mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 22:31:36 +00:00
ca1e135aa3e873fd9ff1d4c4cdae4c21516e8833
22 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
|
99a012e3be |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 0: extract internal/auth/ from middleware package
Bundle 1 / Phase 0: pure refactor splitting auth surface out of internal/api/middleware so Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) and the broader RBAC primitive (roles, permissions, scoped grants) have a clean home. Moved to internal/auth/: NamedAPIKey, HashAPIKey, AuthConfig, NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewAuth, UserKey, AdminKey, GetUser, IsAdmin. Added testfixtures.go (WithActor / WithAdmin / WithActorAdmin) so handler tests don't construct context manually. Stayed in internal/api/middleware/: RequestID, Logging, NewLogging, Recovery, RateLimitConfig, NewRateLimiter (now imports auth.GetUser for per-user keying per audit Category C), CORSConfig, NewCORS, ContentType, CORS, GetRequestID, responseWriter, Chain, audit middleware (now imports auth.GetUser). Updated 22 caller files across cmd/, internal/api/handler/, internal/api/middleware/, internal/mcp/. Existing m008_admin_gate_test.go now scans for auth.IsAdmin( substring; Phase 3 will further evolve to track auth.RequirePermission. Behavior unchanged: all handler / middleware / service / connector / cmd / mcp tests pass with no test-logic edits, only import-path renames. Phase 0 exit criteria: internal/auth/ exists with 6 files; middleware.go went 575 -> 422 lines (auth-related ~150 lines moved out); grep -rE 'middleware\.(GetUser|IsAdmin|UserKey|AdminKey|NamedAPIKey|HashAPIKey|NewAuth)' returns 0 hits; context.WithValue(.*middleware.UserKey/AdminKey) returns 0 hits; go vet ./... clean; go test -short ./... green across all packages tested. Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Per cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md, do not merge to master without (1) make verify green, (2) >= 2 external testers confirm, (3) >= 90% coverage on internal/auth/ in .github/coverage-thresholds.yml. |
||
|
shankar0123
|
0f81c1b956 |
ci: re-fix CodeQL #32 + repair loadtest f5-mock build context
Two unrelated CI failures from run #25305811340; fixed in one
commit since neither needs the other to land first.
CodeQL alert #32 (go/log-injection at middleware.go:68) reopened
after
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
b0fc067317 |
security: close CodeQL #17 (log injection) + #23 (SSRF false-positive reopen)
Two CodeQL alerts in one sweep — both medium-impact follow-ups
on already-merged guards.
Alert #17 — go/log-injection (CWE-117) at
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go:58:
log.Printf("[%s] %s %s %d %v", requestID, r.Method, r.URL.Path, ...)
r.Method and r.URL.Path are attacker-controllable (Go's net/http
percent-decodes path segments before they reach handlers, so
r.URL.Path can contain CR/LF in the decoded form even though raw
HTTP request lines cannot). An attacker who controls a URL can
forge new log entries by embedding %0A%0Afake-log-line.
Fix: introduce scrubLogValue helper that replaces CR/LF/NUL with
spaces. Apply to both r.Method and r.URL.Path. Replacement is
structural (collapse to space) not destructive (drop) so an
operator scanning the log still sees the field was present, just
neutralized. Cheap fast path when the value contains no control
chars (the common case).
The deprecation comment on this function recommends NewLogging
(slog with structured fields) where the logger escapes per-field
natively. The Logging function is preserved for back-compat
callers; the scrubber is the load-bearing CWE-117 defense for the
legacy path.
Alert #23 — go/request-forgery (CWE-918) at scep_probe.go:271:
CodeQL reopened the alert after commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
7cb453a336 |
chore(fmt): repo-wide gofmt -w sweep — close drift surfaced by ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4
Mechanical reformat. The new 'gofmt drift' CI step (added in
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4, commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
6b5af27546 |
Bundle G: Final audit closure — L-004 + D-003/4/5/7 closed; 54/55 + 7/7
Closes the 2026-04-25 audit's final-closure cluster. Score 51/55 -> 54/55
(98% closed); deferred 4/7 -> 7/7 (100%). All severity-graded findings now
closed except M-029 (frontend per-PR migration backlog, by design incremental).
