Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/est.go
T
shankar0123 1c099071d1 fix(bundle-4): EST/SCEP Attack Surface Hardening — 3 audit findings closed
Closes 3 findings (1 High + 1 Medium + 1 Low) from
/Users/shankar/Desktop/cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/.

Bundle 4 hardens the only attack surface reachable by an anonymous network
attacker in certctl: the unauthenticated EST + SCEP enrollment endpoints.

Findings closed:

  - H-004 (High): Hand-rolled ASN.1 parser had no fuzz target.
    The audit's original framing pointed at internal/pkcs7/, but recon
    confirmed that package is an ASN.1 ENCODER (BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7,
    ASN1Wrap*, ASN1EncodeLength) — not a parser. The actual hand-rolled
    PKCS#7 PARSING reachable via anonymous network is in
    internal/api/handler/scep.go::extractCSRFromPKCS7 +
    parseSignedDataForCSR. Added native go fuzz targets:
      * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7
      * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzParseSignedDataForCSR
      * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzPEMToDERChain (defense-in-depth)
      * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzASN1EncodeLength (defense-in-depth)
    Local 15s fuzz session: 150k execs on FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7,
    937k on FuzzPEMToDERChain, 925k on FuzzASN1EncodeLength — zero panics.

  - M-021 (Medium): EST TLS-Unique channel binding (RFC 7030 §3.2.3).
    Added internal/api/handler/est.go::verifyESTTransport — defense-in-depth
    TLS pre-conditions (r.TLS != nil; HandshakeComplete; TLS ≥ 1.2).
    The full §3.2.3 channel binding only applies when EST mTLS is in use;
    certctl does not currently support EST mTLS, so the §3.2.3 requirement
    is moot today. RFC 9266 (TLS 1.3 tls-exporter) and EST mTLS are
    documented as deferred follow-ups in the verifyESTTransport doc comment.

  - L-005 (Low): EST/SCEP issuer-binding fail-loud at startup.
    Pre-Bundle-4 cmd/server/main.go validated that CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID and
    CERTCTL_SCEP_ISSUER_ID existed in the registry but did NOT validate the
    issuer TYPE could emit a CA cert. An operator binding EST to an ACME
    issuer (whose GetCACertPEM returns explicit error) booted successfully
    and only failed at first /est/cacerts request. Post-Bundle-4: new
    preflightEnrollmentIssuer helper calls GetCACertPEM(ctx) at startup
    with a 10s timeout. Failure logs the connector error + the candidate
    issuer types and os.Exit(1).

Tests added/modified:
  - internal/api/handler/est_transport_test.go (new) — 5 verifyESTTransport
    table cases covering plaintext-rejected, incomplete-handshake-rejected,
    TLS 1.0 rejected, TLS 1.2/1.3 accepted
  - cmd/server/preflight_test.go (new) — TestPreflightEnrollmentIssuer
    covering nil-connector, error-from-issuer, empty-PEM, valid cases
  - internal/api/handler/est_handler_test.go (modified) — 7 POST sites
    now stamp r.TLS to satisfy the new transport pre-condition
  - internal/integration/negative_test.go (modified) — setupTestServer
    wraps the test handler with a fake-TLS-state injector so the EST
    handler receives r.TLS != nil; production paths still rely on the
    real TLS listener

Threat model reference: TB-11 (EST/SCEP client ↔ Server) per
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/threat-model.md.
Standards: RFC 7030 §3.2.3, RFC 8894 §3, RFC 5652, RFC 9266 (deferred).
2026-04-25 21:14:41 +00:00

