mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 18:01:37 +00:00
e6cfd756ac85d766a1077cf916b6888d8a88946d
8 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
|
21aeed4f4e |
legal: addlicense headers + normalize legacy variants (Phase 0 RED-4)
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):
addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:
// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).
Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.
Generated via:
addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
-f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
-ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
cmd/ internal/
Verification:
find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
-not -path '*/testdata/*' \
-exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l
Returns: 0
gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
0152bdf567 |
fix(auth/rbac): scope-aware ActorRole revoke (A-4)
HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant) uniqueness
extension lets an operator grant the same role to the same actor at
multiple scopes (e.g. r-operator on profile=p-acme AND profile=p-globex).
But ActorRoleRepository.Revoke's WHERE clause omitted (scope_type,
scope_id) — a single call deleted every variant. Selective revoke was
unrepresentable; operators had to drop all and re-grant N-1, opening
a race window where the actor's access was briefly different.
Closure across all layers (handler → service → repo → MCP → GUI client),
preserving the legacy "revoke all variants" contract for unmodified
callers:
internal/repository/auth.go
- New ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct. Zero value = legacy semantic;
non-empty ScopeType narrows to one variant.
- New ErrActorRoleNotFound sentinel for scoped no-match (HTTP 404).
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
- Revoke signature extended with opts. Empty opts.ScopeType uses
the legacy SQL (no scope WHERE), zero-row delete = no error.
- Non-empty narrows with `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
DISTINCT FROM $6` — the IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM is load-bearing,
vanilla `=` would silently miss the (global, NULL) case because
NULL ≠ NULL in standard SQL.
- Selective revoke with zero matching rows returns
ErrActorRoleNotFound; operators get feedback on typos.
internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go
- Revoke takes opts. Audit row's details map records the scope so
SIEMs can distinguish wide-vs-selective revokes:
`scope: "all_variants"` for the legacy path, or
`scope_type` + `scope_id` for selective. Privilege check
(auth.role.assign) and reserved-actor guard unchanged.
internal/api/handler/auth.go
- RevokeRoleFromKey parses optional `?scope_type=` / `?scope_id=`
query params via new parseRevokeScope helper.
- Validation mirrors AssignRoleToKey: scope_id forbidden with
scope_type=global, required with profile/issuer, invalid
scope_type → 400. scope_id without scope_type also → 400.
- writeAuthError maps ErrActorRoleNotFound to 404.
internal/mcp/tools_auth.go + types.go
- AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput gains optional ScopeType + ScopeID with
jsonschema descriptions explaining the dual-mode contract.
- Tool call site appends URL-encoded query params when ScopeType
is set; legacy callers (no scope_type) emit the bare DELETE
path unchanged.
web/src/api/client.ts
- authRevokeKeyRole signature: optional 3rd argument
`{ scope_type?, scope_id? }`. Pre-A-4 call sites (no opts arg)
keep firing the bare DELETE — fully backward compatible. The
GUI KeysPage's per-row revoke button (still one row per role,
pre-Fix-12) continues to use the legacy shape; future GUI work
can pass scope params for per-variant rows.
docs/operator/rbac.md
- New "Revoke: legacy 'all variants' vs scope-selective" subsection
under "From the HTTP API" with curl examples for both modes plus
the audit-row payload shape that lets SOC/SIEM tell them apart.
