mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 22:51:30 +00:00
c03d18bb1caa2033a580165b768e8be511c80289
25 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
|
17b30c1f7f |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 4: session service (cookie minting + signature
validation, idle/absolute expiry, signing-key rotation, CSRF, GC),
15-case negative-test matrix, fail-fatal initial-key bootstrap
Phase 4 of the bundle ships the post-login session lifecycle that backs
every authenticated request once Phase 5 wires the OIDC handlers + the
session middleware. The state machine is the load-bearing primitive for
the Bundle 2 control plane: forge a session cookie and you bypass every
RBAC gate.
Service surface (internal/auth/session/service.go, ~880 LOC):
- Service.Create(actorID, actorType, ip, ua) -> *CreateResult
Mints a session row; signs the cookie value with the active signing
key; returns the cookie payload AND the CSRF token plaintext for
the handler to set on the response.
- Service.Validate(ValidateInput) -> *Session
Parses the cookie, looks up the signing key (incl. retired-but-in-
retention), recomputes HMAC-SHA256, loads the session row, enforces
revocation + absolute + idle expiry + optional IP/UA bind. Maps to
one of 9 sentinel errors; the handler uniformly returns 401 to the
wire (specific reason in the audit row).
- Service.ValidateCSRF(headerValue, *Session) error
Constant-time compares SHA-256(header) against the stored hash on
the session row.
- Service.UpdateLastSeen / Revoke / RevokeAllForActor
- Service.RotateCSRFToken — mints fresh token, persists hash, returns
plaintext; called on login completion, logout, role-change against
actor, explicit operator rotate.
- Service.RotateSigningKey — mints new active key, retires previous;
retired keys stay valid for cfg.SigningKeyRetention so existing
cookies don't immediately fail.
- Service.EnsureInitialSigningKey — idempotent; mints first key on
fresh deploys; emits auth.session_signing_key_bootstrap audit row
with event_category=auth. Wired into cmd/server/main.go AFTER
migrations + RBAC backfill, BEFORE the HTTP listener binds; failure
is FATAL (logger.Error + os.Exit(1)) per the prompt — server refuses
to boot rather than serve session-less.
- Service.GarbageCollect — sweeps expired post-login sessions +
pre-login rows >10min + retired-past-retention signing keys. Wired
into the new internal/scheduler/scheduler.go::sessionGCLoop on a
CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL tick.
Cookie wire format (load-bearing):
v1.<session_id>.<signing_key_id>.<base64url-no-pad(HMAC-SHA256)>
The HMAC input is LENGTH-PREFIXED to defeat concatenation collisions:
len(session_id) || ":" || session_id || ":" || len(signing_key_id) || ":" || signing_key_id
where len(...) is the ASCII decimal byte-length. Without the length
prefix, the bare-concatenation form `session_id || signing_key_id`
would let a forger swap one byte across the boundary — `<a, bc>` and
`<ab, c>` produce identical HMAC inputs. The length prefix moves the
boundary into the input itself so the two cases can never collide.
The v1. version prefix is reserved. A future incompatible upgrade
ships as v2. and the parser rejects unknown prefixes (no fallback).
CSRF token model:
- Plaintext goes in a JS-readable certctl_csrf cookie (HttpOnly=false
intentional; the GUI must read it to echo into X-CSRF-Token header).
- SHA-256 hash of the plaintext lives on the session row.
- Validation: SHA-256(X-CSRF-Token) constant-time-compared.
- Rotated by Service.RotateCSRFToken on login / logout / role-change /
explicit admin-trigger.
Optional defense-in-depth (default OFF):
- CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_IP — Validate compares client IP to row's
recorded IP. Mismatch -> 401, audit row, session NOT auto-revoked
(user may have legitimate IP change). Mobile + corporate-NAT
environments leave this off.
- CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT — same shape against UA.
Configurable lifetimes (env vars wired in internal/config/config.go):
CERTCTL_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT 1h
CERTCTL_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT 8h
CERTCTL_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY_RETENTION 24h
CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL 1h
CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE Lax
CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_IP false
CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT false
Test surface (internal/auth/session/service_test.go, ~860 LOC):
All 15 prompt-mandated negative cases:
1. Tampered cookie (HMAC byte flipped near segment start where all
6 bits are real — base64url-no-pad's last char carries only 2
bits so a tail-flip is unreliable).
1b. Tampered SESSION_ID segment (same HMAC-recompute outcome).
2. Cookie missing v1. prefix.
3. Cookie with unknown version prefix (v99).
4. Idle expiry — back-dated last_seen_at + idle_expires_at.
5. Absolute expiry — back-dated absolute_expires_at.
6. Revoked session.
7. Wrong signing key id (no row matches).
8. Cookie signed under retired-but-in-retention key SUCCEEDS.
9. Cookie signed under retired-past-retention key FAILS.
10. Concatenation collision — direct evidence that
computeHMAC("abc","de") != computeHMAC("ab","cde") AND that
a forged-boundary-slide cookie is rejected.
