certctl

gsadmin/certctl

Fork 0

mirror of https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git synced 2026-06-11 04:58:57 +00:00

Commit Graph

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shankar0123	a172b6ed3b	Bundle B CI follow-up: G-3 env-var docs + M-028 closure (final 5 SA1019 sites) Two CI failures on master after Bundle B merge: 1. Frontend Build / G-3 env-var docs guardrail Bundle B introduced CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS and CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST without adding them to docs/features.md. The guardrail step that scans Go source for getEnv* calls and asserts each appears in a doc page failed. Fix: docs/features.md rate-limit section extended with both new env vars + a paragraph explaining the per-key keying contract from M-025. 2. Go Build & Test / staticcheck SA1019 hits (6 errors) The CI workflow runs staticcheck without continue-on-error. Bundle 7 opened M-028 to track 6 deprecated-API sites; Bundle 9 closed 1 of them (the elliptic.Marshal in local.go) but kept a deliberate regression-oracle reference in bundle9_coverage_test.go protected only by golangci-lint's //nolint comment — staticcheck-as-CLI does not honor that, only its native //lint:ignore directive. Closure of remaining 5 sites: cmd/server/main_test.go:47, 163, 192, 465 — 4 × middleware.NewAuth migrated to middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit NamedAPIKey entries. The auth=none case at line 465 maps to a nil NamedAPIKey slice (no-op pass-through, matches the NewAuthWithNamedKeys contract for empty input). Audit count was 3; recon found a 4th at line 465 that was missed. internal/api/handler/scep.go:266 — csr.Attributes is a real RFC 2985 §5.4.1 challengePassword carve-out. Go's stdlib deprecation note explicitly applies only to OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.14 (requestedExtensions), NOT to OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.7 (challengePassword), for which there is no non-deprecated stdlib API. Suppressed with native //lint:ignore SA1019 + comment block citing the RFC. internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go:342 — deliberate regression-oracle that calls elliptic.Marshal to prove the new crypto/ecdh path is byte-identical. Comment converted from //nolint:staticcheck to native //lint:ignore SA1019 so staticcheck-as-CLI honors the suppression. Audit deliverables: cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: M-028 box flipped [x]; score 30/55 -> 31/55 (Medium 12/27 -> 13/27). cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: M-028 status partial_closed -> closed with closure note. Verification: go test -count=1 -short ./cmd/server ./internal/api/handler ./internal/connector/issuer/local ./internal/api/middleware ./internal/config — all green. staticcheck on each changed package — 0 SA1019 hits. Bundle C had M-028 in scope; this CI-fix lift moves it forward so master CI goes green immediately. Bundle C scope adjusts to remove M-028 and focuses on M-006 / M-015 / M-016 / M-019 / M-020 plus the M-007 / M-008 coverage gaps.	2026-04-26 23:35:13 +00:00
shankar0123	521802f824	Bundle 9 follow-up: ST1018 ESC sweep + make verify pre-commit gate CI on the bundle-9 merge (run #24962543332) failed golangci-lint with 16 staticcheck ST1018 'string literal contains the Unicode format character U+202X, consider using the \u202X escape sequence' hits — across the two test files we added (internal/validation/unicode_test.go + internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go). Mechanical sweep, byte-identical at runtime: internal/validation/unicode_test.go (13 + 1 hits cleared) RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E + U+2066..U+2069 (lines 39-47) zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 (lines 67-70) additional U+202E in TestValidateUnicodeSafe_ErrorMentionsByteOffset internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (3 hits) U+202E in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsDNSNameRTL U+200B in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsEmailZeroWidth U+202E in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsAdditionalSAN The strings now use Go \uXXXX escape sequences. Identical UTF-8 bytes hit ValidateUnicodeSafe at runtime — every test passes unchanged locally. The file-header comment in unicode_test.go that promised this convention is now actually honored. Verification: staticcheck -checks=ST1018 returns clean across the two packages. go test -count=1 -short still green. Pre-commit gate added to prevent recurrence: Makefile: new 'verify' aggregate target runs gofmt + go vet + golangci-lint run + go test -short — same set CI enforces. Run 'make verify' before every commit going forward. cowork/CLAUDE.md: new 'Pre-commit verification gate' paragraph in Operating Rules. Documents make verify as the canonical gate; explains WHY (Bundle-9 shipped green-on-vet / red-on-CI because ST1018 only fires under golangci-lint's staticcheck, not vet); documents the staticcheck-only fallback for disk-constrained sandboxes. This commit changes only: - 2 test source files (\uXXXX escapes, no behavior change) - Makefile (1 new target, 1 .PHONY entry, 1 help line) - cowork/CLAUDE.md (1 new operating-rule paragraph)	2026-04-26 21:17:12 +00:00