Regression coverage:
Repository (testcontainers, skipped under -short — 6 tests in
internal/repository/postgres/auth_revoke_scope_test.go):
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_RemovesAllVariants
TestRevokeActorRole_WithScope_RemovesOnlyMatching
TestRevokeActorRole_WithGlobalScope_RemovesOnlyGlobal — pins the
IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM branch (global, NULL)
TestRevokeActorRole_NoMatch_ReturnsNotFound — pins the new sentinel
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_NoMatch_IsNoOp — pins the legacy
idempotence contract
TestRevokeActorRole_IssuerScope_RemovesOnlyMatching — pin the
issuer-scope half (profile + issuer are symmetric scope types)
Handler (7 new tests in auth_test.go):
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey — extended to assert no scope
filter is forwarded when query string is empty (legacy behaviour)
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedProfile
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsMissingScopeID
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithoutScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsInvalidScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedNotFoundReturns404
MCP (2 new table rows in tools_per_tool_test.go):
Scoped revoke with scope_type=profile + scope_id=p-acme →
`?scope_type=profile&scope_id=p-acme`
Scoped revoke with scope_type=global (no scope_id) →
`?scope_type=global`
Service-layer test plumbing (service_test.go) updated for new opts
arg: 4 existing call sites pass repository.ActorRoleRevokeOptions{}
to keep their pre-A-4 semantics; the fakeActorRoleRepo.Revoke
implementation now mirrors the postgres scope-aware behaviour
(legacy zero-value vs scoped narrowing + ErrActorRoleNotFound on
no-match).
Verify gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short across
repository/postgres, service/auth, api/handler, and mcp. The
pre-existing KeysPage.test.tsx failure observed on the baseline
commit (reproduced via `git stash` earlier in Fix 03) is unrelated;
my client.ts change adds an optional third argument and is fully
backward-compatible.
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/04-high-actor-role-revoke-scope.md.
Audit doc updated: new row A-4 (2026-05-11) CLOSED appended to the
status table at the bottom of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md.
Operator-visible advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes under
Security (non-BREAKING — legacy callers are unchanged).
Depends on Fix 01 (the scope-aware EffectivePermissions read path on
branch fix/audit-2026-05-11/crit-actor-role-scope-reads). This fix
makes the inverse op selectively reversible; without Fix 01 the read
side would mis-evaluate scoped grants anyway, making selective revoke
moot at runtime.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
a123263498 |
fix(auth/rbac): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope (A-1)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md.
WHAT.
The HIGH-10 closure (commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
f5ba17114d |
fix(audit): close silence-leg of HIGH-6; emit WARN on audit-write failure
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-6 partial closure (silence leg). The audit
identified two distinct gaps in the auth surface's audit-emit pattern:
(1) silence — `_ = audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...)` discards the
error, so a DB hiccup or connection reset between action and
audit-row INSERT goes completely unnoticed. CWE-778; SOC 2 / NIST
AU-9 compliance requires every authorization event to be durably
logged, and 'we have an audit log' is a weaker claim than 'every
authorization event is durably logged.'
(2) non-transactional — the audit row uses a separate connection
from the action's tx, so partial failure leaves an orphan action
row that committed with no audit trail. Decision 8 of the
auth-bundles-index requires action + audit row atomic.
This commit closes leg (1) fully across all six audit-emit call sites
in the auth surface:
- internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/auth/role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/bootstrap/service.go::ValidateAndMint
- internal/auth/breakglass/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/session/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/profile.go::Update (Phase 9 approval-bypass)
Each `_ = ...` swallow is replaced with:
if err := audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...); err != nil {
slog.WarnContext(ctx, '<surface> audit write failed (action
committed; audit row may be missing)',
'action', action, 'actor_id', actor, 'resource_id', resource,
'err', err)
}
Operators monitoring audit-write failures now see structured WARN
logs with action + actor + resource attribution; missing audit rows
can be cross-referenced against monitoring without manual SELECT-from-
audit-table.
