2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shankar0123	f5ba17114d	fix(audit): close silence-leg of HIGH-6; emit WARN on audit-write failure ... Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-6 partial closure (silence leg). The audit identified two distinct gaps in the auth surface's audit-emit pattern: (1) silence — `_ = audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...)` discards the error, so a DB hiccup or connection reset between action and audit-row INSERT goes completely unnoticed. CWE-778; SOC 2 / NIST AU-9 compliance requires every authorization event to be durably logged, and 'we have an audit log' is a weaker claim than 'every authorization event is durably logged.' (2) non-transactional — the audit row uses a separate connection from the action's tx, so partial failure leaves an orphan action row that committed with no audit trail. Decision 8 of the auth-bundles-index requires action + audit row atomic. This commit closes leg (1) fully across all six audit-emit call sites in the auth surface: - internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go::recordAudit - internal/service/auth/role_service.go::recordAudit - internal/auth/bootstrap/service.go::ValidateAndMint - internal/auth/breakglass/service.go::recordAudit - internal/auth/session/service.go::recordAudit - internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::recordAudit - internal/service/profile.go::Update (Phase 9 approval-bypass) Each `_ = ...` swallow is replaced with: if err := audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...); err != nil { slog.WarnContext(ctx, '<surface> audit write failed (action committed; audit row may be missing)', 'action', action, 'actor_id', actor, 'resource_id', resource, 'err', err) } Operators monitoring audit-write failures now see structured WARN logs with action + actor + resource attribution; missing audit rows can be cross-referenced against monitoring without manual SELECT-from- audit-table. Infrastructure for leg (2) (transactional commit) is also landed in this commit: - service.AuditService.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx (new method; accepts repository.Querier from postgres.WithinTx — the existing helper used by the issuer-coverage audit closure) - service/auth.AuditService interface declares the new method - test stub fakeAudit.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx satisfies the extended interface The eight per-path WithinTx-refactors documented in cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md (role grant/revoke, session revoke, breakglass set/remove, approval submit/approve/reject, OIDC provider CRUD, bootstrap consume) are deferred to a v3 follow-on bundle. Each requires reshaping the corresponding repository methods to accept *Tx variants; collectively that's ~2 days of refactor work that warrants its own bundle. The silence-leg closure is the high-impact, low-risk subset that catches the common-failure case (DB connection drops, audit-table outage). Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-6 Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md	2026-05-10 21:24:29 +00:00
shankar0123	3ef45e2ad4	auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split ... # Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.	2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00