Files
certctl/internal/api/middleware/ratelimit_keyed_test.go
shankar0123 8f2e5771db fix(middleware): SEC-006 — TTL-evict idle token-bucket rate-limiter entries
Sprint 2 unified-master-audit closure. Pre-fix the keyed rate
limiter's bucket map had no eviction. The package-level comment
explicitly noted the leak: high-cardinality unauthenticated traffic
(CGNAT churn, Tor exit lists, botnets, infinite-cardinality scanners)
grew process memory unboundedly. Production deploys with millions of
unique IPs would eventually OOM.

Fix:
  - RateLimitConfig.BucketTTL (env CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_TTL,
    default 1h, clamp-floor 1m). 1h chosen to be well above realistic
    operator IP churn windows (returning clients keep their bucket)
    and well below the unbounded-leak window the pre-fix code
    allowed.
  - tokenBucket gains a lastAccess field updated on every allow()
    call via touch(); reading via lastAccessTime() under the bucket's
    own mutex.
  - keyedRateLimiter.sweepLoop runs in a single goroutine per
    limiter (production wires 2: default + no-auth fallback), waking
    every BucketTTL/4. sweep() removes any bucket whose lastAccess
    is older than the cutoff and bumps evictedTotal atomically.
  - Both NewRateLimiter call sites in cmd/server/main.go (default
    stack and no-auth fallback) now thread cfg.RateLimit.BucketTTL.

Regression coverage:
  - TestKeyedRateLimiter_SweepEvictsIdleBuckets: 1000 synthetic IP
    keys populate the map, advance past TTL, call sweep() directly,
    assert map drained to 0 + evictedTotal=1000 + fresh key creates
    new bucket (map not poisoned).
  - TestKeyedRateLimiter_SweepKeepsActiveBuckets: inverse — a bucket
    touched within the TTL window survives the sweep. Catches a
    future regression that inverts the cutoff comparison.

