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Author SHA1 Message Date
shankar0123 a546a1bbef feat(scep): EnvelopedData decrypt + signerInfo POPO verify (RFC 8894 §3.2) 
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 2 of 14.

Implements the new RFC 8894 PKIMessage parse path: EnvelopedData parser
+ decryptor, signerInfo parser + signature verifier, handler dispatch
that tries the RFC 8894 path FIRST and falls through to the legacy MVP
raw-CSR path on any parse failure. Backward compat with lightweight SCEP
clients is preserved by design — no behavior change for any existing
deploy that doesn't set CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_*.

internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata.go (new, ~330 LoC)
  * ParseEnvelopedData: parses CMS EnvelopedData per RFC 5652 §6.1, with
    optional outer ContentInfo unwrapping. Handles SET OF RecipientInfo
    + IssuerAndSerial form rid (RFC 8894 §3.2.2).
  * EnvelopedData.Decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key-trans + AES-CBC (128/192/
    256) or DES-EDE3-CBC content decryption with **constant-time PKCS#7
    padding strip** (no branch on padding-byte values; closes the
    padding-oracle leak surface). Recipient mismatch is BadMessageCheck
    per RFC 8894 §3.3.2.2 (NOT BadCertID); every failure mode returns
    the same ErrEnvelopedDataDecrypt sentinel to close timing-leak legs
    of Bleichenbacher attacks.
  * Equivalent to micromdm/scep's cryptoutil/cryptoutil.go::DecryptPKCS-
    Envelope (cited in code comments; not vendored — fuzz-target
    ownership stays in this sub-package per the operating rule).

internal/pkcs7/signedinfo.go (new, ~370 LoC)
  * ParseSignedData / ParseSignerInfos: parses CMS SignedData per RFC
    5652 §5.3. Resolves each SignerInfo's SID (IssuerAndSerial v1 OR
    [0] SubjectKeyId v3) against the SignedData certificates SET to
    pluck the device's transient signing cert.
  * SignerInfo.VerifySignature: re-serialises signedAttrs as the
    canonical SET OF Attribute (the RFC 5652 §5.4 quirk every CMS
    implementation hits — wire form is [0] IMPLICIT but the signature
    is over EXPLICIT SET OF). Hashes with SHA-1/SHA-256/SHA-512 +
    verifies via RSA PKCS1v15 or ECDSA per the cert's pubkey type.
  * Auth-attr extractors: GetMessageType (PrintableString-decimal),
    GetTransactionID, GetSenderNonce, GetMessageDigest. SCEP attr OIDs
    pinned (RFC 8894 §3.2.1.4).

internal/pkcs7/{envelopeddata,signedinfo}_fuzz_test.go (new)
  * FuzzParseEnvelopedData / FuzzParseSignedData / FuzzParseSignerInfos
    / FuzzVerifySignerInfoSignature — every parser certctl adds gets a
    panic-safety fuzzer (the fuzz-target-ownership rule from
    cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules). Local 5s runs hit ~270k
    executions per parser without panic. Errors are expected for
    arbitrary inputs; only panics are bugs.

internal/pkcs7/{envelopeddata,signedinfo}_test.go (new)
  * Round-trip tests that materialise real RSA/ECDSA pairs, hand-build
    the wire bytes, parse + decrypt + verify, and assert plaintext /
    auth-attr equality. The build helpers use this package's ASN1Wrap
    primitives directly (asn1.Marshal of structs containing nested
    asn1.RawValue is finicky for mixed Class/Tag); gives byte-level
    control matching what real SCEP clients emit.
  * Negative tests: tampered ciphertext / tampered auth-attrs / wrong
    RA / wrong key / mismatched recipients / random garbage all return
    the appropriate sentinel error without panic.

internal/service/scep.go
  * PKCSReqWithEnvelope: RFC 8894 envelope-aware variant. Returns
    *SCEPResponseEnvelope (not error + *SCEPEnrollResult) because RFC
    8894 §3.3 mandates a CertRep PKIMessage on every response, even
    failures — the handler shouldn't translate Go errors into SCEP
    failInfo codes. Returns nil to signal 'invalid challenge password'
    so the caller can translate to HTTP 403 (matches MVP path's wire
    shape; RFC 8894 §3.3.1 is silent on this case).
  * mapServiceErrorToFailInfo: exact mapping table from the prompt
    (CSR parse → BadRequest, CSR sig → BadMessageCheck, crypto policy
    → BadAlg, default → BadRequest).