Infrastructure for leg (2) (transactional commit) is also landed in
this commit:
- service.AuditService.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx (new method;
accepts repository.Querier from postgres.WithinTx — the existing
helper used by the issuer-coverage audit closure)
- service/auth.AuditService interface declares the new method
- test stub fakeAudit.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx satisfies the
extended interface
The eight per-path WithinTx-refactors documented in
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
(role grant/revoke, session revoke, breakglass set/remove, approval
submit/approve/reject, OIDC provider CRUD, bootstrap consume) are
deferred to a v3 follow-on bundle. Each requires reshaping the
corresponding repository methods to accept *Tx variants; collectively
that's ~2 days of refactor work that warrants its own bundle. The
silence-leg closure is the high-impact, low-risk subset that catches
the common-failure case (DB connection drops, audit-table outage).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-6
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
5d79e53ad0 |
auth-bundle-1 follow-on: close coverage gaps to clear Phase 12 floors
CI run #486 (post-Bundle-1 merge + Go 1.25.10 bump) failed three coverage-threshold gates: internal/api/handler 74.7% < floor 75 (-0.3pp) internal/auth 66.3% < floor 85 (-18.7pp) internal/service/auth 51.1% < floor 85 (-33.9pp) The Phase 12 gate file's "85% with negative-test coverage" claim turned out to be aspirational — the read-side and Update-path methods on RoleService / PermissionService / ActorRoleService had zero unit-test coverage, and internal/auth's keystore + HasPermission helper had zero tests. This commit closes the gap without lowering the gate. Per-package CI-style averages after this commit (per scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh's per-function-mean): internal/api/handler 76.1% (+1.4pp, margin +1.1pp) internal/auth 90.5% (+24.2pp, margin +5.5pp) internal/service/auth 93.7% (+42.6pp, margin +8.7pp) Tests added: internal/service/auth/service_test.go (+18 tests, +518 LOC): PermissionService.List, PermissionService.GetByName, RoleService.Get (4 paths), RoleService.List (system caller), RoleService.Update (4 paths), RoleService.ListPermissions (3 paths), RoleService.AddPermission/RemovePermission round-trip + gate paths, RoleService.Delete (success + nil-caller + no-perm + audit), RoleService.Create (nil-caller), ActorRoleService.ListForActor (self-bypass + cross-actor + nil-caller + system + with-perm), ActorRoleService.Effective- Permissions (same shape), ActorRoleService.ListKeys (3 paths + system bypass), ActorRoleService.Revoke (4 paths), Authorizer edge cases (empty actorID short-circuit, empty tenantID default, scoped-grant-without-scope-id no-match invariant, repo-error wrap-and-return, HoldsAnyOf early-exit), recordAudit nil-arm short-circuits. internal/auth/keystore_test.go (NEW, +175 LOC): StaticKeyStore.Len, StaticKeyStore.LookupByHash hit + miss, MutableKeyStore seeded lookup + Len, Add registers new key, AddHashed registers from precomputed hash, AddHashed replaces on duplicate hash (idempotent boot-loader contract), HasPermission no-actor / default-actor-type / checker-error / scoped-check threading. internal/auth/bootstrap/service_test.go (+36 LOC): Service.Available nil-receiver/nil-strategy short-circuit, Service.Available delegates to Strategy when configured. internal/api/handler/auth_test.go (+208 LOC): GetRole returns role + permissions, GetRole 404 + 401, UpdateRole 200 + invalid-JSON-400 + 401, ListKeys returns actor list + 401, RemoveRolePermission 204 (global + scoped) + 401, rolePermToResponse scope encoding pin via GetRole. Verified: gofmt -l . clean (touched files only). go vet ./internal/auth/... ./internal/service/auth/... ./internal/api/handler/ rc=0. go test -count=1 -short on the four packages green. CI-style per-function averages computed via the live scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh arithmetic — all three gated packages clear their floors with margin. Per CLAUDE.md "complete path" + "do not lower the gate to make CI green": gate file unchanged. The 85/85/75 floors stand. |
||
|
shankar0123
|
cbb47aaf5d |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 11 + 12: RBAC MCP tools + negative-test coverage gate
# Phase 11 — RBAC MCP tools
12 new tools in internal/mcp/tools_auth.go mirroring the Phase-4
+ Phase-7 HTTP surface so operators driving certctl from Claude
/ VS Code / any MCP client get the same management capability
the GUI + CLI already expose:
certctl_auth_me GET /v1/auth/me
certctl_auth_list_roles GET /v1/auth/roles
certctl_auth_get_role GET /v1/auth/roles/{id}
certctl_auth_create_role POST /v1/auth/roles
certctl_auth_update_role PUT /v1/auth/roles/{id}
certctl_auth_delete_role DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}
certctl_auth_list_permissions GET /v1/auth/permissions
certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role POST /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions
certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role DELETE /v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}
certctl_auth_list_keys GET /v1/auth/keys
certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key POST /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles
certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key DELETE /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}
Each tool routes through the existing HTTP client (no parallel
business logic), so permission gates fire server-side: a
non-admin caller's MCP tool invocation returns whatever 403 the
underlying HTTP handler emits, fenced via errorResult for LLM-
prompt-injection defense.
