# Architecture Guide ## Overview Certctl is a certificate management platform with a **decoupled control-plane and agent architecture**. The control plane orchestrates certificate issuance and renewal, while agents deployed across your infrastructure handle key generation, certificate deployment, and local validation — private keys never leave the infrastructure they were generated on. New to certificates? Read the [Concepts Guide](concepts.md) first. ### Design Principles 1. **Zero Private Key Exposure** — Private keys are generated and managed only on agents, never sent to the control plane 2. **Decoupled Operations** — Agents operate autonomously; the control plane coordinates but doesn't block agent function 3. **Audit-First** — Complete traceability of all issuance, deployment, and rotation events 4. **Connector Architecture** — Pluggable issuers, targets, and notifiers for extensibility 5. **Self-Hosted** — No cloud lock-in; run with Docker Compose, Kubernetes, or bare metal ## System Components ```mermaid flowchart TB subgraph "Control Plane" API["REST API\n(Go net/http, :8443)"] SVC["Service Layer"] REPO["Repository Layer\n(database/sql + lib/pq)"] SCHED["Background Scheduler\n4 loops"] DASH["Web Dashboard\n(React SPA)"] end subgraph "Data Store" PG[("PostgreSQL 16\n14 tables\nTEXT primary keys")] end subgraph "Agent Fleet" A1["Agent: nginx-prod\n(heartbeat + work poll)"] A2["Agent: f5-prod"] A3["Agent: iis-prod"] end subgraph "Issuer Backends" CA1["Local CA\n(crypto/x509)"] CA2["ACME\n(Let's Encrypt)"] CA3["Vault PKI\n(future)"] end subgraph "Target Systems" T1["NGINX\n(SSH + reload)"] T2["F5 BIG-IP\n(REST API)"] T3["IIS\n(WinRM)"] end DASH --> API API --> SVC SVC --> REPO REPO --> PG SCHED --> SVC SVC -->|"Issue/Renew"| CA1 & CA2 & CA3 A1 & A2 & A3 -->|"CSR + Heartbeat"| API API -->|"Cert + Chain\n(NO private key)"| A1 & A2 & A3 A1 -->|"Deploy"| T1 A2 -->|"Deploy"| T2 A3 -->|"Deploy"| T3 ``` ### Control Plane (Server) The control plane is a Go HTTP server backed by PostgreSQL. It manages state (certificates, agents, targets, issuers, policies), orchestrates issuance by coordinating with CAs through issuer connectors, tracks jobs for certificate issuance/renewal/deployment workflows, maintains an immutable audit trail, and dispatches work via a background scheduler. The server exposes a REST API under `/api/v1/` and optionally serves the web dashboard as static files from the `web/` directory. **Key internals**: The server uses Go 1.22's `net/http` stdlib routing (no external router framework), structured logging via `slog`, and a handler → service → repository layered architecture. Handlers define their own service interfaces for clean dependency inversion. ### Agents Lightweight Go processes that run on or near your infrastructure. An agent generates private keys locally, creates CSRs, receives signed certificates from the control plane, deploys them to target systems, and reports status back. Agents communicate with the control plane via HTTP and authenticate with API keys. The agent runs two background loops: a heartbeat (every 60 seconds) to signal it's alive, and a work poll (every 30 seconds) to check for pending jobs. ### Web Dashboard A single-page React application served as a static HTML file (`web/index.html`). It communicates with the REST API and provides a visual interface for certificate inventory, agent status, job monitoring, audit trail, policy management, and notifications. The dashboard includes a **demo mode** that activates when the API is unreachable — it renders realistic mock data for screenshots and offline presentations. ### PostgreSQL Database All state is stored in PostgreSQL 16. The schema uses TEXT primary keys (not UUIDs) with human-readable prefixed IDs like `mc-api-prod`, `t-platform`, `o-alice`. ```mermaid erDiagram teams ||--o{ owners : "has members" teams ||--o{ managed_certificates : "owns" owners ||--o{ managed_certificates : "responsible for" issuers ||--o{ managed_certificates : "signs" renewal_policies ||--o{ managed_certificates : "governs" managed_certificates ||--o{ certificate_versions : "has versions" managed_certificates ||--o{ certificate_target_mappings : "deployed to" deployment_targets ||--o{ certificate_target_mappings : "receives" agents ||--o{ deployment_targets : "manages" managed_certificates ||--o{ jobs : "triggers" policy_rules ||--o{ policy_violations : "produces" managed_certificates ||--o{ policy_violations : "violates" managed_certificates ||--o{ audit_events : "logged in" managed_certificates ||--o{ notification_events : "generates" teams { text id PK text name text description } owners { text id PK text name text email text team_id FK } managed_certificates { text id PK text name text common_name text[] sans text environment text owner_id FK text team_id FK text issuer_id FK text renewal_policy_id FK text status timestamp expires_at jsonb tags } certificate_versions { text id PK text certificate_id FK text serial_number text fingerprint_sha256 text pem_chain text csr_pem } agents { text id PK text name text hostname text status text api_key_hash } deployment_targets { text id PK text name text type text agent_id FK jsonb config } issuers { text id PK text name text type jsonb config boolean enabled } jobs { text id PK text type text certificate_id FK text target_id FK text status int attempts } policy_rules { text id PK text name text type jsonb config boolean enabled } policy_violations { text id PK text certificate_id FK text rule_id FK text message text severity } audit_events { text id PK text actor text actor_type text action text resource_type text resource_id jsonb details } notification_events { text id PK text type text certificate_id FK text channel text recipient text status } ``` Migrations are idempotent (`IF NOT EXISTS` on all CREATE statements, `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING` on all seed data) so they're safe to run multiple times — important for Docker Compose where both initdb and the server may run the same SQL. ## Data Flow: Certificate Lifecycle ### 1. Create Managed Certificate ```mermaid sequenceDiagram participant U as User / API Client participant API as REST API participant SVC as CertificateService participant DB as PostgreSQL participant AUD as AuditService U->>API: POST /api/v1/certificates
{name, common_name, sans, ...} API->>SVC: Create(ctx, certificate) SVC->>SVC: Validate required fields SVC->>DB: INSERT INTO managed_certificates SVC->>AUD: Create(audit_event: certificate_created) AUD->>DB: INSERT INTO audit_events SVC-->>API: ManagedCertificate API-->>U: 201 Created + JSON body ``` ### 2. Agent Requests Certificate (CSR → Issuance) ```mermaid sequenceDiagram participant A as Agent participant API as Control Plane API participant ISS as Issuer Connector participant DB as PostgreSQL A->>A: Generate RSA-2048 key pair A->>A: Create CSR (CN + SANs, public key only) A->>API: POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/csr
{csr_pem: "-----BEGIN..."} API->>API: Validate CSR format API->>ISS: IssueCertificate(IssuanceRequest{CSR}) ISS-->>API: IssuanceResult{cert_pem, chain_pem, serial, not_after} API->>DB: INSERT INTO certificate_versions API->>DB: UPDATE managed_certificates SET status='Active' API->>DB: INSERT INTO audit_events API-->>A: {certificate_pem, chain_pem}
(NO private key in response) A->>A: Store cert.pem + chain.pem locally Note over A: key.pem stays on agent
