/from-certbot.md |
| acme.sh | migration/from-acmesh.md |
| cert-manager (coexistence, not replacement) | migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md |
| Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) | migration/acme-from-caddy.md |
| cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) | migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md |
| Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) | migration/acme-from-traefik.md |
| API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0) | migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — AUDIT YOUR API KEYS post-upgrade |
Contributor
You're contributing to certctl, running tests locally, or trying to understand the CI pipeline.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Testing strategy | What we test and why; per-PR fast gates vs daily deep-scan |
| Test environment | Local environment with real CAs (Pebble, step-ca, etc.) |
| QA prerequisites | Before running QA: stack boot, demo data baseline, env vars |
| QA test suite | qa_test.go reference for release QA |
| GUI QA checklist | Manual GUI verification pass for release |
| Release sign-off | Release-day checklist — code state, automated gates, manual QA, artefact verification |
| CI pipeline | CI shape, regression guards, adding new checks |
Archive
Historical docs preserved for reference. Most operators don't need these.
| Doc | Why archived |
|---|---|
| Upgrade to TLS (v2.2) | Pre-v2.2 HTTPS-everywhere upgrade procedure |
| Upgrade past v2 JWT removal | G-1 milestone JWT auth removal procedure |
Reading order by role
First-time operator: Concepts → Quickstart → Examples. About 90 minutes end to end.
Production operator: Architecture → Security posture → Control plane TLS → Disaster recovery runbook. About 4 hours end to end.
PKI engineer: ACME server → SCEP server → EST server → Intermediate CA hierarchy. About 6 hours end to end.
Contributor: Architecture → Testing strategy → Test environment → CI pipeline. About 3 hours end to end.