Input types in internal/mcp/types.go (AuthRoleIDInput,
AuthCreateRoleInput, AuthUpdateRoleInput,
AuthRolePermissionGrantInput, AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput,
AuthAssignKeyRoleInput, AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput) carry
jsonschema descriptions so the MCP consumer's tool catalogue
shows operator-friendly hints.
internal/mcp/tools_auth_test.go ships 14 tests:
- TestAuthMCP_AllToolsRegister (registration must not panic)
- TestAuthMCP_PathsAndMethods (table-driven, 12 rows pinning
each tool's HTTP method + URL)
- TestAuthMCP_ForbiddenSurfacesFencedError (12 tools × 403
mock → error surface)
internal/mcp/tools_per_tool_test.go's allHappyPathCases extended
with the 12 new rows so the in-memory dispatch coverage gate
(TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount) stays green at the
new total of 139 registered tools.
Re-derived total via 'grep -cE "gomcp\.AddTool\(" internal/mcp/tools*.go':
133 (121 in tools.go + 12 in tools_auth.go).
# Phase 12 — negative-test coverage gate
Audit of the prompt's 12 negative-test paths against existing
coverage:
1. Missing actor → 401 ✓ TestRequirePermission_NoActorReturns401, TestRBACGate_NoActorReturns401
2. No roles → 403 ✓ TestRequirePermission_DeniedActorReturns403, TestRBACGate_AuditorRole_403sOnAdminRoutes
3. Role lacks specific perm → 403 ✓ same suite
4. Wrong scope → 403 ✓ TestAuthorizer_SpecificScopeMatchesExactID (wrongID arm)
5. Self-grant w/o auth.role.assign → 403 ✓ TestActorRoleService_GrantRequiresAuthRoleAssign
6. Bootstrap token wrong → 401 ✓ TestEnvTokenStrategy_WrongTokenReturnsInvalidToken, TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_WrongToken_401
7. Bootstrap used twice → 410 ✓ TestEnvTokenStrategy_OneShotConsumption, TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_TwiceReturns410
8. Bootstrap when admin exists → 410 ✓ TestEnvTokenStrategy_AdminExistsClosesPath, TestBootstrapHandler_Mint_AdminExists410
9. Role delete with assignees → 409 NEW: TestRoleService_DeleteWithActorsAssignedReturns409
10. Profile-edit loophole → gated ✓ TestProfileEdit_RequiresApprovalLoopholeClosed
11. Permission not in catalog → 400 ✓ TestRoleService_AddPermissionRejectsNonCanonical
12. Scope ID for nonexistent resource → 404 (validation deferred — no FK constraint between role_permissions.scope_id and the resource tables; documented for a future bundle)
Filled the gap at #9 with TestRoleService_DeleteWithActorsAssignedReturns409
which pins the repository sentinel pass-through (postgres FK
ON DELETE RESTRICT → repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse → service
returns the sentinel verbatim → handler maps to HTTP 409).
