5 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shankar0123	0729ee46e0	chore: sweep github.com/shankar0123/certctl URL refs to certctl-io/certctl ... Post-transfer cosmetic + release-critical URL refresh after moving the repo from github.com/shankar0123/certctl to github.com/certctl-io/certctl (2026-05-03). GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward old URLs forever, so existing operators are not broken — but aligns the canonical references with the new owner so: - procurement engineers / contributors browsing the docs see the right URL on first read - operators copying the agent install one-liner hit the new path directly without going through a redirect - the Helm chart's default image repository points at the canonical org registry path - the OnboardingWizard rendered to first-run UI users shows the new URL in the install snippets and doc anchor links - the GitHub Actions release workflow pushes container images to ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-{server,agent} (was: shankar0123) - the release-notes Markdown body in release.yml — which gets stamped into every future release page — references the post-transfer cert-identity (cosign keyless signing now uses the certctl-io workflow URL) and the post-transfer SLSA provenance source-uri. Without this, every cosign verify / slsa-verifier command on a v2.1.0+ release would fail because the cert-identity-regexp would not match the signing identity GitHub Actions OIDC issues post- transfer. Old releases (v2.0.67 and earlier) keep their immutable release-notes pointing at the shankar0123 path and remain verifiable via their own published instructions. Customer impact: - Operators on ghcr.io/shankar0123/certctl-{server,agent}:latest silently freeze on whatever tag was current at transfer time. They get no errors; they just stop receiving updates. The next release notes need a one-line callout (Phase 3.1 of cowork/transfer- certctl-to-org.md) telling them to update their image path to ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-{server,agent}. - All other URLs (git clone, install one-liner, raw.githubusercontent URLs, browser links, GitHub API) continue to resolve via permanent HTTP redirects. The sweep is cosmetic for those. Files swept (30 total): .github/workflows/release.yml — IMAGE_NAMESPACE, source-uri, cosign cert-identity-regexp, IMAGE= snippet (5 refs total). CHANGELOG.md, README.md — anchor links, badges, install one-liner, cosign verify snippets in operator-facing sections. api/openapi.yaml — info / externalDocs URLs. install-agent.sh — GITHUB_REPO const + systemd unit Documentation= field. deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md, deploy/helm/{CHART_SUMMARY,INDEX, INSTALLATION,README}.md, deploy/helm/certctl/{Chart.yaml, README.md,values.yaml}, deploy/helm/examples/values-*.yaml — chart docs + image repository defaults across dev / prod-ha overrides. docs/{certctl-for-cert-manager-users,connector-iis,connectors, migrate-from-acmesh,migrate-from-certbot,quickstart,test-env, why-certctl}.md — operator-facing doc URLs. examples/{acme-nginx,acme-wildcard-dns01,multi-issuer, private-ca-traefik,step-ca-haproxy}/docker-compose.yml + examples/step-ca-haproxy/step-ca-haproxy.md — example image: paths and accompanying narrative. web/src/pages/OnboardingWizard.tsx — first-run-UI URL refs (curl install one-liners, agent docker image path, doc anchor links). Files intentionally NOT swept (Choice A from cowork/transfer-certctl- to-org.md): go.mod, go.sum — module declaration stays github.com/shankar0123/ certctl. Existing imports compile because Go uses the path declared in go.mod, not the URL it was fetched from. Internal- only project; no external Go consumers; rename will land as a mechanical sed when one materializes. ~250 *.go files — every import remains github.com/shankar0123/ certctl/internal/... deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/go.mod — separate test sub-module; same Choice A logic; module path stays. Files intentionally NOT swept (other reasons): README.md lines 244-245 — Scarf-pixel docker-pull commands. shankar0123.docker.scarf.sh/... is a Scarf-account hostname (per-user, not per-repo) and the pixel keeps tracking pulls against the operator's personal Scarf account. Migrating to a certctl-io Scarf account is a separate decision (create org Scarf account → re-create package → update README). deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol — checked-in compiled binary with shankar0123/certctl baked into Go build info via the sub-module path. Out of scope for a URL sweep; will refresh on the next `make test-integration` rebuild. Verification: gofmt: clean (no .go files touched). go vet ./...: clean (verified at this SHA in 1.3 of the transfer checklist; no .go changes since). go build ./...: clean (same). go test -short on representative packages: green (same). Diff shape: 30 files, 74 insertions / 74 deletions, net-zero size, pure URL substitution.	2026-05-03 23:39:50 +00:00