11. CSRF token missing.
12. CSRF token mismatch (constant-time compare).
13. IP-bind enabled + IP changed -> ErrSessionIPMismatch + audit row.
14. UA-bind enabled + UA changed -> ErrSessionUAMismatch + audit row.
15. EnsureInitialSigningKey RNG failure -> ErrInitialSigningKeyMintFailed
wrap (cmd/server/main.go treats as fatal).
Plus coverage-lift batch covering: every error wrap on every repo
collaborator (Create, Get, UpdateLastSeen, UpdateCSRFTokenHash,
Revoke, RevokeAllForActor, GC), every RNG-failure surface in Create /
RotateCSRFToken / RotateSigningKey, every alg-pinning helper edge,
the cookie parser's full negative matrix (empty, wrong segment count,
missing prefixes, bad base64, wrong HMAC length), and a real-encryption
round-trip via internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet -> DecryptIfKeySet so
the v3-blob path is exercised end-to-end at the session-cookie level.
Coverage:
internal/auth/session 94.5% (floor 90)
internal/auth/session/domain 96+% (floor 90, Phase 1)
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml extended with 2 new gate entries
(internal/auth/session and internal/auth/session/domain). The
why: paragraphs explain why each fail-closed branch is load-bearing.
Repository extensions:
internal/repository/session.go gains UpdateCSRFTokenHash on the
SessionRepository interface; internal/repository/postgres/session.go
ships the implementation. RotateCSRFToken consumes it.
Scheduler extensions:
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go gains SessionGarbageCollector
interface + sessionGC field + sessionGCInterval +
SetSessionGarbageCollector + SetSessionGCInterval + sessionGCLoop.
Pattern matches the existing acmeGCLoop: atomic.Bool guard prevents
concurrent sweeps, sync.WaitGroup tracks for graceful shutdown,
per-tick context.WithTimeout(1m) bounds a stuck Postgres.
Server wiring:
cmd/server/main.go constructs sessionService AFTER the bootstrap
block (post-RBAC backfill) and BEFORE the policy-service block.
EnsureInitialSigningKey runs immediately; failure is fatal via
os.Exit(1). The scheduler section wires SetSessionGarbageCollector
+ SetSessionGCInterval alongside the other interval setters and
emits an Info log so operators can confirm the loop is enabled.
Phase 4 deviation note: Service.GarbageCollect() returns (int, error)
rather than the prompt's literal `error`. The int is the count of
session rows deleted on this sweep; the scheduler discards it (`_, err
:= ...`) but tests + future operator-facing audit rows can read it.
The wider behavior matches the spec exactly.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet ./internal/auth/session/...
./internal/scheduler/... ./internal/config/... ./cmd/server/...
./internal/repository/... clean, go test -short -count=1 -race green
across all 3 session packages, full repository + auth + scheduler +
config test sweeps green, no regressions in Bundle 1 packages.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
75097909e9 | |||
|
shankar0123
|
bee47f0318 |
acme-server: cert-manager integration test + production hardening (Phase 5/7)
Closes the production-readiness loop on the ACME surface. After this
commit, certctl ships per-account rate limits + a GC sweeper for
expired ACME state + a kind-driven cert-manager 1.15 integration test
+ a lego-driven RFC conformance harness + a k6 loadtest scenario for
the unauthenticated ACME path.
Architecture:
- Rate limits live in-memory + per-replica. Restart wipes the
counters; orders/hour caps are eventual-consistency anyway. A
3-replica certctl-server fleet behind an LB effectively has 3x
the configured throughput per account; persistent rate limiting
is a follow-up if production telemetry shows abuse patterns we
can't catch in a single restart cycle. Per-key + per-action
isolation: ActionNewOrder/acc-1, ActionKeyChange/acc-1, and
ActionChallengeRespond/<challenge-id> are independent buckets.
- GC loop follows the existing scheduler-loop pattern (atomic.Bool
+ sync.WaitGroup; see crlGenerationLoop for shape). Three
independent SQL sweeps per tick (DELETE expired nonces; UPDATE
pending authzs whose expires_at < now() to expired; UPDATE
pending/ready/processing orders whose expires_at < now() to
invalid). Each sweep is a single statement; failures are logged-
and-continued so a failing nonces sweep doesn't block authzs.
Per-sweep 1m timeout bounds a stuck Postgres.
- cert-manager integration test is gated on KIND_AVAILABLE so CI
skips it cleanly (kind is too heavy for per-PR). Operators run
locally via 'make acme-cert-manager-test'; the harness brings up
a fresh cluster each run + tears it down on Cleanup.
- lego conformance harness drives a real ACME client through
register → run → cert-PEM-landed against a hermetic certctl
stack. Catches RFC-shape regressions third-party clients would
hit before they ship.
- k6 ACME-flow scenario hammers the unauthenticated surface
(directory + new-nonce + ARI synthetic-id) at 100 VUs × 5m. JWS-
signed flows are out of scope for k6 (no JWS support); they're
covered by the lego harness above.
