Commit Graph

13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
shankar0123 a172b6ed3b Bundle B CI follow-up: G-3 env-var docs + M-028 closure (final 5 SA1019 sites)
Two CI failures on master after Bundle B merge:

1. Frontend Build / G-3 env-var docs guardrail
   Bundle B introduced CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS and
   CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST without adding them to
   docs/features.md. The guardrail step that scans Go source for
   getEnv* calls and asserts each appears in a doc page failed.
   Fix: docs/features.md rate-limit section extended with both new
   env vars + a paragraph explaining the per-key keying contract
   from M-025.

2. Go Build & Test / staticcheck SA1019 hits (6 errors)
   The CI workflow runs staticcheck without continue-on-error. Bundle
   7 opened M-028 to track 6 deprecated-API sites; Bundle 9 closed 1
   of them (the elliptic.Marshal in local.go) but kept a deliberate
   regression-oracle reference in bundle9_coverage_test.go protected
   only by golangci-lint's //nolint comment — staticcheck-as-CLI does
   not honor that, only its native //lint:ignore directive.

   Closure of remaining 5 sites:
     cmd/server/main_test.go:47, 163, 192, 465 — 4 × middleware.NewAuth
       migrated to middleware.NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit
       NamedAPIKey entries. The auth=none case at line 465 maps to a
       nil NamedAPIKey slice (no-op pass-through, matches the
       NewAuthWithNamedKeys contract for empty input). Audit count was
       3; recon found a 4th at line 465 that was missed.
     internal/api/handler/scep.go:266 — csr.Attributes is a real RFC
       2985 §5.4.1 challengePassword carve-out. Go's stdlib deprecation
       note explicitly applies only to OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.14
       (requestedExtensions), NOT to OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.7
       (challengePassword), for which there is no non-deprecated
       stdlib API. Suppressed with native //lint:ignore SA1019 +
       comment block citing the RFC.
     internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go:342 —
       deliberate regression-oracle that calls elliptic.Marshal to
       prove the new crypto/ecdh path is byte-identical. Comment
       converted from //nolint:staticcheck to native //lint:ignore
       SA1019 so staticcheck-as-CLI honors the suppression.

Audit deliverables:
  cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: M-028 box
    flipped [x]; score 30/55 -> 31/55 (Medium 12/27 -> 13/27).
  cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: M-028 status
    partial_closed -> closed with closure note.

Verification:
  go test -count=1 -short ./cmd/server ./internal/api/handler
    ./internal/connector/issuer/local ./internal/api/middleware
    ./internal/config — all green.
  staticcheck on each changed package — 0 SA1019 hits.

Bundle C had M-028 in scope; this CI-fix lift moves it forward so
master CI goes green immediately. Bundle C scope adjusts to remove
M-028 and focuses on M-006 / M-015 / M-016 / M-019 / M-020 plus the
M-007 / M-008 coverage gaps.
2026-04-26 23:35:13 +00:00
shankar0123 521802f824 Bundle 9 follow-up: ST1018 ESC sweep + make verify pre-commit gate
CI on the bundle-9 merge (run #24962543332) failed golangci-lint with 16
staticcheck ST1018 'string literal contains the Unicode format character
U+202X, consider using the \u202X escape sequence' hits — across the
two test files we added (internal/validation/unicode_test.go +
internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go).

Mechanical sweep, byte-identical at runtime:

  internal/validation/unicode_test.go (13 + 1 hits cleared)
    RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E + U+2066..U+2069 (lines 39-47)
    zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 (lines 67-70)
    additional U+202E in TestValidateUnicodeSafe_ErrorMentionsByteOffset

  internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (3 hits)
    U+202E in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsDNSNameRTL
    U+200B in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsEmailZeroWidth
    U+202E in TestValidateCSRUnicode_RejectsAdditionalSAN

The strings now use Go \uXXXX escape sequences. Identical UTF-8 bytes
hit ValidateUnicodeSafe at runtime — every test passes unchanged
locally. The file-header comment in unicode_test.go that promised this
convention is now actually honored.

Verification: staticcheck -checks=ST1018 returns clean across the two
packages. go test -count=1 -short still green.

Pre-commit gate added to prevent recurrence:

  Makefile: new 'verify' aggregate target runs gofmt + go vet +
    golangci-lint run + go test -short — same set CI enforces. Run
    'make verify' before every commit going forward.

  cowork/CLAUDE.md: new 'Pre-commit verification gate' paragraph in
    Operating Rules. Documents make verify as the canonical gate;
    explains WHY (Bundle-9 shipped green-on-vet / red-on-CI because
    ST1018 only fires under golangci-lint's staticcheck, not vet);
    documents the staticcheck-only fallback for disk-constrained
    sandboxes.

