mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 15:41:41 +00:00
shankar0123
8b75e0311b
Mechanical sed across the main go.mod's module declaration, the f5-mock-icontrol
sub-module's go.mod, every Go file's import path (361 files), and a rebuild of
the checked-in f5-mock-icontrol binary so its embedded build-info reflects the
new module path. No behavior change.
Choice B from cowork/transfer-certctl-to-org.md, executed 2026-05-04. Choice A
(keep module path declared as github.com/shankar0123/certctl regardless of
repo URL) shipped on the day of the org transfer (2026-05-03) since we had no
external Go consumers; this commit closes that deferral.
Backward-compat: GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward
github.com/shankar0123/certctl → github.com/certctl-io/certctl at the URL
level, but Go's module proxy uses the path declared in go.mod as the
canonical name. Pre-fix, anyone trying `go get github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
hit a "module path mismatch" error because go.mod said
github.com/shankar0123/certctl and the URL they fetched it from said
certctl-io/certctl. Post-fix, the canonical name and the URL agree, so
go get / go install / external Go consumers / Go-tooling integrations
work cleanly via either the new path (preferred) or the old path (which
redirects and Go follows the redirect for source fetch).
Anyone still importing the old path inside their own code keeps working
provided they update their go.mod's `require` line to match — the module
path declared in their consumer's go.sum / go.mod is the authoritative
import name, so a mass sed across their import statements is the migration
on the consumer side. No external consumers exist today.
Diff shape:
361 *.go files — import path replacement only
2 go.mod — module declaration replacement only
1 binary — deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt
so embedded build-info reflects the new path (8618965 vs
8618933 bytes; 32-byte diff is the build-info change)
Total: 364 files, 730 insertions / 730 deletions, net-zero size, pure
mechanical substitution.
Verification:
gofmt: 17 files needed re-alignment after sed (the new path is one char
shorter than the old, so column-aligned import groups drifted). Applied
`gofmt -w` to fix.
go mod tidy: clean exit on both modules.
go vet ./...: clean exit.
go build ./...: clean exit.
go test -short -count=1 on representative packages: all green
(internal/domain, internal/validation, internal/crypto, internal/crypto/signer,
cmd/agent). Test output now reads `ok github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
confirming the module path resolves correctly.
binary: f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt; `strings | grep shankar0123` returns
nothing; `strings | grep certctl-io/certctl` shows the new module path
embedded in build-info.
Files intentionally NOT touched in this commit:
README.md / CHANGELOG.md / docs/ / etc. — already swept to certctl-io
URLs in commit 0729ee4 (the post-transfer URL refresh). This commit is
purely the Go-tooling layer.
Scarf pixels (`shankar0123.docker.scarf.sh/...`) — Scarf-account
namespace, not a Go import or GitHub repo URL. Stays.
This is a non-blocking, non-customer-impacting change. Operators pulling
container images, running `make verify`, hitting the API, or installing the
agent see no functional difference. Only Go-tooling consumers (none today)
are affected, and they're enabled — not broken — by this commit.
447 lines
16 KiB
Go
447 lines
16 KiB
Go
package signer_test
|
|
|
|
// Behavior-equivalence test suite for the Signer abstraction.
|
|
//
|
|
// Phase 2's exit criteria assert that existing tests in the local issuer
|
|
// pass after the refactor. That's necessary but not sufficient: existing
|
|
// tests cover specific scenarios and may not catch a subtle byte-level
|
|
// divergence (e.g., the wrapped Signer marshaling the public key in a
|
|
// different DER ordering, or producing a slightly different signature
|
|
// padding). This file is the explicit guard against that class of
|
|
// regression.
|
|
//
|
|
// Three signing surfaces are exercised, mirroring the four call sites in
|
|
// internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go:
|
|
// - leaf certificate signing (mirrors local.go::generateCertificate / line ~613)
|
|
// - CRL signing (mirrors local.go::GenerateCRL / line ~849)
|
|
// - OCSP response signing (mirrors local.go::SignOCSPResponse / line ~887)
|
|
// The CA-bootstrap call (line ~482) is implicitly covered by leaf
|
|
// signing — it's the same x509.CreateCertificate API.
|
|
//
|
|
// For each surface, two signatures are compared:
|
|
// - RSA-2048 / SHA-256: byte-strict equality (PKCS#1 v1.5 is
|
|
// deterministic given key + digest, so wrapped vs. raw produces
|
|
// identical full DER bytes).
|
|
// - ECDSA-P256 / SHA-256: structural equality (ECDSA uses random k
|
|
// per signature, so signature bytes differ; TBSCertificate /
|
|
// TBSCertificateList / TBSResponseData bytes — everything signed —
|
|
// must be byte-equal across raw and wrapped).
|
|
//
|
|
// A negative test (TestEquivalence_Sentinel) proves the equivalence
|
|
// checker would actually catch a regression — without it, a vacuously-
|
|
// passing assertion would let real divergence through.