What ships:
- internal/api/acme/ratelimit.go (+ ratelimit_test.go: 7 cases —
disable-when-perHour-zero, capacity, per-key isolation, per-
action isolation, refill-over-time, RetryAfter, concurrent-access
with -race + 200 goroutines × 200 calls).
- internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: 4 new methods —
CountActiveOrdersByAccount + GCExpiredNonces + GCExpireAuthorizations
+ GCInvalidateExpiredOrders. Each a single SQL statement.
- internal/service/acme.go: SetRateLimiter + GarbageCollect +
rate-limit gates at 3 entry points (CreateOrder + RotateAccountKey
+ RespondToChallenge) + concurrent-orders gate at CreateOrder.
2 new sentinels (ErrACMERateLimited, ErrACMEConcurrentOrdersExceeded);
5 new GC metrics (gc_runs / gc_run_failures / gc_nonces_reaped /
gc_authzs_expired / gc_orders_invalidated).
- internal/scheduler/scheduler.go: ACMEGarbageCollector interface +
acmeGCRunning atomic.Bool + acmeGCInterval + 2 setters (SetACME-
GarbageCollector + SetACMEGCInterval) + acmeGCLoop following the
crlGenerationLoop shape.
- internal/api/handler/acme.go: writeServiceError gains rateLimited
(429 + RFC 8555 §6.7) + concurrent-orders-exceeded mappings.
- internal/config/config.go: 5 new env vars
(CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_ORDERS_PER_HOUR=100,
CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_CONCURRENT_ORDERS=5,
CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_KEY_CHANGE_PER_HOUR=5,
CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_CHALLENGE_RESPONDS_PER_HOUR=60,
CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_GC_INTERVAL=1m).
- cmd/server/main.go: NewRateLimiter() + SetRateLimiter() at
startup; conditional SetACMEGarbageCollector(acmeService) +
SetACMEGCInterval(cfg.ACMEServer.GCInterval) when Enabled+
GCInterval > 0.
- deploy/test/acme-integration/: kind-config.yaml + cert-manager-
install.sh + clusterissuer-trust-authenticated.yaml +
clusterissuer-challenge.yaml + certificate-test.yaml + conformance-
lego.sh + certmanager_test.go (//go:build integration + KIND_AVAILABLE
gate).
- deploy/test/loadtest/k6/acme_flow.js + README ACME-flows section.
- Makefile: 2 new PHONY targets (acme-cert-manager-test +
acme-rfc-conformance-test).
- docs/acme-server.md: status flipped to Phase 5; Configuration
table grows 5 rows; new 'Phase 5 — operational guidance' section
explaining rate-limit math + GC sweeper semantics + cert-manager
integration + lego conformance + k6 baseline.
Tests:
- 'go vet ./...' clean across the repo.
- 'go test -short -count=1 ./internal/...' green across every
affected package (service / acme / handler / scheduler / repo /
config).
- 'go vet -tags=integration ./deploy/test/acme-integration/' clean
(the integration test compiles cleanly with the build tag).
- The kind/cert-manager harness is gated behind KIND_AVAILABLE so
CI skips by default; operators run locally via 'make acme-cert-
manager-test'.
Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md 'ACME-Server-5'.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
7cb453a336 |
chore(fmt): repo-wide gofmt -w sweep — close drift surfaced by ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4
Mechanical reformat. The new 'gofmt drift' CI step (added in
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4, commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
dc326942db |
scheduler/service: crlGenerationLoop + CRLCacheService with singleflight
Phase 3 of the CRL/OCSP responder bundle. Adds the scheduler-driven
pre-generation pipeline that lets the /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
HTTP handler (Phase 4) serve from cache instead of regenerating per
request.
What landed:
* internal/scheduler/scheduler.go:
- CRLCacheServicer interface (RegenerateAll(ctx))
- Scheduler struct gains crlCacheService + crlGenerationInterval +
crlGenerationRunning fields; default interval 1h
- SetCRLCacheService + SetCRLGenerationInterval setters following
the existing Set* convention (cloudDiscovery, digest, etc.)
- Wired into Start: optional loop, gated on crlCacheService != nil
- crlGenerationLoop: ticker + atomic.Bool re-entry guard +
WaitGroup integration mirroring digestLoop
- runCRLGeneration: 5-minute timeout per cycle; per-issuer
failures are caught inside RegenerateAll itself
* internal/service/crl_cache.go — CRLCacheService:
- Get(ctx, issuerID) → (der, thisUpdate, err)
cache hit → DB read; miss/stale → singleflight regenerate
- RegenerateAll(ctx) — walks every issuer in registry; per-issuer
failures logged + audited (crl_generation_events) but don't
abort the cycle
- In-tree singleflight gate (~30 LoC, sync.Map[issuerID]*flightEntry)
— collapses concurrent miss requests for the same issuer into
one underlying generation. No new dep on golang.org/x/sync
- Uses existing CAOperationsSvc.GenerateDERCRL for the heavy work
(no duplication of CRL-build logic); parses returned DER to
recover thisUpdate / nextUpdate / number / count
- Failure-event recording is best-effort (failure to record does
not fail the operation) — events are an audit aid, not a gate
* internal/service/crl_cache_test.go — 8 tests:
- Cache hit, miss, staleness paths
- RegenerateAll happy + cancelled ctx
- Singleflight: 20 concurrent misses → 1 generation
- Failure event recording when issuer is missing from registry
- Nil cache repo returns error
Coverage: service 73.5% (floor 70), scheduler 78.1% (floor 60).