shankar0123	1dcc7455cd	Bundle 9: Local-issuer hardening — 5 findings closed + 1 partial Closes H-010 + L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 from comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25; partial-closes M-028 (the local.go:682 elliptic.Marshal site only). H-010 (CWE-1257) — local-issuer coverage 68.3% -> 86.7% * internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (NEW) Adds ~30 subtests across CSR-acceptance failure paths, parsePrivateKey four-format coverage, resolveEKUsAndKeyUsage all-EKU + fallback, hashPublicKey RSA + ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 + unsupported curve, ecdsaToECDH byte-identical round-trip pin, loadCAFromDisk expired/non-CA/missing/happy, validateCSRUnicode all rejection arms, marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize / ensureKeyDirSecure all branches, ValidateConfig 5 arms, MaxTTLSeconds cap. * .github/workflows/ci.yml — flips local-issuer floor 60% -> 85% hard with explicit "add tests, do not lower the gate" comment. L-002 (CWE-226) — agent + local-CA private-key zeroization * internal/connector/issuer/local/keymem.go (NEW) * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW) marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize wraps x509.MarshalECPrivateKey with defer clear(der). Agent additionally defer clear(privKeyPEM) on the encoded buffer. Bounds heap-resident exposure of the private scalar to the duration of PEM-encode + os.WriteFile. L-003 (CWE-732) — 0700 key-directory hardening * internal/connector/issuer/local/keystore.go (NEW) * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW) ensureKeyDirSecure / ensureAgentKeyDirSecure create dir tree at 0700, accept owner-only modes, chmod-tighten permissive leaves with re-stat verification, refuse empty/root/dot. Wired ahead of every os.WriteFile(keyPath, ..., 0600) site in cmd/agent/main.go. L-012 (CWE-1007 + CWE-176) — Unicode safety in CN/SAN * internal/validation/unicode.go (NEW) * internal/validation/unicode_test.go (NEW, 8 test functions) ValidateUnicodeSafe rejects RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E + U+2066..U+2069, zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 + U+FEFF, control chars <0x20 + 0x7F..0x9F, and per-DNS-label Latin+non-Latin-letter mixes (Cyrillic-а-in-apple homograph). Pure-IDN labels allowed. Errors cite codepoint + byte offset. Wired into IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate via validateCSRUnicode covering CSR Subject CommonName + DNSNames + EmailAddresses + request-side additional SANs. L-014 — CA-key-in-process threat-model documentation * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go file-header doc comment Documents what the bundled defense-in-depth measures DO and DO NOT protect against; directs operators with stricter requirements to HSM/PKCS#11/cloud-KMS-backed signing (V3 Pro KMS-issuance roadmap entry as the source-of-truth fix). M-028 (CWE-477) PARTIAL — 1 of 6 SA1019 sites * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go::ecdsaToECDH (NEW helper) Replaces deprecated elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) inside hashPublicKey with crypto/ecdh.PublicKey.Bytes(). Dispatches on Curve.Params().Name to avoid importing crypto/elliptic for sentinel comparisons. Supports P-256/P-384/P-521; P-224 returns unsupported-curve error and the caller falls back to a stable X+Y big.Int.Bytes() hash (so SKI generation never panics). * TestHashPublicKey_ECDSA_RoundTripPin — byte-identical regression oracle that pins the new output to the legacy elliptic.Marshal output across all three supported curves (with explicit //nolint:staticcheck on the SA1019 reference). Migration cannot silently change the SubjectKeyId of every previously-issued cert. * 5 SA1019 sites still open (test-file middleware.NewAuth × 3 + scep.go csr.Attributes). Audit deliverables updated: * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md — score 20/55 -> 25/55 closed (High 6/9 -> 7/9; Low 4/19 -> 8/19). * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml — H-010 + L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 status open -> closed; M-028 status open -> partial_closed; closure notes cite the Bundle-9 mechanism. * certctl/CHANGELOG.md — Bundle-9 section under [unreleased].	2026-04-26 17:18:00 +00:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