343 lines
12 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/pkcs7"
)
// ESTService defines the service interface for EST enrollment operations.
// EST (RFC 7030) is a protocol for certificate enrollment over HTTPS.
type ESTService interface {
// GetCACerts returns the PEM-encoded CA certificate chain for the EST issuer.
GetCACerts(ctx context.Context) (string, error)
// SimpleEnroll processes a PKCS#10 CSR and returns a signed certificate.
SimpleEnroll(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error)
// SimpleReEnroll processes a re-enrollment CSR (same as enroll for our purposes).
SimpleReEnroll(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error)
// GetCSRAttrs returns the CSR attributes the server wants clients to include.
GetCSRAttrs(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error)
}
// ESTHandler handles HTTP requests for the EST protocol (RFC 7030).
//
// EST endpoints are served under /.well-known/est/ per the RFC.
// Wire format: base64-encoded DER (PKCS#7 for certs, PKCS#10 for CSRs).
//
// Supported operations:
// - GET /.well-known/est/cacerts — CA certificate distribution
// - POST /.well-known/est/simpleenroll — initial enrollment
// - POST /.well-known/est/simplereenroll — re-enrollment
// - GET /.well-known/est/csrattrs — CSR attributes
type ESTHandler struct {
svc ESTService
}
// NewESTHandler creates a new ESTHandler.
func NewESTHandler(svc ESTService) ESTHandler {
return ESTHandler{svc: svc}
}
// CACerts handles GET /.well-known/est/cacerts
// Returns the CA certificate chain as base64-encoded PKCS#7 (certs-only).
// Per RFC 7030 Section 4.1, this is a "certs-only" CMC Simple PKI Response.
// For simplicity and broad client compatibility, we return base64-encoded DER certificates.
func (h ESTHandler) CACerts(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
caCertPEM, err := h.svc.GetCACerts(r.Context())
if err != nil {
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to get CA certificates: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
// Parse PEM to DER for PKCS#7 encoding
derCerts, err := pkcs7.PEMToDERChain(caCertPEM)
if err != nil {
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to encode CA certificates", requestID)
return
}
// Build a simple PKCS#7 SignedData (certs-only, degenerate) structure
pkcs7Data, err := pkcs7.BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7(derCerts)
if err != nil {
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to build PKCS#7 response", requestID)
return
}
// RFC 7030 Section 4.1.3: response is base64-encoded application/pkcs7-mime
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only")
w.Header().Set("Content-Transfer-Encoding", "base64")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pkcs7Data)
// Write base64 with line breaks at 76 chars per RFC 2045
for i := 0; i < len(encoded); i += 76 {
end := i + 76
if end > len(encoded) {
end = len(encoded)
}
w.Write([]byte(encoded[i:end]))
w.Write([]byte("\r\n"))
}
}
// SimpleEnroll handles POST /.well-known/est/simpleenroll
// Accepts a base64-encoded PKCS#10 CSR and returns a base64-encoded PKCS#7 certificate.
func (h ESTHandler) SimpleEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
if err := verifyESTTransport(r); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("EST transport precondition failed: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
csrPEM, err := h.readCSRFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("Invalid CSR: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
result, err := h.svc.SimpleEnroll(r.Context(), csrPEM)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Enrollment failed: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
h.writeCertResponse(w, result)
}
// SimpleReEnroll handles POST /.well-known/est/simplereenroll
// Same as SimpleEnroll but for re-enrollment (certificate renewal).
func (h ESTHandler) SimpleReEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
if err := verifyESTTransport(r); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("EST transport precondition failed: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
csrPEM, err := h.readCSRFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("Invalid CSR: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
result, err := h.svc.SimpleReEnroll(r.Context(), csrPEM)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Re-enrollment failed: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
h.writeCertResponse(w, result)
}
// verifyESTTransport implements Bundle-4 / M-021 EST transport precondition.
//
// RFC 7030 §3.2.3 ("Linking Identity and POP Information") requires that when
// EST clients use certificate-based authentication AND send a Proof-of-Possession
// (PoP), the PoP MUST be cryptographically bound to the underlying TLS session
// via TLS-Unique (RFC 5929). With TLS 1.3 (which certctl pins via
// `tls.Config.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13` per the HTTPS-Everywhere milestone),
// TLS-Unique is unavailable; RFC 9266 defines `tls-exporter` as the TLS 1.3
// replacement.
//
// **Current scope of this function (Bundle-4 closure):** certctl does NOT
// currently support EST client certificate authentication. The EST endpoint
// accepts unauthenticated POSTs (the SCEP equivalent enforces a
// challenge-password via `preflightSCEPChallengePassword`; EST has no
// equivalent today). Per RFC 7030 §3.2.3, channel binding is REQUIRED only
// when client certificate authentication is in use; without that, the §3.2.3
// requirement is moot.
