mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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shankar0123
b8fac59200
Whitespace alignment drift surfaced by gofmt -l after merging 7 fix branches.
Pure formatting, no semantic change. Pre-existing master drift in
internal/auth/oidc/{domain/types.go, integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go,
test_discovery.go} left untouched — that's separate tech debt.
61 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
61 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
package auth
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import "strings"
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// ProtocolEndpointPrefixes lists the URL path prefixes that authenticate
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// via the protocol itself rather than via certctl's Bearer / cookie
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// stack. Bundle 1 Phase 3 uses this allowlist as the explicit "do NOT
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// wrap with RequirePermission" set: the RBAC middleware applies only to
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// admin handlers replacing legacy IsAdmin checks plus any new
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// permission-gated routes; the endpoints below keep their existing
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// protocol-level auth.
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//
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// Adding a new protocol endpoint that doesn't take a Bearer token MUST
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// also add the prefix here and a parallel test in Phase 12 asserting
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// the route is unwrapped.
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//
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// Per the Phase 3 audit:
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//
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// ACME server : /acme/profile/<id>/* + /acme/* (JWS-signed, RFC 8555).
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// SCEP server : /scep (challenge password +
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// signed CSR, RFC 8894).
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// EST server : /.well-known/est/* (mTLS client cert,
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// RFC 7030).
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// OCSP responder : /.well-known/pki/ocsp (RFC 6960, public).
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// CRL distrib. : /.well-known/pki/crl/* (RFC 5280, public).
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//
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// Plus the existing public-route bypass list at internal/api/router
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// (router.go:69-72): /health, /ready, /api/v1/auth/info. Those bypass
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// EVERY middleware stack, not just RBAC, so they're not in this
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// allowlist; they're handled in router.go directly.
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// Audit 2026-05-10 LOW-7 closure — this slice is the canonical
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// source of truth for "do NOT gate via RBAC" surfaces. The router's
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// AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes had drifted (carrying /scep-mtls and
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// /.well-known/est-mtls that weren't in this list); both are now
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// included so the two slices stay in lockstep. A CI guard
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// (scripts/ci-guards/protocol-endpoint-prefix-sync.sh) is queued
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// against the two slices for future drift detection — meanwhile the
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// Phase 12 TestPhase12_IsProtocolEndpoint_CoversCanonicalPrefixes
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// regression pins the canonical set against this var.
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var ProtocolEndpointPrefixes = []string{
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"/acme",
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"/scep",
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"/scep-mtls", // SCEP + mTLS sibling route (Phase 6.5)
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"/.well-known/est",
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"/.well-known/est-mtls", // EST + mTLS sibling route (EST hardening Phase 2)
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"/.well-known/pki/ocsp",
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"/.well-known/pki/crl",
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}
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// IsProtocolEndpoint reports whether the request path is in the
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// "do not gate" allowlist. Phase 3 RequirePermission check bails out
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// early for these paths so the protocol surface is preserved.
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func IsProtocolEndpoint(path string) bool {
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for _, p := range ProtocolEndpointPrefixes {
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if path == p || strings.HasPrefix(path, p+"/") {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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