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17 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
|
57b539c378 |
docs(b12): observability reference + Postgres backup runbook
Closes acquisition-diligence Bundle 12 — Observability, DR,
Operations Receipts, And Performance Proof. Source IDs: D5, D6, D8,
T9, finding 7, OPS-H1, OPS-M1, OPS-M2, LOW-7.
Two new operator-facing references; both non-audit-framed per the
Bundle 5 doc-placement policy.
docs/operator/observability.md — single canonical statement of what
certctl emits, what it doesn't, and what survives a restart:
- Metrics surface: both /api/v1/metrics (JSON) and
/api/v1/metrics/prometheus (text exposition v0.0.4); inventory of
certctl_certificate_* gauges + certctl_issuance_duration_seconds
per-issuer-type histogram + certctl_uptime_seconds.
- Prometheus library vs hand-rolled exposition: explicit scope
statement — hand-rolled fmt.Fprintf is intentional for v2.x given
the shallow metric surface; client_golang migration tracked as
v3 item (closes OPS-M1).
- Tracing: explicit deferral — no OTel SDK setup, OTel packages
are indirect-only in go.mod, no spans, no OTLP exporter; tracked
as v3 item; in the meantime structured logs carry request_id and
certctl_issuance_duration_seconds carries the per-issuer latency
signal (closes OPS-M2).
- Logging: structured JSON via log/slog; CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL control;
no key material / bearer tokens / session cookies in log lines.
- Rate-limit semantics under restarts + replicas: per-process,
in-memory, reset-on-restart, NOT shared across replicas; full
inventory of the 5 limiter call sites (break-glass login,
SCEP/Intune per-device, EST per-principal CSR, EST HTTP-Basic
source-IP, ACME per-account); multi-replica + sticky-session
implications; database-backed sliding window deferred to v3
(closes D8).
- Performance harness scope: cross-references the explicit
'What it explicitly does NOT measure' list in
deploy/test/loadtest/README.md (closes LOW-7 + finding 7).
docs/operator/runbooks/postgres-backup.md — operator-runnable
backup procedure:
- Inventory of what to back up (DB + operator-managed file
material that lives outside the DB: CA keys, RA keys, OCSP
responder keys, trust bundles).
- Logical backup recipe with docker-compose + Kubernetes variants,
integrity verification step, off-host storage step.
- Physical / PITR recipe pointing at pgbackrest / wal-g
(certctl ships nothing here — standard PostgreSQL DBA work).
- Three sample automation paths (in-cluster Postgres → S3 CronJob,
managed Postgres PITR, self-hosted VM systemd timer + restic).
- Quarterly restore-dry-run procedure.
- Helm CronJob template deliberately not shipped — three
documented reasons (deployment topology / secret-management
integration / off-host storage all vary by operator) plus
roadmap entry for shipping a starter template when a real
operator asks for one (closes D6 + OPS-H1).
Both new docs wired into docs/README.md Operator + Runbooks tables.
D5 (ServiceMonitor) and T9 (canonical k6 load-test) were already
shipped in Bundle 3 (deploy/helm/certctl/templates/servicemonitor.yaml)
and in deploy/test/loadtest/ + .github/workflows/loadtest.yml
respectively; this bundle doesn't touch them — it just records the
closure in the audit HTML.
Verified:
bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh # PASS
bash scripts/ci-guards/doc-rot-detector.sh # PASS
All 35 scripts/ci-guards/*.sh green.
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shankar0123
|
476022ca59 |
docs(b6): secret-custody reference + config-encryption upgrade runbook + private-key CI guard
Closes acquisition-diligence Bundle 6 findings on secret custody, config
encryption, and local artifact hygiene. Source IDs: S6, R4, SEC-M2,
RT-M1, RT-M2, RT-L1.
Surgical closures (artifact-only audit-framed memos stay out of the
public repo per the Bundle 5 lesson):
R4 / RT-L1 — local EC private key artifact
rm cmd/agent/mc-001.key (gitignored, never in git history, leftover
from a 2025-era agent dev run on the operator's workstation).
Added scripts/ci-guards/B6-no-private-keys-in-tree.sh that fails the
build if any TRACKED non-test file contains a PEM private-key block,
so the next attempt to commit similar material gets caught at CI.
Allowlist: *_test.go (hermetic-test PEMs), examples/*.md (sample
walkthroughs), internal/scep/intune/testdata/ (certificates, not
keys).