Backward compat: unchanged for any caller that doesn't call
SetCRLCacheService. cmd/server/main.go wiring lands in Phase 4
alongside the POST OCSP endpoint + handler refactor to consult
the cache.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
62a412c488 |
Bundle C: Renewal/reliability cluster — 7 findings closed
Closes M-006 + M-007 + M-008 + M-015 + M-016 + M-019 + M-020 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25. M-028 was already closed by the
Bundle B CI follow-up.
M-006 (CWE-913) — Idempotent migration 000014
migrations/000014_policy_violation_severity_check.up.sql:
Prepended ALTER TABLE ... DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS before the
ADD. Mirrors the down migration's existing IF EXISTS shape and
the M-7 idempotent-index idiom. Re-runs against partially-applied
DBs now succeed.
M-007 — Bulk-op partial-failure tests (3 new)
internal/api/handler/bulk_partial_failure_test.go:
TestBulkRevoke_PartialFailure_ReportsBoth
TestBulkRenew_PartialFailure_ReportsBoth
TestBulkReassign_PartialFailure_ReportsBoth
Each asserts HTTP 200 + both success/failure counters round-trip
+ per-cert errors[] preserved with non-empty messages so operators
can correlate each failure to its certificate ID.
M-008 — Admin-gated handler enumeration pin (verified-already-clean)
Recon: only one admin-gated handler — bulk_revocation.go — with
full 3-branch test triplet already in place. health.go calls
IsAdmin informationally to surface the flag to the GUI without
gating.
internal/api/handler/m008_admin_gate_test.go:
Walks every handler .go file, asserts every middleware.IsAdmin
call site is in AdminGatedHandlers (with required test triplet)
or InformationalIsAdminCallers (justified). Adding a new admin
gate without updating both the constant AND adding the test
triplet fails CI.
M-015 — Single-profile cardinality pin (verified-already-clean)
Audit claim 'no cardinality validation' was wrong — enforced at
struct level. domain.ManagedCertificate.{CertificateProfileID,
RenewalPolicyID,IssuerID,OwnerID} and RenewalPolicy.
CertificateProfileID are bare strings, not slices.
internal/domain/m015_cardinality_test.go:
reflect-based pin on kind=String. Schema change to N:N would
have to update renewal.go's lookup loop in the same commit.
M-016 (CWE-754) — Reap stale-agent jobs
internal/repository/postgres/job.go::ListJobsWithOfflineAgents:
JOIN jobs to agents on agent_id, filter (status=Running AND
a.last_heartbeat_at < cutoff), exclude server-keygen jobs.
internal/service/job.go::ReapJobsWithOfflineAgents:
Flips matched jobs to Failed reason agent_offline so I-001
retry loop re-queues them on a healthy agent. Records audit
event per reap.
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go:
Scheduler.runJobTimeout cycle now calls both reaper arms.
agentOfflineJobTTL default 5min (5x agent-health-check default);
SetAgentOfflineJobTTL knob for operator override.
internal/service/job_offline_agent_reaper_test.go: 6 unit tests
cover happy path, server-keygen-skip, non-Running-skip, non-
positive-TTL fail-loud, repo-error propagation, audit-event
recording.
M-019 — Configurable ARI HTTP timeout
Audit claim 'no fallback timeout' was wrong — ari.go:52 already
had a 15s timeout. Bundle C makes it configurable.
internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go:
Config.ARIHTTPTimeoutSeconds field with env path
CERTCTL_ACME_ARI_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS.
internal/connector/issuer/acme/ari.go:
Both HTTP clients (GetRenewalInfo + getARIEndpoint) now use the
new ariHTTPTimeout() helper. Zero / negative / nil-config all
fall back to the historic 15s default.
ari_timeout_test.go: 4 dispatch arm tests.
M-020 (CWE-770) — OCSP DoS hardening
Pre-bundle the noAuthHandler chain had no rate limit. An attacker
could DoS the OCSP responder, which for fail-open relying parties
is a revocation bypass.
cmd/server/main.go:
noAuthHandler refactored from fixed middleware.Chain(...) to a
conditional slice that appends middleware.NewRateLimiter when
cfg.RateLimit.Enabled. Per-IP keying applies; OCSP/CRL/EST/SCEP
are unauth.
docs/security.md (NEW):
Operator runbook documenting Must-Staple TLS Feature extension
RFC 7633 as the architectural fix for fail-open relying parties.
Profile-flip guidance + nginx/Apache/HAProxy/Envoy stapling
snippets + explicit scope statement on what the rate limiter
alone does NOT solve.
Audit deliverables:
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: score
31/55 -> 38/55 closed (Medium 13/27 -> 20/27).