This commit changes only:
  - 2 test source files (\uXXXX escapes, no behavior change)
  - Makefile (1 new target, 1 .PHONY entry, 1 help line)
  - cowork/CLAUDE.md (1 new operating-rule paragraph)
2026-04-26 21:17:12 +00:00
shankar0123 1dcc7455cd Bundle 9: Local-issuer hardening — 5 findings closed + 1 partial
Closes H-010 + L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25; partial-closes M-028 (the local.go:682
elliptic.Marshal site only).

H-010 (CWE-1257) — local-issuer coverage 68.3% -> 86.7%
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/bundle9_coverage_test.go (NEW)
    Adds ~30 subtests across CSR-acceptance failure paths, parsePrivateKey
    four-format coverage, resolveEKUsAndKeyUsage all-EKU + fallback,
    hashPublicKey RSA + ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 + unsupported curve,
    ecdsaToECDH byte-identical round-trip pin, loadCAFromDisk
    expired/non-CA/missing/happy, validateCSRUnicode all rejection arms,
    marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize / ensureKeyDirSecure all branches,
    ValidateConfig 5 arms, MaxTTLSeconds cap.
  * .github/workflows/ci.yml — flips local-issuer floor 60% -> 85% hard
    with explicit "add tests, do not lower the gate" comment.

L-002 (CWE-226) — agent + local-CA private-key zeroization
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/keymem.go (NEW)
  * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW)
    marshalPrivateKeyAndZeroize wraps x509.MarshalECPrivateKey with
    defer clear(der). Agent additionally defer clear(privKeyPEM) on the
    encoded buffer. Bounds heap-resident exposure of the private scalar
    to the duration of PEM-encode + os.WriteFile.

L-003 (CWE-732) — 0700 key-directory hardening
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/keystore.go (NEW)
  * cmd/agent/keymem.go (NEW)
    ensureKeyDirSecure / ensureAgentKeyDirSecure create dir tree at 0700,
    accept owner-only modes, chmod-tighten permissive leaves with
    re-stat verification, refuse empty/root/dot. Wired ahead of every
    os.WriteFile(keyPath, ..., 0600) site in cmd/agent/main.go.

L-012 (CWE-1007 + CWE-176) — Unicode safety in CN/SAN
  * internal/validation/unicode.go (NEW)
  * internal/validation/unicode_test.go (NEW, 8 test functions)
    ValidateUnicodeSafe rejects RTL/LTR overrides U+202A..U+202E +
    U+2066..U+2069, zero-width U+200B..U+200D + U+2060 + U+FEFF,
    control chars <0x20 + 0x7F..0x9F, and per-DNS-label
    Latin+non-Latin-letter mixes (Cyrillic-а-in-apple homograph).
    Pure-IDN labels allowed. Errors cite codepoint + byte offset.
    Wired into IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate via
    validateCSRUnicode covering CSR Subject CommonName + DNSNames +
    EmailAddresses + request-side additional SANs.

L-014 — CA-key-in-process threat-model documentation
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go file-header doc comment
    Documents what the bundled defense-in-depth measures DO and DO NOT
    protect against; directs operators with stricter requirements to
    HSM/PKCS#11/cloud-KMS-backed signing (V3 Pro KMS-issuance roadmap
    entry as the source-of-truth fix).

M-028 (CWE-477) PARTIAL — 1 of 6 SA1019 sites
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go::ecdsaToECDH (NEW helper)
    Replaces deprecated elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) inside
    hashPublicKey with crypto/ecdh.PublicKey.Bytes(). Dispatches on
    Curve.Params().Name to avoid importing crypto/elliptic for sentinel
    comparisons. Supports P-256/P-384/P-521; P-224 returns
    unsupported-curve error and the caller falls back to a stable X+Y
    big.Int.Bytes() hash (so SKI generation never panics).
  * TestHashPublicKey_ECDSA_RoundTripPin — byte-identical regression
    oracle that pins the new output to the legacy elliptic.Marshal
    output across all three supported curves (with explicit
    //nolint:staticcheck on the SA1019 reference). Migration cannot
    silently change the SubjectKeyId of every previously-issued cert.
  * 5 SA1019 sites still open (test-file middleware.NewAuth × 3 +
    scep.go csr.Attributes).

