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shankar0123
95cb002905
Three findings from the certctl architecture diligence audit's Phase 1
bundle (Supply-Chain Hardening) closed together in one PR since they all
touch .github/workflows/ + repo root.
RED-1 — delete tracked precompiled binary
- deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol (8.6 MB ARM64 ELF) was
tracked alongside the Go source that builds it. The fixture's
Dockerfile already uses a multi-stage build that re-runs
'go build' inside the container (line 13), so the tracked binary
was vestigial — never actually consumed by the test wiring.
- git rm'd. Path added to .gitignore so it doesn't re-land.
- No Makefile target needed; the Dockerfile is the rebuild path.
RED-2 — SHA-pin every GitHub Action
- Pre: 37 of 41 'uses:' lines were tag-pinned (@v4 etc); only
4 were SHA-pinned (sigstore/cosign-installer + anchore/sbom-action).
- Post: 0 / 41. Every 'uses:' line is now '@<40-char-sha> # vN'
(the trailing comment preserves the human-readable version for
operator audit). SHA-pinning closes the standard supply-chain
attack vector against GitHub Actions consumers.
- SHAs resolved live via the GitHub API; spot-checked one.
TEST-L2 — npm audit hard gate
- Added 'npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high' step to the
Frontend Build job in ci.yml. --omit=dev excludes vitest/vite/
eslint/etc which don't ship to operators.
- Local run today: 0 vulnerabilities; gate enters with no triage
backlog. Catches future regressions.
New CI guards (regression-prevention):
- scripts/ci-guards/no-tag-pinned-actions.sh — fails the build if
a future PR adds 'uses: foo/bar@v2' instead of SHA-pinning.
- scripts/ci-guards/no-precompiled-binary.sh — runs file(1) over
git ls-files output; fails on any tracked ELF/Mach-O/PE.
- Both pass locally. CI's existing loop over scripts/ci-guards/*.sh
picks them up automatically.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-1,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-2,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-TEST-L2
53 lines
2.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
53 lines
2.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# scripts/ci-guards/no-tag-pinned-actions.sh
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#
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# Phase 1 RED-2 closure (2026-05-13): every GitHub Action invocation
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# under .github/workflows/ MUST be SHA-pinned (@<40-char-sha>) rather
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# than tag-pinned (@v4 / @v0.10.0 / etc.). Tags are mutable; SHAs
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# aren't. Mutable tags are the standard supply-chain attack vector
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# against GitHub Actions consumers — a compromised tag silently
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# pulls compromised code on every CI run.
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#
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# Pattern allowance:
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# - `uses: org/repo@<40-char-sha> # v4` ← the trailing comment
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# documenting the human-readable tag is REQUIRED for operator
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# audit purposes ("which version is that SHA?"), but the SHA is
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# the load-bearing pin.
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#
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# How to fix a violation:
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# 1. Look up the action's tag → SHA mapping. Either via the GitHub
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# web UI (visit the action's tags page), or via:
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# curl -sS https://api.github.com/repos/<org>/<repo>/git/refs/tags/<tag> | jq .object.sha
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# 2. Rewrite the line as `uses: <org>/<repo>@<sha> # <tag>`.
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# 3. Re-run this guard locally to confirm.
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#
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# Rationale + history:
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# - Phase 1 of the certctl architecture diligence remediation
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# (cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-2)
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# swept the entire .github/workflows/ tree from 37 tag-pinned /
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# 4 SHA-pinned to 0 tag-pinned / 41 SHA-pinned in one PR.
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# - This guard catches the regression mode: a future PR adds a new
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# `uses: foo/bar@v2` line and the build fails until the
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# contributor SHA-pins it.
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set -e
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# Match `uses: <anything>@vN` or `@v<digit>.<digit>` etc. Don't match
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# `@<40-char-sha>`. The negative-lookahead-free shell-regex shape:
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# anything-not-hex-40-chars after the @.
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VIOLATIONS=$(grep -rnE "uses:[^#]*@v[0-9]" .github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null || true)
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if [ -n "$VIOLATIONS" ]; then
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echo "::error::no-tag-pinned-actions regression: tag-pinned uses: line found."
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echo ""
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echo "GitHub Actions MUST be SHA-pinned (@<40-char-sha>) rather than"
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echo "tag-pinned (@v4). Tags are mutable; SHAs aren't. See the guard"
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echo "header for the fix workflow."
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echo ""
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echo "Violations:"
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echo "$VIOLATIONS"
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "no-tag-pinned-actions guard OK: every GitHub Action is SHA-pinned"
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