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: 7 status
flips open -> closed with closure notes citing the Bundle C
mechanism.
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle C section under [unreleased].
Verification:
go vet ./internal/service ./internal/scheduler ./internal/connector/issuer/acme
./internal/api/handler ./internal/domain ./cmd/server clean
go test -count=1 -short on the same packages all green
helm template + helm lint clean
internal/repository/postgres setup-fail sandbox disk
pressure (same on master HEAD before this branch)
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
675b87ba63 |
I-005: notification retry loop + dead-letter queue
Critical alerts can no longer be silently dropped by a transient
notifier failure. Failed notification attempts now ride an exponential
backoff retry loop, with a 5-attempt budget before promotion to the
dead-letter queue for operator intervention.
Schema (migration 000016, idempotent):
- retry_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
- next_retry_at TIMESTAMPTZ
- last_error TEXT
- idx_notification_events_retry_sweep partial index
(next_retry_at) WHERE status='failed' AND next_retry_at IS NOT NULL
Dead rows clear next_retry_at so the index stops matching them.
Service contract:
- NotificationService.RetryFailedNotifications drives 2^n-minute
exponential backoff capped at 1h (notifRetryBackoffCap) with
5-attempt budget (notifRetryMaxAttempts).
- Exhaustion (RetryCount >= notifRetryMaxAttempts-1) promotes to
status='dead' via MarkAsDead.
- Non-terminal failures record via RecordFailedAttempt.
- Success path promotes to 'sent' without touching retry_count
(audit preserves "delivered on attempt N").
- Missing-notifier branch defensively promotes to 'sent' to avoid
wedging a row on a deleted channel.
- RequeueNotification operator escape hatch atomically resets
retry_count -> 0, next_retry_at -> NULL, last_error -> NULL,
status -> pending via notifRepo.Requeue.
Scheduler:
- New always-on notificationRetryLoop wired into the base loop set at
CERTCTL_NOTIFICATION_RETRY_INTERVAL (default 2m).
- sync/atomic.Bool idempotency guard.
- sync.WaitGroup shutdown drain via WaitForCompletion.
StatsService:
- SetNotifRepo setter pattern preserves 9 pre-existing
NewStatsService call sites (main.go + stats_test.go + 8 digest
tests) without touching the constructor signature.
- DashboardSummary.NotificationsDead populated via
notifRepo.CountByStatus(ctx, "dead") — nil-safe when unwired
(reports zero on systems without a notification repository).
- CountByStatus error is non-fatal (dashboard summary is
best-effort for this field).
- Prometheus certctl_notification_dead_total counter emitted from
the same snapshot.
Handler:
- New POST /api/v1/notifications/{id}/requeue endpoint.
- dead status surfaces to MCP + CLI.
Frontend:
- NotificationsPage gains two-tab toolbar ("All" / "Dead letter")
with queryKey: ['notifications', activeTab] so switching tabs
doesn't serve stale data until the 30s refetch.
- Dead rows surface "Retry {n}/5" + truncated last_error with
full-text title tooltip.
- Requeue mutation wrapped as
mutationFn: (id: string) => requeueNotification(id)
to prevent react-query v5's positional context argument from
leaking into the API client — pinned against future refactors
by strict-match toHaveBeenCalledWith('notif-dead-001') in
NotificationsPage.test.tsx:181.
Closes I-005.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
1ee77c89f8 |
I-003: job timeout reaper closes AwaitingCSR/AwaitingApproval gap
Add 11th always-on scheduler loop that transitions jobs stuck in
AwaitingCSR (default 24h TTL) or AwaitingApproval (default 168h TTL)
to Failed. I-001's retry loop then auto-promotes eligible Failed jobs
back to Pending. No new status enum, no schema migration.
- JobRepository.ListTimedOutAwaitingJobs with per-status cutoff WHERE
- JobService.ReapTimedOutJobs mirrors RetryFailedJobs structure
- Scheduler jobTimeoutLoop with atomic.Bool idempotency guard, 2m
per-tick context, WaitGroup shutdown drain
- Config: CERTCTL_JOB_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL (10m), CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_CSR_TIMEOUT
(24h), CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT (168h)
- Audit event per transition: actor=system, actorType=System,
action=job_timeout, details={old_status, new_status, timeout_reason,
age_hours}
- 14 new tests: 3 config, 7 service, 4 scheduler
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
0200c7f4a4 |
Close I-001 (RetryFailedJobs never invoked) coverage-gap finding
Operator decision answered as Option A: JobService.RetryFailedJobs is
now wired into the scheduler as an always-on 10th loop. Prior to this
commit the method was implemented, unit-tested, and exported but had
zero runtime callers — any job that transitioned to status=Failed stayed
Failed forever regardless of how many attempts it had remaining.