shankar0123	55ce86b132	v2.0.48: swap self-signed TLS bootstrap algorithm ed25519 → ECDSA-P256 ... Follow-up to v2.0.47 (HTTPS-Everywhere). The Phase-3 self-signed bootstrap sidecar shipped an ed25519 server cert. Apple's TLS stack — Safari Network Framework and the macOS-bundled LibreSSL 3.3.6 /usr/bin/curl — does not advertise ed25519 in the ClientHello signature_algorithms extension for server certs, so the handshake fails with the server-side log line: tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms Homebrew OpenSSL 3.x, Chrome, Firefox, and Linux curl all accept ed25519 server certs fine. Apple is the outlier. Rather than gate the demo stack behind "install Homebrew OpenSSL first," swap the bootstrap algorithm to ECDSA-P256 with SHA-256 — universally supported, including on the Apple stack. Changes - deploy/docker-compose.yml: certctl-tls-init openssl invocation swapped to `-newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -nodes`; header comment + echo line updated; multi-line rationale paragraph added. - deploy/docker-compose.test.yml: same openssl swap + echo update for the test harness sidecar that writes to the bind-mounted ./test/certs directory the Go integration_test.go pins via CERTCTL_TEST_CA_BUNDLE. - docs/tls.md: Pattern 1 description + code block updated; "Why ECDSA-P256 and not ed25519" rationale paragraph added covering pre-v2.0.48 history, the Apple diagnosis, accepting clients, and the operator migration command. Patterns 2 (existing Secret) and 3 (cert-manager) explicitly called out as unaffected. - docs/upgrade-to-tls.md: docker-compose procedure sentence updated with cross-reference to tls.md Pattern 1. - docs/test-env.md: "Get the CA bundle for curl" sentence updated. Migration Existing demo installs must tear the `certs` named volume down to pick up the new algorithm: docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml down -v docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d --build Not touched - cmd/server/tls.go: algorithm-agnostic. TLS 1.3 min version with [X25519, P-256] curve preferences for key exchange is orthogonal to the server cert's signature algorithm. No Go code change needed. - Helm chart: Patterns 2 and 3 operators supply their own cert; this patch does not affect them. - Unrelated ed25519 uses (agent key algorithm detection, profile algorithm options, SSH key path examples, tlsprobe key metadata, cloud discovery key-algo display): all orthogonal to the server TLS bootstrap cert. Incidental cleanup - .gitignore: dropped dangling `strategy.md` entry (file doesn't exist in repo; entry was cruft).	2026-04-20 04:17:05 +00:00
shankar0123	52248be717	v2.0.47: HTTPS Everywhere — TLS-only control plane, agents/CLI/MCP ... Breaking change release. Plaintext HTTP listener removed. The certctl control plane now terminates TLS 1.3 on :8443 via http.Server.ListenAndServeTLS. No CERTCTL_TLS_ENABLED=false escape hatch. No dual-listener mode. One-step cutover per docs/upgrade-to-tls.md. Server - cmd/server/tls.go: certHolder with SIGHUP hot-reload + atomic cert swap, buildServerTLSConfig (TLS 1.3 min, GetCertificate callback), preflightServerTLS validation - cmd/server/main.go: ListenAndServeTLS in place of ListenAndServe, watchSIGHUP wiring, cert/key path config threading - tls_test.go: 418-line regression coverage of reload, preflight, callback behavior, SAN validation Config - CERTCTL_TLS_CERT_PATH / CERTCTL_TLS_KEY_PATH (required) - Plaintext rejection: agents/CLI/MCP pre-flight-fail on http:// URLs with a pointer to docs/upgrade-to-tls.md Agents, CLI, MCP - All three pre-flight-reject http:// URLs with fail-loud diagnostic - CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH for private-CA trust - CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY for dev-only bypass (loud warning on startup) - install-agent.sh emits both vars as commented template lines docker-compose - certctl-tls-init sidecar generates SAN-valid self-signed cert into deploy/test/certs/ on first boot - All demo-stack curls pin against ca.crt with --cacert Helm chart - Three TLS provisioning modes, exactly one required: - server.tls.existingSecret (operator-supplied) - server.tls.certManager.enabled (cert-manager integration) - server.tls.selfSigned.enabled (eval only — not for production) - server-certificate.yaml template for cert-manager mode - helm install without a TLS source fails at template render with a pointer to docs/tls.md CI - .github/workflows/ci.yml Helm Chart Validation step renders the chart in both existingSecret and cert-manager modes, plus an inverse guard-regression test