mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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3189f3cd71
chained-auth combinator + AuthInfo OIDC providers extension + 2 CI
guards (Bundle-1-compat + Bundle-1-to-2-upgrade)
Phase 6 wires the Phase 4 session service + Phase 5 OIDC handlers into
the request path. Three middlewares + one combinator land in
internal/auth/session/middleware.go:
1. SessionMiddleware reads `certctl_session` cookie, validates via
SessionService.Validate, populates the legacy UserKey/AdminKey
+ Phase 3 RBAC context keys (ActorIDKey/ActorTypeKey/TenantIDKey)
so downstream RequirePermission + audit-attribution see a
consistent caller. Best-effort UpdateLastSeen keeps the idle-
expiry sliding window fresh. CRITICALLY: never 401s on validate
failure — defers to the next middleware so the chained-auth
combinator can fall back to Bearer.
2. CSRFMiddleware gates state-changing methods (POST/PUT/DELETE/
PATCH) for session-authenticated requests. API-key actors are
EXEMPT (no session row in context => CSRF doesn't apply; they're
not browser-driven). Constant-time-compares SHA-256(X-CSRF-Token
header) against the session row's stored hash via
SessionService.ValidateCSRF. Mismatch returns 403.
3. ChainAuthSessionThenBearer is the load-bearing chained-auth
combinator: tries the session cookie first; on miss/invalid,
falls back to the API-key Bearer middleware; if neither
authenticates, 401. The composition uses bearerSkipIfAuthenticated
so a request with both a valid session AND a valid Bearer uses
the session (cookie wins per the Bundle 2 contract).
Middleware chain order in cmd/server/main.go (per Phase 6 spec):
RequestID → Logging → Recovery → CORS → RateLimit → AUTH (chained:
session → Bearer) → CSRF (state-changing only; API-key exempt) →
Audit → Handler
The chained authMiddleware replaces the bare Bundle-1 bearerMiddleware
at the chain entry point; csrfMiddleware lands immediately after so
session-authenticated requests pass through CSRF before audit. Both
new middlewares are pass-throughs when sessionService is nil
(pre-Phase-4 builds).
AuthInfo extension (Category E): GET /api/v1/auth/info now returns the
list of configured OIDC providers (id + display_name + login_url
where login_url = `/auth/oidc/login?provider=<id>`) so the GUI Login
page renders the correct "Sign in with X" buttons. Endpoint stays
auth-exempt; the providers list is public configuration. Wired via
HealthHandler.OIDCProvidersResolver + a new OIDCProvidersListResolver
projection interface; the cmd/server adapter
oidcProvidersListAdapter projects the postgres OIDCProviderRepository
into the public-safe shape. Resolver lookups are best-effort: failures
fall back to the minimal payload rather than 500-ing the GUI's auth
probe. Nil resolver preserves the pre-Phase-6 minimal shape so test
fixtures + no-db deploys keep compiling.
Bypass list preserved (Category E): the existing public-route
allowlist in router.AuthExemptRouterRoutes is preserved by virtue of
those routes registering via direct r.mux.Handle (they bypass the
entire chain). The protocol-endpoint allowlist (ACME/SCEP/EST/OCSP/
CRL) bypasses via cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix
dispatch — those routes never reach the auth middleware at all. Both
preservations are pinned by the Bundle-1 compat CI guard below.
Tests (internal/auth/session/middleware_test.go):
All 7 Phase 6 spec-mandated middleware-chain tests pass:
1. Session cookie + correct CSRF → 200.
2. Session cookie + wrong CSRF → 403.
3. Bearer-only (no session) + no CSRF → 200 (API-key actors are
CSRF-exempt by design).
4. No cookie + no Bearer → 401.
5. Expired cookie + valid Bearer → fall back to Bearer succeeds.
6. Tampered cookie → 401 (no Bearer to fall back to).
7. Bypass-list awareness — state-changing method, no auth, no
session row → uniform 401 (NOT a CSRF 403; the CSRF check is
gated on session-row presence and never fires for unauth
requests).
Plus coverage-lift tests covering nil-service pass-through, safe-
methods bypass, SessionFromContext nil + populated, isStateChangingMethod
matrix, clientIPFromRequest variants (RemoteAddr / XFF first-hop /
XFF single / no-port), nil-bearer chain branches.