L-004 (CWE-924) — dual-key API rotation overlap window:
internal/config/config.go::ParseNamedAPIKeys rewritten to allow same-name
duplicate entries iff admin flag matches. Mismatched-admin entries rejected
at startup (privilege escalation guard); exact (name,key) duplicates rejected
(typo guard — rotation requires DIFFERENT keys under the same name). Startup
INFO log per name with multiple entries surfaces the active rotation window.
NewAuthWithNamedKeys was already shaped correctly (constant-time hash compare
across all entries, same UserKey + AdminKey for either bearer); Bundle B's
M-025 per-user rate-limit bucket and audit-trail actor inherit consistency
across the rollover automatically. 8 new tests pin the contract end-to-end.
docs/security.md::API key rotation walks the 6-step zero-downtime rollover.
D-003 — Mutation testing wired:
security-deep-scan.yml gets a go-mutesting step covering ./internal/crypto/...,
./internal/pkcs7/..., ./internal/connector/issuer/local/... with per-package
summary lines extracted into go-mutesting.txt artefact.
D-007 — Frontend semgrep wired (recon found Bundle 7's wiring claim was false):
security-deep-scan.yml gets a 'semgrep p/react-security' step running
returntocorp/semgrep:latest --config=p/react-security against /src/web/src;
results uploaded as semgrep-react.json.
D-004 + D-005 — Operator runbook published:
docs/testing-strategy.md (NEW) consolidates per-tool local-run procedures,
acceptance thresholds, and triage paths for go-mutesting, ZAP baseline DAST,
testssl.sh, and semgrep p/react-security. Closes the 'wired CI-only, no
local-run validation' framing for D-004/D-005 by giving operators the same
commands the CI workflow runs.
Verification:
gofmt -l no diff
go vet ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/middleware/... clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/middleware/... PASS
python3 -c 'yaml.safe_load(...)' YAML OK
G-3 env-var docs guard no phantom env-vars
Audit deliverables:
audit-report.md: L-004 + D-003/4/5/7 boxes flipped [x]; score 51/55 -> 54/55
findings.yaml: 5 status flips; new bundle-G-final-closure closure_log entry
CHANGELOG.md: Bundle G entry under [unreleased]; supersedes Bundle E + F
L-004-deferred framing
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
1b4de3fb2d |
Bundle E: Mechanical sweeps & defensive polish — 6 findings closed; L-004 deferred
Closes L-009 + L-010 + L-011 + L-013 + L-020 + L-021 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25. L-004 deferred — recon found NO
rotation infrastructure exists at all; building it from scratch is
a feature project, not a Bundle-E mechanical sweep.
L-009 — ZeroSSL EAB URL configurable
Audit's 'no timeout' claim was wrong: ari.go:329 has 15s timeout.
internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go: zeroSSLEABEndpoint now
lazily reads CERTCTL_ZEROSSL_EAB_URL from env at package init;
defaults to ZeroSSL public endpoint. Pre-existing test override
path preserved.
L-010 — Verified-already-clean
grep -rn 'mock\.Anything' --include='*_test.go' . returned 0.
certctl uses hand-rolled struct mocks (mockJobRepo, mockAuditRepo,
etc.) with explicit method bodies; no testify-style mocks anywhere.
L-011 — IPv6 bracket-aware dialing pinned
Every production net.Dial / DialTimeout site audited:
cmd/agent/main.go:293 — intentional IPv4 literal '8.8.8.8:80'
verify.go / tlsprobe / network_scan — net.Dialer (no string addr)
email.go — net.JoinHostPort (bracket-aware)
ssh.go — addr derives from JoinHostPort upstream
ssrf.go — net.Dialer
internal/connector/notifier/email/email_ipv6_test.go (NEW):
TestJoinHostPort_IPv6BracketsRoundTrip pins IPv4/IPv6/zone variants;
TestSMTPDialerUsesJoinHostPort source-greps email.go and fails CI
if a future refactor swaps in 'host:port' concatenation.
L-013 — Verified-already-clean (monotonic-safe)
Only one site uses now.Sub: middleware.go:393 in tokenBucket.allow().