//
// What we DO enforce here as defense-in-depth:
//
// 1. r.TLS must be non-nil — the EST endpoint MUST be reached over TLS.
// Defensive: certctl pins HTTPS-only at the server-side TLS config, but
// a future routing-layer regression that exposes EST over plaintext
// would be caught here.
// 2. Negotiated TLS version must be >= TLS 1.2 — RFC 7030 doesn't mandate
// a specific TLS version, but a pre-1.2 negotiation indicates a
// misconfigured client/server pair. certctl's MinVersion is TLS 1.3
// so this should always hold.
// 3. r.TLS.HandshakeComplete must be true — defensive against partial-
// handshake replays.
//
// **Deferred to a future bundle (operator decision required):**
//
// - RFC 9266 `tls-exporter` channel binding when EST mTLS is added.
// - EST mTLS support itself — currently EST is unauth-or-bearer; mTLS
// would be a V3-aligned compliance feature.
//
// Returns nil if all preconditions pass; non-nil error otherwise.
func verifyESTTransport(r *http.Request) error {
if r.TLS == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("EST endpoint reached over plaintext; TLS required (RFC 7030 §3.2.1)")
}
if !r.TLS.HandshakeComplete {
return fmt.Errorf("EST request reached handler before TLS handshake completed")
}
// tls.VersionTLS12 == 0x0303; certctl's MinVersion is TLS 1.3 (0x0304).
// Defensive lower bound at TLS 1.2 lets us catch a future MinVersion
// regression cleanly without coupling this guard to the server config.
if r.TLS.Version < 0x0303 {
return fmt.Errorf("EST request negotiated TLS version 0x%04x; TLS 1.2 minimum required", r.TLS.Version)
}
return nil
}
// CSRAttrs handles GET /.well-known/est/csrattrs
// Returns the CSR attributes the server wants the client to include in enrollment requests.
func (h ESTHandler) CSRAttrs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
attrs, err := h.svc.GetCSRAttrs(r.Context())
if err != nil {
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to get CSR attributes: %v", err), requestID)
return
}
if len(attrs) == 0 {
// No specific attributes required — return 204
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/csrattrs")
w.Header().Set("Content-Transfer-Encoding", "base64")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(attrs)))
}
// readCSRFromRequest reads and decodes the CSR from an EST enrollment request.
// EST sends CSRs as base64-encoded PKCS#10 DER with Content-Type application/pkcs10.
func (h ESTHandler) readCSRFromRequest(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20)) // 1MB limit
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to read request body: %w", err)
}
defer r.Body.Close()
if len(body) == 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("empty request body")
}
// Check if it's already PEM-encoded (some clients send PEM directly)
bodyStr := strings.TrimSpace(string(body))
if strings.HasPrefix(bodyStr, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----") {
// Validate it parses
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(bodyStr))
if block == nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid PEM-encoded CSR")
}
if _, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(block.Bytes); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid CSR: %w", err)
}
return bodyStr, nil
}
// EST standard: base64-encoded DER PKCS#10
derBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(bodyStr)
if err != nil {
// Try with padding/whitespace stripped
cleaned := strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
if r == '\r' || r == '\n' || r == ' ' || r == '\t' {
return -1
}
return r
}, bodyStr)
derBytes, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(cleaned)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decode base64 CSR: %w", err)
}
}
// Validate it's a valid PKCS#10 CSR
if _, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(derBytes); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid PKCS#10 CSR: %w", err)
}
// Convert DER to PEM for internal use (certctl services expect PEM)
csrPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST",
Bytes: derBytes,
})
return string(csrPEM), nil
}
// writeCertResponse writes an EST enrollment response as base64-encoded PKCS#7.
func (h ESTHandler) writeCertResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, result *domain.ESTEnrollResult) {
// Parse cert and chain PEM to DER
var derCerts [][]byte
// Add the issued certificate
certDER, err := pkcs7.PEMToDERChain(result.CertPEM)
if err != nil || len(certDER) == 0 {
http.Error(w, "Failed to encode certificate", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
derCerts = append(derCerts, certDER...)
// Add the CA chain if present
if result.ChainPEM != "" {
chainDER, err := pkcs7.PEMToDERChain(result.ChainPEM)
if err == nil {
derCerts = append(derCerts, chainDER...)
}
}
// Build PKCS#7 certs-only
pkcs7Data, err := pkcs7.BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7(derCerts)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Failed to build PKCS#7 response", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only")
w.Header().Set("Content-Transfer-Encoding", "base64")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pkcs7Data)
for i := 0; i < len(encoded); i += 76 {
end := i + 76
if end > len(encoded) {
end = len(encoded)
}
w.Write([]byte(encoded[i:end]))
w.Write([]byte("\r\n"))
}
}
// NOTE: PKCS#7 helpers (BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7, PEMToDERChain, ASN.1 wrappers)
// are in the shared internal/pkcs7 package, used by both EST and SCEP handlers.