Files
certctl/internal/service/target.go
T
shankar0123 d60a0ac297 fix(security): close BUNDLE 1 — server+agent connector config validation chain
Bundle 1 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
acquisition-blocker chain: target.edit (default r-operator grant per
migrations/000029_rbac.up.sql:196) → arbitrary reload_command stored
without validation → agent createTargetConnector json.Unmarshal-only
→ sh -c on agent host. README's 'shell injection prevention on all
connector scripts' claim is now true at the chain level.

Server-side: new internal/connector/target/configcheck package + a
configcheck.Validate call in target.go::Create + ::Update +
::CreateTarget + ::UpdateTarget (all 4 entry points). Rejects shell
metacharacters in reload_command / validate_command / restart_command
for nginx, apache, haproxy, postfix/dovecot, javakeystore, ssh. Sentinel
errors.Is(err, service.ErrInvalidConnectorConfig) available for handler
400 mapping. Non-shell connector types (F5, IIS, Caddy, Traefik, Envoy,
cloud targets, K8s) are no-ops by design.

Agent-side: defense-in-depth connector.ValidateConfig(ctx, configJSON)
call in cmd/agent/main.go inserted between createTargetConnector and
DeployCertificate. This catches (a) configs pre-dating the server gate,
(b) encrypted-blob tampering, (c) per-connector filesystem invariants
that the server can't check.

F5 (S2 finding): proven docs-vs-code drift, not a security bug. The
applyDefaults function never set Insecure=true; runtime default has
always been Go zero-value (false → TLS verified). Three lying 'default
true' comments in f5/f5.go (lines 30, 45-47, 126) rewritten to match
actual code behavior.

Docs (C4 + C9): README L12 + L68 narrowed — 'any CA / any server' →
'Twelve native CA connectors plus an OpenSSL adapter; fifteen native
deployment-target connectors plus a proxy-agent pattern.' 'Every deploy
goes through atomic-write + ...' narrowed to file-based connectors with
inline link to per-target guarantee matrix. New deployment-model.md §1.6
ships a 15-target × 8-property guarantee table covering atomic write /
owner-perms / SHA-256 idempotency / pre-deploy snapshot / on-failure
rollback / post-deploy TLS verify / Prometheus counters / shell-injection
validation — including the K8s preview honesty marker (CLAIM-H4).

Tests: internal/connector/target/configcheck/configcheck_test.go covers
14 shell-injection payloads (semicolon, pipe, backtick, dollar-paren,
redirect, and-chain, newline, double-quote, escape, dollar-var) × 7
shell-using connectors + benign-command acceptance + non-shell no-op
behavior + empty config + malformed JSON. All pass.

Verification (run from /sessions/gifted-blissful-pasteur/mnt/cowork/certctl):
  go fmt ./...              # clean (no diffs)
  go vet ./...              # clean (no findings)
  go test -short -count=1 ./internal/... ./cmd/...
                            # 60+ packages all ok, zero FAIL

Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-1 RT-C1 SEC-M4 CLAIM-M2 CLAIM-L3
Audit-Verifies-False: S2 (F5 'default insecure' was a comment lie, code was always secure)
2026-05-12 23:48:08 +00:00