Both 'now' and tb.lastRefill come from time.Now() which carries
monotonic-clock readings per Go's time package contract;
intra-process now.Sub is monotonic-safe by construction. Doc
comment block added above the call to make the invariant explicit.
L-020 (CWE-563) — ineffassign sweep, 8 unique sites
certificate.go:135 — sortDir initial value dropped (set
unconditionally below by SortDesc branch).
certificate.go:169,175 — argCount post-increments dropped (var
not read past the LIMIT/OFFSET formatting).
agent_group.go, profile.go — page/perPage truly vestigial,
replaced with _ = page; _ = perPage.
issuer.go:633, owner.go:131, target.go:267, team.go:131 — same
treatment for the audit-flagged second-function ListXxx clamps.
First-function List() in issuer/owner/target/team KEEPS its
clamp because page/perPage is used for in-memory slice
pagination — ineffassign correctly didn't flag those.
Build + tests green post-sweep.
L-021 — Transitive CVE bump
go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.45.0 golang.org/x/net@v0.47.0
(crypto required net@0.47.0). go-text@v0.31.0 transitively
bumped.
Per tool-output govulncheck-verbose: x/net@v0.45.0 fixes
GO-2026-4441 + GO-2026-4440; x/crypto@v0.45.0 fixes
GO-2025-4134 + GO-2025-4135 + GO-2025-4116 — all 5 advisories
cleared. Bundle B's ISV grep guard + Bundle D's release-time
govulncheck step are the going-forward monitor + bump pass.
L-004 — Deferred to dedicated bundle
Recon: zero hits for RotateAPIKey / rotated_at / key_status
anywhere in source. API keys configured via
CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED env var; rotation is operator-managed
(edit env + restart). Building rotation infrastructure from
scratch is a feature project, not a mechanical sweep.
Documented in audit-report.md with scope-pivot note.
Audit deliverables:
audit-report.md: score 46/55 -> 52/55 closed
(Low 14/19 -> 19/19 — 100% Low closed except L-004 deferred)
findings.yaml: 6 status flips
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle E section
Verification:
go test -count=1 -short ./internal/service ./internal/connector/issuer/acme
./internal/connector/notifier/email green
go vet on changed packages clean
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
30f9f1e712 |
Bundle B: Auth & transport surface tightening — 5 findings closed
Closes M-001 + M-002 + M-013 + M-018 + M-025 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25.
M-001 (CWE-916) — PBKDF2 100k -> 600k via v3 blob format
internal/crypto/encryption.go:
- New v3Magic (0x03), pbkdf2IterationsV3 (600,000 — OWASP 2024
Password Storage Cheat Sheet floor), v3SaltSize (16 bytes),
deriveKeyWithSaltV3 helper.
- EncryptIfKeySet now unconditionally writes v3:
magic(0x03) || salt(16) || nonce(12) || ciphertext+tag
- DecryptIfKeySet falls through v3 -> v2 -> v1 with AEAD verification
at each step. Wrong-passphrase v3 reads cannot be silently
misattributed to v2/v1.
- IsLegacyFormat updated to recognize 0x03 as non-legacy.
internal/crypto/encryption_v3_test.go (NEW, 7 tests):
V3 round-trip / V2 read-fallback against deterministic v2 fixture /
V3 wrong-passphrase fails / V3-vs-V2 dispatch order / V2 vs V3 keys
differ for same (passphrase, salt) / iteration-count pin at OWASP
2024 floor / IsLegacyFormat-recognises-V3.
Coverage internal/crypto: 86.7% -> 88.2%.
M-002 (CWE-862) — Auth-exempt allowlist constants + AST regression test
Recon found auth-exempt surface spans TWO layers (audit's claim was
incomplete):
Layer 1 (router.go direct r.mux.Handle):
GET /health, GET /ready, GET /api/v1/auth/info, GET /api/v1/version
Layer 2 (cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix dispatch):
/.well-known/pki/*, /.well-known/est/*, /scep[/...]*
internal/api/router/router.go:
- New AuthExemptRouterRoutes constant with per-entry justifications.