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
"crypto"
|
|
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
|
"crypto/elliptic"
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"crypto/rsa"
|
|
"crypto/sha256"
|
|
"crypto/x509"
|
|
"crypto/x509/pkix"
|
|
"math/big"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/crypto/signer"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// fixedTemplate returns an x509 cert template with deterministic fields
|
|
// (no time.Now, no random serial) so two calls to CreateCertificate
|
|
// produce TBSCertificate bytes that are byte-equal modulo the signature.
|
|
func fixedTemplate(t *testing.T) (*x509.Certificate, *x509.Certificate) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
notBefore := time.Date(2026, 4, 28, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
|
notAfter := notBefore.Add(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
|
|
|
|
caTpl := &x509.Certificate{
|
|
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(0xCAFE),
|
|
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "Equiv CA"},
|
|
NotBefore: notBefore,
|
|
NotAfter: notAfter.Add(10 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour),
|
|
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign,
|
|
IsCA: true,
|
|
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
leafTpl := &x509.Certificate{
|
|
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(0xC0FFEE),
|
|
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "leaf.example.com"},
|
|
NotBefore: notBefore,
|
|
NotAfter: notAfter,
|
|
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
|
|
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
|
|
}
|
|
return caTpl, leafTpl
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Leaf certificate signing
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
func TestEquivalence_RSA_LeafCert_BytesIdentical(t *testing.T) {
|
|
caKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("rsa keygen: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
leafKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("leaf rsa keygen: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
wrapped, err := signer.Wrap(caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Wrap: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
caTpl, leafTpl := fixedTemplate(t)
|
|
|
|
// Self-sign the CA so we have a parsed *x509.Certificate to use as
|
|
// the leaf cert's parent (CreateCertificate needs both template and
|
|
// parent; using the same template for both produces a self-signed
|
|
// CA cert that we then parse).
|
|
caDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTpl, caTpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create CA: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
caCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse CA: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sign the same leaf cert twice — once via raw caKey, once via
|
|
// wrapped Signer. PKCS#1 v1.5 is deterministic, so the full DER
|
|
// must be byte-identical.
|
|
der1, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTpl, caCert, &leafKey.PublicKey, caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create leaf (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
der2, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTpl, caCert, &leafKey.PublicKey, wrapped)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create leaf (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(der1, der2) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("RSA leaf cert DER differs between raw and wrapped signer:\n raw: %x\n wrapped: %x", der1, der2)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestEquivalence_ECDSA_LeafCert_TBSIdentical(t *testing.T) {
|
|
caKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ecdsa keygen: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
leafKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("leaf ecdsa keygen: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
wrapped, err := signer.Wrap(caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Wrap: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
caTpl, leafTpl := fixedTemplate(t)
|
|
|
|
caDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTpl, caTpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create CA: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
caCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse CA: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
der1, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTpl, caCert, &leafKey.PublicKey, caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create leaf (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
der2, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTpl, caCert, &leafKey.PublicKey, wrapped)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create leaf (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert1, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der1)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse leaf (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
cert2, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der2)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse leaf (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TBSCertificate is everything that gets signed — Subject, Issuer,
|
|
// Validity, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, Extensions, etc. The signature
|
|
// bytes themselves differ (ECDSA random k) but the input to the
|
|
// signature MUST be byte-identical or the wrapper is doing
|
|
// something behavioral-different than the raw key.
