Files
certctl/internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go
T
shankar0123 78485f7429 fix(auth/users): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login (A-2)
The MED-11 closure shipped users.deactivated_at + DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id}
+ cascade-revoke, but the federated-user soft-delete was reversible: the next
OIDC login under the same (provider, subject) tuple re-minted a session and
re-elevated the user.

Three legs of the chain were severed (each independently CRIT-shaped):

  Leg A — postgres/user.go::userColumns omitted `deactivated_at`, so scanUser
          never populated User.DeactivatedAt. Every Get / GetByOIDCSubject /
          ListAll returned DeactivatedAt = nil regardless of the column value.

  Leg B — postgres/user.go::Update SQL omitted `deactivated_at = $X`, so the
          handler's `u.DeactivatedAt = now()` mutation was a no-op write at
          the SQL level. Even with leg A closed, no row ever flipped.

  Leg C — oidc/service.go::upsertUser did not inspect DeactivatedAt on the
          existing-user path. Even with legs A + B closed, the OIDC login
          would still proceed normally.

The cascade-session-revoke half of the original closure remained correct, but
only for the duration of the user's current cookie. SOC 2 CC6.3 + ISO 27001
A.9.2.6 "user access removal" controls require both immediate revoke AND
persistent block — this fix restores the persistent-block leg.

Closure across layers:

  internal/repository/postgres/user.go
    - userColumns adds `deactivated_at`
    - scanUser reads via sql.NullTime intermediate (column is nullable)
    - Create writes deactivated_at explicitly (NULL for new active users;
      forward-compat for future seed-data flows that pre-populate the column)
    - Update writes deactivated_at on every call; nil DeactivatedAt → NULL
      (supports reactivation)

  internal/auth/oidc/service.go
    - New sentinel ErrUserDeactivated
    - upsertUser checks existing.DeactivatedAt != nil BEFORE mutating email /
      display_name / last_login_at — preserves last_login_at forensics on
      rejected login attempts (defense-in-depth pin against future
      "performance optimization" that reorders the gate)

  internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
    - classifyOIDCFailure adds typed errors.Is dispatch for ErrUserDeactivated
      → audit category "user_deactivated" (SOC/SIEM observability surface)

  internal/api/handler/auth_users.go
    - Self-deactivate guard on Deactivate: HTTP 409 + audit row
      auth.user_deactivate_self_rejected when caller targets own User row.
      Prevents an admin from one-way-door locking themselves out via the
      standard handler; break-glass remains the recovery path.
    - New Reactivate handler: inverse of Deactivate. Clears DeactivatedAt
      via Update; emits auth.user_reactivated audit row. Idempotent on
      already-active rows. Sessions revoked at deactivation stay revoked
      (cascade irreversible by design — user must complete fresh OIDC
      login).

  internal/api/router/router.go
    - POST /api/v1/auth/users/{id}/reactivate wired with auth.user.deactivate
      gate (reactivation is the inverse op, not a separate privilege)

  web/src/api/client.ts + web/src/pages/auth/UsersPage.tsx
    - authReactivateUser() client function
    - Reactivate button on deactivated rows in UsersPage

Regression coverage:

  Postgres (testcontainers, skipped under -short):
    TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_RoundTrip — Create → set DeactivatedAt
      → Update → Get / GetByOIDCSubject / ListAll round-trip the value
    TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreateWritesNullForActive — new active
      user reads back DeactivatedAt = nil
    TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreatePersistsPreDeactivated — Create
      with non-nil DeactivatedAt round-trips (forward-compat path)

  OIDC service:
    TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsDeactivatedUser — errors.Is
      ErrUserDeactivated; CallbackResult nil; persisted email / last_login_at
      / deactivated_at NOT mutated by the rejected attempt
    TestService_HandleCallback_AllowsReactivatedUser — DeactivatedAt = nil
      → happy path resumes
    TestService_HandleCallback_DeactivatedUserPreservesForensics —
      defense-in-depth pin against future regressions that reorder the
      gate-vs-mutation sequence

  Classifier:
    TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended — typed dispatch + wrapped variant
      round-trip through errors.Is

  Handler:
    TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_RejectsSelfDeactivate — HTTP 409 + audit
      row + cascade-revoke NOT fired + row stays active
    TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_OtherUser_HappyPath — HTTP 204 + cascade
      fires + row soft-deleted
    TestAuthUsers_Reactivate_HappyPath / _IdempotentOnActiveUser /
      _UnknownID / _MissingID / _UpdateError

Phase 6 verify gate green on the targeted packages: gofmt clean, go vet
clean, go test -short pass across internal/auth/oidc, internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, internal/repository/postgres, internal/auth/...,
internal/service/..., internal/tlsprobe/..., internal/trustanchor/...,
internal/validation/...

Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/02-crit-deactivated-at-enforcement.md
Closure annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11 row.
Operator advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes.
2026-05-11 02:21:05 +00:00