- New AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes constant.
internal/api/router/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
AST-walks router.go for every direct mux.Handle call and asserts
set equals AuthExemptRouterRoutes; reads source bytes of Register /
RegisterFunc and asserts they still wrap with middleware.Chain.
cmd/server/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
14-case table test on buildFinalHandler asserting documented
prefixes route to noAuthHandler and authenticated routes route to
apiHandler; inverse-overlap pin proves no documented bypass shadows
an authenticated prefix.
M-013 (CWE-942) — CORS deny-by-default verified-already-clean + pin
Audit claim 'default allows all origins if env-var unset' was WRONG.
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewCORS already denies cross-
origin requests when len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 (no
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header is emitted, same-origin policy
applies).
internal/api/middleware/cors_test.go: +TestNewCORS_NilOriginsDeniesAll
+ TestNewCORS_M013_ContractDocumentedInOrder (5-case table test
pinning the 3-arm dispatch contract).
M-018 (CWE-319 / PCI-DSS Req 4) — Postgres TLS opt-in toggle
deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: new postgresql.tls.{mode,caSecretRef}
operator-facing knobs. Default 'disable' preserves in-cluster pod-
network behavior; PCI-scoped operators set verify-full.
deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: certctl.databaseURL helper
pipes postgresql.tls.mode into ?sslmode=.
deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-secret.yaml: uses the helper
instead of hardcoded sslmode=disable.
deploy/docker-compose.yml: CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL is now
${CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL:-...} so operators override without editing.
docs/database-tls.md (NEW): operator runbook covering 4 deployment
shapes, RDS verify-full example with PGSSLROOTCERT mount, and
pg_stat_ssl verification query.
helm template + helm lint clean.
M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1) — Per-key rate limiting
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewRateLimiter rewritten from
a single global tokenBucket to a keyedRateLimiter map keyed on
'user:'+GetUser(ctx) for authenticated callers
'ip:'+RemoteAddr-host for unauthenticated
- Empty UserKey strings treated as unauthenticated.
- X-Forwarded-For intentionally NOT consulted (header-spoofing risk).
- Create-on-demand bucket allocation under sync.RWMutex with double-
check pattern.
RateLimitConfig.PerUserRPS / PerUserBurstSize fields with env vars
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS / CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST
allow per-user budgets distinct from per-IP.
internal/api/middleware/ratelimit_keyed_test.go (NEW, 5 tests):
TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets / SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket /
TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets / PerUserBudgetOverride /
EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous.
Coverage internal/api/middleware: 82.1% -> 83.7%.
Audit deliverables:
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: score
25/55 -> 30/55 closed (High 7/9, Medium 7/27 -> 12/27, Low 8/19).
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: 5 status flips
open -> closed with closure notes citing the Bundle B mechanism.
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle B section under [unreleased].
Verification:
go test -count=1 -short ./... all green
staticcheck on changed packages no new SA*/ST* hits
(the 4 pre-existing SA1019 sites in cmd/server/main_test.go are
Bundle 9 / M-028 partial closure leftovers tracked in Bundle C)
helm template + helm lint clean
internal/repository/postgres setup-fail sandbox disk pressure,
same on master HEAD before this branch — environmental, not Bundle B
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
3e78ecb799 |
feat(security): bodyLimit on noAuth + security headers + encryption-key validation (H-1 master)
Closes three 2026-04-24 audit findings (all P2):
- cat-s5-4936a1cf0118: noAuthHandler chain accepted arbitrary-size
bodies (EST simpleenroll, SCEP, PKI CRL/OCSP, /health, /ready).
Memory exhaustion vector without HTTP-layer auth gatekeeping.
- cat-s11-missing_security_headers: zero security headers on any
response. Clickjacking, MIME-sniffing, untrusted-origin resource
loads against the dashboard and API.
- cat-r-encryption_key_no_length_validation: CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
accepted with any non-empty value including a single character.
PBKDF2-SHA256 (100k rounds) does not compensate for low-entropy
passphrases at scale (CWE-916, CWE-329).
Changes:
- cmd/server/main.go::noAuthHandler chain — added bodyLimitMiddleware
+ securityHeadersMiddleware. Same default cap as authed surface
(1MB via CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE), same 413 on overflow.
- cmd/server/main.go::middlewareStack (authed) — added
securityHeadersMiddleware before corsMiddleware.
- internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go (new) — SecurityHeaders
middleware + SecurityHeadersDefaults() with conservative defaults:
HSTS 1y+includeSubDomains, X-Frame-Options DENY, X-Content-Type-
Options nosniff, Referrer-Policy no-referrer-when-downgrade, CSP
default-src 'self' + img/data + style 'unsafe-inline' (Tailwind/Vite
needs it; scripts still 'self' only) + connect 'self' + frame-
ancestors 'none'. Operators behind a customising reverse proxy can
disable any header by setting its config field to empty.
- internal/config/config.go::Validate() — enforce minEncryptionKeyLength
= 32 bytes when CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY is set. Empty stays
accepted (downstream fail-closed sentinel handles it). Structured
error names the env var, the actual length, the required minimum,
and the canonical generation command (`openssl rand -base64 32`).
Tests:
- internal/api/middleware/securityheaders_test.go (new) — 4 cases
(defaults present, empty value disables single header, override
applied, headers on 4xx/5xx).
- internal/config/config_test.go — 5 new cases for the encryption-key
length check (empty accepted, 1-byte rejected, 31-byte rejected at
boundary, 32-byte accepted, 44-byte realistic operator key accepted).
Documentation:
- CHANGELOG.md — H-1 section above D-2 under [unreleased] with
Breaking-change callout (operators with low-entropy keys must rotate
before upgrade).
- coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md — Live Tracker
25/47 → 33/47, P1 14/14 (zero remaining), P2 11/27 → 16/27. Three
H-1 findings flipped + closed-bundle row added.
Verification:
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- golangci-lint v2.11.4 run ./... — 0 issues
- go test ./internal/api/middleware/... — pass (incl. 4 new
SecurityHeaders cases)
- go test ./internal/config/... — pass (incl. 5 new EncryptionKey
cases)
- tsc --noEmit (frontend) — clean
- All sibling guardrails (S-1 / G-3 / D-1 / D-2 / B-1 / L-1) still pass
Audit findings closed:
- cat-s5-4936a1cf0118 (P2)
- cat-s11-missing_security_headers (P2)
- cat-r-encryption_key_no_length_validation (P2)
Breaking change:
- Operators with CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY shorter than 32 bytes
must rotate before upgrade. Generate via `openssl rand -base64 32`.
Deferred follow-ups:
- Weak-key dictionary check (reject password123, common ASCII patterns)
— adds operational friction with low marginal entropy gain at the
32-byte minimum.
- CSP 'unsafe-inline' for styles — required for Tailwind/Vite
per-component <style> blocks; removing requires HTML report or
component refactor outside H-1 scope.
- Permissions-Policy header — dashboard uses no advanced browser APIs
(camera, mic, geolocation); deferred until a real consumer needs it.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
9c1d446e40 |
fix(security,config): remove unimplemented JWT auth-type, close silent downgrade (G-1)
The pre-G-1 config validator accepted CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt and the
startup log faithfully echoed 'authentication enabled type=jwt'.
Reasonable people read that and concluded JWT auth was on. It wasn't.
The auth-middleware wiring at cmd/server/main.go unconditionally routed
every request through the api-key bearer middleware regardless of
cfg.Auth.Type. So CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt quietly compared the incoming
'Authorization: Bearer <token>' against whatever string the operator put
in CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET — real JWT clients got 401, and operators who
treated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET as a *signing* secret (because they thought
they were configuring JWT) had effectively handed an attacker an api-key.
A security finding masquerading as a config option.
We chose the audit-recommended structural fix: remove the option, fail
fast at startup, and add the gateway-fronting pattern as the documented
forward path. Implementing JWT middleware would have meant jwks vs
static-secret rotation, claim mapping, expiry enforcement, audience and
issuer validation, key rollover semantics, and regression coverage at the
same depth as the existing api-key path — a feature, not a fix. Operators
who genuinely need JWT/OIDC front certctl with an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium /
Authelia) and run the upstream certctl with CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none. Same
shape works on docker-compose and Helm.
The change is comprehensive across 7 phases — every surface that
mentioned 'jwt' as a certctl-auth-type is updated, plus structural
backstops (typed enum, runtime guard, helm template validation, CI grep
guard) so the lie can't reappear.
