Files
certctl/internal/repository/auth.go
T
shankar0123 0152bdf567 fix(auth/rbac): scope-aware ActorRole revoke (A-4)
HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant) uniqueness
extension lets an operator grant the same role to the same actor at
multiple scopes (e.g. r-operator on profile=p-acme AND profile=p-globex).
But ActorRoleRepository.Revoke's WHERE clause omitted (scope_type,
scope_id) — a single call deleted every variant. Selective revoke was
unrepresentable; operators had to drop all and re-grant N-1, opening
a race window where the actor's access was briefly different.

Closure across all layers (handler → service → repo → MCP → GUI client),
preserving the legacy "revoke all variants" contract for unmodified
callers:

  internal/repository/auth.go
    - New ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct. Zero value = legacy semantic;
      non-empty ScopeType narrows to one variant.
    - New ErrActorRoleNotFound sentinel for scoped no-match (HTTP 404).

  internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
    - Revoke signature extended with opts. Empty opts.ScopeType uses
      the legacy SQL (no scope WHERE), zero-row delete = no error.
    - Non-empty narrows with `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
      DISTINCT FROM $6` — the IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM is load-bearing,
      vanilla `=` would silently miss the (global, NULL) case because
      NULL ≠ NULL in standard SQL.
    - Selective revoke with zero matching rows returns
      ErrActorRoleNotFound; operators get feedback on typos.

  internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go
    - Revoke takes opts. Audit row's details map records the scope so
      SIEMs can distinguish wide-vs-selective revokes:
      `scope: "all_variants"` for the legacy path, or
      `scope_type` + `scope_id` for selective. Privilege check
      (auth.role.assign) and reserved-actor guard unchanged.

  internal/api/handler/auth.go
    - RevokeRoleFromKey parses optional `?scope_type=` / `?scope_id=`
      query params via new parseRevokeScope helper.
    - Validation mirrors AssignRoleToKey: scope_id forbidden with
      scope_type=global, required with profile/issuer, invalid
      scope_type → 400. scope_id without scope_type also → 400.
    - writeAuthError maps ErrActorRoleNotFound to 404.

  internal/mcp/tools_auth.go + types.go
    - AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput gains optional ScopeType + ScopeID with
      jsonschema descriptions explaining the dual-mode contract.
    - Tool call site appends URL-encoded query params when ScopeType
      is set; legacy callers (no scope_type) emit the bare DELETE
      path unchanged.

  web/src/api/client.ts
    - authRevokeKeyRole signature: optional 3rd argument
      `{ scope_type?, scope_id? }`. Pre-A-4 call sites (no opts arg)
      keep firing the bare DELETE — fully backward compatible. The
      GUI KeysPage's per-row revoke button (still one row per role,
      pre-Fix-12) continues to use the legacy shape; future GUI work
      can pass scope params for per-variant rows.

  docs/operator/rbac.md
    - New "Revoke: legacy 'all variants' vs scope-selective" subsection
      under "From the HTTP API" with curl examples for both modes plus
      the audit-row payload shape that lets SOC/SIEM tell them apart.

Regression coverage:

  Repository (testcontainers, skipped under -short — 6 tests in
  internal/repository/postgres/auth_revoke_scope_test.go):
    TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_RemovesAllVariants
    TestRevokeActorRole_WithScope_RemovesOnlyMatching
    TestRevokeActorRole_WithGlobalScope_RemovesOnlyGlobal — pins the
      IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM branch (global, NULL)
    TestRevokeActorRole_NoMatch_ReturnsNotFound — pins the new sentinel
    TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_NoMatch_IsNoOp — pins the legacy
      idempotence contract
    TestRevokeActorRole_IssuerScope_RemovesOnlyMatching — pin the
      issuer-scope half (profile + issuer are symmetric scope types)

  Handler (7 new tests in auth_test.go):
    TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey — extended to assert no scope
      filter is forwarded when query string is empty (legacy behaviour)
    TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedProfile
    TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedGlobal
    TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobal
    TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsMissingScopeID
    TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithoutScopeType
    TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsInvalidScopeType
    TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedNotFoundReturns404

  MCP (2 new table rows in tools_per_tool_test.go):
    Scoped revoke with scope_type=profile + scope_id=p-acme →
      `?scope_type=profile&scope_id=p-acme`
    Scoped revoke with scope_type=global (no scope_id) →
      `?scope_type=global`

Service-layer test plumbing (service_test.go) updated for new opts
arg: 4 existing call sites pass repository.ActorRoleRevokeOptions{}
to keep their pre-A-4 semantics; the fakeActorRoleRepo.Revoke
implementation now mirrors the postgres scope-aware behaviour
(legacy zero-value vs scoped narrowing + ErrActorRoleNotFound on
no-match).