2253 lines
88 KiB
Go

package oidc
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/jwt"
oidcdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/oidc/domain"
userdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/user/domain"
cryptopkg "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/crypto"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// sha384New returns a SHA-384 hash via crypto/sha512 (Go stdlib).
func sha384New() hash.Hash { return sha512.New384() }
// sha512New returns a SHA-512 hash. Helper named to mirror sha384New.
func sha512New() hash.Hash { return sha512.New() }
// =============================================================================
// Mock IdP test fixture
//
// Spins up an httptest.Server that serves the OIDC discovery doc + JWKS
// + a token endpoint that returns server-signed ID tokens. Lets us
// drive the full OIDC service.HandleCallback path without a live IdP.
// Used by the audience / issuer / nonce / azp / at_hash / iat negative
// tests below.
// =============================================================================
type mockIdP struct {
server *httptest.Server
key *rsa.PrivateKey
signer jose.Signer
keyID string
// Per-request token customization. Tests set these before calling
// HandleCallback to inject the specific malformity.
overrideAudience []string
overrideIssuer string
overrideNonce string
overrideAZP string
overrideExp time.Time
overrideIAT time.Time
overrideSubject string
overrideEmail string
overrideGroups []string
overrideATHash string // when set, injected as the id_token at_hash claim
overrideName string // when set to a sentinel "<empty>", emits empty name
// advertisedAlgs controls what id_token_signing_alg_values_supported
// reports in the discovery doc. Tests set ["HS256"] to trigger the
// downgrade-attack defense.
advertisedAlgs []string
// advertiseIssParameterSupported controls whether the discovery
// doc emits `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true`.
// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 — drives the RFC 9207 iss URL parameter
// check in HandleCallback.
advertiseIssParameterSupported bool
// omitUserinfoEndpoint suppresses listing the userinfo endpoint in
// the discovery doc. Used to test the "userinfo fallback configured
// but provider has no userinfo endpoint" branch in fetchUserinfoGroups.
omitUserinfoEndpoint bool
// userinfoGroups is what the /userinfo endpoint returns under the
// `groups` claim. Empty (default) means the endpoint returns a
// response without a `groups` claim at all.
userinfoGroups []string
// userinfoFails causes /userinfo to return HTTP 500. Used to
// exercise fetchUserinfoGroups's UserInfo-fetch error wrap.
userinfoFails bool
// suppressIDToken causes /token to return a response WITHOUT an
// id_token field. Used to test the "token response missing
// id_token" branch in HandleCallback.
suppressIDToken bool
// Captured to assert the PKCE verifier round-trip + return a stub
// access_token + id_token to the service.
receivedCode string
receivedVerifier string
}
func newMockIdP(t *testing.T) *mockIdP {
t.Helper()
return newMockIdPWithTB(t)
}
// newMockIdPWithTB is the testing.TB-typed sibling so benchmarks
// (bench_test.go) can construct the same fixture without forcing a
// *testing.T parameter. testing.TB is satisfied by both *testing.T
// and *testing.B; this is a standard Go pattern for shared test
// helpers.
func newMockIdPWithTB(t testing.TB) *mockIdP {
t.Helper()
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
keyID := "test-key-1"
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: key},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT").WithHeader("kid", keyID),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("jose.NewSigner: %v", err)
}
idp := &mockIdP{
key: key,
signer: signer,
keyID: keyID,
advertisedAlgs: []string{"RS256"},
}
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
base := "http://" + r.Host
doc := map[string]interface{}{
"issuer": base,
"authorization_endpoint": base + "/authorize",
"token_endpoint": base + "/token",
"jwks_uri": base + "/jwks",
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": idp.advertisedAlgs,
"response_types_supported": []string{"code"},
"subject_types_supported": []string{"public"},
}
if !idp.omitUserinfoEndpoint {
doc["userinfo_endpoint"] = base + "/userinfo"
}
// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 — only emit the iss-parameter claim
// when explicitly requested so default tests stay back-compat
// with pre-fix behavior.
if idp.advertiseIssParameterSupported {
doc["authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported"] = true
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(doc)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/userinfo", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if idp.userinfoFails {
http.Error(w, "userinfo simulated failure", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// The OAuth2 client sends the access token as Bearer; we don't
// validate the value (the test stub always returns
// "test-access-token" from /token). Return a JSON body with the
// claims the production fetchUserinfoGroups path consumes.
body := map[string]interface{}{
"sub": "test-subject",
"email": "user@example.com",
}
if idp.userinfoGroups != nil {
body["groups"] = idp.userinfoGroups
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(body)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/jwks", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
jwks := jose.JSONWebKeySet{
Keys: []jose.JSONWebKey{
{Key: key.Public(), KeyID: keyID, Algorithm: "RS256", Use: "sig"},
},
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(jwks)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_ = r.ParseForm()
idp.receivedCode = r.PostFormValue("code")
idp.receivedVerifier = r.PostFormValue("code_verifier")
base := "http://" + r.Host
now := time.Now().UTC()
audience := []string{"certctl"}
if idp.overrideAudience != nil {
audience = idp.overrideAudience
}
issuer := base
if idp.overrideIssuer != "" {
issuer = idp.overrideIssuer
}
exp := now.Add(time.Hour)
if !idp.overrideExp.IsZero() {
exp = idp.overrideExp
}
iat := now
if !idp.overrideIAT.IsZero() {
iat = idp.overrideIAT
}
subject := "test-subject"
if idp.overrideSubject != "" {
subject = idp.overrideSubject
}
email := "user@example.com"
if idp.overrideEmail == "<empty>" {
email = ""
} else if idp.overrideEmail != "" {
email = idp.overrideEmail
}
groups := []string{"engineers"}
if idp.overrideGroups != nil {
groups = idp.overrideGroups
}
// "name" is included by default; "<empty>" sentinel suppresses it
// (used to test the upsertUser display-name fallback chain).
name := "Test User"
if idp.overrideName == "<empty>" {
name = ""
} else if idp.overrideName != "" {
name = idp.overrideName
}
claims := map[string]interface{}{
"iss": issuer,
"aud": audience,
"sub": subject,
"exp": exp.Unix(),
"iat": iat.Unix(),
"email": email,
"name": name,
"groups": groups,
}
if idp.overrideNonce != "" {
claims["nonce"] = idp.overrideNonce
} else {
// Echo back whatever nonce the test supplied via the
// pre-login row. The test stub PreLoginStore generates a
// fixed nonce; we mirror it here.
claims["nonce"] = "test-nonce-fixed"
}
if idp.overrideAZP != "" {
claims["azp"] = idp.overrideAZP
}
// Default: emit a correct at_hash computed from the canned
// access_token under SHA-256 (matches the RS256 signing alg the
// mockIdP uses). Tests that need to exercise the
// at_hash-mismatch / at_hash-missing paths set overrideATHash
// to "<wrong>" or "<empty>" respectively.
switch idp.overrideATHash {
case "":
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte("test-access-token"))
claims["at_hash"] = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:len(h)/2])
case "<empty>":
// Suppress at_hash entirely.
default:
claims["at_hash"] = idp.overrideATHash
}
raw, err := jwt.Signed(signer).Claims(claims).Serialize()
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
return
}
resp := map[string]interface{}{
"access_token": "test-access-token",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600,
}
if !idp.suppressIDToken {
resp["id_token"] = raw
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)
})
mux.HandleFunc("/authorize", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Tests call HandleCallback directly; this endpoint exists for
// completeness but the test never round-trips through it.
http.Error(w, "test fixture: not implemented", 501)
})
idp.server = httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(idp.server.Close)
return idp
}
func (m *mockIdP) URL() string { return m.server.URL }
// =============================================================================
// Stubs for the Service's collaborators
// =============================================================================
type stubProviderLookup struct {
provider *oidcdomain.OIDCProvider
}
func (s *stubProviderLookup) Get(_ context.Context, id string) (*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider, error) {
if s.provider == nil || s.provider.ID != id {
return nil, repository.ErrOIDCProviderNotFound
}
return s.provider, nil
}
func (s *stubProviderLookup) List(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider, error) {
if s.provider == nil {
return nil, nil
}
return []*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider{s.provider}, nil
}
type stubMappings struct {
roleIDs []string
mapErr error // when set, Map returns this error
}
func (s *stubMappings) ListByProvider(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]*oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (s *stubMappings) Get(_ context.Context, _ string) (*oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping, error) {
return nil, repository.ErrGroupRoleMappingNotFound
}
func (s *stubMappings) Add(_ context.Context, _ *oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping) error { return nil }
func (s *stubMappings) Remove(_ context.Context, _ string) error { return nil }
func (s *stubMappings) Map(_ context.Context, _ string, _ []string) ([]string, error) {
if s.mapErr != nil {
return nil, s.mapErr
}
return s.roleIDs, nil
}
type stubUsers struct {
byID map[string]*userdomain.User
bySubject map[string]*userdomain.User
createErr error // when set, Create returns this error
getErr error // when set, GetByOIDCSubject returns this error (other than NotFound)
}
func newStubUsers() *stubUsers {
return &stubUsers{
byID: make(map[string]*userdomain.User),
bySubject: make(map[string]*userdomain.User),
}
}
func (s *stubUsers) Get(_ context.Context, id string) (*userdomain.User, error) {
u, ok := s.byID[id]
if !ok {
return nil, repository.ErrUserNotFound
}
return u, nil
}
func (s *stubUsers) GetByOIDCSubject(_ context.Context, providerID, subject string) (*userdomain.User, error) {
if s.getErr != nil {
return nil, s.getErr
}
u, ok := s.bySubject[providerID+":"+subject]
if !ok {
return nil, repository.ErrUserNotFound
}
return u, nil
}
func (s *stubUsers) Create(_ context.Context, u *userdomain.User) error {
if s.createErr != nil {
return s.createErr
}
s.byID[u.ID] = u
s.bySubject[u.OIDCProviderID+":"+u.OIDCSubject] = u
return nil
}
func (s *stubUsers) Update(_ context.Context, u *userdomain.User) error {
s.byID[u.ID] = u
s.bySubject[u.OIDCProviderID+":"+u.OIDCSubject] = u
return nil
}
func (s *stubUsers) ListAll(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]*userdomain.User, error) {
out := make([]*userdomain.User, 0, len(s.byID))
for _, u := range s.byID {
out = append(out, u)
}
return out, nil
}
type stubSessions struct {
cookieValue string
csrfToken string
mintErr error // when set, MintForUser returns this error
}
func (s *stubSessions) MintForUser(_ context.Context, _ *userdomain.User, _ []string, _, _ string) (string, string, error) {
if s.mintErr != nil {
return "", "", s.mintErr
}
if s.cookieValue == "" {
s.cookieValue = "test-cookie"
}