Files changed:
Phase 1 — production code (typed enum + jwt removal):
- internal/config/config.go: AuthType typed alias + AuthTypeAPIKey /
AuthTypeNone constants + ValidAuthTypes() helper. Validate() routes
literal 'jwt' through a dedicated multi-line diagnostic naming the
authenticating-gateway pattern, then cross-checks against
ValidAuthTypes(). Secret-required branch simplified to api-key-only.
Field comment on AuthConfig.Type rewritten to drop jwt and point at
the gateway pattern.
- internal/api/middleware/middleware.go: AuthConfig.Type field comment
references the typed config.AuthType constants.
- internal/api/handler/health.go: same treatment for HealthHandler.AuthType.
- cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime switch immediately after
config.Load() — exits 1 on any unsupported auth-type that bypassed the
validator. Auth-disabled startup log explicitly names the
authenticating-gateway pattern.
Phase 2 — tests (Red→Green, contract pinning):
- internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated
(two table rows pinning the dedicated G-1 error fires regardless of
whether Secret is set), TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (property
guard against future re-introduction),
TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None (allowed-set contract),
TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType (pins non-jwt invalid values still
hit the generic invalid-auth-type error). Removed the prior
TestValidate_JWTAuth_MissingSecret happy-path since its premise is
inverted post-G-1.
- internal/api/handler/health_test.go: removed
TestAuthInfo_ReturnsAuthType_JWT (which baked the silent-downgrade lie
into the regression suite). Pre-existing _APIKey test continues to
cover the api-key happy path.
Phase 3 — spec, docs, env templates:
- api/openapi.yaml: auth_type enum dropped to [api-key, none] with
inline comment naming the G-1 closure.
- .env.example (root): CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block rewritten to drop
jwt and point at the gateway pattern; secret-required conditional
simplified to api-key-only.
- docs/architecture.md: middleware-stack bullet rewritten to drop the
JWT mention; new H3 'Authenticating-gateway pattern (JWT, OIDC, mTLS)'
section explaining the design rationale and listing oauth2-proxy /
Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium / Authelia / Caddy
forward_auth / Apache mod_auth_openidc / nginx auth_request as the
standard fronting options.
- docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md (new ~125 lines): migration guide
with preconditions, what-changes, both recovery paths, complete
docker-compose oauth2-proxy walkthrough, Traefik ForwardAuth and Envoy
ext_authz patterns, rollback posture.
Phase 4 — Helm chart (template validation + docs):
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: new certctl.validateAuthType
helper mirroring the existing certctl.tls.required pattern. Fails
template render on any server.auth.type outside {api-key, none} with
a multi-line diagnostic.
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-deployment.yaml,
server-configmap.yaml, server-secret.yaml: invoke the helper at the
top of each template that depends on .Values.server.auth.type.
- deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: auth: block comment expanded with the
G-1 rationale and gateway-pattern cross-reference.
- deploy/helm/CHART_SUMMARY.md: server.auth.type table row now surfaces
the allowed set and points at the upgrade doc.
- deploy/helm/certctl/README.md: new 'JWT / OIDC via authenticating
gateway' section with a Kubernetes-flavored oauth2-proxy + certctl
walkthrough.
Phase 5 — release surface:
- CHANGELOG.md: new [unreleased] top entry with Breaking / Removed /
Added / Changed sections; explicit pointer at
docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md from the Breaking subsection.
Phase 6 — CI guardrail:
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: new 'Forbidden auth-type literal regression
guard (G-1)' step. Scoped patterns catch the actual regression shapes
(map literal, slice literal, switch case, OpenAPI enum, env-file
default, AuthType('jwt') cast). Comments and the dedicated rejection
branch are intentionally exempt; connector-package JWT references
(Google OAuth2 / step-ca) are exempt as out-of-scope external
protocols. Verified locally: the guard passes on the actual tree and
fires on all 4 synthetic regression patterns.
Out of scope (explicitly untouched):
- internal/connector/discovery/gcpsm/gcpsm.go — Google OAuth2 service-
account JWT (external protocol).
- internal/connector/issuer/googlecas/googlecas.go — same.
- internal/connector/issuer/stepca/stepca.go — step-ca's provisioner
one-time-token JWT for /sign API.
