Follow-up to 6119f26 (awsacmpca: replace stub client with AWS SDK v2
implementation). CI's golangci-lint contextcheck rule flagged six
violations in awsacmpca_test.go where mustNew/awsacmpca.New were
called from test functions that had ctx in scope but didn't thread it
through New(). The previous commit used context.Background() inside
New() with the rationale that "the audit allows either threading or
documenting the limitation"; CI made that choice for us.
Threading ctx is the right shape per the audit's stated preference.
The fix cascades from awsacmpca.New through issuerfactory.NewFromConfig
and IssuerRegistry.Rebuild because the contextcheck rule propagates
upward through every caller that has ctx in scope.
This commit:
- Changes awsacmpca.New(config, logger) to
awsacmpca.New(ctx, config, logger). The ctx is passed to
buildSDKClient → awsconfig.LoadDefaultConfig so SDK credential chain
resolution honors caller deadlines (LoadDefaultConfig may probe IMDS
or remote credential sources). The doc-comment on New explains that
callers without a useful deadline should pass context.Background()
and that the SDK has internal credential-resolution timeouts.
- Adds ctx as the first parameter of issuerfactory.NewFromConfig.
Currently only the AWSACMPCA branch uses ctx (it's threaded into
awsacmpca.New); the other 11 branches accept ctx without using it.
This is a contractual change that lets callers thread ctx through
without contextcheck warnings, even though most issuer constructors
do no ctx-aware work today.
- Adds ctx as the first parameter of IssuerRegistry.Rebuild. Rebuild
iterates over configs and calls NewFromConfig per issuer; the same
ctx flows through every connector instantiation.
- Updates the two production call sites in internal/service:
- issuer.go:279 (TestIssuer connection test) now passes its
method-scoped ctx
- issuer.go:303 (BuildRegistry) now passes its method-scoped ctx
to Rebuild
- Updates 13 test sites in internal/connector/issuerfactory/factory_test.go
via a new testCtx() helper that returns context.Background(). Helper
is dedicated to this file so contextcheck's "you have a ctx in scope,
pass it" rule doesn't fire on test functions that don't otherwise
need ctx.
- Updates 6 test sites in internal/service/issuer_registry_test.go
to pass context.Background() to Rebuild.
- Removes the now-stale "// NewFromConfig has no ctx parameter
(preserved across all 12 connectors); pass context.Background() ..."
comment from the awsacmpca branch in factory.go — that workaround
is no longer the design.
Verified locally:
- gofmt -l . clean
- go vet ./... clean
- staticcheck ./... clean
- golangci-lint run --timeout 5m ./... clean (was failing with 6
contextcheck issues before the cascade; now 0 issues)
- go test -short -count=1 across all changed packages green
Sandbox couldn't run the existing CI's full make verify due to
disk pressure on /sessions and a virtiofs concurrent-open-file
ceiling on go mod tidy; operator should run `make verify` on
the workstation to confirm.
Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-01/RESULTS.md
Top-10 fix#1 (CI follow-up; behavior unchanged from 6119f26).
Closes L-009 + L-010 + L-011 + L-013 + L-020 + L-021 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25. L-004 deferred — recon found NO
rotation infrastructure exists at all; building it from scratch is
a feature project, not a Bundle-E mechanical sweep.
L-009 — ZeroSSL EAB URL configurable
Audit's 'no timeout' claim was wrong: ari.go:329 has 15s timeout.
internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go: zeroSSLEABEndpoint now
lazily reads CERTCTL_ZEROSSL_EAB_URL from env at package init;
defaults to ZeroSSL public endpoint. Pre-existing test override
path preserved.
L-010 — Verified-already-clean
grep -rn 'mock\.Anything' --include='*_test.go' . returned 0.
certctl uses hand-rolled struct mocks (mockJobRepo, mockAuditRepo,
etc.) with explicit method bodies; no testify-style mocks anywhere.