Closes SEC-006.
2026-05-16 04:01:18 +00:00

284 lines
9.6 KiB
Go

package middleware
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
)
// Bundle B / Audit M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1): per-key rate-limiter
// regression suite. Pre-bundle the limiter was global — a single noisy
// caller could exhaust everyone's budget. Post-bundle each authenticated
// user and each distinct IP gets an independent token bucket.
func newKeyedTestHandler(t *testing.T, cfg RateLimitConfig) http.Handler {
t.Helper()
return NewRateLimiter(cfg)(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}),
)
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets ensures one IP
// exhausting its bucket does not affect another IP.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets(t *testing.T) {
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, RateLimitConfig{RPS: 0.0001, BurstSize: 1})
// IP A burns its single token.
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:54321"
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("IP A first request should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// IP A's second request must 429.
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("IP A second request should 429; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// IP B's first request must still pass — independent bucket.
req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req2.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.2:54321"
rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("IP B first request must pass (independent bucket); got %d", rr2.Code)
}
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket pins the keying
// rule that authenticated callers are bucketed by user identity, not by
// IP — so a user rotating between devices still shares one budget.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket(t *testing.T) {
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, RateLimitConfig{RPS: 0.0001, BurstSize: 1})
mkReq := func(remote string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = remote
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, "alice")
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
// Alice from IP X exhausts her bucket.
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("10.0.0.1:54321"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("alice first request should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// Alice from IP Y must 429 — same user-scoped bucket.
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("10.0.0.2:54321"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("alice second request from different IP should still 429; got %d", rr.Code)
}
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets pins the keying rule
// that two authenticated users share neither buckets nor side effects.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets(t *testing.T) {
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, RateLimitConfig{RPS: 0.0001, BurstSize: 1})
mkReq := func(user string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:54321"
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, user)
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("alice"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("alice first request should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("alice"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("alice second request should 429; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// Bob shares the same RemoteAddr but his bucket is independent.
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("bob"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("bob's first request must pass despite alice exhausting hers; got %d", rr.Code)
}
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_PerUserBudgetOverride exercises the optional
// PerUserRPS / PerUserBurstSize knobs. Authenticated callers get the
// generous budget; unauthenticated callers stay on the strict default.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_PerUserBudgetOverride(t *testing.T) {
cfg := RateLimitConfig{
RPS: 0.0001,
BurstSize: 1, // strict for unauthenticated
PerUserRPS: 0.0001,
PerUserBurstSize: 5, // generous for authenticated
}
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, cfg)
// IP-keyed: 1 token, second request 429.
ipReq := func() *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.99:54321"
return req
}
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, ipReq())
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ip request 1 should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, ipReq())
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("ip request 2 should 429; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// User-keyed: 5 tokens, sixth request 429.
userReq := func() *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.42:54321"
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, "carol")
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
for i := 1; i <= 5; i++ {
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, userReq())
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("user request %d should pass; got %d", i, rr.Code)
}
}
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, userReq())
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("user request 6 should 429 (over PerUserBurstSize); got %d", rr.Code)
}
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous ensures a
// misconfigured auth middleware that puts an empty string under UserKey
// does NOT collapse every anonymous request onto a single bucket.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous(t *testing.T) {
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, RateLimitConfig{RPS: 0.0001, BurstSize: 1})
mkReq := func(remote string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = remote
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), auth.UserKey{}, "")
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("10.0.1.1:54321"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("first anonymous request should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("10.0.1.2:54321"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("second anonymous request from different IP should still pass (independent IP buckets); got %d", rr.Code)
}
}
// =============================================================================
// SEC-006 closure (Sprint 2, 2026-05-16). The token-bucket map now has
// a background sweeper that evicts buckets whose last allow() call is
// older than the configured BucketTTL. This test pins the eviction
// path against a synthetic 1000-key load and asserts:
//
// 1. Buckets created by N distinct keys land in the map.
// 2. After the simulated TTL elapses and the sweeper runs, the map
// is reclaimed and evictedTotal reflects the count.
// 3. A subsequent request from a fresh key creates a new bucket
// (i.e. the map isn't poisoned by the eviction).
//
// The test calls sweep() directly rather than relying on the goroutine
// + time.Ticker so it stays deterministic and fast. The sweeper
// goroutine itself is exercised in production; this test pins the
// eviction predicate.
// =============================================================================
func TestKeyedRateLimiter_SweepEvictsIdleBuckets(t *testing.T) {
limiter := &keyedRateLimiter{
ipRate: 1000,
ipBurst: 1000,
userRate: 1000,
userBurst: 1000,
buckets: make(map[string]*tokenBucket),
bucketTTL: 100 * time.Millisecond,
}
// Populate 1000 buckets from a synthetic IP-key churn.
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
key := "ip:198.51.100." + fmt.Sprintf("%d", i%256) + "/" + fmt.Sprintf("%d", i)
if !limiter.allow(key, false) {
t.Fatalf("synthetic IP-key %d: allow returned false on first call", i)
}
}
limiter.mu.RLock()
if got := len(limiter.buckets); got != 1000 {
limiter.mu.RUnlock()
t.Fatalf("post-populate bucket count = %d; want 1000", got)
}
limiter.mu.RUnlock()
// Advance past the TTL boundary, then sweep.
time.Sleep(110 * time.Millisecond)
limiter.sweep()
limiter.mu.RLock()
remaining := len(limiter.buckets)
limiter.mu.RUnlock()
if remaining != 0 {
t.Errorf("post-sweep bucket count = %d; want 0 (all should have been evicted)", remaining)
}
if got := limiter.evictedTotal.Load(); got != 1000 {
t.Errorf("evictedTotal = %d; want 1000", got)
}
// A fresh request creates a new bucket — map isn't poisoned.
if !limiter.allow("ip:203.0.113.7", false) {
t.Errorf("fresh key: allow returned false on first call after sweep")
}
limiter.mu.RLock()
defer limiter.mu.RUnlock()
if got := len(limiter.buckets); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("post-sweep-plus-one bucket count = %d; want 1", got)
}
}
// TestKeyedRateLimiter_SweepKeepsActiveBuckets pins the inverse — a
// bucket touched within the TTL window survives the sweep. Catches a
// future regression that inverts the cutoff comparison.
func TestKeyedRateLimiter_SweepKeepsActiveBuckets(t *testing.T) {
limiter := &keyedRateLimiter{
ipRate: 1000,
ipBurst: 1000,
userRate: 1000,
userBurst: 1000,
buckets: make(map[string]*tokenBucket),
bucketTTL: 1 * time.Hour, // generous so test timing doesn't flake
}
limiter.allow("ip:198.51.100.42", false)
limiter.sweep()
limiter.mu.RLock()
defer limiter.mu.RUnlock()
if got := len(limiter.buckets); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("active-bucket count = %d; want 1 (sweep should not evict within TTL)", got)
}
if got := limiter.evictedTotal.Load(); got != 0 {
t.Errorf("evictedTotal = %d; want 0 (no evictions expected)", got)
}
}