- docs/test-env.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/features.md — describe
external CAs' use of JWT, not certctl's auth shape.
- Implementing actual JWT middleware. Feature, not a fix.
Verification (all gates pass):
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go test -short ./... — every package green
- go test -short -race ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/... — clean
- govulncheck ./... — no vulnerabilities in our code
- helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ — clean
- helm template with auth.type=api-key — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=none — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=jwt — fails with validateAuthType
diagnostic (exit 1)
- python3 yaml.safe_load on api/openapi.yaml — parses
- CI guardrail mirror — clean on real tree, fires on all 4 synthetic
regression patterns
- Smoke test: 'CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt ./certctl-server' exits non-zero
with: 'Failed to load configuration: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt is no
longer accepted (G-1 silent auth downgrade): no JWT middleware ships
with certctl. To use JWT/OIDC, run an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium) in
front of certctl and set CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none on the upstream.
See docs/architecture.md "Authenticating-gateway pattern" and
docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md for the migration walkthrough'
config pkg coverage: ValidAuthTypes 100%, Validate 94.7%, total 75.5%.
Refs: coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md
§2 P1 cluster, cat-g-jwt_silent_auth_downgrade
Audit recommendation followed verbatim: 'Remove jwt from
validAuthTypes until middleware ships'.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
ff7357f889 |
fix(lint): godoc comment on NewAuthWithNamedKeys must lead with function name (ST1020)
CI failure on master (commit |
||
|
shankar0123
|
3287e174dc |
Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e3196e7b50 |
M-2 PR-F: Middleware/ACME ctx-propagation + contextcheck linter + audit closeout
Final PR in the six-commit M-2 sequence (PR-A: CertificateService cluster |
||
|
shankar0123
|
d14a45401b |
fix(audit): drain in-flight recording goroutines on shutdown (M-1)
Audit events spawned from the HTTP middleware ran in detached goroutines using context.Background(). On SIGTERM the DB pool was closed before those goroutines finished writing, silently dropping audit events (CWE-662 Improper Synchronization / CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption). NewAuditLog now returns an *AuditMiddleware struct that tracks every spawned goroutine with sync.WaitGroup. Callers wire the middleware via its Middleware method value (preserves the existing func(http.Handler) http.Handler shape) and drain the WaitGroup with Flush(ctx), which blocks until in-flight recordings complete or the provided context is cancelled — mirroring scheduler.WaitForCompletion. Flush is invoked in cmd/server/main.go between http.Server.Shutdown (no new requests accepted) and db.Close (pool torn down), with a timeout returning ErrAuditFlushTimeout wrapping ctx.Err(). Request-derived inputs (method, path, status) are snapshotted before the goroutine spawn so the worker does not race with http.Server reusing r after the handler returns. Tests: TestAuditLog_FlushDrainsInFlightGoroutines TestAuditLog_FlushTimeoutReturnsErrAuditFlushTimeout Verification: go build ./... : 0 go vet ./... : 0 go test -race -short ./... : 0 (all packages) go test -cover ./internal/api/middleware : 81.4% golangci-lint run : 0 issues govulncheck ./... : 0 vulns in called code |
||
|
shankar0123
|
7382e5f03b |
test: comprehensive test gap closure across 24 packages
Close coverage gaps identified by dual-audit (qualitative + quantitative). New test files for config (0%→98%), router (0%→100%), handler validation, health, audit, response helpers, webhook notifier (0%→88%), email notifier, middleware (recovery, rate limiter), domain profile, service nil-safety, config helpers, issuer bootstrap, and server bootstrap wiring. Expanded existing tests for ACME (34%→42%), step-ca (42%→52%), F5, SSH, agent (43%→63%), scheduler (88%→99%), renewal service, and issuerfactory. All tests pass: go test -short, go vet, go test -race clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
6d508cf53f |
fix: security audit remediation (AUDIT-001, 003, 004, 005, 006, 018)