if s.csrfToken == "" {
s.csrfToken = "test-csrf"
}
return s.cookieValue, s.csrfToken, nil
}
// stubPreLogin is in-memory PreLoginStore. Single-use enforced via
// delete-on-LookupAndConsume.
type stubPreLogin struct {
rows map[string]preLoginRow
createErr error // when set, CreatePreLogin returns this error
}
type preLoginRow struct {
providerID, state, nonce, verifier string
// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 — UA/IP binding captured at
// CreatePreLogin so LookupAndConsume can surface them for the
// service-layer compare.
clientIP, userAgent string
}
func newStubPreLogin() *stubPreLogin {
return &stubPreLogin{rows: make(map[string]preLoginRow)}
}
func (s *stubPreLogin) CreatePreLogin(_ context.Context, providerID, state, nonce, verifier, clientIP, userAgent string) (string, string, error) {
if s.createErr != nil {
return "", "", s.createErr
}
cookieVal := fmt.Sprintf("pl-%d", len(s.rows)+1)
s.rows[cookieVal] = preLoginRow{providerID, state, nonce, verifier, clientIP, userAgent}
return cookieVal, "ses-" + cookieVal, nil
}
func (s *stubPreLogin) LookupAndConsume(_ context.Context, cookie string) (string, string, string, string, string, string, error) {
r, ok := s.rows[cookie]
if !ok {
return "", "", "", "", "", "", ErrPreLoginNotFound
}
delete(s.rows, cookie)
return r.providerID, r.state, r.nonce, r.verifier, r.clientIP, r.userAgent, nil
}
// =============================================================================
// Standalone unit tests (no live IdP needed)
// =============================================================================
// Test 1: PKCE 'plain' is rejected. The Service NEVER generates a plain
// verifier (oauth2.GenerateVerifier + S256ChallengeOption are
// hard-coded), but we pin the deny-list constant exists so a future
// regression is caught.
func TestService_PKCEPlainRejectedSentinel(t *testing.T) {
// The sentinel exists; that's the contract a future code path must
// reference if it ever surfaces a plain-method path. Pin it.
if ErrPKCEPlainRejected == nil {
t.Fatalf("ErrPKCEPlainRejected sentinel must exist")
}
if !strings.Contains(ErrPKCEPlainRejected.Error(), "plain") {
t.Errorf("sentinel message should reference 'plain'; got %q", ErrPKCEPlainRejected.Error())
}
}
// Test 2: state replay (consume-once). After LookupAndConsume succeeds,
// a second call with the same cookie returns ErrPreLoginNotFound.
func TestService_StateReplayDeniedByConsumeOnce(t *testing.T) {
pl := newStubPreLogin()
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-x", "the-state", "the-nonce", "verifier-xxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
if _, _, _, _, _, _, err := pl.LookupAndConsume(context.Background(), cookie); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first LookupAndConsume: %v", err)
}
_, _, _, _, _, _, err = pl.LookupAndConsume(context.Background(), cookie)
if !errors.Is(err, ErrPreLoginNotFound) {
t.Errorf("second LookupAndConsume err = %v; want ErrPreLoginNotFound (single-use violated)", err)
}
}
// Test 3: forged pre-login cookie returns ErrPreLoginNotFound.
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsForgedPreLoginCookie(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), "bogus-cookie", "any-code", "any-state", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrPreLoginNotFound) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrPreLoginNotFound", err)
}
}
// Test 4: state mismatch (cookie matches but the callback state doesn't).
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsStateMismatch(t *testing.T) {
svc, pl := newServiceForUnitTestWithPL(t)
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-test", "real-state", "real-nonce", "verifier-xxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "wrong-state", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrStateMismatch) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrStateMismatch", err)
}
}
// Test 5: alg pinning — direct unit test of isDisallowedAlg helper.
// Hand-builds a JWT header for each algorithm, asserts the deny-list
// catches HS* and `none`.
func TestService_AlgPinning_RejectsHSAlgsAndNone(t *testing.T) {
for _, alg := range []string{"HS256", "HS384", "HS512", "none"} {
header := fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"typ":"JWT"}`, alg)
token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
rejected, gotAlg := isDisallowedAlg(token)
if !rejected {
t.Errorf("alg=%q: not rejected; want rejected", alg)
}
if gotAlg != alg {
t.Errorf("alg=%q: extracted %q; want %q", alg, gotAlg, alg)
}
}
}
// Test 6: alg pinning — allowed algs pass.
func TestService_AlgPinning_AllowsRSAndECAndEdDSA(t *testing.T) {
for _, alg := range []string{"RS256", "RS512", "ES256", "ES384", "EdDSA"} {
header := fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"typ":"JWT"}`, alg)
token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
rejected, gotAlg := isDisallowedAlg(token)
if rejected {
t.Errorf("alg=%q: rejected; want allowed", alg)
}
if gotAlg != alg {
t.Errorf("alg=%q: extracted %q; want %q", alg, gotAlg, alg)
}
}
}
// Test 7: malformed JWT (wrong segment count) → rejected as if alg-bad.
func TestService_AlgPinning_RejectsMalformedJWT(t *testing.T) {
for _, bad := range []string{"", "single-segment", "two.segments", "more.than.three.segments"} {
rejected, _ := isDisallowedAlg(bad)
if !rejected {
t.Errorf("malformed JWT %q: not rejected", bad)
}
}
}
// Test 8: at_hash recomputation — happy path matches.
func TestService_ATHash_MatchesForRS256(t *testing.T) {
accessToken := "test-access-token-value"
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(accessToken))
half := h[:len(h)/2]
expected := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(half)
header := `{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`
rawIDToken := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
if !atHashMatches(rawIDToken, accessToken, expected) {
t.Errorf("atHashMatches should accept correctly-computed at_hash")
}
}
// Test 9: at_hash mismatch → rejected.
func TestService_ATHash_RejectsMismatch(t *testing.T) {
header := `{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`
rawIDToken := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
if atHashMatches(rawIDToken, "the-token", "wrong-hash-claim") {
t.Errorf("atHashMatches accepted bad at_hash; should reject")
}
}
// Test 10: at_hash for unknown alg returns false (defense vs an alg
// that escaped the alg-pin check).
func TestService_ATHash_UnknownAlgReturnsFalse(t *testing.T) {
header := `{"alg":"unknown","typ":"JWT"}`
rawIDToken := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
if atHashMatches(rawIDToken, "any-access-token", "any-hash") {
t.Errorf("atHashMatches with unknown alg should return false")
}
}
// Test 11: IdP downgrade-attack defense. A provider whose discovery doc
// advertises HS256 in id_token_signing_alg_values_supported is REJECTED
// by the cache load with ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised.
func TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RejectsHSAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"RS256", "HS256"} // HS256 is the downgrade vector
svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-bad-idp")
_, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-bad-idp")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised", err)
}
}
// Test 12: IdP downgrade-attack defense — `none` advertisement also
// triggers rejection.
func TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RejectsNoneAdvertised(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"RS256", "none"}
svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-none-idp")
_, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-none-idp")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised", err)
}
}
// Test 13: clean RS256 IdP loads successfully.
func TestService_GetOrLoad_AcceptsCleanIdP(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t) // default advertisedAlgs=["RS256"]
svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-good-idp")
entry, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-good-idp")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getOrLoad: %v", err)
}
if entry.provider == nil {
t.Errorf("entry.provider is nil")
}
if entry.verifier == nil {
t.Errorf("entry.verifier is nil")
}
}
// Test 14: RefreshKeys evicts the cache + re-fetches discovery, which
// re-runs the downgrade defense. If the IdP rotated to advertising
// HS256 between loads, RefreshKeys catches it.
func TestService_RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, _ := newServiceWithProvider(t, idp.URL(), "op-rotate")
if _, err := svc.getOrLoad(context.Background(), "op-rotate"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("initial load: %v", err)
}
// IdP rotates to advertising HS256.
idp.advertisedAlgs = []string{"RS256", "HS256"}
err := svc.RefreshKeys(context.Background(), "op-rotate")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised) {
t.Errorf("RefreshKeys err = %v; want ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised", err)
}
}
// Test 15: HandleCallback happy path against the mock IdP.
func TestService_HandleCallback_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-happy")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-happy", "happy-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "verifier-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "test-code", "happy-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
if res.User == nil {
t.Errorf("CallbackResult.User nil")
}
if len(res.RoleIDs) == 0 {
t.Errorf("CallbackResult.RoleIDs empty")
}
if res.CookieValue == "" {
t.Errorf("CallbackResult.CookieValue empty")
}
}
// Test 16: HandleCallback rejects ID token with wrong audience.
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsWrongAudience(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideAudience = []string{"some-other-client"}
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-aud")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-aud", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
// gooidc.Verify catches this first; its wrap reaches us as a wrapped error.
// Either ErrAudienceMismatch (our re-check) OR a wrapped verify error is acceptable.
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected non-nil err for wrong-aud token")
}
}
// Test 17: HandleCallback rejects an ID token whose nonce doesn't match
// the pre-login row.
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsNonceMismatch(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideNonce = "wrong-nonce-from-idp"
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-nonce")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-nonce", "s", "expected-nonce", "v-bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrNonceMismatch) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrNonceMismatch", err)
}
}
// Test 18: HandleCallback rejects expired ID token.
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideExp = time.Now().Add(-2 * time.Hour) // 2 hours past
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-exp")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-exp", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
// Either ErrTokenExpired (our re-check) or a wrapped verify error is fine.
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected non-nil err for expired token")
}
}
// Test 19: HandleCallback rejects ID token whose iat is too old per the
// configured IATWindow.
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsIATTooOld(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
// Token was issued 20 minutes ago; default IATWindow is 5 minutes.
idp.overrideIAT = time.Now().Add(-20 * time.Minute)
idp.overrideExp = time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour) // exp is fine