Coverage on internal/auth/session/middleware.go: 100% per-function
across the 9 entry points (SessionValidator interfaces +
NewSessionMiddleware + NewCSRFMiddleware + ChainAuthSessionThenBearer +
bearerSkipIfAuthenticated + SessionFromContext + isStateChangingMethod
+ clientIPFromRequest + lastIndexByte). Package coverage 94.9%.
Two new CI guards:
scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-compat-regression.sh — Bundle-1-only
compat invariants. Static-source checks that protect the Bundle-1
path since spinning up docker-compose + running the integration
test suite is sandbox-infeasible:
1. SessionMiddleware MUST defer-to-next on missing/invalid cookie.
2. CSRFMiddleware MUST be pass-through on missing session row.
3. cmd/server/main.go MUST wire ChainAuthSessionThenBearer.
4. The 4 public OIDC routes MUST be in AuthExemptRouterRoutes.
5. AuthInfo MUST guard on OIDCProvidersResolver != nil.
scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-to-2-upgrade-regression.sh — Bundle-1 →
Bundle-2 upgrade invariants:
1. Migrations 000034..000037 use CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS.
2. Migrations are wrapped in BEGIN; ... COMMIT;.
3. NO DROP TABLE / ALTER ... DROP COLUMN against any of the 19
protected Bundle-1 tables (api_keys, audit_events, certificates,
certificate_versions, profiles, issuers, targets, agents, jobs,
owners, teams, agent_groups, notifications, roles, permissions,
role_permissions, actor_roles, tenants, approvals,
intermediate_cas, issuance_approval_requests).
4. 000037 INSERTs use ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING (idempotent re-apply).
5. ChainAuthSessionThenBearer is wired (Bundle-1 Bearer keys
continue to authenticate post-upgrade).
6. Bootstrap handler is registered (fresh-deployment bootstrap
still works).
Both guards are sandbox-feasible static analysis. When the operator
gets a Linux VM with docker-in-docker, promote both to real `docker
compose up` integration tests against a v2.1.0 baseline DB dump.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet ./internal/auth/... ./internal/api/...
./cmd/server/... clean, go test -short -count=1 -race green across
internal/auth/session (94.9% coverage), internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, no regressions in Bundle 1 packages, both new
ci-guards green.
366 lines
12 KiB
Go
366 lines
12 KiB
Go
package session
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
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sessiondomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/session/domain"
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)
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// =============================================================================
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// In-memory stubs.
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// =============================================================================
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type stubSessionValidator struct {
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sess *sessiondomain.Session
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validateErr error
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updateLastErr error
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validateCalls int
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updateCalls int
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}
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func (s *stubSessionValidator) Validate(_ context.Context, _ ValidateInput) (*sessiondomain.Session, error) {
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s.validateCalls++
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return s.sess, s.validateErr
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}
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func (s *stubSessionValidator) UpdateLastSeen(_ context.Context, _ string) error {
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s.updateCalls++
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return s.updateLastErr
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}
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func (s *stubSessionValidator) ValidateCSRF(headerValue string, sess *sessiondomain.Session) error {
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if sess == nil {
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return ErrCSRFMismatch
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}
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if headerValue == "" {
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return ErrCSRFMissing
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}
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if hashCSRFToken(headerValue) != sess.CSRFTokenHash {
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return ErrCSRFMismatch
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}
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return nil
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// Helpers.
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// =============================================================================
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// mockBearer returns a Bearer middleware stub that authenticates any
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// "Authorization: Bearer XYZ" header by setting the actor context.
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// Mimics auth.NewAuthWithKeyStore's success-path behavior for tests
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// without spinning up a real KeyStore.
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func mockBearer(_ *testing.T) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if authHeader != "Bearer test-key" {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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ctx := r.Context()
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.UserKey{}, "api-key-actor")
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorIDKey{}, "api-key-actor")
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.ActorTypeKey{}, "APIKey")
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, auth.TenantIDKey{}, "t-default")
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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// markAuthenticated returns a tiny handler that 200s + writes the
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// actor id from context so tests can inspect which auth path won.