Never transmitted anywhere A->>A: Deploy to target system ``` ### 3. Deploy Certificate to Target The agent deploys certificates using target connectors. Each connector knows how to push certificates to a specific system: - **NGINX**: Writes cert/chain files to disk, validates config with `nginx -t`, reloads with `nginx -s reload` or `systemctl reload nginx` - **F5 BIG-IP**: Calls the F5 REST API to upload certificate and update virtual server bindings - **IIS**: Uses WinRM to import the certificate into the Windows certificate store and bind it to an IIS site The agent handles both the certificate (public) and the private key (local only). The control plane never sees the private key. ### 4. Automatic Renewal The control plane runs a scheduler with four background loops: ```mermaid flowchart LR subgraph "Scheduler (Background Goroutines)" R["Renewal Checker\n⏱ every 1h"] J["Job Processor\n⏱ every 30s"] H["Agent Health\n⏱ every 2m"] N["Notification Processor\n⏱ every 1m"] end R -->|"Find expiring certs\nCreate renewal jobs"| DB[("PostgreSQL")] J -->|"Process pending jobs\nCoordinate issuance"| DB H -->|"Check heartbeat staleness\nMark agents offline"| DB N -->|"Send pending notifications\nEmail / Webhook"| DB ``` | Loop | Interval | Purpose | |------|----------|---------| | Renewal checker | 1 hour | Finds certificates approaching expiry, creates renewal jobs | | Job processor | 30 seconds | Processes pending jobs (issuance, renewal, deployment) | | Agent health check | 2 minutes | Marks agents as offline if heartbeat is stale | | Notification processor | 1 minute | Sends pending notifications via configured channels | When the renewal checker finds a certificate within its renewal window (e.g., 30 days before expiry), it creates a renewal job. The job processor picks it up, coordinates with the issuer, and triggers deployment. All steps are logged in the audit trail and generate notifications. ## Connector Architecture Certctl uses connector interfaces for extensibility. Each connector type has a standard interface that implementations must satisfy. ```mermaid flowchart TB subgraph "Issuer Connectors" direction TB II["IssuerConnector Interface\nIssueCertificate() | RenewCertificate()\nRevokeCertificate() | GetOrderStatus()"] II --> LC["Local CA"] II --> ACME["ACME v2"] II --> VP["Vault PKI (future)"] end subgraph "Target Connectors" direction TB TI["TargetConnector Interface\nDeployCertificate()\nValidateDeployment()"] TI --> NG["NGINX"] TI --> F5["F5 BIG-IP"] TI --> IIS["IIS"] end subgraph "Notifier Connectors" direction TB NI["NotifierConnector Interface\nSendAlert() | SendEvent()"] NI --> EM["Email (SMTP)"] NI --> WH["Webhook (HTTP)"] NI --> SL["Slack (future)"] end ``` ### Issuer Connector Handles certificate issuance from CAs. ```go type Connector interface { ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, config json.RawMessage) error IssueCertificate(ctx context.Context, request IssuanceRequest) (*IssuanceResult, error) RenewCertificate(ctx context.Context, request RenewalRequest) (*IssuanceResult, error) RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, request RevocationRequest) error GetOrderStatus(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*OrderStatus, error) } ``` Built-in issuers: **Local CA** (self-signed, for development/demos) and **ACME** (Let's Encrypt, Sectigo, etc., in progress). ### Target Connector Deploys certificates to infrastructure. Note: the interface does NOT include private keys — agents handle keys locally. ```go type Connector interface { ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, config json.RawMessage) error DeployCertificate(ctx context.Context, request DeploymentRequest) (*DeploymentResult, error) ValidateDeployment(ctx context.Context, request ValidationRequest) (*ValidationResult, error) } ``` Built-in targets: **NGINX**, **F5 BIG-IP**, **IIS**. ### Notifier Connector Sends alerts about certificate lifecycle events. ```go type Connector interface { ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, config json.RawMessage) error SendAlert(ctx context.Context, alert Alert) error SendEvent(ctx context.Context, event Event) error } ``` Built-in notifiers: **Email** (SMTP) and **Webhook** (HTTP POST). See the [Connector Development Guide](connectors.md) for details on building custom connectors. ## Security Model ### Private Key Management ```mermaid flowchart LR subgraph "Agent (Your Infrastructure)" GEN["1. GENERATE\ncrypto/rsa 2048-bit"] STORE["2. STORE\nFile perms 0600"] USE["3. USE\nCSR gen + deployment"] ROT["4. ROTATE\nDelete old after renewal"] end subgraph "Control Plane (certctl-server)" CP["Only sees:\n• Certificates (public)\n• Chains (public)\n• CSRs (public key only)"] end GEN --> STORE --> USE --> ROT USE -.