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-iat")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-iat", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrIATTooOld) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrIATTooOld", err)
}
}
// Test 20: HandleCallback rejects when group claim is missing.
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsGroupsMissing(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideGroups = []string{} // empty groups claim
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-grp")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-grp", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrGroupsMissing) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrGroupsMissing", err)
}
}
// Test 21: HandleCallback rejects when groups don't match any
// configured mapping → ErrGroupsUnmapped.
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsGroupsUnmapped(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPLNoMappings(t, idp.URL(), "op-unmap")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-unmap", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrGroupsUnmapped) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrGroupsUnmapped", err)
}
}
// =============================================================================
// Test helpers
// =============================================================================
func makeProvider(idpURL, providerID string) *oidcdomain.OIDCProvider {
return &oidcdomain.OIDCProvider{
ID: providerID,
TenantID: "t-default",
Name: "Test " + providerID,
IssuerURL: idpURL,
ClientID: "certctl",
ClientSecretEncrypted: []byte("test-secret"),
RedirectURI: "https://certctl.example.com/auth/oidc/callback",
GroupsClaimPath: "groups",
GroupsClaimFormat: "string-array",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "profile", "email"},
IATWindowSeconds: 300,
JWKSCacheTTLSeconds: 3600,
Enabled: true, // MED-9: default-on for test fixtures
}
}
// newServiceWithProvider returns a Service wired against the given IdP
// URL + a provider already in the stub provider lookup.
func newServiceWithProvider(t *testing.T, idpURL, providerID string) (*Service, *stubPreLogin) {
return newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idpURL, providerID)
}
func newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t *testing.T, idpURL, providerID string) (*Service, *stubPreLogin) {
t.Helper()
prov := makeProvider(idpURL, providerID)
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(
&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov},
mappings,
users,
sessions,
pl,
"", // no encryption key; client_secret already plaintext for test
)
return svc, pl
}
func newServiceWithProviderAndPLNoMappings(t *testing.T, idpURL, providerID string) (*Service, *stubPreLogin) {
t.Helper()
prov := makeProvider(idpURL, providerID)
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: nil} // empty mappings
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(
&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov},
mappings,
users,
sessions,
pl,
"",
)
return svc, pl
}
func newServiceForUnitTest(t *testing.T) *Service {
t.Helper()
pl := newStubPreLogin()
return NewService(
&stubProviderLookup{},
&stubMappings{},
newStubUsers(),
&stubSessions{},
pl,
"",
)
}
func newServiceForUnitTestWithPL(t *testing.T) (*Service, *stubPreLogin) {
t.Helper()
pl := newStubPreLogin()
return NewService(
&stubProviderLookup{},
&stubMappings{},
newStubUsers(),
&stubSessions{},
pl,
"",
), pl
}
// =============================================================================
// Additional coverage tests: HandleAuthRequest entry point, upsert
// update path, atHashMatches alg coverage, helpers.
// =============================================================================
// TestService_HandleAuthRequest_BuildsValidIdPRedirect covers the
// authz-request path end-to-end. Asserts the URL contains state +
// nonce + code_challenge_method=S256 + the operator-configured
// client_id.
func TestService_HandleAuthRequest_BuildsValidIdPRedirect(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-har")
authURL, cookieValue, preLoginID, err := svc.HandleAuthRequest(context.Background(), "op-har", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleAuthRequest: %v", err)
}
if cookieValue == "" || preLoginID == "" {
t.Errorf("empty cookieValue or preLoginID")
}
for _, want := range []string{
"client_id=certctl",
"code_challenge_method=S256",
"code_challenge=",
"state=",
"nonce=",
"redirect_uri=",
"scope=",
} {
if !strings.Contains(authURL, want) {
t.Errorf("authURL missing %q in %q", want, authURL)
}
}
// Pin the pre-login row got persisted with a matching state value.
if len(pl.rows) != 1 {
t.Errorf("pl rows = %d; want 1", len(pl.rows))
}
}
// TestService_HandleAuthRequest_UnknownProviderRejected pins the
// repo-not-found path through HandleAuthRequest.
func TestService_HandleAuthRequest_UnknownProviderRejected(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
_, _, _, err := svc.HandleAuthRequest(context.Background(), "op-nonexistent", "", "")
if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrOIDCProviderNotFound) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrOIDCProviderNotFound", err)
}
}
// TestService_UpsertUser_UpdateExistingPath: a second login by the
// same user updates last_login_at + email + display_name without
// creating a duplicate row.
func TestService_UpsertUser_UpdateExistingPath(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
users := newStubUsers()
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-upd")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
// First login creates the user.
cookie1, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-upd", "s1", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-1aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "", "")
res1, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie1, "code", "s1", "", "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
if len(users.byID) != 1 {
t.Errorf("first login: user count = %d; want 1", len(users.byID))
}
originalLogin := res1.User.LastLoginAt
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond) // ensure timestamps advance
// Second login by same subject: update path, no new user row.
cookie2, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-upd", "s2", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-2aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "", "")
idp.overrideEmail = "user-renamed@example.com"
res2, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie2, "code2", "s2", "", "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
if len(users.byID) != 1 {
t.Errorf("second login: user count = %d; want 1 (Update path)", len(users.byID))
}
if !res2.User.LastLoginAt.After(originalLogin) {
t.Errorf("LastLoginAt did not advance on second login: %v -> %v", originalLogin, res2.User.LastLoginAt)
}
if res2.User.Email != "user-renamed@example.com" {
t.Errorf("Email did not update: %q", res2.User.Email)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsDeactivatedUser pins the A-2
// CRIT closure. A federated user whose `users.deactivated_at` is
// non-nil must NOT be able to log in via OIDC; HandleCallback must
// return ErrUserDeactivated BEFORE the email/display-name mutation
// and last_login_at bump, and BEFORE the session mint.
//
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-2 — pre-fix, the deactivate handler set
// `users.deactivated_at` on the in-memory struct, but: (a) the SQL
// Update omitted the column so the write was a no-op; (b) the
// postgres SELECT didn't include the column so even if (a) were
// fixed scanUser returned DeactivatedAt = nil; (c) upsertUser never
// looked at DeactivatedAt. The lying-field chain meant the very
// next OIDC login re-elevated the user. This test pins the
// service-layer leg of the closure (the SQL legs are pinned by
// postgres/user_test.go).
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsDeactivatedUser(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
users := newStubUsers()
// Pre-seed the user as deactivated. The default mockIdP subject
// is "test-subject"; the provider ID is "op-deact".
deactivatedAt := time.Now().UTC().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-deact")
seeded := &userdomain.User{
ID: "u-deactivated",
TenantID: prov.TenantID,
Email: "deactivated@example.com",
DisplayName: "Deactivated User",
OIDCSubject: "test-subject",
OIDCProviderID: "op-deact",
LastLoginAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
WebAuthnCredentials: []byte("[]"),
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-24 * time.Hour),
UpdatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-1 * time.Hour),
DeactivatedAt: &deactivatedAt,
}
users.byID[seeded.ID] = seeded
users.bySubject["op-deact:test-subject"] = seeded
originalLastLogin := seeded.LastLoginAt
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-deact", "deact-state", "test-nonce-fixed",
"v-deactiveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "deact-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUserDeactivated) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v; want ErrUserDeactivated", err)
}
if res != nil {
t.Errorf("CallbackResult should be nil on rejection, got %+v", res)
}
// Defense order pin — the rejected attempt must NOT have touched
// the persisted row's mutable fields. (Pre-fix the upsertUser
// path would update email + last_login_at first and only catch
// later; A-2 closure moves the check to the head of the function.)
row := users.byID["u-deactivated"]
if row.LastLoginAt != originalLastLogin {
t.Errorf("last_login_at advanced on rejected login: %v -> %v", originalLastLogin, row.LastLoginAt)
}
if row.Email != "deactivated@example.com" {
t.Errorf("email mutated on rejected login: %q", row.Email)
}
if row.DeactivatedAt == nil {
t.Error("deactivated_at was cleared on rejected login")
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_AllowsReactivatedUser covers the
// Reactivate handler's wire end: after `users.deactivated_at` is
// cleared, the next OIDC login goes through the update path
// normally. Pins the inverse of TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsDeactivatedUser.
func TestService_HandleCallback_AllowsReactivatedUser(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
users := newStubUsers()
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-react")
seeded := &userdomain.User{
ID: "u-reactivated",
TenantID: prov.TenantID,
Email: "reactivated@example.com",
DisplayName: "Reactivated User",
OIDCSubject: "test-subject",
OIDCProviderID: "op-react",
LastLoginAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-2 * time.Hour),
WebAuthnCredentials: []byte("[]"),
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-24 * time.Hour),
UpdatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-1 * time.Hour),
DeactivatedAt: nil, // active again
}
users.byID[seeded.ID] = seeded
users.bySubject["op-react:test-subject"] = seeded
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-react", "react-state", "test-nonce-fixed",
"v-reactiveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee", "", "")
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "react-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback after reactivation: %v", err)
}
if res == nil || res.User == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil callback result after reactivation")
}
if res.User.ID != "u-reactivated" {
t.Errorf("CallbackResult.User.ID = %q; want u-reactivated", res.User.ID)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_DeactivatedUserPreservesForensics
// makes the defense-in-depth claim explicit: a rejected login does
// not bump last_login_at. This guards against a regression where
// someone "fixes" upsertUser by re-ordering the assignments to set
// LastLoginAt before checking DeactivatedAt.
func TestService_HandleCallback_DeactivatedUserPreservesForensics(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