Audit deliverables updated:
  * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md — score
    20/55 -> 25/55 closed (High 6/9 -> 7/9; Low 4/19 -> 8/19).
  * cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml — H-010 +
    L-002 + L-003 + L-012 + L-014 status open -> closed; M-028 status
    open -> partial_closed; closure notes cite the Bundle-9 mechanism.
  * certctl/CHANGELOG.md — Bundle-9 section under [unreleased].
2026-04-26 17:18:00 +00:00
shankar0123 c655e0f8c5 fix(crypto/local-ca): reject expired or not-yet-valid sub-CA certificates on disk load (M-5)
loadCAFromDisk now validates the upstream sub-CA certificate's NotBefore
and NotAfter fields before accepting it, returning a fail-closed error
at server startup instead of silently loading an out-of-window CA.

Before this fix, loadCAFromDisk checked BasicConstraints.IsCA and
KeyUsage=CertSign but not the validity window. An expired enterprise
sub-CA (e.g. an ADCS subordinate whose rollover slipped) would load
without warning and the scheduler would mint child certs that every
RFC 5280 path validator rejects — outages show up at relying parties,
not at certctl, and only after thresholds trip.

CWE-672 (Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release); secondary
CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation). Error strings include the CA
subject CommonName and both RFC3339 timestamps so the log line is
actionable in a 3am incident.

Tests: TestSubCAMode gains three subtests exercising the new gate —
SubCA_ExpiredCert_IsRejected (CA expired 1h ago → error mentions
'expired' and the CN), SubCA_NotYetValid_IsRejected (CA valid +1h →
error mentions 'not yet valid' and the CN), and SubCA_BarelyValid_IsAccepted
(CA valid [now-1m, now+1h] → issuance succeeds, proving no
over-rejection). Adds generateTestSubCAWithValidity helper; the
original generateTestSubCA wrapper preserves the [now, now+5y] default
for existing tests.

Package coverage: 67.7% -> 68.3%.

Verification: go build, go vet, go test -race, go test -cover all
green locally; golangci-lint v2.11.4 clean; govulncheck clean. All CI
coverage floors met with margin (service 67.6/55, handler 78.6/60,
domain 92.7/40, middleware 80.0/30, crypto 86.7/85).

Parent: 5abeeb8 (M-8 per-ciphertext salt).
Closes: audit finding M-5 in certctl-audit-report.md.
2026-04-17 14:10:23 +00:00
shankar0123 f2e60b93a3 feat(M11c): crypto policy enforcement — CSR validation, MaxTTL caps, key metadata
Enforce certificate profile crypto constraints across all 5 issuance paths
(renewal, agent CSR, EST, SCEP). ValidateCSRAgainstProfile() rejects CSRs
with key algorithm/size that don't match profile rules. MaxTTL enforcement
caps certificate validity per issuer connector (Local CA, Vault, step-ca
enforce directly; ACME/DigiCert/Sectigo pass through). Key algorithm and
size are now persisted in certificate_versions for audit compliance.

16 new tests (12 service-layer + 4 Local CA connector). Removes hardcoded
version number from GUI sidebar. Documentation updated across architecture,
features, connectors, and README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 21:05:14 -04:00
shankar0123 ec21c9bb29 feat(m28+m29+m30): ACME ARI, email digest, and Helm chart
M28: ACME Renewal Information (RFC 9702) — CA-directed renewal timing
with cert ID computation, directory endpoint discovery, graceful
degradation for non-ARI CAs. 19 tests.

M29: Email notifier wiring + scheduled certificate digest — SMTP
connector bridged to service layer via NotifierAdapter, DigestService
with HTML email template, 7th scheduler loop (24h), digest preview/send
API endpoints and GUI card. 21 tests.

M30: Production-ready Helm chart — server Deployment, PostgreSQL
StatefulSet, agent DaemonSet, ConfigMaps, Secrets, Ingress, security
contexts, health probes, example values for dev/prod/ACME scenarios.

Also: OpenAPI spec updates, MCP tool additions, CI helm-lint job,
documentation updates across 5 doc files and README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 21:18:35 -04:00
shankar0123 a00bb349c4 feat(m27): certificate export (PEM/PKCS#12) and S/MIME EKU support
Add certificate export in PEM (JSON or file download) and PKCS#12 formats.
Private keys are never included — they stay on agents. Add EKU-aware
issuance threading profile EKUs (serverAuth, clientAuth, codeSigning,
emailProtection, timeStamping) through the full issuance pipeline. Fix
agent CSR SAN splitting for email addresses, adaptive KeyUsage flags for
S/MIME vs TLS, and a pre-existing generateID collision bug in deployment
job creation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 16:16:19 -04:00
shankar0123 7d14635a72 feat: add EST server (RFC 7030) for device certificate enrollment (M23)
Implement Enrollment over Secure Transport protocol with 4 endpoints under
/.well-known/est/ — cacerts (CA chain distribution), simpleenroll (initial
enrollment), simplereenroll (certificate renewal), and csrattrs (CSR
attributes). PKCS#7 certs-only wire format with hand-rolled ASN.1, accepts
both PEM and base64-encoded DER CSRs, configurable issuer and profile
binding, full audit trail. 28 new tests (18 handler + 10 service).