->|"CSR (public key only)"| CP CP -.->|"Signed cert + chain"| USE style CP fill:#fee,stroke:#c33 style GEN fill:#efe,stroke:#3c3 style STORE fill:#efe,stroke:#3c3 style USE fill:#efe,stroke:#3c3 style ROT fill:#efe,stroke:#3c3 ``` Private keys follow a strict lifecycle: 1. **Generated on the agent** — never sent to the control plane 2. **Stored on the agent** — file permissions 0600, owned by the agent process user 3. **Used by the agent** — for deployment to targets and CSR generation 4. **Rotated by the agent** — old keys deleted after successful renewal The control plane only ever handles public material: certificates, chains, and CSRs. This is a deliberate architectural decision — even if the control plane database is compromised, no private keys are exposed. ### Authentication - **API clients → Server**: API key in `Authorization: Bearer` header, or `none` for demo mode - **Agent → Server**: API key registered at agent creation, included in all requests - **Server → Issuers**: ACME account key, or connector-specific credentials - **Agent → Targets**: SSH keys, API tokens, WinRM credentials (stored locally on agent) ### Audit Trail Every action is recorded as an immutable audit event: ```json { "id": "audit-001", "actor": "o-alice", "actor_type": "User", "action": "certificate_created", "resource_type": "certificate", "resource_id": "mc-api-prod", "details": {"environment": "production"}, "timestamp": "2026-03-14T10:30:00Z" } ``` Audit events cannot be modified or deleted. They support filtering by actor, action, resource type, resource ID, and time range. ## API Design All endpoints are under `/api/v1/` and follow consistent patterns: - **List**: `GET /api/v1/{resources}` — returns `{data: [...], total, page, per_page}` - **Get**: `GET /api/v1/{resources}/{id}` — returns the resource - **Create**: `POST /api/v1/{resources}` — returns the created resource with `201` - **Update**: `PUT /api/v1/{resources}/{id}` — returns the updated resource - **Delete**: `DELETE /api/v1/{resources}/{id}` — returns `204` (soft delete/archive) - **Actions**: `POST /api/v1/{resources}/{id}/{action}` — returns `202` for async operations Resources: certificates, issuers, targets, agents, jobs, policies, teams, owners, audit, notifications. Health checks live outside the API prefix: `GET /health` and `GET /ready`. ## Deployment Topologies ### Docker Compose (Development / Small Deployments) ```mermaid flowchart TB subgraph "Docker Network (certctl-network)" SERVER["certctl-server\n:8443\nAPI + Dashboard"] PG[("PostgreSQL\n:5432\nSchema + Seed Data")] AGENT["certctl-agent\nHeartbeat + Work Poll"] end USER["Browser / curl"] -->|"HTTP :8443"| SERVER SERVER -->|"SQL"| PG AGENT -->|"HTTP (internal)"| SERVER ``` ### Production (Kubernetes) ```mermaid flowchart TB subgraph "Kubernetes Cluster" subgraph "Control Plane" DEP["Deployment\ncertctl-server\nreplicas: 2+"] CM["ConfigMap\nIssuer/target configs"] SEC["Secret\nAPI keys, ACME creds"] end subgraph "Data" SS[("StatefulSet\nPostgreSQL\nprimary + replica")] end subgraph "Agent Fleet" DS["DaemonSet\ncertctl-agent\n(infra nodes)"] end end ING["Ingress\n+ TLS termination"] --> DEP DEP --> SS DEP --> CM & SEC DS --> DEP ``` For production, you would also add an ingress controller, TLS termination for the certctl API itself, and external PostgreSQL (RDS, Cloud SQL, etc.). ## What's Next - [Quick Start](quickstart.md) — Get certctl running locally - [Advanced Demo](demo-advanced.md) — Issue a certificate end-to-end - [Connector Guide](connectors.md) — Build custom connectors