users := newStubUsers()
deactivatedAt := time.Now().UTC().Add(-30 * time.Minute)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-forensic")
seeded := &userdomain.User{
ID: "u-forensic",
TenantID: prov.TenantID,
Email: "forensic@example.com",
DisplayName: "Forensic User",
OIDCSubject: "test-subject",
OIDCProviderID: "op-forensic",
LastLoginAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-48 * time.Hour),
WebAuthnCredentials: []byte("[]"),
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-72 * time.Hour),
UpdatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Add(-30 * time.Minute),
DeactivatedAt: &deactivatedAt,
}
users.byID[seeded.ID] = seeded
users.bySubject["op-forensic:test-subject"] = seeded
frozenLastLogin := seeded.LastLoginAt
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-forensic", "for-state", "test-nonce-fixed",
"v-forensiccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "for-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrUserDeactivated) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v; want ErrUserDeactivated", err)
}
row := users.byID["u-forensic"]
if row.LastLoginAt != frozenLastLogin {
t.Errorf("last_login_at advanced on rejected login (forensics tainted): %v -> %v",
frozenLastLogin, row.LastLoginAt)
}
}
// TestService_ATHash_CoversAllAllowedAlgs pins the at_hash alg dispatch
// for every algorithm in DefaultAllowedAlgs.
func TestService_ATHash_CoversAllAllowedAlgs(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
alg string
hashName string
}{
{"RS256", "sha256"},
{"RS512", "sha512"},
{"ES256", "sha256"},
{"ES384", "sha384"},
{"EdDSA", "sha512"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.alg, func(t *testing.T) {
accessToken := "access-token-for-" + tc.alg
// Compute the expected hash using the same logic as atHashMatches.
var sum []byte
switch tc.alg {
case "RS256", "ES256":
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(accessToken))
sum = h[:]
case "ES384":
// SHA-384 via crypto/sha512 (sha512.Sum384 returns [48]byte).
// Avoid importing sha512 here; use the prod helper indirectly.
ok := atHashMatches(makeJWTHeader(tc.alg), accessToken, computeATHashViaProd(t, tc.alg, accessToken))
if !ok {
t.Errorf("alg=%q: atHashMatches returned false on round-trip", tc.alg)
}
return
case "RS512", "EdDSA":
ok := atHashMatches(makeJWTHeader(tc.alg), accessToken, computeATHashViaProd(t, tc.alg, accessToken))
if !ok {
t.Errorf("alg=%q: atHashMatches returned false on round-trip", tc.alg)
}
return
}
half := sum[:len(sum)/2]
expected := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(half)
if !atHashMatches(makeJWTHeader(tc.alg), accessToken, expected) {
t.Errorf("alg=%q: at_hash mismatch", tc.alg)
}
})
}
}
// computeATHashViaProd shims around atHashMatches by binary-searching
// for the at_hash value: we just call the production helper with each
// alg, and the test passes if the same value reproduces. Avoids
// duplicating the alg → hash dispatch in test code.
func computeATHashViaProd(_ *testing.T, alg, accessToken string) string {
// Build a JWT with that alg, then use atHashMatches twice with
// different claim values to find the matching one. Since we
// can't easily do that without infinite test loops, the easier
// path is to call the production code at the at_hash reflect
// surface. But our service has no public at_hash compute helper —
// only matches helper. So: use a trial-and-error with the empty
// hash and check against the real recomputed hash via a helper
// that doesn't exist. Instead, this function reaches into the
// implementation by replicating it minimally.
h := newHasherForAlg(alg)
if h == nil {
return ""
}
h.Write([]byte(accessToken))
sum := h.Sum(nil)
half := sum[:len(sum)/2]
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(half)
}
// newHasherForAlg duplicates the dispatch in atHashMatches for the
// test helper. Kept in test code so the production path stays
// dependency-light.
func newHasherForAlg(alg string) interface {
Write([]byte) (int, error)
Sum([]byte) []byte
} {
switch alg {
case "RS256", "ES256":
return sha256.New()
case "ES384":
return sha384New()
case "RS512", "EdDSA":
return sha512New()
default:
return nil
}
}
// makeJWTHeader returns a minimal JWT-shape string with the given alg
// in the header. body + sig are dummy.
func makeJWTHeader(alg string) string {
header := fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"typ":"JWT"}`, alg)
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
}
// TestService_AlgPinning_HandlesWhitespaceInHeader pins the parser
// against headers with whitespace around the alg value (some libraries
// emit " :" instead of ":").
func TestService_AlgPinning_HandlesWhitespaceInHeader(t *testing.T) {
header := `{"alg" : "RS256" ,"typ":"JWT"}`
token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
rejected, alg := isDisallowedAlg(token)
if rejected {
t.Errorf("RS256 with whitespace: rejected = true; want allowed")
}
if alg != "RS256" {
t.Errorf("alg extraction failed: got %q", alg)
}
}
// TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderWithBadBase64 returns rejected=true
// when the header isn't decodable.
func TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderWithBadBase64(t *testing.T) {
rejected, _ := isDisallowedAlg("!!!not-base64.body.sig")
if !rejected {
t.Errorf("bad base64 header: rejected = false; want true")
}
}
// TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderMissingAlgField returns rejected=true.
func TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderMissingAlgField(t *testing.T) {
header := `{"typ":"JWT"}`
token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
rejected, _ := isDisallowedAlg(token)
if !rejected {
t.Errorf("header missing alg: rejected = false; want true")
}
}
// TestService_IsJWKSFetchError pins the error-string heuristic.
func TestService_IsJWKSFetchError(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
msg string
want bool
}{
{"oidc: fetching keys oidc: get keys failed: timeout", true},
{"failed to fetch jwks_uri", true},
{"unable to load key set", true},
{"some other unrelated error", false},
{"", false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
got := isJWKSFetchError(errors.New(tc.msg))
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isJWKSFetchError(%q) = %v; want %v", tc.msg, got, tc.want)
}
}
if isJWKSFetchError(nil) {
t.Errorf("isJWKSFetchError(nil) = true; want false")
}
}
// TestIsJWKSFetchError_GoOIDCV318Strings pins the canonical go-oidc/v3
// v3.18.0 error wordings against isJWKSFetchError. Audit 2026-05-10
// Nit-2: go-oidc's only typed error as of v3.18.0 is
// *oidc.TokenExpiredError; JWKS-fetch failures bubble up as
// fmt.Errorf-wrapped strings. A future go-oidc bump that changes
// these strings will trip this test and force isJWKSFetchError to be
// re-derived (or, ideally, switched to errors.As against a newly-
// exposed typed error). Without this pin, a silent upstream string
// change would make every JWKS-rotation login surface as 500 instead
// of 503 — the operator-distinguishable wire shape promised by
// ErrJWKSUnreachable.
func TestIsJWKSFetchError_GoOIDCV318Strings(t *testing.T) {
// Canonical substrings observed in go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 verify path.
// Sources (all under github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3@v3.18.0/oidc/):
// - jwks.go:175 → fmt.Errorf("fetching keys %w", err)
// - jwks.go:260 → fmt.Errorf("oidc: failed to decode keys: %v %s", ...)
// Also stably matched by isJWKSFetchError's "jwks_uri" + "key set"
// fallbacks (substrings inside go-oidc-emitted strings and our
// own /api/v1/auth/oidc/.../refresh wrap errors).
canonical := []string{
// Direct go-oidc v3.18.0 fmt.Errorf outputs.
"fetching keys: dial tcp: lookup idp.example.com: no such host",
"oidc: failed to decode keys: invalid character 'h' looking for beginning of value",
// Wrap from our own RefreshKeys / verify retry path.
"failed to refresh remote key set: timeout",
"unable to load key set: cancelled",
}
for _, msg := range canonical {
if !isJWKSFetchError(errors.New(msg)) {
t.Errorf("canonical go-oidc v3.18.0 string %q not detected as JWKS-fetch error; "+
"update isJWKSFetchError or pin the new substring", msg)
}
}
}
// TestIsKidMismatchError_GoOIDCV318Strings pins the canonical
// go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 wordings for the kid-not-in-cache failure mode.
// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-6: a future go-oidc bump that changes the
// wording will trip this test and force isKidMismatchError to be
// re-derived. Without this pin, the JWKS auto-refresh-on-cache-miss
// recovery would silently regress and every post-IdP-rotation login
// would surface as a generic verify error instead of recovering.
func TestIsKidMismatchError_GoOIDCV318Strings(t *testing.T) {
canonical := []string{
// Direct go-oidc v3.18.0 verifier outputs when no JWK in the
// cached key set matches the token's header kid.
"signing key with id \"key-2\" not found",
"oidc: kid \"new-kid\" not found",
"key with id \"abc\" not found",
"no matching key for kid \"xyz\"",
}
for _, msg := range canonical {
if !isKidMismatchError(errors.New(msg)) {
t.Errorf("canonical kid-mismatch string %q not detected; "+
"update isKidMismatchError or pin the new substring", msg)
}
}
// Confirm a non-kid verify error does NOT trigger the auto-refresh:
// a wrong signature on a known kid would otherwise produce an
// unbounded refresh loop in production.
if isKidMismatchError(errors.New("invalid signature")) {
t.Errorf("non-kid-mismatch error misclassified as kid-mismatch")
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss exercises the
// MED-6 recovery: the IdP rotates its signing key between provider
// load + token verify; the first verify fails with kid-not-in-cache,
// the auto-RefreshKeys path re-fetches the discovery doc + JWKS, and
// the second verify succeeds against the rotated key.
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-med6-rotate")
// Prime the verifier cache with the initial key by running one
// successful handshake.
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-med6-rotate", "init-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "verifier-med6init-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin (init): %v", err)
}
if _, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "init-state", "", "ip", "ua"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback (init): %v", err)
}
// Rotate the IdP's signing key + key id. Subsequent token-sign
// operations use the new key; the cached JWKS still holds the old
// public key, so the next Verify trips kid-not-in-cache until the
// MED-6 auto-refresh kicks in.
rotateMockIdPKey(t, idp, "test-key-2")
// Issue a new handshake; this hits the rotated key + the auto-
// refresh recovery path.
cookie2, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-med6-rotate", "post-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "verifier-med6post-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin (post-rotate): %v", err)
}
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie2, "code-rot", "post-state", "", "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback (post-rotate, expected MED-6 auto-refresh): %v", err)
}
if res == nil || res.User == nil {
t.Fatalf("post-rotate CallbackResult missing user")
}
}
// rotateMockIdPKey replaces the mockIdP's RSA signing key + key id so
// subsequent ID tokens are signed under a fresh kid the cached JWKS
// doesn't contain. Used by the MED-6 regression test.
func rotateMockIdPKey(t *testing.T, idp *mockIdP, newKeyID string) {
t.Helper()
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa.GenerateKey (rotate): %v", err)
}
signer, err := jose.NewSigner(
jose.SigningKey{Algorithm: jose.RS256, Key: key},
(&jose.SignerOptions{}).WithType("JWT").WithHeader("kid", newKeyID),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("jose.NewSigner (rotate): %v", err)
