mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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45361477ed
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
5c01c7f. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.
M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
* Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
* Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
audit_events row.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
unauthenticated endpoints.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.
M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
* Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
* Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
viewers receive 403.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.
M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
* Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
'/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5)
GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960)
* Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
* Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
* Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
- internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
- internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
mounted on the unauthenticated branch.
M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.
Verification (all gates green):
* go vet ./... — clean
* go build ./... — ok
* go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass
* web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass
* web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean
* grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.
Documentation:
* coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
* CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
closure note.
* docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
— refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
API keys.
* api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.
.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
409 lines
13 KiB
Go
409 lines
13 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"strings"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// ErrSelfApproval is returned by ApproveJob when the actor attempting to
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// approve a renewal job is the same person listed as the owner of the
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// underlying certificate. M-003 enforces separation of duties: the owner who
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// requested (or benefits from) the renewal must not be the same identity that
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// approves it. Handlers map this sentinel to HTTP 403 Forbidden.
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var ErrSelfApproval = errors.New("self-approval forbidden: actor is the owner of the certificate")
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// JobService manages job processing and status tracking.
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// It coordinates between the scheduler and various job-specific services.
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type JobService struct {
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jobRepo repository.JobRepository
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certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
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ownerRepo repository.OwnerRepository
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renewalService *RenewalService
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deploymentService *DeploymentService
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logger *slog.Logger
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}
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// NewJobService creates a new job service.
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//
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// certRepo and ownerRepo are required for the M-003 not-self-approval check
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// in ApproveJob. Callers may pass nil for either to disable the check
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// (useful for tests that don't exercise the approval path); when nil, the
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// service logs a warning on the first approval attempt and permits the
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// transition. Production wiring must supply both.
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func NewJobService(
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jobRepo repository.JobRepository,
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certRepo repository.CertificateRepository,
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ownerRepo repository.OwnerRepository,
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renewalService *RenewalService,
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deploymentService *DeploymentService,
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logger *slog.Logger,
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) *JobService {
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return &JobService{
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jobRepo: jobRepo,
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certRepo: certRepo,
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ownerRepo: ownerRepo,
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renewalService: renewalService,
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deploymentService: deploymentService,
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logger: logger,
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}
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}
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// ProcessPendingJobs fetches and processes all pending jobs.
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// It routes jobs to the appropriate service based on job type and handles errors gracefully.
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//
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// Concurrency (H-6 CWE-362): jobs are claimed via ClaimPendingJobs which uses
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// SELECT ... FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED and flips Pending → Running atomically. Concurrent
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// scheduler replicas in HA deployments will therefore never observe the same Pending row,
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// and the subsequent UpdateStatus(Running) calls inside the downstream service methods are
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// idempotent against the pre-flipped state.
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func (s *JobService) ProcessPendingJobs(ctx context.Context) error {
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// Claim pending jobs atomically (H-6 remediation: was ListByStatus which had no row lock).
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// Empty jobType matches all types; zero limit means unlimited (preserves prior semantics).
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pendingJobs, err := s.jobRepo.ClaimPendingJobs(ctx, "", 0)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to claim pending jobs: %w", err)
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}
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if len(pendingJobs) == 0 {
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s.logger.Debug("no pending jobs to process")
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return nil
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}
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s.logger.Info("processing pending jobs", "count", len(pendingJobs))
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var processedCount int
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var failedCount int
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// Process each job
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for _, job := range pendingJobs {
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// Skip deployment jobs that have an agent_id — those are meant for agent
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// pickup via GetPendingWork(), not server-side processing. The server should
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// only process deployment jobs without an agent (legacy/serverless targets).
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if job.Type == domain.JobTypeDeployment && job.AgentID != nil && *job.AgentID != "" {
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s.logger.Debug("skipping agent-routed deployment job",
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"job_id", job.ID,
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"agent_id", *job.AgentID)
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continue
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}
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if err := s.processJob(ctx, job); err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to process job",
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"job_id", job.ID,
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"job_type", job.Type,
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"error", err)
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failedCount++
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continue
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}
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processedCount++
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}
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s.logger.Info("job processing completed",
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"processed", processedCount,
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"failed", failedCount,
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"total", len(pendingJobs))
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return nil
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}
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// processJob routes a single job to the appropriate service based on type.