L-011 — IPv6 bracket-aware dialing pinned
Every production net.Dial / DialTimeout site audited:
cmd/agent/main.go:293 — intentional IPv4 literal '8.8.8.8:80'
verify.go / tlsprobe / network_scan — net.Dialer (no string addr)
email.go — net.JoinHostPort (bracket-aware)
ssh.go — addr derives from JoinHostPort upstream
ssrf.go — net.Dialer
internal/connector/notifier/email/email_ipv6_test.go (NEW):
TestJoinHostPort_IPv6BracketsRoundTrip pins IPv4/IPv6/zone variants;
TestSMTPDialerUsesJoinHostPort source-greps email.go and fails CI
if a future refactor swaps in 'host:port' concatenation.
L-013 — Verified-already-clean (monotonic-safe)
Only one site uses now.Sub: middleware.go:393 in tokenBucket.allow().
Both 'now' and tb.lastRefill come from time.Now() which carries
monotonic-clock readings per Go's time package contract;
intra-process now.Sub is monotonic-safe by construction. Doc
comment block added above the call to make the invariant explicit.
L-020 (CWE-563) — ineffassign sweep, 8 unique sites
certificate.go:135 — sortDir initial value dropped (set
unconditionally below by SortDesc branch).
certificate.go:169,175 — argCount post-increments dropped (var
not read past the LIMIT/OFFSET formatting).
agent_group.go, profile.go — page/perPage truly vestigial,
replaced with _ = page; _ = perPage.
issuer.go:633, owner.go:131, target.go:267, team.go:131 — same
treatment for the audit-flagged second-function ListXxx clamps.
First-function List() in issuer/owner/target/team KEEPS its
clamp because page/perPage is used for in-memory slice
pagination — ineffassign correctly didn't flag those.
Build + tests green post-sweep.
L-021 — Transitive CVE bump
go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.45.0 golang.org/x/net@v0.47.0
(crypto required net@0.47.0). go-text@v0.31.0 transitively
bumped.
Per tool-output govulncheck-verbose: x/net@v0.45.0 fixes
GO-2026-4441 + GO-2026-4440; x/crypto@v0.45.0 fixes
GO-2025-4134 + GO-2025-4135 + GO-2025-4116 — all 5 advisories
cleared. Bundle B's ISV grep guard + Bundle D's release-time
govulncheck step are the going-forward monitor + bump pass.
L-004 — Deferred to dedicated bundle
Recon: zero hits for RotateAPIKey / rotated_at / key_status
anywhere in source. API keys configured via
CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED env var; rotation is operator-managed
(edit env + restart). Building rotation infrastructure from
scratch is a feature project, not a mechanical sweep.
Documented in audit-report.md with scope-pivot note.
Audit deliverables:
audit-report.md: score 46/55 -> 52/55 closed
(Low 14/19 -> 19/19 — 100% Low closed except L-004 deferred)
findings.yaml: 6 status flips
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle E section
Verification:
go test -count=1 -short ./internal/service ./internal/connector/issuer/acme
./internal/connector/notifier/email green
go vet on changed packages clean
The GlobalSign Atlas HVCA connector previously used InsecureSkipVerify:true
on its mTLS TLS config, disabling server certificate validation and
defeating the purpose of the client-side mTLS handshake. This was a
CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability silently degrading
trust on every production call to GlobalSign's signing API.
Remediation (per H-5 audit finding, Lens 4.4):
- Remove InsecureSkipVerify from all three http.Client construction sites
(ValidateConfig, getHTTPClient, and legacy initialisation path).
- Introduce buildServerTLSConfig() helper that constructs tls.Config with
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12 (addresses adjacent L-1 recommendation).
- New optional config field `server_ca_path` (env:
CERTCTL_GLOBALSIGN_SERVER_CA_PATH). When unset the connector trusts the
system root CA bundle (correct default for GlobalSign's publicly-trusted
HVCA endpoints). When set the bundle is loaded via x509.NewCertPool() +
AppendCertsFromPEM, and only those roots are trusted (supports private
HVCA deployments and defence-in-depth root pinning).