}
idp.key = key
idp.signer = signer
idp.keyID = newKeyID
}
// TestService_DecryptClientSecret_NoKeyReturnsBytesAsIs covers the
// empty-key short-circuit (used by tests with plaintext blobs).
func TestService_DecryptClientSecret_NoKeyReturnsBytesAsIs(t *testing.T) {
plain := []byte("test-plaintext-secret")
got, err := decryptClientSecret(plain, "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decryptClientSecret(no key): %v", err)
}
if string(got) != string(plain) {
t.Errorf("decryptClientSecret returned %q; want %q", string(got), string(plain))
}
}
// TestService_RandomB64URL_ProducesNonEmptyAndUnique pins the random
// generator's contract.
func TestService_RandomB64URL_ProducesNonEmptyAndUnique(t *testing.T) {
a, err := randomB64URL(32)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a: %v", err)
}
b, err := randomB64URL(32)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("b: %v", err)
}
if a == "" || b == "" {
t.Errorf("got empty random value")
}
if a == b {
t.Errorf("two random values were equal (RNG broken)")
}
}
// =============================================================================
// Phase 7 — OIDC first-admin bootstrap hook tests.
// =============================================================================
// Phase 7 spec test #1: fresh DB + OIDC login matching bootstrap groups
// → user becomes admin. Pin: when the hook returns grantAdmin=true, the
// resolved roleIDs include r-admin even if mappings.Map returned empty.
func TestService_BootstrapHook_GrantsAdminOnMatch(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-bootstrap")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: nil} // intentionally empty — fresh deploy
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
hookCalled := false
svc.SetAdminBootstrapHook(func(_ context.Context, providerID string, groups []string, userID string) (bool, error) {
hookCalled = true
// Verify the hook receives the right inputs.
if providerID != "op-bootstrap" {
t.Errorf("hook providerID = %q; want op-bootstrap", providerID)
}
if len(groups) == 0 {
t.Errorf("hook groups empty; expected at least one")
}
if userID == "" {
t.Errorf("hook userID empty; expected upserted user id")
}
return true, nil // grant admin
})
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-bootstrap", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-bootstrapxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
if !hookCalled {
t.Errorf("bootstrap hook never invoked")
}
if !sliceContains(res.RoleIDs, "r-admin") {
t.Errorf("expected r-admin in RoleIDs after bootstrap; got %v", res.RoleIDs)
}
}
// Phase 7 spec test #2: fresh DB + OIDC login NOT matching bootstrap
// groups → user upserted but mapping fails closed (no admin grant).
// The hook returns grantAdmin=false; mappings.Map empty → ErrGroupsUnmapped.
func TestService_BootstrapHook_NoMatchPreservesEmptyMappingFailClosed(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPLNoMappings(t, idp.URL(), "op-no-match")
svc.SetAdminBootstrapHook(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ []string, _ string) (bool, error) {
return false, nil // not a bootstrap match
})
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-no-match", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-nomatchxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrGroupsUnmapped) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrGroupsUnmapped (no bootstrap match + empty mappings)", err)
}
}
// Phase 7 spec test #3: existing admin + OIDC login matching bootstrap
// groups → bootstrap mode disabled (hook returns grantAdmin=false), normal
// group-role mapping wins. Pin: the hook is ALWAYS called but its
// grantAdmin=false response means the user gets the ordinary mapped
// role set, not r-admin.
func TestService_BootstrapHook_AdminAlreadyExistsFallsThroughToNormalMapping(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-existing-admin")
// Hook says grantAdmin=false because (in production) an admin already
// exists; the closure does the AdminExists probe.
svc.SetAdminBootstrapHook(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ []string, _ string) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
})
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-existing-admin", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-existingxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
// stubMappings returns r-operator; the hook returned false; r-admin
// MUST NOT appear in the role set.
if sliceContains(res.RoleIDs, "r-admin") {
t.Errorf("admin-already-exists path should not grant r-admin; got %v", res.RoleIDs)
}
if !sliceContains(res.RoleIDs, "r-operator") {
t.Errorf("expected normal mapping (r-operator) to win; got %v", res.RoleIDs)
}
}
// Phase 7 hook-error path: hook returns an error → HandleCallback wraps it.
func TestService_BootstrapHook_ErrorWraps(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-hook-err")
svc.SetAdminBootstrapHook(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ []string, _ string) (bool, error) {
return false, fmt.Errorf("simulated AdminExists probe failure")
})
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-hook-err", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-errxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "admin bootstrap") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want admin bootstrap wrap", err)
}
}
// Phase 7 idempotence: hook returns grantAdmin=true AND mappings.Map
// already includes r-admin → roleIDs has r-admin exactly once.
func TestService_BootstrapHook_IdempotentWhenAdminAlreadyMapped(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-idem")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}} // already mapped
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
svc.SetAdminBootstrapHook(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ []string, _ string) (bool, error) {
return true, nil
})
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-idem", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-idempxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
count := 0
for _, rid := range res.RoleIDs {
if rid == "r-admin" {
count++
}
}
if count != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected r-admin to appear exactly once; got %d (RoleIDs=%v)", count, res.RoleIDs)
}
}
func sliceContains(s []string, v string) bool {
for _, x := range s {
if x == v {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// TestService_SetClockForTest_OverridesNow pins the test seam works.
func TestService_SetClockForTest_OverridesNow(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
frozen := time.Date(2026, 5, 10, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
svc.SetClockForTest(func() time.Time { return frozen })
if got := svc.clockNow(); !got.Equal(frozen) {
t.Errorf("clock = %v; want %v", got, frozen)
}
}
// =============================================================================
// Coverage-lift batch: HandleCallback branch tests + fetchUserinfoGroups +
// upsertUser fallback chain + decryptClientSecret real-encrypt round trip +
// randomB64URL error path + HandleAuthRequest preLogin failure.
//
// These tests exist to lift the package above the 90% per-statement floor
// pinned by Phase 13 of the bundle prompt. Each one targets a specific
// uncovered branch in service.go; the test name announces which.
// =============================================================================
// TestService_HandleCallback_AZPRequired_OnMultiAud pins the OIDC core
// §3.1.3.7 step 5 enforcement: a multi-audience ID token MUST carry an
// `azp` claim equal to the relying-party client_id, otherwise the token
// is rejected.
func TestService_HandleCallback_AZPRequired_OnMultiAud(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
// Multi-aud, NO azp — Phase 3 requires azp in this case.
idp.overrideAudience = []string{"certctl", "another-relying-party"}
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-azp-req")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-azp-req", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-azpreqxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrAZPRequired) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrAZPRequired", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_AZPMismatch pins the equal-to-client_id
// requirement when azp is present.
func TestService_HandleCallback_AZPMismatch(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideAZP = "some-other-client" // != "certctl"
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-azp-mis")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-azp-mis", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-azpmisxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrAZPMismatch) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrAZPMismatch", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_ATHashMismatch pins the at_hash recompute
// check: if the IdP returns at_hash that doesn't match SHA-256 of the
// access token's first half, reject.
func TestService_HandleCallback_ATHashMismatch(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
// Inject a wrong at_hash. The mockIdP returns access_token =
// "test-access-token"; the real at_hash for that token under RS256
// is sha256[:16] base64url. We overshoot with a known-wrong value.
idp.overrideATHash = "not-the-real-at-hash"
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-ath-mis")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-ath-mis", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-athmisxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrATHashMismatch) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrATHashMismatch", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_ATHashRequired_WhenAccessTokenPresent pins
// the Phase 3 tightening of the OIDC core "MAY" to a service-level
// "MUST": when an access token is returned, the ID token MUST carry an
// at_hash claim. A substituted access token would otherwise ride a
// clean ID token through the verifier — fail closed at the service.
func TestService_HandleCallback_ATHashRequired_WhenAccessTokenPresent(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideATHash = "<empty>" // suppress at_hash even though access_token is returned
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-ath-req")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-ath-req", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-athreqxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrATHashRequired) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrATHashRequired", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_IATInFuture pins the iat-in-future rejection
// (60s clock-skew tolerance is the only allowance).
func TestService_HandleCallback_IATInFuture(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
// iat is 10 minutes in the future, well beyond 60s skew.
idp.overrideIAT = time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute)
idp.overrideExp = time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-iat-fut")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-iat-fut", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-iatfutxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrIATInFuture) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrIATInFuture", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_MappingsMapError pins the wrap on the
// mappings.Map repo-layer error.
func TestService_HandleCallback_MappingsMapError(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-map-err")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{mapErr: fmt.Errorf("simulated repo failure")}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-map-err", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-mapxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "group-role mapping") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want group-role mapping wrap", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_SessionMintError pins the wrap on the
