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fe7e766510
M-004 — OCSP issuer binding (composite key):
The OCSP lookup path now binds (issuer_id, serial) as a composite key
rather than resolving by serial alone. CertificateRepository and
RevocationRepository gain GetByIssuerAndSerial methods; ca_operations.go
scopes both lookups by the issuer_id path param. When no managed cert
binds to that (issuer, serial) tuple, GetOCSPResponse constructs an
RFC 6960 §2.2 'unknown' response (CertStatus=2) instead of the prior
default 'good'. Short-lived cert exemption (profile TTL < 1h) is
preserved. Real repo errors (non-sql.ErrNoRows) fail closed with a log.
Regression coverage: internal/service/ca_operations_test.go
- TestCAOperationsSvc_GetOCSPResponse_Unknown_CrossIssuer
- TestCAOperationsSvc_GetOCSPResponse_Unknown_UnknownSerial
M-005 — Discovery Claim/Dismiss actor propagation:
DiscoveryService.ClaimDiscovered and DismissDiscovered now accept an
explicit 'actor string' parameter (propagation pattern mirrors
bulk_revocation.go / revocation_svc.go). The handler layer passes
resolveActor(r.Context()) — the named-key identity established by the
M-002 auth unification — and the service falls back to 'api' (the same
safe sentinel resolveActor uses when no auth context is present) only
when the caller passes an empty string. Never falls back to 'operator'.
Regression coverage: internal/service/discovery_test.go
- TestDiscoveryService_ClaimDiscovered_AuditActor
- TestDiscoveryService_DismissDiscovered_AuditActor
- TestDiscoveryService_ClaimDiscovered_EmptyActorFallsBackToAPI
- TestDiscoveryService_DismissDiscovered_EmptyActorFallsBackToAPI
Each new test asserts event.Actor matches the caller-supplied string (or
'api' on empty input) and explicitly asserts event.Actor != 'operator'
to lock in the historical fix intent.
Files:
internal/api/handler/discovery.go — pass resolveActor(ctx)
internal/api/handler/discovery_handler_test.go — updated call sites
internal/integration/lifecycle_test.go — updated mock wiring
internal/repository/interfaces.go — GetByIssuerAndSerial on
CertificateRepository +
RevocationRepository
internal/repository/postgres/certificate.go — composite key lookup
internal/service/ca_operations.go — (issuer_id, serial) scoping
internal/service/ca_operations_test.go — 2 new M-004 tests
internal/service/discovery.go — actor parameter + 'api' fallback
internal/service/discovery_test.go — 4 new M-005 tests
internal/service/shortlived_test.go — mock signature update
internal/service/testutil_test.go — mock GetByIssuerAndSerial
190 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
190 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"math/big"
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"time"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// CAOperationsSvc provides CA operations: CRL generation and OCSP response signing.
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// This service handles revocation status queries and certificate lifecycle operations
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// related to the certificate authority.
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type CAOperationsSvc struct {
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revocationRepo repository.RevocationRepository
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certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
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profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository
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issuerRegistry *IssuerRegistry
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}
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// NewCAOperationsSvc creates a new CA operations service.
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func NewCAOperationsSvc(
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revocationRepo repository.RevocationRepository,
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certRepo repository.CertificateRepository,
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profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository,
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) *CAOperationsSvc {
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return &CAOperationsSvc{
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revocationRepo: revocationRepo,
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certRepo: certRepo,
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profileRepo: profileRepo,
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}
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}
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// SetIssuerRegistry sets the issuer registry for CRL and OCSP operations.
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func (s *CAOperationsSvc) SetIssuerRegistry(registry *IssuerRegistry) {
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s.issuerRegistry = registry
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}
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// GenerateDERCRL generates a DER-encoded X.509 CRL for the given issuer.
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// Short-lived certificates (profile TTL < 1 hour) are excluded from the CRL.
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func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) ([]byte, error) {
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if s.revocationRepo == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
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}
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if s.issuerRegistry == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer registry not configured")
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}
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issuerConn, ok := s.issuerRegistry.Get(issuerID)
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if !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer not found: %s", issuerID)
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}
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revocations, err := s.revocationRepo.ListAll(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list revocations: %w", err)
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}
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// Filter to this issuer and convert to CRL entries.
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// Short-lived certificates (profile TTL < 1 hour) are excluded — expiry is sufficient revocation.