- Error wrapping chain: "failed to read server CA bundle at %s" and
"no valid PEM certificates found in server CA bundle at %s" surface
config problems at ValidateConfig time instead of silently failing at
request time.
Docs, config, service env-seed, and GUI issuer type definition updated to
expose the new field. Tests: 9 dead `InsecureSkipVerify: true` client
TLSClientConfig blocks (no-ops against httptest.NewServer plain-HTTP)
replaced with bare http.Client; new TestGlobalSign_ServerTLSConfig covers
pinned-CA trust, untrusted-server rejection, missing-file and invalid-PEM
error paths.
Verification:
- go build ./... clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -race ./internal/connector/issuer/globalsign/... ./internal/config/... ./internal/service/... ok
- go test ./... (excluding testcontainers-gated repo layer) ok
- golangci-lint run ./... 0 issues
- govulncheck ./... 0 reachable vulns
- Per-layer coverage: service 68.7% (≥55), handler 83.6% (≥60), domain 82.0% (≥40), middleware 63.8% (≥30)
- globalsign package coverage: 75.9%
- Invariant sweep: 0 InsecureSkipVerify references remain in globalsign
package (only a test-file comment documenting the removal).
EncryptIfKeySet/DecryptIfKeySet in internal/crypto/encryption.go previously
returned plaintext + wasEncrypted=false when the operator had not configured
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY. That produced a data-at-rest confidentiality
bypass (CWE-311): sensitive fields on dynamically-configured issuer and
target rows (source='database') were persisted to PostgreSQL without any
encryption, and no caller could distinguish the encrypted from the plaintext
branch at runtime. The only visible signal was a single warning log line
emitted once at startup.
Fail closed instead:
- EncryptIfKeySet / DecryptIfKeySet now return crypto.ErrEncryptionKeyRequired
(a new exported sentinel, errors.Is-unwrappable) when the key is empty or
nil, rather than silently emitting plaintext. The (result, wasEncrypted,
err) tuple signature is preserved for source compatibility; only the
semantics of the no-key branch changed.
- cmd/server/main.go grows a startup pre-flight check: if no encryption key
is configured the server lists issuers and targets, counts rows with
source='database', and refuses to start (os.Exit(1)) if any exist. Operators
must either configure CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY or remove the exposed
rows before the control plane can boot. The warning-only path is retained
for the clean-slate case (no database rows).
- internal/service/issuer.go's SeedFromEnvVars now guards the encryption call
with len(s.encryptionKey) > 0 so env-seeded rows (source='env', which are
reconstructable on every boot from process env) continue to persist as
plaintext in the 'config' column when no key is configured. Registry load
already falls through to cfg.Config when EncryptedConfig is nil. GUI/API
write paths (source='database') remain fail-closed via propagation of
ErrEncryptionKeyRequired.
- Integration tests that exercise CreateIssuer via the handler layer now
supply a real 32-byte AES-256 test key so the encrypt path runs instead of
returning ErrEncryptionKeyRequired. Same pattern in internal/service/
testutil_test.go for consolidated service-layer tests.
- internal/crypto/encryption_test.go grows regression guards:
TestEncryptIfKeySet_EmptyKeyFailsClosed (nil_key + empty_key subtests),
TestDecryptIfKeySet_EmptyKeyFailsClosed (nil_key + empty_key subtests),
TestEncryptDecryptIfKeySet_RoundTripProducesDifferentCiphertext,
TestDecryptIfKeySet_RejectsTamperedCiphertext, and
TestEncryptIfKeySet_PreservesErrEncryptionKeyRequiredSentinel (verifies
the sentinel unwraps through fmt.Errorf(%w)-style wrapping).
Wire format is unchanged: AES-256-GCM Encrypt/Decrypt/DeriveKey, the
12-byte nonce prefix, the GCM auth tag, the PBKDF2 salt
('certctl-config-encryption-v1'), and the 100,000 iteration count are all
byte-identical. Ciphertexts produced before this change remain decryptable.