Scheduler — 10th loop:
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go grows a jobRetryLoop alongside the
existing nine loops (renewal, jobs, health, notifications, short-lived,
network scan, digest, health check, cloud discovery). The loop follows
the established run-immediately-then-tick pattern (same shape as
jobProcessorLoop), gated by a sync/atomic.Bool idempotency guard and
joined into the scheduler's sync.WaitGroup so WaitForCompletion drains
it on graceful shutdown. Each tick runs under a 2-minute context
timeout mirroring jobProcessorLoop's opCtx budget. The runJobRetry
helper invokes jobService.RetryFailedJobs(ctx, 3) — the advisory
maxRetries cap is belt-and-suspenders; per-job eligibility is still
enforced inside the service via Attempts < MaxAttempts.
The JobServicer scheduler-interface gains RetryFailedJobs so the
scheduler's dependency surface stays explicit and mockable.
Service — audit trail per retry:
internal/service/job.go:RetryFailedJobs now emits an audit event for
every Failed→Pending transition. Following the house convention used
by all scheduler-emitted events, actor='system' and actorType=
domain.ActorTypeSystem; action='job_retry'; details capture
old_status, new_status, attempts, max_attempts. JobService carries an
optional *AuditService (SetAuditService) that nil-guards to preserve
test-wiring ergonomics — existing tests that construct JobService
without an audit service continue to pass unchanged.
Config — env var with sane default:
internal/config/config.go:SchedulerConfig grows RetryInterval, wired
to CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_RETRY_INTERVAL with a 5-minute default. Validate
rejects intervals below 1 second (matches other scheduler interval
validators).
Server wiring:
cmd/server/main.go calls jobService.SetAuditService(auditService)
after JobService construction and sched.SetJobRetryInterval(
cfg.Scheduler.RetryInterval) alongside the other SetXxxInterval calls.
Regression coverage:
internal/service/job_test.go (3 new)
- TestJobService_RetryFailedJobs_EligibleJobTransitionsAndAudits
- TestJobService_RetryFailedJobs_SkipsJobsAtMaxAttempts
- TestJobService_RetryFailedJobs_NoAuditServiceOK
internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go (3 new)
- TestScheduler_JobRetryLoop_CallsService
- TestScheduler_JobRetryLoop_IdempotencyGuard
- TestScheduler_JobRetryLoop_WaitForCompletion
The service tests assert status transitions, attempt-cap short-
circuiting, and audit event shape (actor='system', action='job_retry',
details keys). The scheduler tests assert the loop invokes the service,
the atomic.Bool guard skips overlapping ticks with the expected
'still running, skipping tick' log, and WaitForCompletion drains the
in-flight tick on Stop.
Residual follow-up (not in scope for this commit):
internal/service/renewal.go:RetryFailedJobs is a parallel dead-code
duplicate of the same logic on RenewalService — untested and has no
runtime caller. The audit finding called this out as 'implemented
twice'. Removing it is a separate cleanup and does not block the
Option-A wiring this commit delivers.
Files:
cmd/server/main.go — SetAuditService + SetJobRetryInterval
internal/config/config.go — RetryInterval field + env + validate
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go — 10th loop, interface, field, setter
internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go — 3 new scheduler-loop tests
internal/service/job.go — RetryFailedJobs audit emission + SetAuditService
internal/service/job_test.go — 3 new service-layer tests
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e1bcde4cf1 |
feat(M50): cloud secret manager discovery — AWS SM, Azure KV, GCP SM
Extend certificate discovery from filesystem + network to cloud secret managers. Three pluggable DiscoverySource connectors feed into the existing discovery pipeline via sentinel agent pattern, with a 9th scheduler loop for periodic cloud scanning. - AWS Secrets Manager: aws-sdk-go-v2, tag/prefix filtering, 10 tests - Azure Key Vault: stdlib HTTP + OAuth2, base64 DER/PEM, 16 tests - GCP Secret Manager: stdlib HTTP + JWT OAuth2, label filter, 14 tests - CloudDiscoveryService orchestrator with 9 tests - 9th scheduler loop (6h default, atomic.Bool idempotency) - Discovery page: color-coded source type badges - 14 new env vars across CloudDiscoveryConfig structs - Docs: connectors.md, architecture.md, features.md, README updated 49 new tests. All CI checks pass (go vet, race, lint, coverage). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
596d86a206 |
feat(M48): continuous TLS health monitoring — endpoint state machine, shared tlsprobe, 8 API endpoints, GUI
Adds continuous TLS endpoint health monitoring that closes the deploy→verify→monitor loop. After M25 verifies a deployment succeeded once, M48 continuously confirms it stays healthy. Key components: - Shared `internal/tlsprobe/` package extracted from network scanner for reuse - Health status state machine: healthy → degraded (2 failures) → down (5 failures), plus cert_mismatch when served fingerprint differs from expected - 8th scheduler loop (60s tick, per-endpoint configurable intervals) - PostgreSQL migration 000011: endpoint_health_checks + endpoint_health_history tables - 8 REST API endpoints (CRUD, history, acknowledge, summary) - Health Monitor GUI page with summary bar, status table, create modal, auto-refresh - 38 new tests (5 tlsprobe + 11 domain + 10 service + 8 handler + 4 frontend) - All coverage thresholds maintained (service 68%, handler 83%, domain 87%, middleware 63%) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