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var entries []CRLEntry
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for _, rev := range revocations {
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if rev.IssuerID != issuerID {
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continue
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}
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// Check short-lived exemption: look up the cert's profile
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if s.profileRepo != nil && s.certRepo != nil {
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cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, rev.CertificateID)
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if err == nil && cert.CertificateProfileID != "" {
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profile, err := s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, cert.CertificateProfileID)
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if err == nil && profile.IsShortLived() {
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slog.Debug("skipping short-lived cert from CRL",
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"certificate_id", rev.CertificateID,
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"profile_id", cert.CertificateProfileID)
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continue
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}
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}
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}
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// Parse serial number from hex string
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serial := new(big.Int)
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serial.SetString(rev.SerialNumber, 16)
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entries = append(entries, CRLEntry{
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SerialNumber: serial,
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RevokedAt: rev.RevokedAt,
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ReasonCode: domain.CRLReasonCode(domain.RevocationReason(rev.Reason)),
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})
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}
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return issuerConn.GenerateCRL(ctx, entries)
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}
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// GetOCSPResponse generates a signed OCSP response for the given certificate serial.
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func (s *CAOperationsSvc) GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string) ([]byte, error) {
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if s.revocationRepo == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
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}
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if s.issuerRegistry == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer registry not configured")
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}
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issuerConn, ok := s.issuerRegistry.Get(issuerID)
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if !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer not found: %s", issuerID)
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}
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serial := new(big.Int)
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serial.SetString(serialHex, 16)
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now := time.Now()
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// Short-lived cert exemption: if the cert's profile has TTL < 1 hour,
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// always return "good" — expiry is sufficient revocation for short-lived certs.
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if s.profileRepo != nil && s.certRepo != nil {
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// Look up cert by (issuer_id, serial) — per RFC 5280 §5.2.3, serial numbers
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// are unique only within a single issuer. The OCSP URL path carries issuer_id,
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// so we scope the lookup to avoid cross-issuer collisions.
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rev, _ := s.revocationRepo.GetByIssuerAndSerial(ctx, issuerID, serialHex)
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if rev != nil {
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cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, rev.CertificateID)
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if err == nil && cert.CertificateProfileID != "" {
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profile, err := s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, cert.CertificateProfileID)
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if err == nil && profile.IsShortLived() {
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return issuerConn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, OCSPSignRequest{
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CertSerial: serial,
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CertStatus: 0, // good — short-lived exemption
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ThisUpdate: now,
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NextUpdate: now.Add(1 * time.Hour),
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})
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// Check if this (issuer_id, serial) is revoked — RFC 5280 §5.2.3 scoping.
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rev, err := s.revocationRepo.GetByIssuerAndSerial(ctx, issuerID, serialHex)
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if err == nil && rev != nil {
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// Revoked
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return issuerConn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, OCSPSignRequest{
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CertSerial: serial,
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CertStatus: 1, // revoked
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RevokedAt: rev.RevokedAt,
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RevocationReason: domain.CRLReasonCode(domain.RevocationReason(rev.Reason)),
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ThisUpdate: now,
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NextUpdate: now.Add(1 * time.Hour),
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})
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}
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// Not revoked. Per RFC 6960 §2.2, we must only return "good" for a
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// certificate that was actually issued by this CA. Verify the
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// (issuer_id, serial) tuple maps to a real certificate in inventory
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// before asserting "good"; otherwise return "unknown". This closes the
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// coverage gap where forged/guessed serials would be accepted as valid
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// because they had no revocation row (M-004).
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if s.certRepo != nil {
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cert, certErr := s.certRepo.GetByIssuerAndSerial(ctx, issuerID, serialHex)
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if certErr != nil || cert == nil {
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if certErr != nil && !errors.Is(certErr, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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// Real repository failure — log but still fail closed with "unknown"
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// rather than leaking a bogus "good" assertion.
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slog.Warn("OCSP cert lookup failed; returning unknown",
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"issuer_id", issuerID,
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"serial", serialHex,
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"error", certErr)
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}
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return issuerConn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, OCSPSignRequest{
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CertSerial: serial,
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CertStatus: 2, // unknown
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ThisUpdate: now,
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NextUpdate: now.Add(1 * time.Hour),
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})
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}
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}
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// Known cert, not revoked — return "good"
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return issuerConn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, OCSPSignRequest{
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CertSerial: serial,
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CertStatus: 0, // good
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ThisUpdate: now,
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NextUpdate: now.Add(1 * time.Hour),
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})
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}
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