520 lines
18 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/connector/target/configcheck"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/crypto"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// ErrInvalidConnectorConfig is returned by Create / Update / CreateTarget /
// UpdateTarget when configcheck.Validate rejects the target's config JSON
// (e.g., shell metacharacters in reload_command). The HTTP handler should
// map this to 400 via errors.Is. Bundle 1 / RT-C1 closure 2026-05-12.
var ErrInvalidConnectorConfig = errors.New("invalid connector config")
// ErrAgentNotFound is returned by [TargetService.CreateTarget] when the caller
// references an agent_id that is empty or does not correspond to a registered
// agent. The handler layer maps this to HTTP 400 via [errors.Is]. See C-002 in
// the project's coverage-gap audit — this sentinel replaces a silent
// Postgres FK violation (23503 → HTTP 500) with a deterministic 400.
var ErrAgentNotFound = errors.New("referenced agent does not exist")
// validTargetTypes is the set of allowed target types for validation.
var validTargetTypes = map[domain.TargetType]bool{
domain.TargetTypeNGINX: true,
domain.TargetTypeApache: true,
domain.TargetTypeHAProxy: true,
domain.TargetTypeF5: true,
domain.TargetTypeIIS: true,
domain.TargetTypeTraefik: true,
domain.TargetTypeCaddy: true,
domain.TargetTypeEnvoy: true,
domain.TargetTypePostfix: true,
domain.TargetTypeDovecot: true,
domain.TargetTypeSSH: true,
domain.TargetTypeWinCertStore: true,
domain.TargetTypeJavaKeystore: true,
domain.TargetTypeKubernetesSecrets: true,
domain.TargetTypeAWSACM: true,
domain.TargetTypeAzureKeyVault: true,
}
// isValidTargetType checks if a type string is a known target type.
func isValidTargetType(t domain.TargetType) bool {
return validTargetTypes[t]
}
// TargetService provides business logic for deployment target management.
//
// The encryptionKey field holds the raw passphrase (not a pre-derived 32-byte
// key). Per-ciphertext salt derivation is performed inside
// [crypto.EncryptIfKeySet] / [crypto.DecryptIfKeySet] on each call. See M-8
// in certctl-audit-report.md.
type TargetService struct {
targetRepo repository.TargetRepository
agentRepo repository.AgentRepository
auditService *AuditService
encryptionKey string
logger *slog.Logger
}
// NewTargetService creates a new target service. The encryptionKey is the raw
// passphrase; it MUST NOT be pre-derived via crypto.DeriveKey (that was the
// v1 behavior, replaced in M-8 with per-ciphertext random salt).
func NewTargetService(
targetRepo repository.TargetRepository,
auditService *AuditService,
agentRepo repository.AgentRepository,
encryptionKey string,
logger *slog.Logger,
) *TargetService {
return &TargetService{
targetRepo: targetRepo,
agentRepo: agentRepo,
auditService: auditService,
encryptionKey: encryptionKey,
logger: logger,
}
}
// List returns a paginated list of deployment targets.
func (s *TargetService) List(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]*domain.DeploymentTarget, int64, error) {
if page < 1 {
page = 1
}
if perPage < 1 {
perPage = 50
}
targets, err := s.targetRepo.List(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list targets: %w", err)
}
total := int64(len(targets))
start := (page - 1) * perPage
if start >= int(total) {
return nil, total, nil
}
end := start + perPage
if end > int(total) {
end = int(total)
}
return targets[start:end], total, nil
}
// Get retrieves a deployment target by ID.
func (s *TargetService) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
target, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get target %s: %w", id, err)
}
return target, nil
}
// Create validates and stores a new deployment target, encrypting sensitive config.
func (s *TargetService) Create(ctx context.Context, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, actor string) error {
if target.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("target name is required")
}
if !isValidTargetType(target.Type) {
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported target type: %s", target.Type)
}
// Bundle 1 / RT-C1 closure: reject shell-metacharacter injection in
// command-bearing config fields BEFORE encryption + storage. Without
// this, target.edit (default r-operator grant) → agent sh -c becomes
// an RCE chain. See internal/connector/target/configcheck/configcheck.go.
if err := configcheck.Validate(string(target.Type), target.Config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrInvalidConnectorConfig, err)
}
if target.ID == "" {
target.ID = generateID("target")
}
now := time.Now()
if target.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
target.CreatedAt = now
}
if target.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
target.UpdatedAt = now
}
if target.TestStatus == "" {
target.TestStatus = "untested"
}
if target.Source == "" {
target.Source = "database"
}
// Encrypt the full config and store redacted version in config column
if len(target.Config) > 0 {
encrypted, _, err := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(target.Config), s.encryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", err)
}
target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
target.Config = redactConfigJSON(target.Config)
}
if err := s.targetRepo.Create(ctx, target); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create target: %w", err)
}
if s.auditService != nil {
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "create_target", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "target", target.ID, nil); auditErr != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
return nil
}
// Update modifies an existing deployment target. Handles "********" preservation for sensitive fields.
func (s *TargetService) Update(ctx context.Context, id string, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, actor string) error {
if target.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("target name is required")
}
target.ID = id
target.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
// If config contains "********" values, merge with existing decrypted config