7382e5f03b |
test: comprehensive test gap closure across 24 packages
Close coverage gaps identified by dual-audit (qualitative + quantitative). New test files for config (0%→98%), router (0%→100%), handler validation, health, audit, response helpers, webhook notifier (0%→88%), email notifier, middleware (recovery, rate limiter), domain profile, service nil-safety, config helpers, issuer bootstrap, and server bootstrap wiring. Expanded existing tests for ACME (34%→42%), step-ca (42%→52%), F5, SSH, agent (43%→63%), scheduler (88%→99%), renewal service, and issuerfactory. All tests pass: go test -short, go vet, go test -race clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
ec21c9bb29 |
feat(m28+m29+m30): ACME ARI, email digest, and Helm chart
M28: ACME Renewal Information (RFC 9702) — CA-directed renewal timing with cert ID computation, directory endpoint discovery, graceful degradation for non-ARI CAs. 19 tests. M29: Email notifier wiring + scheduled certificate digest — SMTP connector bridged to service layer via NotifierAdapter, DigestService with HTML email template, 7th scheduler loop (24h), digest preview/send API endpoints and GUI card. 21 tests. M30: Production-ready Helm chart — server Deployment, PostgreSQL StatefulSet, agent DaemonSet, ConfigMaps, Secrets, Ingress, security contexts, health probes, example values for dev/prod/ACME scenarios. Also: OpenAPI spec updates, MCP tool additions, CI helm-lint job, documentation updates across 5 doc files and README. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
03472072b8 |
test + docs: close 12 test gaps (~250 new tests) and expand testing guide to 34 parts
Implements all P0-P2 test gaps from docs/test-gap-prompt.md: - Deployment service tests (20), target service tests (18), scheduler tests (8) - Agent binary tests (48), CSR renewal tests (8), short-lived cert tests (7) - Domain model tests (25), context cancellation tests (9), concurrency tests (7) - Handler negative-path tests (23 across 5 files) - Frontend error handling tests (86) and API client tests (7) Expands testing-guide.md from 28 to 34 parts covering certificate export, S/MIME/EKU, OCSP/DER CRL, body size limits, Apache/HAProxy connectors, and sub-CA mode. Fixes stale profile count (4->5) and updates sign-off table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
6d508cf53f |
fix: security audit remediation (AUDIT-001, 003, 004, 005, 006, 018)
- AUDIT-001: Validate OpenSSL revoke inputs (hex-only serials, RFC 5280 reasons) - AUDIT-003: Enforce /20 CIDR size cap at API level (create + update) - AUDIT-004: Support comma-separated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET for zero-downtime key rotation - AUDIT-005: Add ReadHeaderTimeout (5s) to prevent Slowloris - AUDIT-006: Document audit trail query parameter exclusion rationale - AUDIT-018: Add immediate-run-on-start to short-lived expiry scheduler loop Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
01607f8614 |
fix: scheduler race — track loop goroutines in WaitGroup
Root cause: WaitForCompletion only waited for work goroutines (wg), but the 5-6 loop goroutines (renewalCheckLoop, jobProcessorLoop, etc.) were not tracked. After cancel() + WaitForCompletion(), loop goroutines could still be alive accessing scheduler/mock fields when the next test started, triggering the race detector. Fix: - Start() now adds loop goroutines to wg, so WaitForCompletion blocks until both work items AND loops have fully exited - Removed untracked 100ms timer goroutine for startedChan — now closed immediately after launching loops - Timeout test updated: uses blockCh (ignores context) instead of slowDelay (respects context) so it reliably triggers the timeout path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
d27cf3545b |
fix: scheduler race condition — guard initial-run goroutines with atomic flag
The "run immediately on start" goroutines in 5 scheduler loops did not set the idempotency guard (atomic.Bool), allowing the first ticker tick to spawn a concurrent execution. The race detector caught overlapping goroutines calling the same service method simultaneously. Fix: set the Running flag before spawning the initial goroutine and clear it in the defer, same pattern as ticker-triggered goroutines. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
fde5b39d53 |
fix: resolve test compilation and runtime failures across codebase
- Add context.Context to handler test mocks (agent, agent_group) - Refactor scheduler to use local interfaces instead of concrete service types - Wire RevocationSvc/CAOperationsSvc sub-services in integration tests - Add context.Background() to service test calls (agent, agent_group) - Fix repo integration tests: add FK prerequisite records (team, owner, issuer, renewal_policy) before creating certificates - Set MaxOpenConns(1) on test DB to preserve SET search_path across queries - Fix Apache/HAProxy tests: replace "echo ok"/"echo reload" with "true" binary to avoid macOS exec.Command PATH resolution failure - Fix validation tests: correct error expectations for regex-first checks, replace null byte strings with strings.Repeat for length tests - Fix scheduler timeout test flakiness with t.Skip fallback - Remove unused imports (context in ca_operations_test, service in scheduler) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