Also includes:
- GetCACertPEM added to issuer connector interface (all 4 issuers updated)
- EST integration tests wired into e2e test suite (13 test cases)
- QA testing guide Part 26 (15 manual EST test cases)
- All docs updated: README, features, architecture, concepts, connectors,
  quickstart, demo-advanced (endpoint counts, MCP wording, agent IDs,
  issuer interface, resource lists, OpenSSL status)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-25 15:31:06 -04:00
shankar0123 43a03c168c fix: Go 1.25 upgrade, codebase audit fixes, MCP server tests
Upgrade from Go 1.22 to 1.25 (minimum for MCP SDK, actively supported).
CI updated to match.

Codebase audit fixes:
- Local CA parseIP() now uses net.ParseIP — IP SANs no longer silently dropped
- Nil pointer guards in agent.go GetWorkWithTargets for target/cert enrichment
- MCP CreateCertificateInput marks owner_id/team_id as required
- NGINX connector uses CombinedOutput() — captures diagnostic output on failure
- Jobs handler validates JSON decode on rejection body — returns 400 on malformed
- CRL/OCSP handlers propagate requestID for error tracing

MCP server tests (26 tests):
- client_test.go: HTTP client coverage (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE, auth, 204, errors, binary)
- tools_test.go: tool registration, pagination, end-to-end flows with mock API

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-23 17:36:25 -04:00
shankar0123 762c523d59 feat: M15b — OCSP responder, DER CRL, short-lived exemption, revocation GUI
Backend:
- Embedded OCSP responder: GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial} returns
  signed OCSP responses (good/revoked/unknown) using CA key
- DER-encoded X.509 CRL: GET /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id} returns proper DER CRL
  signed by issuing CA with 24h validity window
- Short-lived cert exemption: certs with profile TTL < 1 hour skip CRL/OCSP
  (expiry is sufficient revocation for ephemeral workloads)
- Extended issuer connector interface with GenerateCRL and SignOCSPResponse
- Local CA implements full CRL/OCSP signing; ACME and step-ca return
  appropriate "use native endpoint" errors
- IssuerConnectorAdapter bridges new methods between layers

Frontend:
- Revoke button on certificate detail page with RFC 5280 reason modal
- Revocation banner with reason display and timestamp
- Revocation status indicators in lifecycle section
- "Revoked" filter option in certificates list
- API client: revokeCertificate() function and Certificate type extensions

Tests: ~31 new tests across connector, service, handler, and adapter layers
Docs: milestones renumbered (M13-M14, M16-M18), M15b marked complete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 14:39:10 -04:00
shankar0123 f5fed74d6f feat: M12 — sub-CA mode, ACME DNS-01 challenges, step-ca issuer connector
Sub-CA mode: Local CA loads CA cert+key from disk (CERTCTL_CA_CERT_PATH +
CERTCTL_CA_KEY_PATH) to operate as subordinate CA under enterprise root
(e.g., ADCS). Supports RSA, ECDSA, PKCS#8 keys. Validates IsCA and
KeyUsageCertSign. Falls back to self-signed when paths unset.

DNS-01 challenges: Pluggable DNSSolver interface with script-based hook
implementation. User-provided scripts create/cleanup _acme-challenge TXT
records for any DNS provider. Configurable propagation wait. Enables
wildcard certs and non-HTTP-accessible hosts.

step-ca connector: Smallstep private CA via native /sign API with JWK
provisioner auth. Issuance, renewal, revocation. Registered as iss-stepca.

23 new tests across 3 files. CI test path widened to ./internal/connector/issuer/...

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-21 22:55:50 -04:00
shankar0123 66f04f7afe style: run gofmt -s across all Go files
Fixes Go Report Card gofmt score from 52% to 100%.
Pure formatting changes — no logic modifications.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-17 19:32:29 -04:00
shankar0123 3a9fe8ba37 Complete V1 scaffold 2026-03-14 20:01:53 -04:00