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(cert1.RawTBSCertificate, cert2.RawTBSCertificate) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ECDSA leaf cert TBSCertificate differs between raw and wrapped signer (expected: signature bytes differ; everything else byte-equal)")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Confirm both signatures are independently valid against the CA's
|
|
// public key. This is the proof that the wrapper actually signed
|
|
// (not just produced random bytes that happened to match length).
|
|
if err := cert1.CheckSignatureFrom(caCert); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("raw-signed leaf failed validation: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := cert2.CheckSignatureFrom(caCert); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("wrapped-signed leaf failed validation: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// CRL signing (mirrors internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go::GenerateCRL)
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
func TestEquivalence_RSA_CRL_BytesIdentical(t *testing.T) {
|
|
caKey, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
wrapped, err := signer.Wrap(caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Wrap: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
caTpl, _ := fixedTemplate(t)
|
|
caDER, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTpl, caTpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
|
|
caCert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER)
|
|
|
|
thisUpdate := time.Date(2026, 4, 28, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
|
crlTpl := &x509.RevocationList{
|
|
Number: big.NewInt(1),
|
|
ThisUpdate: thisUpdate,
|
|
NextUpdate: thisUpdate.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
|
|
RevokedCertificateEntries: []x509.RevocationListEntry{
|
|
{
|
|
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(0xDEAD),
|
|
RevocationTime: thisUpdate,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
der1, err := x509.CreateRevocationList(rand.Reader, crlTpl, caCert, caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create CRL (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
der2, err := x509.CreateRevocationList(rand.Reader, crlTpl, caCert, wrapped)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create CRL (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(der1, der2) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("RSA CRL DER differs between raw and wrapped signer:\n raw: %x\n wrapped: %x", der1[:64], der2[:64])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestEquivalence_ECDSA_CRL_TBSIdentical(t *testing.T) {
|
|
caKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
wrapped, err := signer.Wrap(caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Wrap: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
caTpl, _ := fixedTemplate(t)
|
|
caDER, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTpl, caTpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
|
|
caCert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER)
|
|
|
|
thisUpdate := time.Date(2026, 4, 28, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
|
crlTpl := &x509.RevocationList{
|
|
Number: big.NewInt(1),
|
|
ThisUpdate: thisUpdate,
|
|
NextUpdate: thisUpdate.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
der1, err := x509.CreateRevocationList(rand.Reader, crlTpl, caCert, caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create CRL (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
der2, err := x509.CreateRevocationList(rand.Reader, crlTpl, caCert, wrapped)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create CRL (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crl1, err := x509.ParseRevocationList(der1)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse CRL (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
crl2, err := x509.ParseRevocationList(der2)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse CRL (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RawTBSRevocationList is the signed input. Must be byte-equal for
|
|
// equivalence; signature bytes differ for ECDSA.
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(crl1.RawTBSRevocationList, crl2.RawTBSRevocationList) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ECDSA CRL TBSRevocationList differs between raw and wrapped signer")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Both CRLs must validate against the CA.
|
|
if err := crl1.CheckSignatureFrom(caCert); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("raw-signed CRL failed validation: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := crl2.CheckSignatureFrom(caCert); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("wrapped-signed CRL failed validation: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// OCSP response signing
|
|
// (mirrors internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go::SignOCSPResponse)
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
func TestEquivalence_RSA_OCSPResponse_BytesIdentical(t *testing.T) {
|
|
caKey, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
wrapped, err := signer.Wrap(caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Wrap: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
caTpl, _ := fixedTemplate(t)
|
|
caDER, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTpl, caTpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
|
|
caCert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER)
|
|
|
|
thisUpdate := time.Date(2026, 4, 28, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
|
ocspTpl := ocsp.Response{
|
|
Status: ocsp.Good,
|
|
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(0xCAFEBABE),
|
|
ThisUpdate: thisUpdate,
|
|
NextUpdate: thisUpdate.Add(24 * time.Hour),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp1, err := ocsp.CreateResponse(caCert, caCert, ocspTpl, caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create OCSP (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
resp2, err := ocsp.CreateResponse(caCert, caCert, ocspTpl, wrapped)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create OCSP (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(resp1, resp2) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("RSA OCSP response differs between raw and wrapped signer (PKCS#1 v1.5 must be deterministic)")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestEquivalence_ECDSA_OCSPResponse_StructurallyIdentical(t *testing.T) {
|
|
caKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
wrapped, err := signer.Wrap(caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Wrap: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
caTpl, _ := fixedTemplate(t)
|
|
caDER, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTpl, caTpl, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
|
|
caCert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(caDER)
|
|
|
|
thisUpdate := time.Date(2026, 4, 28, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
|
ocspTpl := ocsp.Response{
|
|
Status: ocsp.Good,
|
|
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(0xCAFEBABE),
|
|
ThisUpdate: thisUpdate,
|
|
NextUpdate: thisUpdate.Add(24 * time.Hour),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp1, err := ocsp.CreateResponse(caCert, caCert, ocspTpl, caKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create OCSP (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
resp2, err := ocsp.CreateResponse(caCert, caCert, ocspTpl, wrapped)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create OCSP (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsed1, err := ocsp.ParseResponse(resp1, caCert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse OCSP (raw): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
parsed2, err := ocsp.ParseResponse(resp2, caCert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse OCSP (wrapped): %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compare every field except Signature + RawResponderName (which
|
|
// the parser may normalize differently across calls).