internal/api/handler/scep.go
  * SCEPService interface gains PKCSReqWithEnvelope.
  * SCEPHandler now optionally carries an RA cert + key pair. SetRAPair
    upgrades the handler to the RFC 8894 path; without that call the
    handler stays MVP-only (the v2.0.x behavior).
  * pkiOperation: tries the RFC 8894 path FIRST when the RA pair is
    set. tryParseRFC8894 helper does the full pipeline (ParseSignedData
    → VerifySignature → extract auth-attrs → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt
    → x509.ParseCertificateRequest the recovered bytes). On any failure
    it falls through to the legacy extractCSRFromPKCS7 MVP path —
    backward compat is non-negotiable.
  * Phase 2 emits the legacy certs-only response on RFC 8894 success;
    Phase 3 (next commit) swaps in writeCertRepPKIMessage with the
    proper status / failInfo / nonce-echo wire shape.

cmd/server/main.go
  * Per-profile loop now calls loadSCEPRAPair after preflight to load
    the cert + key + inject via SetRAPair. crypto + crypto/tls imports
    added.
  * loadSCEPRAPair helper: tls.X509KeyPair-based parse + leaf cert
    extraction. Failures here indicate TOCTOU between preflight + load.

internal/api/handler/scep_handler_test.go +
internal/api/router/router_scep_profiles_test.go
  * mockSCEPService / scepProfileMockService gain PKCSReqWithEnvelope
    stubs to satisfy the extended interface. Existing test cases
    unchanged (they exercise the MVP path; RA pair is unset).

Verification:
  * gofmt + go vet clean for the files I touched.
  * go test -short -count=1 green across pkcs7 / api/handler /
    api/router / service / cmd/server.
  * Coverage: pkcs7 78.4% (was 100% — drops because new code includes
    paths the round-trip tests don't yet hit, like decryption alg
    fall-through and v3 SubjectKeyId SID matching).
  * Fuzz-target seed-corpus runs (5s each, ~270k execs/parser): no
    panic. Pre-merge fuzz-time bumps to 30s per the prompt's
    verification gate.

Phase 2 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Living progress at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md.
 2026-04-29 12:36:27 +00:00
shankar0123 95d0d85391 Bundle Q (Coverage Audit Closure): property-based pilot + hygiene — L-001/L-002/L-003/L-004/I-001 closed 
Five small closures wrapping the Low-tier and Info-tier audit findings.

Q.1 — cmd/cli round-out (L-001 closed)
======================================
cmd/cli/dispatch_test.go: ~30 dispatch tests across handleCerts /
handleAgents / handleJobs / handleImport / handleStatus. httptest.NewTLSServer
mocks the API; cli.NewClient(_, _, _, _, true) constructs an
insecure-skip-verify client. Each test pins the missing-args usage-print
path AND the happy-path delegation. Result: 7.1% -> 63.5% coverage
(gate: >=30%).

Q.2 — awssm round-out (L-002 closed)
======================================
internal/connector/discovery/awssm/awssm_edge_test.go: New() default
constructor, extractKeyInfo (ECDSA/Ed25519/unknown — was RSA-only),
processSecret filter arms (NamePrefix mismatch / TagFilter mismatch /
empty-value / GetSecretValue error), realSMClient stub-contract pin
(ListSecrets / GetSecretValue / NewRealSMClient), and EmailAddresses
SAN extraction. Result: 78.2% -> 96.0% coverage (gate: >=85%).

Q.3 — Property-based testing pilot (L-003 closed)
======================================
gopter@v0.2.11 added to go.mod (test-only).

internal/crypto/encryption_property_test.go:
- TestProperty_EncryptDecryptRoundTrip — 50 successful tests,
  DecryptIfKeySet(EncryptIfKeySet(x, k), k) == x
- TestProperty_WrongPassphraseRejected — 30 successful tests,
  AEAD never returns nil-error AND bytes-equal plaintext under
  wrong passphrase
Both skipped under -short to keep developer loop fast (PBKDF2 600k
rounds × 50 iters ≈ 15s on -race CI).

internal/pkcs7/length_property_test.go:
- TestProperty_ASN1LengthRoundTrip — three sub-properties:
  decodeLength(encode(x)) == x for x ∈ [0, 2³¹−1]; short-form
  invariant (length<128 → 1 byte == length); long-form invariant
  (length>=128 → high bit set + N bytes follow). 500 successful
  tests in <10ms.

Q.4 — Architecture diagram multi-agent update (L-004 closed)
======================================
docs/qa-test-guide.md::Architecture: ASCII diagram updated to show
'certctl-agent (×N)' + callout explaining seed_demo.sql provisions
12 agent rows (1 active, 2 retired, 9 reserved/sentinel) for Parts
04, 05, 55 + FSM coverage. Operators running parallel-agent topologies
guided to AGENT_COUNT=N + 'make qa-stats'.

Q.5 — Test-naming CI guard (I-001 closed)
======================================
.github/workflows/ci.yml: Test-naming convention guard added after
the QA-doc seed-count drift guard. Greps for func Test<X>( missing
the <X>_<Scenario> suffix. Prints first 20 non-conformant as
::warning:: annotations. continue-on-error: true (informational).
Excludes TestMain + TestProperty_*. Promotion to hard-fail tracked
as I-001-extended.