shankar0123

a172b6ed3b

Bundle B CI follow-up: G-3 env-var docs + M-028 closure (final 5 SA1019 sites)

Two CI failures on master after Bundle B merge:

1. Frontend Build / G-3 env-var docs guardrail
   Bundle B introduced CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS and
   CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST without adding them to
   docs/features.md. The guardrail step that scans Go source for
   getEnv* calls and asserts each appears in a doc page failed.
   Fix: docs/features.md rate-limit section extended with both new
   env vars + a paragraph explaining the per-key keying contract
   from M-025.

2. Go Build & Test / staticcheck SA1019 hits (6 errors)
   The CI workflow runs staticcheck without continue-on-error. Bundle
   7 opened M-028 to track 6 deprecated-API sites; Bundle 9 closed 1
   of them (the elliptic.Marshal in local.go) but kept a deliberate
   regression-oracle reference in bundle9_coverage_test.go protected
   only by golangci-lint's //nolint comment — staticcheck-as-CLI does
   not honor that, only its native //lint:ignore directive.

   Closure of remaining 5 sites:
     cmd/server/main_test.go:47, 163, 192, 465 — 4 × middleware.NewAuth
       migrated to middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit
       NamedAPIKey entries. The auth=none case at line 465 maps to a
       nil NamedAPIKey slice (no-op pass-through, matches the
       NewAuthWithNamedKeys contract for empty input). Audit count was
       3; recon found a 4th at line 465 that was missed.
     internal/api/handler/scep.go:266 — csr.Attributes is a real RFC
       2985 §5.4.1 challengePassword carve-out. Go's stdlib deprecation
       note explicitly applies only to OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.14
       (requestedExtensions), NOT to OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.7
       (challengePassword), for which there is no non-deprecated
       stdlib API. Suppressed with native //lint:ignore SA1019 +
       comment block citing the RFC.
     internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go:342 —
       deliberate regression-oracle that calls elliptic.Marshal to
       prove the new crypto/ecdh path is byte-identical. Comment
       converted from //nolint:staticcheck to native //lint:ignore
       SA1019 so staticcheck-as-CLI honors the suppression.

Audit deliverables:
  cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: M-028 box
    flipped [x]; score 30/55 -> 31/55 (Medium 12/27 -> 13/27).
  cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: M-028 status
    partial_closed -> closed with closure note.

Verification:
  go test -count=1 -short ./cmd/server ./internal/api/handler
    ./internal/connector/issuer/local ./internal/api/middleware
    ./internal/config — all green.
  staticcheck on each changed package — 0 SA1019 hits.

Bundle C had M-028 in scope; this CI-fix lift moves it forward so
master CI goes green immediately. Bundle C scope adjusts to remove
M-028 and focuses on M-006 / M-015 / M-016 / M-019 / M-020 plus the
M-007 / M-008 coverage gaps.

2026-04-26 23:35:13 +00:00

shankar0123

521802f824

Bundle 9 follow-up: ST1018 ESC sweep + make verify pre-commit gate

CI on the bundle-9 merge (run #24962543332) failed golangci-lint with 16
staticcheck ST1018 'string literal contains the Unicode format character
U+202X, consider using the \u202X escape sequence' hits — across the
two test files we added (internal/validation/unicode_test.go +
internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go).

Mechanical sweep, byte-identical at runtime:

  internal/validation/unicode_test.go (13 + 1 hits cleared)
    RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E + U+2066..U+2069 (lines 39-47)
    zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 (lines 67-70)
    additional U+202E in TestValidateUnicodeSafe_ErrorMentionsByteOffset

  internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (3 hits)
    U+202E in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsDNSNameRTL
    U+200B in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsEmailZeroWidth
    U+202E in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsAdditionalSAN

The strings now use Go \uXXXX escape sequences. Identical UTF-8 bytes
hit ValidateUnicodeSafe at runtime — every test passes unchanged
locally. The file-header comment in unicode_test.go that promised this
convention is now actually honored.

Verification: staticcheck -checks=ST1018 returns clean across the two
packages. go test -count=1 -short still green.

Pre-commit gate added to prevent recurrence:

  Makefile: new 'verify' aggregate target runs gofmt + go vet +
    golangci-lint run + go test -short — same set CI enforces. Run
    'make verify' before every commit going forward.

  cowork/CLAUDE.md: new 'Pre-commit verification gate' paragraph in
    Operating Rules. Documents make verify as the canonical gate;
    explains WHY (Bundle-9 shipped green-on-vet / red-on-CI because
    ST1018 only fires under golangci-lint's staticcheck, not vet);
    documents the staticcheck-only fallback for disk-constrained
    sandboxes.