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func markAuthenticated() http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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actorID, _ := r.Context().Value(auth.ActorIDKey{}).(string)
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fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"actor_id":%q}`, actorID)
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})
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}
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func newSession(t *testing.T, csrfPlaintext string) *sessiondomain.Session {
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t.Helper()
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now := time.Now().UTC()
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return &sessiondomain.Session{
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ID: "ses-test",
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ActorID: "u-alice",
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ActorType: "User",
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SigningKeyID: "sk-test",
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CSRFTokenHash: hashCSRFToken(csrfPlaintext),
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IdleExpiresAt: now.Add(time.Hour),
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AbsoluteExpiresAt: now.Add(8 * time.Hour),
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CreatedAt: now,
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LastSeenAt: now,
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TenantID: "t-default",
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}
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// 7 Phase 6 spec-mandated middleware-chain tests.
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// =============================================================================
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// #1: Session cookie + correct CSRF -> succeeds.
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func TestPhase6_SessionPlusCorrectCSRF_Succeeds(t *testing.T) {
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csrf := "the-csrf-token-plaintext"
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{sess: newSession(t, csrf)}
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chain := buildPhase6Chain(stub, stub)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/whatever", nil)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessiondomain.PostLoginCookieName, Value: "v1.ses-test.sk-test.mac"})
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req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", csrf)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("status = %d; want 200; body=%q", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if !strContains(w.Body.String(), "u-alice") {
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t.Errorf("body missing actor id; got %q", w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// #2: Session cookie + WRONG CSRF -> 403.
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func TestPhase6_SessionPlusWrongCSRF_403(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{sess: newSession(t, "real-csrf")}
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chain := buildPhase6Chain(stub, stub)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/whatever", nil)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessiondomain.PostLoginCookieName, Value: "v1.ses-test.sk-test.mac"})
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req.Header.Set("X-CSRF-Token", "wrong-csrf")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Errorf("status = %d; want 403", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// #3: Bearer-only (no session) + no CSRF -> succeeds (API-key actors are CSRF-exempt).
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func TestPhase6_BearerOnly_NoCSRF_Succeeds(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{validateErr: errors.New("no cookie")}
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chain := buildPhase6Chain(stub, stub)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/whatever", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer test-key")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("status = %d; want 200; body=%q", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if !strContains(w.Body.String(), "api-key-actor") {
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t.Errorf("body missing api-key actor id; got %q", w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// #4: No cookie + no Bearer -> 401.
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func TestPhase6_NeitherCookieNorBearer_401(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{}
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chain := buildPhase6Chain(stub, stub)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/whatever", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Errorf("status = %d; want 401; body=%q", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// #5: Expired cookie + valid Bearer -> falls back to Bearer, succeeds.
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func TestPhase6_ExpiredCookieValidBearer_FallsBackToBearer(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{validateErr: ErrSessionExpiredAbsolute}
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chain := buildPhase6Chain(stub, stub)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/whatever", nil)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessiondomain.PostLoginCookieName, Value: "v1.ses-expired.sk-x.mac"})
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer test-key")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("status = %d; want 200; body=%q", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if !strContains(w.Body.String(), "api-key-actor") {
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t.Errorf("expected Bearer fallback to win; body=%q", w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// #6: Tampered cookie -> 401 (no Bearer to fall back to).
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func TestPhase6_TamperedCookie_401(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{validateErr: ErrSessionInvalidCookie}
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chain := buildPhase6Chain(stub, stub)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/whatever", nil)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessiondomain.PostLoginCookieName, Value: "v1.ses-x.sk-x.tampered"})
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Errorf("status = %d; want 401", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// #7: Bypass-list awareness — the protocol-endpoint allowlist is
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// enforced by the dispatch layer (cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler)
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// and the public-route allowlist by direct r.mux.Handle in router.go;
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// neither reaches the auth chain. Pin the contract by asserting that
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// the chained-auth combinator's behavior on a request with no auth +
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// a state-changing method is uniformly 401, NOT a CSRF 403 — i.e., the
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// CSRF check is gated on session-row presence and never fires for
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// unauthenticated requests.
