SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 5.6 follow-up.
Closes the 'lying field' gap from the original Phase 5.6 commit (b33b843).
That commit shipped CertificateProfile.MustStaple as a domain field +
IssuanceRequest.MustStaple as the issuer-interface field + the local
issuer's RFC 7633 extension generation + byte-exact tests against the
spec — but the service layer (SCEP + EST + agent + renewal) never read
profile.MustStaple and never set IssuanceRequest.MustStaple. Operators
who set the field got: a stored value, an API that returned it, docs
that promised it worked, and a cert with no extension. Worse than not
having the field at all.
Per the new operating rule landed in cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules
('Always take the complete path, not the easy path'), this commit closes
the wire end-to-end.
internal/service/renewal.go
* IssuerConnector interface signature gains a mustStaple bool param on
IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate. The original 'this is a wider
refactor' framing was overstated — it's one extra arg threaded
through six call sites, not a structural change.
internal/service/issuer_adapter.go
* IssuerConnectorAdapter.IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate accept
the new param + populate IssuanceRequest.MustStaple /
RenewalRequest.MustStaple. Connectors that don't honor extension
injection (Vault, EJBCA, ACME, etc.) silently ignore the field —
the Phase 5.6 commit's docblock already noted this.
internal/service/scep.go
* processEnrollment now reads profile.MustStaple alongside
profile.MaxTTLSeconds and threads it through the IssueCertificate
call. The SCEP path was the load-bearing one — the original Phase
5.6 docs example showed exactly this code shape but the wire was
never landed.
internal/service/est.go
* Same pattern as SCEP: read profile.MustStaple + thread to
IssueCertificate. Defense in depth so a deploy that mounts the
same profile across SCEP + EST gets consistent extension behavior.
internal/service/agent.go
* The fallback direct-issuer signing path in heartbeatPipeline reads
profile + threads MustStaple through. Server-mode keygen + ad-hoc
CSR submission paths both go through this.
internal/service/renewal.go (the renewal-loop side, not the interface)
* Both renewal call sites (server-CSR-generated + agent-CSR-submitted)
read profile.MustStaple + thread it through RenewCertificate. Renewed
certs match their initial-issuance extension set when the bound
profile changes mid-lifetime.
internal/service/scep_must_staple_test.go (new)
* TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_PlumbsMustStapleToIssuer — end-to-end
integration test: profile.MustStaple=true → SCEP service →
mock IssuerConnector saw mustStaple=true. This is the test the
original Phase 5.6 commit should have shipped — proves the wire
reaches the connector.
* TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_NoMustStaplePropagatesFalse — companion
pinning the symmetric contract; the mock pre-sets LastMustStaple=true
so a stuck-at-true bug surfaces.
internal/service/testutil_test.go +
internal/service/m11c_crypto_enforcement_test.go +
internal/service/issuer_adapter_test.go +
cmd/server/preflight_test.go
* Mock + fake IssuerConnector implementations gain the new mustStaple
bool param. mockIssuerConnector + capturingIssuerConnector also gain
a LastMustStaple / lastMustStaple field used by the new integration
tests to assert the wire reached the connector.
* Existing test call sites for adapter.IssueCertificate /
adapter.RenewCertificate gain a trailing 'false' arg (mechanical bulk
edit, no behavior change).
Verification:
* gofmt + go vet + staticcheck clean for all touched paths.
* go test -short -count=1 green across cmd/agent / cmd/cli /
cmd/mcp-server / cmd/server / api/handler / api/middleware /
api/router / service / scheduler / pkcs7 / connector/issuer/local /
every connector subpackage / domain / crypto / mcp / repository.
* The new TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_PlumbsMustStapleToIssuer test passes,
proving the wire works end-to-end.
The follow-up rule from cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules — 'can an
operator flip the configurable bit and observe the behavior change
end-to-end with no further code changes?' — is now YES for must-staple
on the SCEP + EST + agent + renewal paths.
Enforce certificate profile crypto constraints across all 5 issuance paths
(renewal, agent CSR, EST, SCEP). ValidateCSRAgainstProfile() rejects CSRs
with key algorithm/size that don't match profile rules. MaxTTL enforcement
caps certificate validity per issuer connector (Local CA, Vault, step-ca
enforce directly; ACME/DigiCert/Sectigo pass through). Key algorithm and
size are now persisted in certificate_versions for audit compliance.
16 new tests (12 service-layer + 4 Local CA connector). Removes hardcoded
version number from GUI sidebar. Documentation updated across architecture,
features, connectors, and README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add certificate export in PEM (JSON or file download) and PKCS#12 formats.
Private keys are never included — they stay on agents. Add EKU-aware
issuance threading profile EKUs (serverAuth, clientAuth, codeSigning,
emailProtection, timeStamping) through the full issuance pipeline. Fix
agent CSR SAN splitting for email addresses, adaptive KeyUsage flags for
S/MIME vs TLS, and a pre-existing generateID collision bug in deployment
job creation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The EST milestone (M23) added GetCACertPEM to the issuer.Connector
interface but missed updating mockConnectorLayerIssuer in the adapter
test file. This caused go vet to fail in CI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GenerateCRL test was passing []issuer.RevokedCertEntry instead of
[]CRLEntry, causing go vet failure. Also fixed OCSPSignRequest
references to use service-layer type for consistency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- Embedded OCSP responder: GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial} returns
signed OCSP responses (good/revoked/unknown) using CA key
- DER-encoded X.509 CRL: GET /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id} returns proper DER CRL
signed by issuing CA with 24h validity window
- Short-lived cert exemption: certs with profile TTL < 1 hour skip CRL/OCSP
(expiry is sufficient revocation for ephemeral workloads)
- Extended issuer connector interface with GenerateCRL and SignOCSPResponse
- Local CA implements full CRL/OCSP signing; ACME and step-ca return
appropriate "use native endpoint" errors
- IssuerConnectorAdapter bridges new methods between layers
Frontend:
- Revoke button on certificate detail page with RFC 5280 reason modal
- Revocation banner with reason display and timestamp
- Revocation status indicators in lifecycle section
- "Revoked" filter option in certificates list
- API client: revokeCertificate() function and Certificate type extensions
Tests: ~31 new tests across connector, service, handler, and adapter layers
Docs: milestones renumbered (M13-M14, M16-M18), M15b marked complete
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements core revocation infrastructure: POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke
with all 8 RFC 5280 reason codes, JSON-formatted CRL at GET /api/v1/crl, webhook
and email revocation notifications, best-effort issuer notification, and immutable
revocation audit trail. Includes 48 new tests across service, handler, integration,
and domain layers (600+ total). Fixes 3 pre-existing test bugs (team_test error
matching, agent_group delete status code, team handler per_page validation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
shankar0123