Verify gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short across
repository/postgres, service/auth, api/handler, and mcp. The
pre-existing KeysPage.test.tsx failure observed on the baseline
commit (reproduced via `git stash` earlier in Fix 03) is unrelated;
my client.ts change adds an optional third argument and is fully
backward-compatible.

Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/04-high-actor-role-revoke-scope.md.
Audit doc updated: new row A-4 (2026-05-11) CLOSED appended to the
status table at the bottom of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md.
Operator-visible advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes under
Security (non-BREAKING — legacy callers are unchanged).

Depends on Fix 01 (the scope-aware EffectivePermissions read path on
branch fix/audit-2026-05-11/crit-actor-role-scope-reads). This fix
makes the inverse op selectively reversible; without Fix 01 the read
side would mis-evaluate scoped grants anyway, making selective revoke
moot at runtime.
2026-05-11 10:50:34 +00:00

214 lines
10 KiB
Go

package repository
import (
"context"
"errors"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
)
// Sentinel errors for the RBAC repositories. Postgres implementations
// translate SQLSTATE codes (23505 unique-violation, 23503 FK-violation,
// no-rows) into these so handler / service code branches via errors.Is.
var (
// ErrAuthNotFound is returned by Get / GetByName when no row matches.
// Maps to HTTP 404.
ErrAuthNotFound = errors.New("auth: row not found")
// ErrAuthDuplicateName is returned by Create when a UNIQUE constraint
// fires (e.g. roles.name within a tenant). Maps to HTTP 409.
ErrAuthDuplicateName = errors.New("auth: duplicate name")
// ErrAuthRoleInUse is returned by RoleRepository.Delete when active
// actor_roles still reference the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
// Maps to HTTP 409.
ErrAuthRoleInUse = errors.New("auth: role still has active actor assignments")
// ErrAuthReservedActor is returned when a mutation targets a system-
// reserved actor (currently `actor-demo-anon`). Maps to HTTP 409.
ErrAuthReservedActor = errors.New("auth: reserved system actor cannot be modified")
// ErrAuthUnknownPermission is returned when a RolePermission grant
// references a permission name not in the canonical catalog.
// Maps to HTTP 400.
ErrAuthUnknownPermission = errors.New("auth: permission not in canonical catalog")
// ErrActorRoleNotFound is returned by ActorRoleRepository.Revoke
// when the caller passes a non-empty `RevokeOptions.ScopeType` that
// doesn't match any persisted (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id)
// tuple. The legacy no-opts "revoke all variants" call never
// returns this — pre-A-4 callers cannot start seeing the error.
// Maps to HTTP 404. Audit 2026-05-11 A-4.
ErrActorRoleNotFound = errors.New("auth: no actor_role row matches the requested scope")
)
// ActorRoleRevokeOptions narrows ActorRoleRepository.Revoke to a
// specific (scope_type, scope_id) variant when set. Audit 2026-05-11
// A-4 — HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant)
// uniqueness extension allows multiple scoped grants of the same role
// to the same actor; without scope plumbing on Revoke an operator who
// granted Alice `r-operator` against both `profile=p-acme` and
// `profile=p-globex` cannot selectively revoke one.
//
// Semantics:
//
// - Zero value (ScopeType="") preserves the legacy "revoke all
// variants" behaviour. Every actor_roles row matching
// (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id) is deleted regardless
// of scope. Pre-A-4 callers that don't pass options stay correct.
//
// - Non-empty ScopeType filters to that one variant. `global`
// requires ScopeID==nil; `profile` / `issuer` require
// ScopeID!=nil. The SQL uses `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
// DISTINCT FROM $6` so the NULL case matches cleanly.
//
// - If the filter doesn't match any row, the repository returns
// ErrActorRoleNotFound — the caller (service / handler) maps it
// to HTTP 404. The legacy "revoke all" semantic stays best-effort
// (deleting zero rows is not an error) because the GUI used to
// fire it as a clean-up and operators rely on the idempotence.
type ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct {
ScopeType authdomain.ScopeType
ScopeID *string
}
// TenantRepository wraps the tenants table. Bundle 1 ships single-tenant
// (one seeded `t-default`); the future managed-service offering activates
// multi-tenant by inserting additional tenants.
type TenantRepository interface {
Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Tenant, error)
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Tenant, error)
EnsureDefault(ctx context.Context) error
}
// RoleRepository wraps the roles + role_permissions tables.
type RoleRepository interface {
Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
GetByName(ctx context.Context, tenantID, name string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.Role, error)
Create(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error
Update(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error
// Delete fails with ErrAuthRoleInUse when active actor_roles still
// reference the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
// ListPermissions returns the (Permission, ScopeType, ScopeID)
// triples granted to the role.
ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error)
// AddPermission creates a row in role_permissions. ON CONFLICT DO
// NOTHING preserves idempotency for re-applied seeds.
AddPermission(ctx context.Context, grant *authdomain.RolePermission) error
// RemovePermission deletes a specific (role, permission, scope) row.
RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, grant *authdomain.RolePermission) error
}
// PermissionRepository wraps the permissions table.
type PermissionRepository interface {
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error)
GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.Permission, error)
// IsCanonical returns true when name is in
// authdomain.CanonicalPermissions. The migration seeds the catalog;
// this is an in-memory check so callers (RoleService.AddPermission)
// can fail-fast without a DB roundtrip.
IsCanonical(name string) bool
}
// ActorRoleRepository wraps the actor_roles table.
type ActorRoleRepository interface {
// ListByActor returns all standing role grants for an actor.
ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
// ListByRole returns all actors holding a given role. Used by
// RoleService.Delete to enforce the in-use guard.
ListByRole(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
// Grant creates an actor_roles row. Idempotent via ON CONFLICT.
// The reserved actor `actor-demo-anon` admin grant is seeded by
// the migration; this method will create additional grants for it
// only if the operator explicitly wires that, which the API
// layer rejects.
Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
// Revoke deletes actor_roles row(s). Without opts (the legacy
// no-options call shape) every variant matching
// (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id) is deleted regardless
// of (scope_type, scope_id). With opts.ScopeType set, only the
// matching variant is deleted; no-match returns
// ErrActorRoleNotFound. The API layer must reject revocations
// targeting `actor-demo-anon` to preserve the demo path. Audit
// 2026-05-11 A-4 — see ActorRoleRevokeOptions for semantics.
Revoke(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, roleID, tenantID string, opts ActorRoleRevokeOptions) error
// EffectivePermissions returns the deduplicated set of
// (permission_name, scope_type, scope_id) triples granted to the
// actor across all roles they hold. The middleware-level
// auth.RequirePermission gate (Phase 3) calls this on every
// gated request; implementations should cache or use SQL JOINs
// for performance.
EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]EffectivePermission, error)
// AdminExists reports whether ANY actor in the tenant currently
// holds the r-admin role. Bundle 1 Phase 6's bootstrap probe
// uses this to gate the day-0 endpoint: once the answer flips
// from false to true the bootstrap path stays closed forever
// (the seeded actor-demo-anon admin only exists in demo mode;
// in api-key mode the operator either uses bootstrap or
// CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED to mint the first admin). The query
// excludes the synthetic actor-demo-anon so demo-mode deploys
// can still bootstrap a real admin if/when the operator
// switches to api-key mode without re-migrating.
AdminExists(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (bool, error)
// ListDistinctActors returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type)
// pair with at least one actor_roles grant in the tenant.
// Bundle 1 Phase 7's `auth keys list` + scope-down helper use
// this to enumerate the actor population without joining
// against the env-var-loaded namedKeys (whose canonical record
// is the actor_roles backfill from Phase 1 / C2). The synthetic
// actor-demo-anon is included so the GUI can render it as
// "system-managed, scope-down hidden"; Phase 7's interactive
// flow filters it out of the prompt loop.
ListDistinctActors(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]ActorWithRoles, error)
}
// ActorWithRoles is the (actor, roles) projection returned by
// ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Roles is the slice of role
// IDs the actor holds; the caller can resolve role names via the
// RoleRepository or the CLI's already-cached role list.
type ActorWithRoles struct {
ActorID string
ActorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue
TenantID string
RoleIDs []string
}
// EffectivePermission is the (permission, scope) pair returned by
// ActorRoleRepository.EffectivePermissions. Multiple actor_roles rows
// may grant the same permission at different scopes; callers receive
// every grant and the matcher handles "global beats specific" semantics.
type EffectivePermission struct {
PermissionName string
ScopeType authdomain.ScopeType
ScopeID *string // NULL = global
}
// APIKeyRepository wraps the api_keys table. Bundle 1 Phase 6 ships
// this so the bootstrap endpoint (POST /v1/auth/bootstrap) can mint
// the first admin API key without needing the operator to roundtrip
// through CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED. Operator-tier keys live here;
// agent-tier keys remain on the agents table (`api_key_hash` column).
type APIKeyRepository interface {
// Create stores a new key row. ID + CreatedAt default if zero.
// The plaintext key is NOT stored — callers pass only the
// SHA-256 hex hash. Returns ErrAuthDuplicateName when the
// (name) UNIQUE constraint fires.
Create(ctx context.Context, key *authdomain.APIKey) error
// GetByName returns a single row by operator-visible name.
// Returns ErrAuthNotFound when no row matches.
GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error)
// List returns every key row across the tenant. Bundle 1 ships
// single-tenant so tenantID is typically t-default.
List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.APIKey, error)
// Delete removes a key row by name. Used by the RBAC API's key
// rotation/revocation paths.
Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error
}