Per Phase 1 audit at cowork/docs-overhaul-phase-1-audit-2026-05-04/. Adds a `> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05` line right after the H1 heading of every doc that didn't already have one (41 files). This dates the freshness clock for the future Phase 4 per-doc review. The discipline going forward: when a doc's content gets a meaningful edit, bump the date. When the date gets old (e.g., >6 months), the doc earns a freshness-review pass. Mechanical insertion via awk one-liner, applied to every docs/*.md that didn't already match `grep -q 'Last reviewed:'`. Files that already carried the line from earlier Phase 2 work (the navigation index, the new connector docs, the new SCEP server / legacy-clients- TLS-1.2 / release-verification docs, and the 5 per-connector deep dives) were skipped to avoid duplicate insertion. Net: every doc in docs/ now has a Last reviewed line.
5.2 KiB
Database TLS — Postgres Transport Encryption
Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
Audit reference: Bundle B / M-018. PCI-DSS v4.0 Req 4 §2.2.5; CWE-319.
certctl talks to Postgres over a single connection-string URL controlled by the
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL env var. The sslmode query parameter on that URL
selects the transport-encryption posture. Pre-Bundle-B all the bundled
deployment artifacts (Helm chart, docker-compose) hard-coded sslmode=disable.
Bundle B exposes that as an operator-facing knob with a documented default and
explicit opt-in / opt-out paths for the four real-world deployment shapes.
Quick reference
| Deployment shape | Default sslmode |
When to change |
|---|---|---|
| Helm chart, bundled Postgres, in-cluster | disable |
When the cluster does not provide pod-network encryption (CNI without WireGuard / IPSec) and the workload is in PCI-DSS scope. |
| Helm chart, external Postgres (RDS / Cloud SQL / Azure DB) | not auto-set | Always set to verify-full and provide the cloud provider's server CA bundle. |
| docker-compose, bundled Postgres on docker bridge | disable |
Demo/dev only; not a deployment shape we expect operators to harden. |
| docker-compose / k8s with external Postgres | not auto-set | Always set CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL to a connection string with sslmode=verify-full. |
sslmode values come from lib/pq (the underlying driver). The full set is:
disable, allow, prefer, require, verify-ca, verify-full. PCI-DSS
Req 4 v4.0 §2.2.5 considers verify-ca the floor for sensitive-data transport;
verify-full is the floor for systems exposed to spoofing risk (it adds
hostname validation against the server cert's CN/SAN).
Helm chart (Bundle B)
Bundle B adds two values under postgresql.tls:
postgresql:
tls:
mode: disable # disable | require | verify-ca | verify-full
caSecretRef: "" # Secret with ca.crt key (required for verify-ca / verify-full)
The chart pipes postgresql.tls.mode into the ?sslmode= parameter of the
generated CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL (see templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.databaseURL).
For external Postgres, set postgresql.enabled: false and override
server.env.CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL directly with the full connection string —
the operator authoring an external-DB values file owns the entire URL.
Example: external RDS with verify-full
postgresql:
enabled: false # Disable bundled Postgres
server:
env:
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: |
postgres://certctl:STRONGPW@my-db.cabc12345.us-east-1.rds.amazonaws.com:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full
# Provide the AWS RDS root CA bundle as a secret + mount.
# AWS publishes per-region root certs at https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com/
extraVolumes:
- name: rds-ca
secret:
secretName: rds-ca-bundle # kubectl create secret generic rds-ca-bundle --from-file=ca.crt=...
extraVolumeMounts:
- name: rds-ca
mountPath: /etc/postgresql-ca
readOnly: true
# lib/pq honors PGSSLROOTCERT for the verify-{ca,full} CA bundle path.
server:
env:
PGSSLROOTCERT: /etc/postgresql-ca/ca.crt
docker-compose (development / demo)
The bundled deploy/docker-compose.yml keeps sslmode=disable as the default
because the Postgres container shares the docker bridge network with the certctl
server and the compose file is not a production deployment artifact. To opt in:
export CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL='postgres://certctl:certctl@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full'
docker compose up
Verification
For any non-disable mode, confirm the connection actually negotiated TLS:
# From inside the certctl-server container or any host with psql + the same URL:
psql "$CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL" -c "SELECT ssl, version, cipher FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid();"
# Expected output for verify-full: ssl=t, version=TLSv1.3 (or TLSv1.2), cipher=...
If ssl=f appears, the connection silently fell back to plaintext — investigate
the cert chain or sslmode value before treating the deployment as PCI-compliant.
What this does NOT cover
- Postgres-to-Postgres replication — if you run a replica, replica-primary
TLS is configured via the Postgres server itself (
pg_hba.conf+ssl=on); it is independent of certctl'sCERTCTL_DATABASE_URL. - Backup transport —
pg_dump/pg_basebackuphonor the samesslmodeparameter when invoked with the URL form, but the bundled chart's backup story (if any) is operator-owned. - Encryption at rest —
sslmodeis a transport concern only. Disk encryption is the cloud provider's storage layer (RDS, EBS, etc.) or the operator's Postgres TDE / disk LUKS / etc.
Reverting
If sslmode=verify-full causes connection failures (most common: missing CA
bundle, wrong hostname), drop temporarily to sslmode=require to confirm TLS
is at least negotiated, then add the CA bundle and ratchet back up. Never
revert to sslmode=disable on a system carrying real cert metadata —
audit_events alone contains enough operator/issuer/target identity to justify
TLS in any scoped environment.