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https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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shankar0123
95cb002905
Three findings from the certctl architecture diligence audit's Phase 1
bundle (Supply-Chain Hardening) closed together in one PR since they all
touch .github/workflows/ + repo root.
RED-1 — delete tracked precompiled binary
- deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol (8.6 MB ARM64 ELF) was
tracked alongside the Go source that builds it. The fixture's
Dockerfile already uses a multi-stage build that re-runs
'go build' inside the container (line 13), so the tracked binary
was vestigial — never actually consumed by the test wiring.
- git rm'd. Path added to .gitignore so it doesn't re-land.
- No Makefile target needed; the Dockerfile is the rebuild path.
RED-2 — SHA-pin every GitHub Action
- Pre: 37 of 41 'uses:' lines were tag-pinned (@v4 etc); only
4 were SHA-pinned (sigstore/cosign-installer + anchore/sbom-action).
- Post: 0 / 41. Every 'uses:' line is now '@<40-char-sha> # vN'
(the trailing comment preserves the human-readable version for
operator audit). SHA-pinning closes the standard supply-chain
attack vector against GitHub Actions consumers.
- SHAs resolved live via the GitHub API; spot-checked one.
TEST-L2 — npm audit hard gate
- Added 'npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high' step to the
Frontend Build job in ci.yml. --omit=dev excludes vitest/vite/
eslint/etc which don't ship to operators.
- Local run today: 0 vulnerabilities; gate enters with no triage
backlog. Catches future regressions.
New CI guards (regression-prevention):
- scripts/ci-guards/no-tag-pinned-actions.sh — fails the build if
a future PR adds 'uses: foo/bar@v2' instead of SHA-pinning.
- scripts/ci-guards/no-precompiled-binary.sh — runs file(1) over
git ls-files output; fails on any tracked ELF/Mach-O/PE.
- Both pass locally. CI's existing loop over scripts/ci-guards/*.sh
picks them up automatically.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-1,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-2,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-TEST-L2
82 lines
3.3 KiB
YAML
82 lines
3.3 KiB
YAML
name: CodeQL
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# Public-facing SAST baseline that complements the existing security-deep-scan
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# workflow (gosec, osv-scanner, trivy, ZAP, semgrep, schemathesis, nuclei,
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# testssl) with cross-file Go and JavaScript dataflow analysis. Results land
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# in the repository's Security → Code scanning tab as a public signal — any
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# operator/security team auditing certctl can see the scan history and
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# triage state without asking.
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#
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# Why CodeQL in addition to gosec:
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# - gosec is single-file pattern matching (catches obvious issues like
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# `os/exec.Command(userInput)`); CodeQL does interprocedural taint
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# tracking (catches the same issue when the userInput is laundered
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# through several function calls or struct fields).
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# - GitHub-native; no third-party SaaS license gate (works for BSL 1.1
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# and other source-available licenses, unlike Aikido / Snyk / SonarCloud
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# free tiers which require OSI-approved licenses).
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# - SARIF results auto-deduplicate and persist on PRs, so reviewers see
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# "this PR introduces N new findings" rather than re-running ad hoc.
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#
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# Findings that are intentional (e.g., the SSH connector's
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# InsecureIgnoreHostKey, ACME DNS solver's intentional shell-out to operator-
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# supplied scripts) get suppressed via inline `// codeql[<rule-id>]`
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# comments OR via a `.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml` query-pack tweak —
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# document the rationale in the same commit that adds the suppression so
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# the public scan-tab readers see the threat-model justification.
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on:
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push:
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branches: [master]
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pull_request:
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branches: [master]
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schedule:
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# Weekly Sunday 06:00 UTC, in addition to push/PR coverage. Catches
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# rule-pack updates from CodeQL upstream (their Go/JS rulesets ship
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# new queries on a roughly-monthly cadence).
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- cron: '0 6 * * 0'
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permissions:
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contents: read
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security-events: write # SARIF upload to GitHub code scanning
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actions: read
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jobs:
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analyze:
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name: Analyze (${{ matrix.language }})
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 30
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strategy:
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fail-fast: false
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matrix:
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language: [go, javascript-typescript]
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steps:
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- name: Checkout
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uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
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- name: Set up Go
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if: matrix.language == 'go'
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uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
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with:
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# Match ci.yml + release.yml + security-deep-scan.yml.
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go-version: '1.25.10'
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- name: Initialize CodeQL
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uses: github/codeql-action/init@7fd177fa680c9881b53cdab4d346d32574c9f7f4 # v3
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with:
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languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
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# Use the security-and-quality query suite — security finds plus
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# maintainability/correctness issues that the smaller security-extended
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# suite skips. Comparable scope to what Aikido / SonarCloud run.
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queries: security-and-quality
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- name: Autobuild
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uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@7fd177fa680c9881b53cdab4d346d32574c9f7f4 # v3
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- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
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uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@7fd177fa680c9881b53cdab4d346d32574c9f7f4 # v3
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with:
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category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}"
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# SARIF upload is implicit (and is what populates the Security tab).
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