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func (s *JobService) processJob(ctx context.Context, job *domain.Job) error {
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s.logger.Debug("processing job",
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"job_id", job.ID,
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"job_type", job.Type,
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"certificate_id", job.CertificateID)
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switch job.Type {
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case domain.JobTypeRenewal:
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return s.renewalService.ProcessRenewalJob(ctx, job)
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case domain.JobTypeDeployment:
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return s.deploymentService.ProcessDeploymentJob(ctx, job)
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case domain.JobTypeIssuance:
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return s.processIssuanceJob(ctx, job)
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case domain.JobTypeValidation:
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return s.processValidationJob(ctx, job)
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("unknown job type: %s", job.Type)
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}
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}
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// processIssuanceJob handles a certificate issuance job.
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// It reuses the renewal service's ProcessRenewalJob since the flow is identical:
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// generate key → create CSR → call issuer → store version → create deployment jobs.
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// The only difference is semantics (new cert vs renewed cert), not mechanics.
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func (s *JobService) processIssuanceJob(ctx context.Context, job *domain.Job) error {
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s.logger.Debug("processing issuance job", "job_id", job.ID)
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// Issuance follows the same code path as renewal for the Local CA:
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// generate server-side key + CSR → sign via issuer → store cert version → deploy
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return s.renewalService.ProcessRenewalJob(ctx, job)
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}
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// processValidationJob handles a certificate validation job.
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// This is a placeholder that documents the flow.
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// TODO: Implement actual validation job processing if needed.
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func (s *JobService) processValidationJob(ctx context.Context, job *domain.Job) error {
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s.logger.Debug("processing validation job", "job_id", job.ID)
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// TODO: Implement validation job processing
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// In production:
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// 1. Fetch the certificate
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// 2. For each target, call target connector ValidateDeployment
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// 3. Aggregate results
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// 4. Update job status based on results
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// 5. Send notification if any validation fails
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return fmt.Errorf("validation job processing not yet implemented")
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}
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// RetryFailedJobs finds failed jobs and resets them for retry.
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// It only retries jobs that haven't exceeded max attempts.
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func (s *JobService) RetryFailedJobs(ctx context.Context, maxRetries int) error {
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s.logger.Debug("retrying failed jobs", "max_retries", maxRetries)
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failedJobs, err := s.jobRepo.ListByStatus(ctx, domain.JobStatusFailed)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch failed jobs: %w", err)
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}
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var retriedCount int
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for _, job := range failedJobs {
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// Check if we can retry (Attempts < MaxAttempts)
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if job.Attempts >= job.MaxAttempts {
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s.logger.Debug("job exceeded max retries",
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"job_id", job.ID,
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"attempts", job.Attempts,
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"max_attempts", job.MaxAttempts)
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continue
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}
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// Reset status to pending for retry
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if err := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, job.ID, domain.JobStatusPending, ""); err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to reset job status for retry",
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"job_id", job.ID,
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"error", err)
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continue
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}
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retriedCount++
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}
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s.logger.Info("failed jobs retry completed",
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"retried", retriedCount,
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"total_failed", len(failedJobs))
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return nil
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}
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// GetJobStatus returns the current status of a job.
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func (s *JobService) GetJobStatus(ctx context.Context, jobID string) (*domain.Job, error) {
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job, err := s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, jobID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch job: %w", err)
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}
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return job, nil
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}
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// CancelJob cancels a pending or running job (handler interface method).
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func (s *JobService) CancelJob(ctx context.Context, jobID string) error {
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job, err := s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, jobID)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch job: %w", err)
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}
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if job.Status != domain.JobStatusPending && job.Status != domain.JobStatusRunning {
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return fmt.Errorf("cannot cancel job with status %s", job.Status)
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}
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if err := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, jobID, domain.JobStatusCancelled, "cancelled by user"); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to cancel job: %w", err)
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}
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s.logger.Info("job cancelled", "job_id", jobID)
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return nil
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}
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// ListJobs returns paginated jobs with optional filtering (handler interface method).
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func (s *JobService) ListJobs(ctx context.Context, status, jobType string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.Job, int64, error) {
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if page < 1 {
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page = 1
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}
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if perPage < 1 {
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perPage = 50
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}
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allJobs, err := s.jobRepo.List(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list jobs: %w", err)
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}
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// Filter jobs in memory based on status and jobType
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var filtered []*domain.Job
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for _, job := range allJobs {
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if job == nil {
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continue
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}
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if status != "" && string(job.Status) != status {
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continue
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}
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if jobType != "" && string(job.Type) != jobType {
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continue
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}
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filtered = append(filtered, job)
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}
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total := int64(len(filtered))
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start := (page - 1) * perPage
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if start >= int(total) {
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return nil, total, nil
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}
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end := start + perPage
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if end > int(total) {
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end = int(total)
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}
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var result []domain.Job
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for _, job := range filtered[start:end] {
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if job != nil {
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result = append(result, *job)
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}
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}
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return result, total, nil
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}
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// GetJob returns a single job (handler interface method).