that asserts helm template MUST refuse to render when no TLS source is configured. Previously the single `helm template` invocation hit the certctl.tls.required fail-loud guard and exit-1'd CI. Four invocations now: lint (existingSecret), template (existingSecret), template (cert-manager), template (no args — must fail). Integration tests - deploy/test/integration_test.go stands up the Compose stack over HTTPS, extracts the CA bundle, and exercises every certctl API over https://localhost:8443 - All 34 integration subtests green (per Phase 8 local CI-parity) Documentation - New: docs/tls.md (provisioning patterns, rotation, SIGHUP reload) - New: docs/upgrade-to-tls.md (one-step cutover, no-downgrade warnings, fleet-roll sequencing) - CHANGELOG.md: v2.2.0 "HTTPS Everywhere — The Irony" entry (file heading unchanged; release tag is v2.0.47) - All curls in docs/, examples/, deploy/helm/ guides use https://localhost:8443 --cacert Verification - grep -rn "ListenAndServe[^T]" cmd/ internal/ → 0 hits - grep -rn "\"http://" cmd/ internal/ → 2 benign hits (Caddy admin API default, SSRF doc comment) — zero certctl endpoints - Tasks #197–#206 (Phases 0–8) all closed in the tracker Files: 65 changed, 3489 insertions, 372 deletions (pre-CI-fix).	2026-04-20 03:43:10 +00:00
shankar0123	3287e174dc	Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001) ... Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006) on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests, and the React client. M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash, principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel. * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware, bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer now read the principal off the context and persist it on every audit_events row. * Regression coverage: - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation, principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for unauthenticated endpoints. - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go, job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions. M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B) * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403 when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field. * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and viewers receive 403. * Regression coverage: - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf, TestRejectJob_NotSelf. - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go — TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds. M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto: GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id} Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5) GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial} Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960) * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served. * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial. * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404. * Regression coverage: - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer. - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP. - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are mounted on the unauthenticated branch. M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002 EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in. Verification (all gates green): * go vet ./... — clean * go build ./... — ok * go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits, all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments. Documentation: * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 → Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.) * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification closure note. * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md, docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md, docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named API keys. * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths. .gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session- scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.	2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00
shankar0123	0822f748a5	feat: S/MIME certificate support in integration tests + test env docs ... Add S/MIME (emailProtection EKU) end-to-end test coverage: - ValidateCommonName() now accepts email addresses for S/MIME certs - S/MIME test profile (prof-test-smime) in seed data - Phase 11 test: issuance, EKU, KeyUsage, email SAN verification - EST config enabled in test Docker Compose - Portable KeyUsage parsing (awk, works on BSD/GNU) - Full test environment documentation (docs/test-env.md) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-02 18:32:57 -04:00