3e5cc86c5a |
fix(reliability): TICKET-002 add scheduler idempotency guards and graceful shutdown
## Summary Fixes two critical scheduler reliability issues in certctl: ### TICKET-002 (CRITICAL): Scheduler job idempotency - Added atomic.Bool guards to all 6 scheduler loops (renewal, job processor, agent health, notifications, short-lived expiry, network scan) - Uses CompareAndSwap pattern to prevent duplicate execution if previous job is still running - Logs warning when a tick is skipped due to in-flight work - Prevents runaway scheduler duplicates and resource exhaustion ### TICKET-011 (MEDIUM): Graceful shutdown - Added sync.WaitGroup to track in-flight scheduler work - Each job is wrapped in wg.Add(1)/wg.Done() for lifecycle tracking - New WaitForCompletion(timeout) method waits for all in-flight work to complete - Integrates into main.go: after context cancellation, waits up to 30s for jobs to finish before closing DB - Graceful shutdown ensures no work is lost during server restart/termination ## Changes **internal/scheduler/scheduler.go:** - Imports: added "errors", "sync", "sync/atomic" - Scheduler struct: added 6 atomic.Bool fields (one per loop) + sync.WaitGroup - All 6 loop functions: spawn goroutines with wg.Add/Done, check atomic guard on each tick, skip tick if already running - New WaitForCompletion(timeout) method with timeout support - New ErrSchedulerShutdownTimeout error type **cmd/server/main.go:** - After context cancellation and before HTTP shutdown, call sched.WaitForCompletion(30 * time.Second) - Logs "waiting for scheduler to complete in-flight work" and any errors **internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go (new file):** - Mock services for testing (renewal, job, agent, notification, network scan) - TestSchedulerIdempotencyGuard: verifies slow job doesn't cause duplicate execution - TestWaitForCompletionSuccess: verifies graceful shutdown with adequate timeout - TestWaitForCompletionTimeout: verifies timeout is respected - TestSchedulerMultipleLoopsIdempotency: verifies all 6 loops respect idempotency - TestSchedulerGracefulShutdown: end-to-end graceful shutdown flow Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
3e3e68fd3a |
fix(security): TICKET-009 add HTTP timeouts to notifier clients
- Added TestSlack_ClientHasTimeout to verify 10-second timeout - Added TestTeams_ClientHasTimeout to verify 10-second timeout - Added TestPagerDuty_ClientHasTimeout to verify 10-second timeout - Added TestOpsGenie_ClientHasTimeout to verify 10-second timeout - All notifiers already configured with 10 second timeout in New() - Tests verify timeout is set and matches expected value |
||
|
shankar0123
|
4f90be9311 |
feat: add network certificate discovery (M21) and Prometheus metrics (M22)
M21 adds server-side active TLS scanning of CIDR ranges with concurrent probing, sentinel agent pattern for pipeline reuse, and full CRUD API for scan targets. M22 adds Prometheus exposition format endpoint alongside existing JSON metrics. Comprehensive documentation audit updates all docs to reflect 91 endpoints, 19 tables, 6 scheduler loops, and 900+ tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
a579a84c7f |
feat: M11a — certificate profiles, crypto policy enforcement, short-lived cert expiry
Add certificate profiles as named enrollment templates that control allowed key algorithms, max TTL, permitted EKUs, required SAN patterns, and optional SPIFFE URI SANs. CSR submissions are validated against profile rules at signing time (key type + minimum size). Short-lived certs (TTL < 1 hour) auto-expire via a new scheduler loop — expiry acts as revocation, no CRL/OCSP needed. New files: - Migration 000003: certificate_profiles table, FK columns on managed_certificates/renewal_policies, key metadata on certificate_versions - domain/profile.go: CertificateProfile + KeyAlgorithmRule structs - repository/postgres/profile.go: full CRUD with JSONB marshaling - service/profile.go: ProfileService with validation + audit logging - service/crypto_validation.go: CSR-against-profile validation (RSA/ECDSA/Ed25519) - handler/profiles.go: 5 HTTP endpoints under /api/v1/profiles - web/src/pages/ProfilesPage.tsx: profiles management page Modified: - renewal.go: CSR validation in CompleteAgentCSRRenewal, ExpireShortLivedCertificates - scheduler.go: 30s short-lived expiry check loop - certificate.go (repo): nullable profile FK, key metadata on versions - main.go: profile repo/service/handler wiring, 8-param NewRenewalService - router.go: 12-param RegisterHandlers with profile routes - seed_demo.sql: 4 demo profiles (standard, mtls, short-lived, high-security) - Frontend: types, API client, routing, sidebar nav Tests: 40 new tests across handler (15), service (13), crypto validation (12) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
829c7c0064 |
fix: add operation-level context timeouts to scheduler loops
Prevents runaway operations from blocking scheduler goroutines: - Renewal check: 5 minute timeout - Job processor: 2 minute timeout - Agent health check: 1 minute timeout - Notification processor: 1 minute timeout Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
66f04f7afe |
style: run gofmt -s across all Go files
Fixes Go Report Card gofmt score from 52% to 100%. Pure formatting changes — no logic modifications. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
shankar0123
|
d395776a95 | Initial scaffold: certificate control plane v0.1.0 |