|
|
if parsed1.Status != parsed2.Status {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status differs: %d vs %d", parsed1.Status, parsed2.Status)
|
|
}
|
|
if parsed1.SerialNumber.Cmp(parsed2.SerialNumber) != 0 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("serial differs: %v vs %v", parsed1.SerialNumber, parsed2.SerialNumber)
|
|
}
|
|
if !parsed1.ThisUpdate.Equal(parsed2.ThisUpdate) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ThisUpdate differs")
|
|
}
|
|
if !parsed1.NextUpdate.Equal(parsed2.NextUpdate) {
|
|
t.Fatalf("NextUpdate differs")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Both responses must validate against the CA.
|
|
if err := parsed1.CheckSignatureFrom(caCert); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("raw-signed OCSP failed validation: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := parsed2.CheckSignatureFrom(caCert); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("wrapped-signed OCSP failed validation: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Negative test: the equivalence checker isn't trivially-passing
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
// TestEquivalence_Sentinel_DifferentKeysProduceDifferentBytes is the smoke
|
|
// check that the equivalence assertions above would actually catch a
|
|
// regression. Sign with two different keys; assert the resulting cert
|
|
// DER bytes differ. If THIS test passes trivially (false negative), the
|
|
// equivalence checker is broken and the test suite above is not actually
|
|
// guarding anything.
|
|
func TestEquivalence_Sentinel_DifferentKeysProduceDifferentBytes(t *testing.T) {
|
|
keyA, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
keyB, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
caTpl, leafTpl := fixedTemplate(t)
|
|
leafKey, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
|
|
caDERA, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTpl, caTpl, &keyA.PublicKey, keyA)
|
|
caCertA, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(caDERA)
|
|
caDERB, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTpl, caTpl, &keyB.PublicKey, keyB)
|
|
caCertB, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(caDERB)
|
|
|
|
der1, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTpl, caCertA, &leafKey.PublicKey, keyA)
|
|
der2, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTpl, caCertB, &leafKey.PublicKey, keyB)
|
|
if bytes.Equal(der1, der2) {
|
|
t.Fatal("sentinel: certs signed by DIFFERENT keys must NOT byte-equal — equivalence checker is trivially-passing")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Sanity: the wrapped signer's Sign output is independently valid for
|
|
// arbitrary digests (covers the path that doesn't go through x509.*).
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
func TestEquivalence_WrappedSign_RSA_VerifiesAgainstStdlib(t *testing.T) {
|
|
k, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
w, err := signer.Wrap(k)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Wrap: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
digest := sha256OfBytes([]byte("test message"))
|
|
sig, err := w.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, crypto.SHA256)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(&k.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, digest, sig); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("wrapped RSA Sign produced signature that does not verify with stdlib VerifyPKCS1v15: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestEquivalence_WrappedSign_ECDSA_VerifiesAgainstStdlib(t *testing.T) {
|
|
k, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
w, err := signer.Wrap(k)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Wrap: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
digest := sha256OfBytes([]byte("test message"))
|
|
sig, err := w.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, crypto.SHA256)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !ecdsa.VerifyASN1(&k.PublicKey, digest, sig) {
|
|
t.Fatal("wrapped ECDSA Sign produced signature that does not verify with stdlib VerifyASN1")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func sha256OfBytes(b []byte) []byte {
|
|
h := sha256.Sum256(b)
|
|
return h[:]
|
|
}
|