// SessionService.MintForUser error.
func TestService_HandleCallback_SessionMintError(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-mint-err")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{mintErr: fmt.Errorf("simulated session minter failure")}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-mint-err", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-mintxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "session mint") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want session mint wrap", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_UserCreateError pins the wrap on the
// users.Create repo-layer error.
func TestService_HandleCallback_UserCreateError(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-uc-err")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
users.createErr = fmt.Errorf("simulated insert failure")
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-uc-err", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-ucxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "upsert user") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want upsert user wrap", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_GetByOIDCSubjectNonNotFoundError pins the
// upsertUser early-return when the GetByOIDCSubject repo call fails for
// a reason OTHER than not-found (DB connection drop, query error, etc.).
func TestService_HandleCallback_GetByOIDCSubjectNonNotFoundError(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-get-err")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
users.getErr = fmt.Errorf("simulated query failure")
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-get-err", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-getxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "simulated query failure") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want simulated query failure unwrap", err)
}
}
// TestService_UpsertUser_DisplayNameFallsBackToEmail covers the
// last-resort fallback: when both name and preferred_username are empty,
// the user record's display_name is set to the email.
func TestService_UpsertUser_DisplayNameFallsBackToEmail(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideName = "<empty>" // suppress name claim entirely
// preferred_username isn't emitted by the mockIdP at all, so it's "".
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-name-fb")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-name-fb", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-namxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
if res.User.DisplayName != "user@example.com" {
t.Errorf("DisplayName = %q; want fallback to email %q", res.User.DisplayName, "user@example.com")
}
}
// TestService_FetchUserinfoGroups_HappyPath_OnEmptyIDTokenGroups pins
// the userinfo fallback: if the ID token's groups claim is empty AND
// the operator opted in via FetchUserinfo, the userinfo endpoint is
// consulted and its groups feed the role-mapping step.
func TestService_FetchUserinfoGroups_HappyPath_OnEmptyIDTokenGroups(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideGroups = []string{} // ID token returns no groups
idp.userinfoGroups = []string{"engineers", "platform"} // userinfo returns groups
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-ui-ok")
prov.FetchUserinfo = true
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-ui-ok", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-uioxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback: %v", err)
}
if len(res.RoleIDs) == 0 {
t.Errorf("expected RoleIDs from userinfo-fallback path; got empty")
}
}
// TestService_FetchUserinfoGroups_ReturnsErrGroupsMissing_WhenUserinfoAlsoEmpty
// pins the fail-closed semantics: even with FetchUserinfo=true, if the
// userinfo response also has no groups, the login fails closed.
func TestService_FetchUserinfoGroups_ReturnsErrGroupsMissing_WhenUserinfoAlsoEmpty(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideGroups = []string{} // ID token returns no groups
idp.userinfoGroups = nil // userinfo also returns no groups
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-ui-empty")
prov.FetchUserinfo = true
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-ui-empty", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-uixxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrGroupsMissing) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrGroupsMissing", err)
}
}
// TestService_FetchUserinfoGroups_ReturnsErrGroupsMissing_WhenEndpointMissing
// pins the "operator opted in but provider doesn't list a userinfo
// endpoint" branch in fetchUserinfoGroups.
func TestService_FetchUserinfoGroups_ReturnsErrGroupsMissing_WhenEndpointMissing(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideGroups = []string{}
idp.omitUserinfoEndpoint = true // discovery doc lacks userinfo_endpoint
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-ui-noendpoint")
prov.FetchUserinfo = true
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-ui-noendpoint", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-uixxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrGroupsMissing) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrGroupsMissing", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleAuthRequest_PreLoginStoreError pins the wrap on a
// PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin failure (e.g. database unavailable
// during the GET /auth/oidc/start handler).
func TestService_HandleAuthRequest_PreLoginStoreError(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-pl-err")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
pl.createErr = fmt.Errorf("simulated pre-login insert failure")
svc := NewService(
&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov},
&stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}},
newStubUsers(),
&stubSessions{},
pl,
"",
)
_, _, _, err := svc.HandleAuthRequest(context.Background(), "op-pl-err", "", "")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "pre-login store") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want pre-login store wrap", err)
}
}
// TestService_DecryptClientSecret_RealEncryptedRoundTrip pins that the
// production decrypt path works against a real
// internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet output. Catches future regressions
// where the v3 blob format changes without updating this consumer.
func TestService_DecryptClientSecret_RealEncryptedRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
plaintext := []byte("super-secret-client-secret-do-not-leak")
passphrase := "test-passphrase-please-keep-secret"
blob, _, err := cryptopkg.EncryptIfKeySet(plaintext, passphrase)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EncryptIfKeySet: %v", err)
}
if len(blob) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("EncryptIfKeySet returned empty blob")
}
got, err := decryptClientSecret(blob, passphrase)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decryptClientSecret: %v", err)
}
if string(got) != string(plaintext) {
t.Errorf("decrypt round-trip: got %q; want %q", string(got), string(plaintext))
}
}
// TestService_DecryptClientSecret_BadPassphraseFails pins that a wrong
// passphrase against a real encrypted blob returns an error (NOT the
// plaintext, NOT a panic).
func TestService_DecryptClientSecret_BadPassphraseFails(t *testing.T) {
plaintext := []byte("super-secret-client-secret-do-not-leak")
passphrase := "test-passphrase-correct"
blob, _, err := cryptopkg.EncryptIfKeySet(plaintext, passphrase)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EncryptIfKeySet: %v", err)
}
got, err := decryptClientSecret(blob, "wrong-passphrase-different")
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("decryptClientSecret with wrong passphrase: err = nil, got = %q; want non-nil err", string(got))
}
}
// TestService_RandomB64URL_PropagatesReadError exercises the readRand
// seam by overriding it to return an error. Asserts the production code
// surfaces the error rather than silently returning an empty string.
func TestService_RandomB64URL_PropagatesReadError(t *testing.T) {
original := readRand
readRand = func(_ []byte) (int, error) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("simulated entropy starvation")
}
defer func() { readRand = original }()
got, err := randomB64URL(32)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("randomB64URL: err = nil; want non-nil")
}
if got != "" {
t.Errorf("randomB64URL: returned %q on error path; want empty string", got)
}
}
// TestService_HandleAuthRequest_RandomFailureSurfaces pins that a
// state-generation failure from the readRand seam surfaces through the
// HandleAuthRequest path as a wrapped "state generate" error.
func TestService_HandleAuthRequest_RandomFailureSurfaces(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, _ := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-rand-fail")
original := readRand
readRand = func(_ []byte) (int, error) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("simulated rng exhaustion")
}
defer func() { readRand = original }()
_, _, _, err := svc.HandleAuthRequest(context.Background(), "op-rand-fail", "", "")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "state generate") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want state generate wrap", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleAuthRequest_NonceRandomFailureSurfaces lets the
// state-generation succeed on call 1 and fails the nonce-generation on
// call 2. Pins the second readRand call's error wrap.
func TestService_HandleAuthRequest_NonceRandomFailureSurfaces(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, _ := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-nonce-rand-fail")
original := readRand
calls := 0
readRand = func(b []byte) (int, error) {
calls++
if calls == 1 {
return original(b) // state succeeds
}
return 0, fmt.Errorf("simulated rng exhaustion on nonce") // nonce fails
}
defer func() { readRand = original }()
_, _, _, err := svc.HandleAuthRequest(context.Background(), "op-nonce-rand-fail", "", "")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "nonce generate") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want nonce generate wrap", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsTokenResponseMissingIDToken pins
// the "token response missing id_token" branch — the IdP returned a
// 200 from /token but the response payload lacked the id_token field
// (a misconfigured IdP, or a OAuth2-only flow we shouldn't be hitting).
func TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsTokenResponseMissingIDToken(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.suppressIDToken = true
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-no-idtok")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-no-idtok", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-noidxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "missing id_token") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want missing id_token error", err)
}
}
// TestService_FetchUserinfoGroups_ReturnsErrGroupsMissing_WhenUserinfoFails
// pins the UserInfo-fetch HTTP error wrap. With FetchUserinfo=true and
// /userinfo returning HTTP 500, the service surfaces ErrGroupsMissing
// to the caller (the inner error stays in the audit row, not the wire).
func TestService_FetchUserinfoGroups_ReturnsErrGroupsMissing_WhenUserinfoFails(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideGroups = []string{}
idp.userinfoFails = true
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-ui-500")
prov.FetchUserinfo = true
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-ui-500", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-uifxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrGroupsMissing) {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want ErrGroupsMissing", err)