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func (s *JobService) GetJob(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Job, error) {
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return s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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}
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// ApproveJob approves a renewal job that is awaiting approval.
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// Transitions the job from AwaitingApproval to Pending so the scheduler picks it up.
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//
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// actor is the named-key identity of the approver (from the auth middleware
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// via resolveActor). M-003: if actor matches the certificate owner's Name or
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// Email (case-insensitive), returns ErrSelfApproval to enforce separation of
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// duties. Callers must pass a non-empty actor; empty actor is treated as an
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// anonymous system caller and permitted (internal/system paths).
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func (s *JobService) ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id, actor string) error {
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job, err := s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("job not found: %w", err)
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}
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if job.Status != domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval {
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return fmt.Errorf("cannot approve job with status %s (must be AwaitingApproval)", job.Status)
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}
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if err := s.checkNotSelf(ctx, job, actor); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, id, domain.JobStatusPending, ""); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to approve job: %w", err)
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}
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s.logger.Info("renewal job approved",
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"job_id", id,
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"certificate_id", job.CertificateID,
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"actor", actor)
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return nil
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}
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// RejectJob rejects a renewal job that is awaiting approval.
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// Transitions the job to Cancelled with a rejection reason.
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//
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// actor is the named-key identity of the rejector (from the auth middleware
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// via resolveActor). Rejection is NOT subject to the not-self check — an
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// owner is permitted to cancel their own pending renewal. actor is recorded
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// on the log line for audit attribution.
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func (s *JobService) RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id, reason, actor string) error {
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job, err := s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("job not found: %w", err)
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}
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if job.Status != domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval {
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return fmt.Errorf("cannot reject job with status %s (must be AwaitingApproval)", job.Status)
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}
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msg := "rejected by user"
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if reason != "" {
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msg = "rejected: " + reason
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}
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if err := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, id, domain.JobStatusCancelled, msg); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to reject job: %w", err)
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}
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s.logger.Info("renewal job rejected",
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"job_id", id,
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"certificate_id", job.CertificateID,
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"reason", reason,
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"actor", actor)
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return nil
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}
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// checkNotSelf enforces the M-003 separation-of-duties rule for renewal
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// approval: the actor approving a job may not be the owner of the underlying
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// certificate.
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//
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// Resolution rules:
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// - Empty actor → permitted (internal/system caller; auth middleware already
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// short-circuits anonymous users at the handler layer).
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// - certRepo or ownerRepo nil → warn once, permit (test/bootstrap wiring).
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// - Job has no certificate or certificate has no OwnerID → permitted (no
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// owner to collide with).
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// - Owner record not found → warn, permit (defensive: stale FK should not
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// block operations).
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// - Case-insensitive match against owner.Name OR owner.Email → returns
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// ErrSelfApproval.
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func (s *JobService) checkNotSelf(ctx context.Context, job *domain.Job, actor string) error {
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if actor == "" {
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return nil
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}
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if s.certRepo == nil || s.ownerRepo == nil {
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s.logger.Warn("not-self approval check skipped: cert/owner repo not wired",
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"job_id", job.ID, "actor", actor)
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return nil
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}
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if job.CertificateID == "" {
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return nil
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}
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cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, job.CertificateID)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Warn("not-self approval check: certificate lookup failed",
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"job_id", job.ID, "certificate_id", job.CertificateID, "error", err)
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return nil
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}
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if cert == nil || cert.OwnerID == "" {
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return nil
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}
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owner, err := s.ownerRepo.Get(ctx, cert.OwnerID)
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if err != nil || owner == nil {
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s.logger.Warn("not-self approval check: owner lookup failed",
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"job_id", job.ID, "owner_id", cert.OwnerID, "error", err)
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return nil
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}
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actorLower := strings.ToLower(actor)
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if strings.ToLower(owner.Name) == actorLower || strings.ToLower(owner.Email) == actorLower {
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s.logger.Warn("self-approval blocked",
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"job_id", job.ID,
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"certificate_id", job.CertificateID,
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"owner_id", owner.ID,
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"actor", actor)
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return ErrSelfApproval
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}
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return nil
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}
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