# Runbook: PostgreSQL backup for certctl > Last reviewed: 2026-05-13 Use this when: - You're setting up a new certctl deployment and need a backup policy before going to production. - A buyer or auditor asks "where's the backup automation?" and you need to point at the recommended cadence + procedure. - You're rotating the encryption key, swapping CAs, or doing any other destructive maintenance and want a snapshot to roll back to. certctl does not ship a built-in backup daemon. Postgres is the system of record for every piece of certctl state that isn't on the operator's filesystem (CA keys, OCSP responder keys, SCEP/EST trust bundles — see "Operator-managed (NOT in DB)" in the [disaster-recovery runbook](disaster-recovery.md#postgres-restore)); backing it up is treated as a standard PostgreSQL operations task that the operator owns end-to-end with their existing tooling. This page is the recommended recipe. ## What to back up | Layer | Tool | Cadence | |---|---|---| | `certctl` database (the row data) | `pg_dump` (logical) **or** `pg_basebackup` + WAL archive (physical PIT) | ≥ daily, retention ≥ 30d | | CA cert + key (`CERTCTL_CA_CERT_PATH`, `CERTCTL_CA_KEY_PATH`) | Out-of-band file backup (operator's existing secret-management tool) | On change | | SCEP RA cert + key (per profile) | Out-of-band file backup | On change | | OCSP responder keys | Out-of-band file backup (`CERTCTL_OCSP_RESPONDER_KEY_DIR`) | On change | | Trust-anchor PEM bundles | Out-of-band file backup | On change | | Env vars (auth secret, etc.) | Operator's secret-management tool (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.) | On rotation | A backup of only the Postgres database without the operator-managed file material is **not a complete restore artifact** — see the [disaster-recovery runbook's Postgres-restore section](disaster-recovery.md#postgres-restore) for the full inventory. The DR runbook owns the restore procedure; this page owns the capture procedure. ## Logical backup (recommended for most deployments) `pg_dump -Fc` produces a portable compressed dump that's easy to restore into a fresh Postgres instance at any version ≥ the dump's source version. Best for deployments where the DB is small enough that a full logical dump fits the backup window (rough rule of thumb: under a million `managed_certificates` rows + corresponding history). ### docker-compose ```bash # 1. Snapshot. Run from any host that can reach the postgres container. TIMESTAMP=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ) docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml exec -T postgres \ pg_dump --format=custom --no-owner --no-acl --dbname=certctl \ > "certctl-${TIMESTAMP}.dump" # 2. Verify integrity (catch transport / truncation bugs early). docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/dumps" -w /dumps postgres:16-alpine \ pg_restore --list "certctl-${TIMESTAMP}.dump" > /dev/null \ && echo "OK: pg_restore --list parses the dump cleanly" \ || { echo "CORRUPT DUMP"; exit 1; } # 3. Move to durable storage (S3, GCS, NFS, encrypted-at-rest blob # storage of your choice). DO NOT leave the dump on the certctl host # alone — that defeats the purpose of having a backup. aws s3 cp "certctl-${TIMESTAMP}.dump" "s3://your-bucket/certctl/" ``` ### Kubernetes (with the bundled Helm chart) ```bash # 1. Snapshot via kubectl exec into the postgres StatefulSet pod. TIMESTAMP=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ) NAMESPACE=certctl kubectl exec -n "$NAMESPACE" statefulset/postgres -- \ pg_dump --format=custom --no-owner --no-acl --dbname=certctl \ > "certctl-${TIMESTAMP}.dump" # 2. Same verification step as above. # 3. Same off-host storage step as above. ``` ### Restore (cross-reference) The restore procedure lives in [disaster-recovery.md § Postgres restore](disaster-recovery.md#postgres-restore). The key reminders: stop certctl first, restore the DB, run any migrations newer than the snapshot, truncate the CRL + OCSP caches, then restart. ## Physical / PITR backup (large fleets, RPO < 1h) Logical dumps have a coarse RPO (the last successful dump). For deployments where ≤ 1h of cert-issuance history loss is unacceptable, pair Postgres physical backups with continuous WAL archiving: - `pg_basebackup` for the initial seed - `archive_command = ''` in `postgresql.conf` to ship every WAL segment off the host as it closes - `pgbackrest` or `wal-g` for the operational layer (both are battle-tested, support encryption, and integrate cleanly with S3 / GCS / Azure Blob) certctl ships nothing in this layer — it's standard PostgreSQL DBA work, and shipping a bespoke recipe would just be a worse version of what `pgbackrest` already does. The [pgbackrest configuration guide](https://pgbackrest.org/configuration.html) is the authoritative reference. ## Automation paths This is the gap an acquisition reviewer typically wants to see filled. certctl ships no backup CronJob template in the Helm chart — the operator owns this layer because: 1. The right tool depends on the deployment topology (in-cluster Postgres vs. managed Postgres vs. self-hosted on a VM). 2. The right secret-management integration depends on the operator's existing stack (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, sealed-secrets, External Secrets). 3. The right storage backend depends on the operator's existing off-host blob storage. A bundled CronJob would be a half-answer for any operator with an established backup posture, and would have to be torn out before production. Three sample recipes that cover the common cases: - **In-cluster Postgres → S3:** a CronJob running an alpine image with `aws-cli` + the `pg_dump` command above, output piped to `aws s3 cp`. Cosign-signed if your supply-chain policy requires it. - **Managed Postgres (AWS RDS / GCP Cloud SQL / Azure DB):** rely on the cloud provider's built-in PITR backup; configure retention ≥ 30 days; the certctl deployment surface is the connection string alone. - **Self-hosted VM:** systemd timer + `pg_dump` + `restic` (or `borgbackup`) to encrypted off-host storage. Tracked in [WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md](../../../WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md) as a post-v2.1.0 nice-to-have: an opt-in Helm CronJob template for the in-cluster-Postgres-to-S3 case as a starter. The right time to ship it is when a real operator asks for it; speculatively shipping it without that signal would just produce a template every deployment ends up rewriting. ## Verification — what to dry-run quarterly A backup you've never restored is a backup you don't have. Add this to your quarterly on-call rotation: 1. Pick the most recent dump from the previous quarter. 2. Stand up a throwaway Postgres instance (Docker, kind, anything). 3. `pg_restore -d certctl `. 4. Bring up a certctl-server container pointed at the throwaway DB (`CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL=postgres://certctl:...@throwaway/...`). 5. Confirm `/api/v1/version` returns 200, `/api/v1/certificates` lists the expected rows, and the scheduler logs show no migration-version mismatch. 6. Tear down. Note the timing in your DR registry. The [disaster-recovery runbook](disaster-recovery.md) covers what to do when this dry-run reveals a gap. ## Related reading - [`docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md`](disaster-recovery.md) — the restore companion - [`docs/operator/secret-custody.md`](../secret-custody.md) — what the operator-managed file material (CA keys, RA keys, trust anchors) contains, why it lives outside the DB, and what it costs to lose