}
}
// TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderMissingColonAfterAlg covers the parser
// branch where the alg key appears but isn't followed by a colon (a
// malformed header that's still valid base64 + valid JSON outer shape).
func TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderMissingColonAfterAlg(t *testing.T) {
// `"alg" "RS256"` — alg key but no colon between key and value.
// Note: this is intentionally not valid JSON; the minimal parser
// only checks for the colon and rejects this shape conservatively.
header := `{"alg" "RS256"}`
token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
rejected, _ := isDisallowedAlg(token)
if !rejected {
t.Errorf("header missing colon after alg: rejected = false; want true")
}
}
// TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderAlgValueNotQuoted covers the parser
// branch where the value after the colon isn't a JSON string literal
// (e.g., a number or unquoted token).
func TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderAlgValueNotQuoted(t *testing.T) {
header := `{"alg":42}`
token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
rejected, _ := isDisallowedAlg(token)
if !rejected {
t.Errorf("header with non-string alg: rejected = false; want true")
}
}
// TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderAlgValueUnterminatedString covers the
// parser branch where the value starts a JSON string but never closes
// it (truncated header).
func TestService_AlgPinning_HeaderAlgValueUnterminatedString(t *testing.T) {
// Valid base64 of `{"alg":"RS256` (missing closing quote + brace).
header := `{"alg":"RS256`
token := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(header)) + ".body.sig"
rejected, _ := isDisallowedAlg(token)
if !rejected {
t.Errorf("header with unterminated alg string: rejected = false; want true")
}
}
// =============================================================================
// MED-17 regression tests — RFC 9207 iss URL parameter check.
//
// HandleCallback REQUIRES the `iss` callback URL parameter when the
// provider's discovery doc advertises
// authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true. Pre-fix the
// parameter was ignored; mix-up attacks could route the auth code to
// the wrong relying-party endpoint without detection.
// =============================================================================
// TestService_HandleCallback_MED17_NoSupport_AnyIssAccepted pins the
// back-compat case: providers that don't advertise iss-parameter
// support (the majority today) get the same behavior as before —
// callback iss is not required and an arbitrary value is ignored.
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED17_NoSupport_AnyIssAccepted(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
// advertiseIssParameterSupported deliberately left false.
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-iss-back-compat")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-iss-back-compat", "iss-bc-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-issbcxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
// Pass a callbackIss value the provider didn't advertise support
// for — the service must ignore it.
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "iss-bc-state", "https://malicious.example/", "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback (no-support, arbitrary callbackIss): %v; want nil (parameter must be ignored)", err)
}
if res == nil {
t.Fatalf("CallbackResult nil for back-compat happy path")
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_MED17_SupportButMissing rejects with
// ErrIssParamMissing when the provider advertised support but the
// callback URL omitted the iss query parameter.
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED17_SupportButMissing(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.advertiseIssParameterSupported = true
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-iss-missing")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-iss-missing", "iss-miss-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-issmsxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
_, err = svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "iss-miss-state", "", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrIssParamMissing) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v; want ErrIssParamMissing", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_MED17_SupportButMismatch rejects with
// ErrIssParamMismatch when the provider advertised support and the
// callback URL supplied an iss query parameter but the value doesn't
// match the matched provider's IssuerURL. This is the load-bearing
// mix-up-attack defense.
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED17_SupportButMismatch(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.advertiseIssParameterSupported = true
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-iss-mismatch")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-iss-mismatch", "iss-mm-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-issmmxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
// Supply an honest-looking but wrong iss — the impersonator's URL
// instead of the matched provider's IssuerURL.
_, err = svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "iss-mm-state", "https://attacker.example/", "ip", "ua")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrIssParamMismatch) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v; want ErrIssParamMismatch", err)
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_MED17_SupportAndCorrect succeeds when the
// callback iss exactly matches the matched provider's IssuerURL —
// the success path that proves the gate isn't over-eager.
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED17_SupportAndCorrect(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.advertiseIssParameterSupported = true
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-iss-ok")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-iss-ok", "iss-ok-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-issokxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
// The matched provider's IssuerURL is the mockIdP server URL.
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "iss-ok-state", idp.URL(), "ip", "ua")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback (correct iss): %v", err)
}
if res == nil {
t.Fatalf("CallbackResult nil for happy iss path")
}
}
// =============================================================================
// MED-16 regression tests — pre-login UA / IP binding (RFC 9700 §4.7.1).
//
// HandleCallback rejects a pre-login cookie whose stored client_ip or
// user_agent doesn't match the incoming /auth/oidc/callback request's
// values. Each leg has an independent enforcement toggle; the binding
// is also tolerant of empty values on either side (rolling-deploy +
// headless-proxy compat).
// =============================================================================
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_UAMismatchRejected(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-med16-ua")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-med16-ua", "ua-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "verifier-med16uaxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "10.0.0.1", "MozillaLogin/1.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
_, err = svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "ua-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "AttackerUA/2.0")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrPreLoginUAMismatch) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v; want ErrPreLoginUAMismatch", err)
}
}
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_IPMismatchRejected(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-med16-ip")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-med16-ip", "ip-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "verifier-med16ipxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
_, err = svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "ip-state", "", "203.0.113.7", "Mozilla/5.0")
if !errors.Is(err, ErrPreLoginIPMismatch) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v; want ErrPreLoginIPMismatch", err)
}
}
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_BothMatch_Succeeds(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-med16-ok")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-med16-ok", "ok-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "verifier-med16okxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "ok-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback (matching UA+IP): %v", err)
}
if res == nil {
t.Fatal("CallbackResult nil on matching binding")
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues pins the
// rolling-deploy compat — a pre-login row persisted before migration
// 000044 has empty clientIP/userAgent; the consume-side check must
// pass through (the legacy row's binding is unenforceable).
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-med16-legacy")
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-med16-legacy", "leg-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "verifier-med16legxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "leg-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "Mozilla/5.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback (legacy empty bind): %v", err)
}
if res == nil {
t.Fatal("CallbackResult nil for legacy-row compat path")
}
}
// TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch pins
// the operator-escape-hatch behaviour: setting requireUA=false means
// a UA mismatch passes through silently. The binding is still
// persisted (so audit forensics can detect it retroactively) but the
// in-band reject is suppressed.
func TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, pl := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "op-med16-uaopt")
svc.SetPreLoginBindingRequirements(false, true) // UA off, IP on
cookie, _, err := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-med16-uaopt", "ua-opt-state", "test-nonce-fixed", "verifier-med16optxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "10.0.0.1", "MozillaLogin/1.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreatePreLogin: %v", err)
}
res, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "ua-opt-state", "", "10.0.0.1", "AttackerUA/2.0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleCallback (requireUA=false, UA mismatch): %v", err)
}
if res == nil {
t.Fatal("CallbackResult nil with requireUA=false")
}
}
// TestService_UpsertUser_ValidateErrorOnEmptyEmail pins the
// User.Validate failure path. The IdP returns an empty email (missing
// claim); the upsertUser display-name fallback resolves to "" too;
// User.Validate then trips ErrUserEmptyEmail.
func TestService_UpsertUser_ValidateErrorOnEmptyEmail(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
idp.overrideEmail = "<empty>" // sentinel — see /token handler patch below
idp.overrideName = "<empty>" // suppress name to force email fallback
prov := makeProvider(idp.URL(), "op-validate-err")
pl := newStubPreLogin()
mappings := &stubMappings{roleIDs: []string{"r-operator"}}
users := newStubUsers()
sessions := &stubSessions{}
svc := NewService(&stubProviderLookup{provider: prov}, mappings, users, sessions, pl, "")
cookie, _, _ := pl.CreatePreLogin(context.Background(), "op-validate-err", "s", "test-nonce-fixed", "v-valxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx", "", "")
_, err := svc.HandleCallback(context.Background(), cookie, "code", "s", "", "ip", "ua")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "validate") {
t.Errorf("err = %v; want validate wrap", err)
}
}