This commit changes only:
  - 2 test source files (\uXXXX escapes, no behavior change)
  - Makefile (1 new target, 1 .PHONY entry, 1 help line)
  - cowork/CLAUDE.md (1 new operating-rule paragraph)

2026-04-26 21:17:12 +00:00

shankar0123

1dcc7455cd

Bundle 9: Local-issuer hardening — 5 findings closed + 1 partial

Closes H-010 + L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25; partial-closes M-028 (the local.go:682
elliptic.Marshal site only).

H-010 (CWE-1257) — local-issuer coverage 68.3% -> 86.7%
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (NEW)
    Adds ~30 subtests across CSR-acceptance failure paths, parsePrivateKey
    four-format coverage, resolveEKUsAndKeyUsage all-EKU + fallback,
    hashPublicKey RSA + ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 + unsupported curve,
    ecdsaToECDH byte-identical round-trip pin, loadCAFromDisk
    expired/non-CA/missing/happy, validateCSRUnicode all rejection arms,
    marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize / ensureKeyDirSecure all branches,
    ValidateConfig 5 arms, MaxTTLSeconds cap.
  * .github/workflows/ci.yml — flips local-issuer floor 60% -> 85% hard
    with explicit "add tests, do not lower the gate" comment.

L-002 (CWE-226) — agent + local-CA private-key zeroization
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/keymem.go (NEW)
  * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW)
    marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize wraps x509.MarshalECPrivateKey with
    defer clear(der). Agent additionally defer clear(privKeyPEM) on the
    encoded buffer. Bounds heap-resident exposure of the private scalar
    to the duration of PEM-encode + os.WriteFile.

L-003 (CWE-732) — 0700 key-directory hardening
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/keystore.go (NEW)
  * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW)
    ensureKeyDirSecure / ensureAgentKeyDirSecure create dir tree at 0700,
    accept owner-only modes, chmod-tighten permissive leaves with
    re-stat verification, refuse empty/root/dot. Wired ahead of every
    os.WriteFile(keyPath, ..., 0600) site in cmd/agent/main.go.

L-012 (CWE-1007 + CWE-176) — Unicode safety in CN/SAN
  * internal/validation/unicode.go (NEW)
  * internal/validation/unicode_test.go (NEW, 8 test functions)
    ValidateUnicodeSafe rejects RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E +
    U+2066..U+2069, zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 + U+FEFF,
    control chars <0x20 + 0x7F..0x9F, and per-DNS-label
    Latin+non-Latin-letter mixes (Cyrillic-а-in-apple homograph).
    Pure-IDN labels allowed. Errors cite codepoint + byte offset.
    Wired into IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate via
    validateCSRUnicode covering CSR Subject CommonName + DNSNames +
    EmailAddresses + request-side additional SANs.

L-014 — CA-key-in-process threat-model documentation
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go file-header doc comment
    Documents what the bundled defense-in-depth measures DO and DO NOT
    protect against; directs operators with stricter requirements to
    HSM/PKCS#11/cloud-KMS-backed signing (V3 Pro KMS-issuance roadmap
    entry as the source-of-truth fix).

M-028 (CWE-477) PARTIAL — 1 of 6 SA1019 sites
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go::ecdsaToECDH (NEW helper)
    Replaces deprecated elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) inside
    hashPublicKey with crypto/ecdh.PublicKey.Bytes(). Dispatches on
    Curve.Params().Name to avoid importing crypto/elliptic for sentinel
    comparisons. Supports P-256/P-384/P-521; P-224 returns
    unsupported-curve error and the caller falls back to a stable X+Y
    big.Int.Bytes() hash (so SKI generation never panics).
  * TestHashPublicKey_ECDSA_RoundTripPin — byte-identical regression
    oracle that pins the new output to the legacy elliptic.Marshal
    output across all three supported curves (with explicit
    //nolint:staticcheck on the SA1019 reference). Migration cannot
    silently change the SubjectKeyId of every previously-issued cert.
  * 5 SA1019 sites still open (test-file middleware.NewAuth × 3 +
    scep.go csr.Attributes).

Audit deliverables updated:
  * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md — score
    20/55 -> 25/55 closed (High 6/9 -> 7/9; Low 4/19 -> 8/19).
  * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml — H-010 +
    L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 status open -> closed; M-028 status
    open -> partial_closed; closure notes cite the Bundle-9 mechanism.
  * certctl/CHANGELOG.md — Bundle-9 section under [unreleased].

2026-04-26 17:18:00 +00:00

3 Commits