if len(target.Config) > 0 {
mergedConfig, err := s.mergeRedactedConfig(ctx, id, target.Config)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to merge config: %w", err)
}
// Bundle 1 / RT-C1 closure: validate the POST-MERGE config to catch
// injection attempts even when the redacted-merge path is used.
// Validation runs on the same bytes that will be encrypted + stored.
if err := configcheck.Validate(string(target.Type), mergedConfig); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrInvalidConnectorConfig, err)
}
// Encrypt the merged config
encrypted, _, encErr := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet(mergedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
if encErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", encErr)
}
target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
target.Config = redactConfigJSON(json.RawMessage(mergedConfig))
}
if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, target); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update target %s: %w", id, err)
}
if s.auditService != nil {
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "update_target", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
return nil
}
// Delete removes a deployment target.
func (s *TargetService) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) error {
if err := s.targetRepo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete target %s: %w", id, err)
}
if s.auditService != nil {
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "delete_target", domain.EventCategoryConfig, "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
return nil
}
// TestConnection tests a target's connectivity by checking the assigned agent's heartbeat status.
// Target connectors run on agents, not on the server, so we can't instantiate a connector here.
// Instead, we verify the agent is online and reachable.
func (s *TargetService) TestConnection(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
target, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("target not found: %w", err)
}
if target.AgentID == "" {
s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
return fmt.Errorf("target has no assigned agent")
}
agent, err := s.agentRepo.Get(ctx, target.AgentID)
if err != nil {
s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent not found: %w", err)
}
// I-004: AgentRepository.Get intentionally surfaces retired rows (the banner
// + 410 Gone paths need to see them). A test against a retired agent can
// never succeed — the agent is tombstoned, will never heartbeat again, and
// any active targets have already been cascade-retired alongside it. Fail
// fast with an explicit message instead of falling through to the Status /
// heartbeat checks, which would produce a misleading "agent is Offline" or
// "heartbeat stale" diagnostic.
if agent.IsRetired() {
s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s is retired", agent.ID)
}
if agent.Status != domain.AgentStatusOnline {
s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s is %s (expected Online)", agent.ID, agent.Status)
}
// Check heartbeat freshness (agent must have heartbeated within the last 5 minutes)
if agent.LastHeartbeatAt != nil {
if time.Since(*agent.LastHeartbeatAt) > 5*time.Minute {
s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s last heartbeat was %s ago (stale)", agent.ID, time.Since(*agent.LastHeartbeatAt).Round(time.Second))
}
}
s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "success")
return nil
}
// ListTargets returns paginated targets (handler interface method).
func (s *TargetService) ListTargets(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.DeploymentTarget, int64, error) {
// Bundle E / Audit L-020: page/perPage are unused; the underlying repo
// List() does not yet take pagination params. Marked explicitly so
// ineffassign sees no dead store and future maintainers see the
// vestigial params rather than a misleading default-applied clamp.
_ = page
_ = perPage
targets, err := s.targetRepo.List(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list targets: %w", err)
}
total := int64(len(targets))
var result []domain.DeploymentTarget
for _, t := range targets {
if t != nil {
result = append(result, *t)
}
}
return result, total, nil
}
// GetTarget returns a single target (handler interface method).
func (s *TargetService) GetTarget(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
return s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
}
// CreateTarget creates a new target (handler interface method).
func (s *TargetService) CreateTarget(ctx context.Context, target domain.DeploymentTarget) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
if !isValidTargetType(target.Type) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported target type: %s", target.Type)
}
// Bundle 1 / RT-C1 closure: reject shell-metacharacter injection in
// command-bearing config fields BEFORE encryption + storage. Mirrors
// Create() above so the HTTP handler entry point is also gated.
if err := configcheck.Validate(string(target.Type), target.Config); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrInvalidConnectorConfig, err)
}
// C-002: enforce agent_id FK at service layer so we return a clean 400
// instead of bubbling a Postgres 23503 foreign-key violation out as 500.
// The schema (migrations/000001 line 104) declares agent_id TEXT NOT NULL
// with a FK to agents(id); we mirror that contract here for deterministic
// error mapping.
if target.AgentID == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: agent_id is required", ErrAgentNotFound)
}
agent, err := s.agentRepo.Get(ctx, target.AgentID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrAgentNotFound, target.AgentID)
}
// I-004: refuse to attach new targets to a retired agent. The agent is
// tombstoned and no deployments would ever succeed against it; letting a
// row slip past here would immediately be cascade-retired on the next
// dependency sweep and confuse operators ("why is this brand-new target
// already retired?"). Treating retired agents as "not found" for creation