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func TestPhase6_StateChangingMethod_Unauthenticated_Returns401NotCSRF403(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{}
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chain := buildPhase6Chain(stub, stub)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/whatever", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Errorf("status = %d; want 401 (not 403); body=%q", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// Coverage-lift tests.
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// =============================================================================
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func TestSessionMiddleware_NilService_PassThrough(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewSessionMiddleware(nil)
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handler := mw(markAuthenticated())
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("nil service should pass through; got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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func TestCSRFMiddleware_NilService_PassThrough(t *testing.T) {
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mw := NewCSRFMiddleware(nil)
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handler := mw(markAuthenticated())
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/x", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("nil service should pass through; got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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func TestCSRFMiddleware_SafeMethodsBypass(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{sess: newSession(t, "csrf")}
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mw := NewCSRFMiddleware(stub)
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handler := mw(markAuthenticated())
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for _, method := range []string{http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, http.MethodOptions, http.MethodTrace} {
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req := httptest.NewRequest(method, "/x", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("safe method %s blocked by CSRF middleware; status=%d", method, w.Code)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestSessionFromContext_NilMissing(t *testing.T) {
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if s := SessionFromContext(context.Background()); s != nil {
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t.Errorf("expected nil; got %v", s)
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}
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}
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func TestSessionFromContext_PopulatedReturnsSession(t *testing.T) {
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sess := newSession(t, "csrf")
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ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), sessionContextKey{}, sess)
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if s := SessionFromContext(ctx); s != sess {
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t.Errorf("expected returned session pointer to match; got %v", s)
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}
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}
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func TestIsStateChangingMethod(t *testing.T) {
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for _, tc := range []struct {
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method string
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want bool
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}{
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{http.MethodGet, false},
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{http.MethodHead, false},
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{http.MethodOptions, false},
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{http.MethodTrace, false},
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{http.MethodPost, true},
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{http.MethodPut, true},
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{http.MethodDelete, true},
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{http.MethodPatch, true},
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} {
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if got := isStateChangingMethod(tc.method); got != tc.want {
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t.Errorf("isStateChangingMethod(%s) = %v; want %v", tc.method, got, tc.want)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestClientIPFromRequest_Variants(t *testing.T) {
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r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "1.2.3.4:5555"
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if ip := clientIPFromRequest(r); ip != "1.2.3.4" {
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t.Errorf("RemoteAddr: got %q; want 1.2.3.4", ip)
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}
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r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2")
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if ip := clientIPFromRequest(r); ip != "10.0.0.1" {
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t.Errorf("XFF first hop: got %q; want 10.0.0.1", ip)
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}
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r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "10.0.0.99")
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if ip := clientIPFromRequest(r); ip != "10.0.0.99" {
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t.Errorf("XFF single: got %q; want 10.0.0.99", ip)
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}
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r2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
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r2.RemoteAddr = "no-port"
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if ip := clientIPFromRequest(r2); ip != "no-port" {
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t.Errorf("no-port RemoteAddr: got %q; want no-port", ip)
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}
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}
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func TestChainAuthSessionThenBearer_NilBearer_Session401Path(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{validateErr: ErrSessionInvalidCookie}
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chain := ChainAuthSessionThenBearer(NewSessionMiddleware(stub), nil)(markAuthenticated())
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessiondomain.PostLoginCookieName, Value: "v1.ses.sk.bad"})
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Errorf("status = %d; want 401", w.Code)
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}
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}
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func TestChainAuthSessionThenBearer_NilBearer_SessionAuthSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
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stub := &stubSessionValidator{sess: newSession(t, "csrf")}
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chain := ChainAuthSessionThenBearer(NewSessionMiddleware(stub), nil)(markAuthenticated())
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
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req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessiondomain.PostLoginCookieName, Value: "v1.ses.sk.mac"})
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
chain.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Errorf("status = %d; want 200", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Helpers.
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
func buildPhase6Chain(svcSession SessionValidator, svcCSRF CSRFValidator) http.Handler {
|
|
auth := ChainAuthSessionThenBearer(NewSessionMiddleware(svcSession), mockBearer(nil))
|
|
csrf := NewCSRFMiddleware(svcCSRF)
|
|
return auth(csrf(markAuthenticated()))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func strContains(s, sub string) bool {
|
|
for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
|
|
if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|