Verified:
- go build ./... : clean
- go vet ./... : clean
- go test -race ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/service/... \
./internal/integration/... ./cmd/server/... : pass
- golangci-lint run ./... : 0 issues
- govulncheck ./... : 0 reachable vulnerabilities
- rg 'return plaintext, false, nil' internal/ : no matches
- Coverage: crypto 85.0% (unchanged), service 67.8% (was 67.9%, noise),
cmd/server 0.0% (unchanged baseline). All above CI thresholds.
See certctl-audit-report.md for the full finding record and resolution log.
Backend rejected lowercase type strings (e.g., "acme") sent by older
cached frontends. Add normalizeIssuerType() with alias map for
case-insensitive lookup, wire into both Create paths. Add missing
Entrust/GlobalSign/EJBCA to validIssuerTypes. Add lowercase fallbacks
to issuer factory switch. 39 new test subtests covering normalization,
lowercase create flows, and M49 type acceptance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add three new issuer connectors completing commercial and open-source CA
coverage. Entrust uses mTLS client certificate auth with sync/async
issuance. GlobalSign Atlas uses mTLS + API key/secret dual auth with
serial-based tracking. EJBCA supports dual auth (mTLS or OAuth2) for
self-hosted Keyfactor CAs.
Each connector implements the full issuer.Connector interface (9 methods),
includes httptest-based unit tests (~14 each), and follows established
patterns (injectable HTTP clients, RFC 5280 revocation reason mapping,
CRL/OCSP delegated to CA).
Also includes: issuer factory cases, env var seeding, config structs,
domain types, seed data (3 rows, all disabled), OpenAPI enum updates,
frontend issuer catalog entries with config fields, and full docs
(connectors.md, architecture.md, features.md, README).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full audit of all ~100 backend API endpoints against frontend client functions
and TypeScript interfaces. Fixes field name mismatches, missing client functions,
phantom interface fields, type coercion for Go bool/int config fields, and
issuer type ID alignment with backend domain constants.
Backend:
- issuer.go/target.go: GUI-created entities default enabled=true (Go bool
zero value was overriding DB DEFAULT)
Frontend types (types.ts):
- Certificate: fingerprint→fingerprint_sha256, phantom fields made optional
- CertificateVersion: fingerprint→fingerprint_sha256, chain_pem→pem_chain,
removed phantom version/cert_pem fields
- Job: error_message→last_error (matches Go json tag)
Frontend client (client.ts):
- Added getNotification(id) and getAuditEvent(id) for existing backend routes
Frontend pages:
- CertificateDetailPage: derives serial/fingerprint/issuedAt from latest
CertificateVersion instead of empty Certificate fields
- JobsPage/JobDetailPage: error_message→last_error
- TargetsPage: reload_cmd→reload_command, validate_cmd→validate_command,
added missing config fields per backend structs (validate_command for
NGINX/Apache, hostname/winrm_timeout for IIS, private_key/passphrase/
cert_mode/key_mode for SSH, winrm_https/winrm_insecure for WinCertStore,
create_keystore for JavaKeystore, mode for Dovecot), type coercion via
buildConfigPayload() with BOOL_FIELDS/INT_FIELDS sets, IIS WinRM nesting
- TargetDetailPage: added passphrase to sensitiveKeys redaction
- issuerTypes.ts: type IDs aligned to backend constants (acme→ACME,
local→GenericCA, stepca→StepCA, openssl→OpenSSL), backward compat aliases
preserved, step-ca config fields updated to match backend struct
Utilities (utils.ts):
- formatDate/formatDateTime accept string|undefined|null
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three related ACME ecosystem changes shipped as a single milestone:
1. ACME Certificate Profile Selection: Custom JWS-signed newOrder POST with
`profile` field (e.g., `tlsserver`, `shortlived` for 6-day certs) bypassing
acme.Client.AuthorizeOrder() since golang.org/x/crypto lacks profile support.