// purposes keeps the error surface tight and matches the default-list
// contract established by repository.AgentRepository.List.
if agent.IsRetired() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s (retired)", ErrAgentNotFound, target.AgentID)
}
if target.ID == "" {
target.ID = generateID("target")
}
now := time.Now()
if target.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
target.CreatedAt = now
}
if target.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
target.UpdatedAt = now
}
if target.TestStatus == "" {
target.TestStatus = "untested"
}
if target.Source == "" {
target.Source = "database"
}
// GUI-created targets should be enabled by default.
// Go's bool zero value is false, which overrides the DB default when explicitly inserted.
if target.Source == "database" && !target.Enabled {
target.Enabled = true
}
// Encrypt config
if len(target.Config) > 0 {
encrypted, _, err := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(target.Config), s.encryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", err)
}
target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
target.Config = redactConfigJSON(target.Config)
}
if err := s.targetRepo.Create(ctx, &target); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create target: %w", err)
}
return &target, nil
}
// UpdateTarget modifies a target (handler interface method).
func (s *TargetService) UpdateTarget(ctx context.Context, id string, target domain.DeploymentTarget) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
target.ID = id
target.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
// Merge redacted fields with existing config
if len(target.Config) > 0 {
mergedConfig, err := s.mergeRedactedConfig(ctx, id, target.Config)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to merge config: %w", err)
}
// Bundle 1 / RT-C1 closure: validate the POST-MERGE config (same
// reasoning as Update() above).
if err := configcheck.Validate(string(target.Type), mergedConfig); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrInvalidConnectorConfig, err)
}
encrypted, _, encErr := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet(mergedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
if encErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", encErr)
}
target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
target.Config = redactConfigJSON(json.RawMessage(mergedConfig))
}
if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, &target); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update target: %w", err)
}
return &target, nil
}
// DeleteTarget removes a target (handler interface method).
func (s *TargetService) DeleteTarget(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return s.targetRepo.Delete(ctx, id)
}
// --- Internal helpers ---
// getDecryptedConfig returns the decrypted config JSON for a target.
func (s *TargetService) getDecryptedConfig(target *domain.DeploymentTarget) (json.RawMessage, error) {
if len(target.EncryptedConfig) > 0 {
decrypted, err := crypto.DecryptIfKeySet(target.EncryptedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return json.RawMessage(decrypted), nil
}
if len(target.Config) > 0 {
return target.Config, nil
}
return json.RawMessage("{}"), nil
}
// mergeRedactedConfig merges incoming config (which may have "********" values)
// with the existing decrypted config so sensitive fields are preserved.
func (s *TargetService) mergeRedactedConfig(ctx context.Context, id string, incoming json.RawMessage) ([]byte, error) {
// Parse incoming config
var incomingMap map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(incoming, &incomingMap); err != nil {
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: incoming config is not a JSON object, using as-is", "target", id, "error", err)
return incoming, nil
}
// Check if any values are "********"
hasRedacted := false
for _, v := range incomingMap {
if str, ok := v.(string); ok && str == "********" {
hasRedacted = true
break
}
}
if !hasRedacted {
return incoming, nil // No redacted values, use incoming as-is
}
// Load existing target to get real values
existing, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: could not load existing target, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
return incoming, nil
}
existingConfig, err := s.getDecryptedConfig(existing)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: could not decrypt existing config, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
return incoming, nil
}
var existingMap map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(existingConfig, &existingMap); err != nil {
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: existing config is not a JSON object, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
return incoming, nil
}
// Merge: for each "********" value in incoming, use existing value
for k, v := range incomingMap {
if str, ok := v.(string); ok && str == "********" {
if existingVal, exists := existingMap[k]; exists {
incomingMap[k] = existingVal
}
}
}
return json.Marshal(incomingMap)
}
// updateTestStatus updates the test_status and last_tested_at fields in the database
// and records an audit event.
func (s *TargetService) updateTestStatus(ctx context.Context, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, status string) {
now := time.Now()
target.TestStatus = status
target.LastTestedAt = &now
target.UpdatedAt = now
if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, target); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to update test status", "target", target.ID, "status", status, "error", err)
}
// Record audit event for connection test
if s.auditService != nil {
action := "target_test_connection_" + status
details := map[string]interface{}{"target_type": string(target.Type), "result": status, "agent_id": target.AgentID}
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, "system", domain.ActorTypeSystem, action, "target", target.ID, details); auditErr != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to record test connection audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
}