- AUDIT-001: Validate OpenSSL revoke inputs (hex-only serials, RFC 5280 reasons) - AUDIT-003: Enforce /20 CIDR size cap at API level (create + update) - AUDIT-004: Support comma-separated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET for zero-downtime key rotation - AUDIT-005: Add ReadHeaderTimeout (5s) to prevent Slowloris - AUDIT-006: Document audit trail query parameter exclusion rationale - AUDIT-018: Add immediate-run-on-start to short-lived expiry scheduler loop Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
de9264baf7 |
docs: synchronize project documentation with codebase
Implements 3 deferred security tickets (TICKET-003, TICKET-007, TICKET-010) and performs comprehensive documentation audit to eliminate drift between code and docs. Code changes: - TICKET-003: Repository integration tests with testcontainers-go (50+ subtests) - TICKET-007: CertificateService decomposition into RevocationSvc + CAOperationsSvc - TICKET-010: Request body size limits via http.MaxBytesReader middleware - Fix missing slog import in certificate.go after service decomposition Documentation updates: - README: Fix endpoint count (97→93), expand env var reference (15→39 vars) - CLAUDE.md: Fix OpenAPI operation count (85→93), update file locations - architecture.md: Add body size limits section, middleware chain ordering - CONTRIBUTING.md: New contributor guide with architecture conventions, test patterns, middleware ordering, CI thresholds - SECURITY_REMEDIATION.md: Removed from repo (moved to cowork, gitignored) - Test files: Add doc comments to all new test files Documentation that should exist but doesn't yet: - Architecture diagrams (C4 model or similar) - Threat model document - Testing philosophy guide - Disaster recovery runbook - Upgrade guide (migration between versions) - API versioning strategy document Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
4655f68e87 |
fix(testing): TICKET-015 replace time.Sleep with channel-based sync in audit tests
The audit middleware records events asynchronously via goroutines. Tests previously used time.Sleep(50ms) to wait for audit recording, which is unreliable. Implemented waitableAuditRecorder wrapper that: - Wraps mockAuditRecorder to intercept RecordAPICall invocations - Signals via buffered channel when recording completes - Provides Wait(timeout) method for tests to synchronously wait - Returns true on successful wait, false on timeout Replaced all 7 time.Sleep(50ms) calls with recorder.Wait(1*time.Second) calls, improving test reliability and reducing flakiness. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
3e3e68fd3a |
fix(security): TICKET-009 add HTTP timeouts to notifier clients
- Added TestSlack_ClientHasTimeout to verify 10-second timeout - Added TestTeams_ClientHasTimeout to verify 10-second timeout - Added TestPagerDuty_ClientHasTimeout to verify 10-second timeout - Added TestOpsGenie_ClientHasTimeout to verify 10-second timeout - All notifiers already configured with 10 second timeout in New() - Tests verify timeout is set and matches expected value |
||
|
shankar0123
|
9b0ff37973 |
feat: M19 API audit log + M16a notifier connectors (Slack, Teams, PagerDuty, OpsGenie)
M19: HTTP middleware records every API call to the immutable audit trail with method, path, actor, SHA-256 body hash, status, and latency. Best-effort async recording via goroutine. Health/ready probes excluded. M16a: Four pluggable notifier connectors — Slack (incoming webhook), Teams (MessageCard), PagerDuty (Events API v2), OpsGenie (Alert API v2). Each enabled by config env var. 30 new tests across middleware and connectors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
ee75f149ae |
feat: M14 — Observability (dashboard charts, agent fleet, stats API, metrics, structured logging, rollback)
Backend: StatsService with 5 aggregation methods, JSON metrics endpoint, slog-based structured logging middleware. Stats API: dashboard summary, certificates-by-status, expiration timeline, job trends, issuance rate. 23 new backend tests. Frontend: Recharts-powered dashboard with 4 charts (status pie, expiration heatmap, job trends line, issuance bar), agent fleet overview page with OS/arch grouping and version breakdown, deployment rollback buttons on version history. 7 new frontend tests. 78 API endpoints, 744+ total tests (658 Go + 86 Vitest). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
28205e1131 |
Implement M7: auth middleware, rate limiting, CORS, and GUI login flow
Add SHA-256 API key authentication with constant-time comparison, configurable token bucket rate limiter, CORS origin allowlist middleware, and React auth context with login page. Auth info endpoint bootstraps GUI without credentials. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
d395776a95 | Initial scaffold: certificate control plane v0.1.0 |