Verification
======================================
- python3 yaml.safe_load on ci.yml: OK
- go vet ./cmd/cli/... ./internal/connector/discovery/awssm/...
  ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/pkcs7/...: clean
- go test -short -count=1 across all four packages: PASS
- go test -count=1 (full property tests): PASS
  - crypto 15.4s (50 + 30 × 600k PBKDF2)
  - pkcs7 5ms

Audit deliverables
======================================
- gap-backlog.md: strikethroughs on L-001/L-002/L-003/L-004/I-001
  with per-finding closure note
- closure-plan.md: ticks Bundle Q [x] with per-item breakdown

Closes: L-001, L-002, L-003, L-004, I-001
Bundle: Q (Property-Based + Hygiene)
 2026-04-27 18:36:47 +00:00
shankar0123 1c099071d1 fix(bundle-4): EST/SCEP Attack Surface Hardening — 3 audit findings closed 
Closes 3 findings (1 High + 1 Medium + 1 Low) from
/Users/shankar/Desktop/cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/.

Bundle 4 hardens the only attack surface reachable by an anonymous network
attacker in certctl: the unauthenticated EST + SCEP enrollment endpoints.

Findings closed:

  - H-004 (High): Hand-rolled ASN.1 parser had no fuzz target.
    The audit's original framing pointed at internal/pkcs7/, but recon
    confirmed that package is an ASN.1 ENCODER (BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7,
    ASN1Wrap*, ASN1EncodeLength) — not a parser. The actual hand-rolled
    PKCS#7 PARSING reachable via anonymous network is in
    internal/api/handler/scep.go::extractCSRFromPKCS7 +
    parseSignedDataForCSR. Added native go fuzz targets:
      * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7
      * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzParseSignedDataForCSR
      * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzPEMToDERChain (defense-in-depth)
      * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzASN1EncodeLength (defense-in-depth)
    Local 15s fuzz session: 150k execs on FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7,
    937k on FuzzPEMToDERChain, 925k on FuzzASN1EncodeLength — zero panics.

  - M-021 (Medium): EST TLS-Unique channel binding (RFC 7030 §3.2.3).
    Added internal/api/handler/est.go::verifyESTTransport — defense-in-depth
    TLS pre-conditions (r.TLS != nil; HandshakeComplete; TLS ≥ 1.2).
    The full §3.2.3 channel binding only applies when EST mTLS is in use;
    certctl does not currently support EST mTLS, so the §3.2.3 requirement
    is moot today. RFC 9266 (TLS 1.3 tls-exporter) and EST mTLS are
    documented as deferred follow-ups in the verifyESTTransport doc comment.

  - L-005 (Low): EST/SCEP issuer-binding fail-loud at startup.
    Pre-Bundle-4 cmd/server/main.go validated that CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID and
    CERTCTL_SCEP_ISSUER_ID existed in the registry but did NOT validate the
    issuer TYPE could emit a CA cert. An operator binding EST to an ACME
    issuer (whose GetCACertPEM returns explicit error) booted successfully
    and only failed at first /est/cacerts request. Post-Bundle-4: new
    preflightEnrollmentIssuer helper calls GetCACertPEM(ctx) at startup
    with a 10s timeout. Failure logs the connector error + the candidate
    issuer types and os.Exit(1).

Tests added/modified:
  - internal/api/handler/est_transport_test.go (new) — 5 verifyESTTransport
    table cases covering plaintext-rejected, incomplete-handshake-rejected,
    TLS 1.0 rejected, TLS 1.2/1.3 accepted
  - cmd/server/preflight_test.go (new) — TestPreflightEnrollmentIssuer
    covering nil-connector, error-from-issuer, empty-PEM, valid cases
  - internal/api/handler/est_handler_test.go (modified) — 7 POST sites
    now stamp r.TLS to satisfy the new transport pre-condition
  - internal/integration/negative_test.go (modified) — setupTestServer
    wraps the test handler with a fake-TLS-state injector so the EST
    handler receives r.TLS != nil; production paths still rely on the
    real TLS listener

Threat model reference: TB-11 (EST/SCEP client ↔ Server) per
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/threat-model.md.
Standards: RFC 7030 §3.2.3, RFC 8894 §3, RFC 5652, RFC 9266 (deferred).
 2026-04-25 21:14:41 +00:00
shankar0123 bcefb11e65 feat(M51): add SCEP server (RFC 8894) for MDM and network device enrollment 
Implements Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol with single-endpoint
operation-based dispatch (GetCACaps, GetCACert, PKIOperation), PKCS#7
SignedData CSR extraction with fallback for raw/base64 CSR, challenge
password authentication via CSR attributes, and shared internal/pkcs7
package extracted from EST handler to eliminate code duplication.

24 new tests (11 service + 13 handler) plus 5 shared pkcs7 package tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-15 16:47:18 -04:00