ES256 JWS signing with kid mode, nonce management, directory discovery.
Empty profile delegates to standard library path (zero behavior change).
Configurable via CERTCTL_ACME_PROFILE env var. GUI: profile dropdown on
ACME issuer config.
2. ARI RFC 9702 → 9773 Renumber: All 25+ references updated across Go source,
docs, README, and examples. Zero remaining occurrences of RFC 9702.
3. 45-Day / Short-Lived Certificate Positioning: 5 domain tests validating
renewal thresholds against SC-081v3 validity reduction timeline (200→100→47
days) and Let's Encrypt 45-day/6-day profiles. ARI (RFC 9773) is the
expected renewal path for 6-day shortlived certs.
New tests: 13 profile + 5 domain threshold + 1 frontend = 19 new tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirror M34's dynamic issuer config pattern for deployment targets: AES-256-GCM
encrypted config storage, sensitive field redaction in API responses, agent
heartbeat-based test connection endpoint, and full frontend updates including
test status indicators, source badges, and removal of stale hostname/status
fields from the Target interface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace static env-var-based issuer wiring with GUI-driven dynamic
configuration stored encrypted in PostgreSQL. Operators can now
configure, test, enable/disable, and manage issuers from the dashboard
without restarting the server.
Key changes:
- AES-256-GCM encryption for sensitive issuer config at rest (PBKDF2
key derivation with 100k iterations)
- Dynamic IssuerRegistry with sync.RWMutex replacing static map
- Connector factory pattern (issuerfactory.NewFromConfig) replacing
140 lines of static wiring in main.go
- Migration 000009: encrypted_config, last_tested_at, test_status,
source columns on issuers table
- Env var seeding on first boot with ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
- Registry Rebuild() for atomic map swap after CRUD operations
- Issuer type validation against domain constants on Create
- Audit trail for test connection results
- Conditional seeding for step-ca/OpenSSL (only when env vars set)
- GUI: source badge, connection test status on issuer detail page
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All 10 service files now use slog.Error for failure logging instead of
fmt.Printf. Audit event recording errors are checked and logged rather
than silently discarded. Adds consistent structured context (resource IDs,
operation names) to all error log statements.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All service-layer Create methods (team, owner, target, issuer,
certificate) were unconditionally overwriting user-provided IDs with
auto-generated ones and leaving CreatedAt/UpdatedAt as zero values.
This caused three user-visible bugs:
- POST /api/v1/teams with {"id": "t-demo"} returned a generated ID
like "team-1773601137949154216" instead of "t-demo"
- POST /api/v1/owners referencing the user-provided team_id failed
with Internal Server Error (FK constraint on non-existent generated ID)
- created_at/updated_at came back as "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z"
Fix: all 9 affected Create methods (both context-aware and handler
interface variants) now check if ID is empty before generating, and
set timestamps to time.Now() if zero-valued. Follows the existing
correct pattern in policy.go CreateRule/CreatePolicy.
Also removes two stale temp files (audit.go.* and issuer.go.*) that
were accidentally committed to the repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Runtime fixes:
- Fix env var mismatch (CERTCTL_DB_URL → CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL)
- Fix table name mismatches (certificates → managed_certificates, notifications → notification_events)
- Add renewal_policy_id to certificate queries
- Remove non-existent created_at from notification queries
- Add env var fallback for agent CLI flags
- Graceful degradation for missing notifiers/issuers in demo mode
- Copy web/ directory in Dockerfile for dashboard serving
Service layer:
- Implement handler-service interface pattern across all services
- Wire up certificate, agent, job, policy, team, owner, audit, notification services
Documentation:
- Add concepts.md: beginner-friendly guide to TLS, CAs, private keys
- Rewrite quickstart.md with accurate API examples matching actual handlers
- Add demo-advanced.md: interactive demo with cert issuance and automated script
- Update architecture.md with correct table names and connector interfaces
- Update connectors.md to match actual Go interface signatures
- Update demo-guide.md with cross-references to new docs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
shankar0123