# Coverage gates
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml gains 2 entries:
- internal/auth: floor 85
- internal/service/auth: floor 85
.github/workflows/ci.yml's coverage test command extended with
./internal/auth/... and ./internal/api/router/... so the
threshold check has data to evaluate.
# Protocol-endpoint not-gated test (Category F)
internal/api/router/phase12_protocol_allowlist_test.go (new)
adds 3 router-level invariant tests:
- TestPhase12_ProtocolEndpointsNotGated: AST-walks router.go,
asserts no rbacGate(...) call references a path under any
protocol-endpoint prefix (/acme, /scep, /.well-known/est,
/.well-known/pki/ocsp, /.well-known/pki/crl).
- TestPhase12_IsProtocolEndpoint_CoversCanonicalPrefixes:
pins auth.IsProtocolEndpoint against the canonical prefix
set; if a future protocol lands without lockstep allowlist
update, this fails.
- TestPhase12_RBACGateRoutesAreUnderAPIv1: belt-and-braces —
every rbacGate-wrapped route MUST start with /api/v1/.
Catches accidental cross-prefix wraps.
Complements the existing TestRequirePermission_ProtocolEndpointBypassesGate
(middleware-level) + TestRouter_AuthExemptAllowlist_PinsActualRegistrations
(allowlist drift) so the Category F invariant is pinned at all
three layers (middleware + router + dispatch).
# Verifications
* gofmt clean repo-wide.
* go vet ./... clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
service + repository + cmd + domain + mcp: clean.
* go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth (incl.
bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router,
internal/cli, internal/service (incl. auth),
internal/domain/auth, internal/mcp, cmd/server, cmd/cli.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
3ef45e2ad4 |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp. |
||
|
shankar0123
|
bd54d5f7fa |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 2: RBAC service layer + Authorizer primitive
Bundle 1 / Phase 2: ships PermissionService, RoleService, ActorRoleService, and the Authorizer primitive that Phase 3 RequirePermission middleware calls on every gated request.
Authorizer.CheckPermission semantics: a grant matches when (a) the permission name equals the requested permission AND (b) the grant is global-scoped OR the grant scope_type+scope_id exactly match the request. Global beats specific; per-resource grants widen the effective set rather than shadowing global. Hot-path query is one ActorRoleRepository.EffectivePermissions JOIN call (already shipped in Phase 1) plus an in-memory walk; Phase 12 will add benchmarks + caching if the JOIN cost shows up at scale.
Privilege-escalation guard: ActorRoleService.Grant and Revoke require the caller to hold auth.role.assign globally. Without it, ErrSelfRoleAssignment. System callers (AsSystemCaller()) bypass the check; bootstrap, migrations, scheduler-initiated grants use this path. Reserved actor actor-demo-anon is rejected on Grant + Revoke so the demo path stays alive even after a misclick (ErrAuthReservedActor).
Caller abstraction: every service entry point takes *Caller (ActorID, ActorType, TenantID, IsSystem). CallerFromContext is a stub returning ErrUnauthenticated; Phase 3 wires the middleware-context bridge that fills the Caller from request context. The contract is pinned by TestCallerFromContext_Phase2ReturnsUnauthenticated so the Phase 3 upgrade is observable.
Audit recording: every mutating service operation calls AuditService.RecordEvent. Bundle 1 Phase 8 adds the event_category column + parameter and back-fills 'auth' for these calls; until then the rows go in with the default category.
Test coverage: in-memory fakeRoleRepo / fakePermissionRepo / fakeActorRoleRepo / fakeAudit pin the privilege-escalation invariants (ErrUnauthenticated for nil caller, ErrForbidden for missing perm, ErrInvalidPermission for non-canonical permission name, ErrSelfRoleAssignment for Grant without auth.role.assign, ErrAuthReservedActor for actor-demo-anon mutations, system-caller bypass) without requiring testcontainers. Phase 12 will add live-Postgres integration coverage.
Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Phase 1 was
|