RT-M1 — landing-page HSM implication
certctl.io/index.html: 'their hardware' / 'your hardware' colloquial
comparisons rephrased to 'their custody' / 'your servers'. The phrase
'Your keys. Your hardware. Your data. Your terms.' becomes 'Your
keys. Your servers. Your data. Your terms.' to remove any inferred
HSM-backed key-storage claim. The technical disclosure now lives in
docs/operator/secret-custody.md (linked below); the landing page no
longer makes a claim it cannot back.
S6 + SEC-M2 + RT-M2 (composite documentation closure)
Added docs/operator/secret-custody.md — public operator reference
enumerating every secret material on the control plane and on
agents:
- Local CA private key (FileDriver, file-on-disk, heap-resident
with the L-014 carve-out documented in
internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go).
- Agent ECDSA P-256 keys (file on agent host, never transmitted).
- OIDC client secret (AES-256-GCM v3, PBKDF2 600k).
- Session signing key (same encryption regime).
- Break-glass credential (Argon2id, never encrypted).
- API-key bearer tokens (SHA-256 hash only; plaintext shown once).
- CSR private keys mid-issuance (agent memory only).
- Issuer-connector backend secrets (encrypted_config column,
fail-closed for source='database', plaintext-by-design for
source='env' with rationale).
The Env-seeded-vs-DB-seeded plaintext policy is explained in plain
text so a buyer review can independently verify the startup guard at
cmd/server/main.go:222-262 makes sense.
Added docs/operator/runbooks/config-encryption-upgrade.md — the
procedural arm: how to force v1/v2 -> v3 re-seal across the
database, plus the passphrase-rotation order. Documents the
AEAD-driven read fallback (v3 -> v2 -> v1) and the fact that
re-sealing happens passively on UPDATE. Open roadmap item: a
certctl admin reseal --all command (tracked in
WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md).
Both docs wired into docs/README.md Operator + Runbooks tables.
Verification:
rg -n 'CONFIG_ENCRYPTION|encrypt|v1|private key|HSM|PKCS11|mc-001.key|\.key|Local CA' \
internal cmd docs .gitignore README.md # ambient (no NEW leaks)
find . -name '*.key' \
-not -path './.git/*' -not -path './web/node_modules/*' # empty
git ls-files | xargs grep -lE 'BEGIN .* PRIVATE KEY' \
| grep -vE '_test\.go$|^examples/|^internal/scep/intune/testdata/' # empty
bash scripts/ci-guards/B6-no-private-keys-in-tree.sh # PASS
bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh # PASS
bash scripts/ci-guards/doc-rot-detector.sh # PASS
Residual roadmap (deliberately deferred):
- signer.PKCS11Driver (HSM-token-backed CA-key custody).
- signer.CloudKMSDriver (AWS/GCP/Azure KMS-backed CA-key custody).
- FIPS 140-3 mode for the whole control plane.
- HSM-backed session signing key.
- Built-in 'certctl admin reseal --all' command.
All five tracked in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md, not retracted.
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shankar0123
|
5b151e74da |
docs: remove audit-bundle-flavored docs from public repo
Three docs added in Bundle 4 + Bundle 5 closure commits ( |
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shankar0123
|
750478a6fe |
fix(scale): close BUNDLE 4 — migrations, scheduler HA, rate-limits, scale receipts
Bundle 4 closure (2026-05-13 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"what happens under multi-replica" question cluster: migration runner
had no concurrency control + no applied-version ledger, 15 scheduler
loops had per-process idempotency but no cross-replica documentation,
rate limits were process-local without an operator-facing scope
statement, load-test scope explicitly omitted four hot paths without
linking them to a roadmap.
Source findings closed:
HIGH-1 + D4 + finding 4 (migration tracking)
D8 (scheduler loop ownership)
MED-1 + MED-2 (rate-limit scope)
T9 + LOW-7 + finding 7 (load-test receipt scope)
Closures by source ID:
HIGH-1 + D4 + finding 4 — Migration tracking + advisory lock.
internal/repository/postgres/db.go::RunMigrations now wraps every
migration execution in:
1. A dedicated *sql.Conn pinned to one connection for the entire
scan + apply lifecycle (pg_advisory_lock is connection-scoped).
2. pg_advisory_lock(migrationAdvisoryLockID) — fixed int64 key
derived from "certctl-migrations" so the same constant resolves
across deployments without colliding with operator advisory
locks. Blocks the second replica until the first finishes.
3. CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations(version TEXT PK,
applied_at TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT NOW()) — audit ledger.
4. Skip-applied loop: SELECT version FROM schema_migrations →
map[string]struct{} → skip every .up.sql whose filename is in
the map. INSERT after successful execute, ON CONFLICT
(version) DO NOTHING for defense in depth.
Pre-Bundle-4 every server boot re-ran all 45 .up.sql files. The
"idempotency via IF NOT EXISTS / ON CONFLICT" contract in CLAUDE.md
held per-migration but offered no protection when two Helm replicas
raced on schema DDL. Post-Bundle-4 single-replica deploys see zero
behavior change beyond the audit-table population; multi-replica
deploys get HA-safe schema bootstrap.
D8 — Scheduler HA semantics documented.
New docs/operator/scheduler-ha.md with per-loop inventory of all 15
loops in internal/scheduler/scheduler.go. Classification:
- HA-safe (jobProcessorLoop, jobRetryLoop) — FOR UPDATE SKIP
LOCKED via ClaimPendingJobs (Bundle 1 H-6 closure,
|
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shankar0123
|
9f7b5d89a5 |
docs(contributor): document the Auditable Codebase Bundle guards
Three doc changes for the bundle's discoverability: 1. New docs/contributor/ci-guards.md (185 lines) Entry-point doc for new contributors. Explains the four categories of guards (code-shape, contract-parity, build/dep, operational), the discipline that keeps them honest (allowlist + expiration), and how to add a new one. Cross-references scripts/ci-guards/README.md for the exhaustive list. 2. scripts/ci-guards/README.md — added a 'Forward-looking guards' subsection naming complete-path-config-coverage, doc-rot-detector, and cold-db-compose-smoke with their item references + a one-sentence description of what each catches. Replaced the stale '22 guards' header with 'Count: re-derive via ls' per the no-version-stamped-numbers convention from CLAUDE.md. 3. docs/README.md — wired ci-guards.md into the Contributor section navigation table. Bumped 'Last reviewed:' to 2026-05-12 on the two docs touched (docs/README.md, docs/contributor/ci-pipeline.md). Verified: doc-rot-detector.sh green at 91 docs scanned, 89 dated, 0 warns, 0 fails. Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-1 Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-2 Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-5 Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-6 |
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shankar0123
|
56e2ea1ad7 |
docs: v2.1.0 release polish — strip internal bundle/phase tags, update status for OIDC ship
README:
- Rewrite Status block: drop the stale 'federated identity not yet
shipped' line; flag v2.1.0 OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout
+ break-glass as early-access; encourage GitHub issues for IdP
rough edges. (A1 framing — keep early-access umbrella, no
SAML/WebAuthn/JIT roadmap teaser.)
- Add OIDC SSO bullet to 'What it does' covering per-IdP runbooks,
group-claim → role mapping, AES-256-GCM client_secret encryption,
JWKS auto-refresh, PKCE-S256, RFC 9700 §4.7.1 pre-login binding,
RFC 9207 iss check, __Host- cookies, CSRF rotation, idle+absolute
expiry, BCL, break-glass admin.
- Update Security paragraph: three auth paths (API keys / OIDC /
break-glass), HMAC-signed sessions, CSRF rotation, RFC OIDC BCL.
- Correct CI coverage thresholds against
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml (service 70%, handler 75%,
crypto 88%, auth packages 85-95%); 'static analysis' replaces
the inflated '11 linters' claim (actual count is 4 active).
Docs B3 sweep — strip operator-facing 'Bundle N' / 'Phase N' tags:
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md — rewrite intro; rename 5 H2
sections (API-key + RBAC defenses / OIDC + sessions + break-glass
defenses / OIDC + sessions threat catalogue / Closed federated-
identity threats / Future-work threats); clean ~12 H3/prose hits.
- docs/operator/rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from intro,
scope_id deferral note, MCP tools section, day-0 bootstrap, and
'Where to look next'.
- docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md — drop 'Phase 14' framing from
title intro, hardware floor caption, result table caption,
methodology, and pre-merge audit section.
- docs/operator/security.md — already cleaned earlier this session
(RBAC / day-0 / approval-bypass / OIDC federation / sessions /
OIDC first-admin / break-glass H3s).
- docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/{index,keycloak,authentik,okta,
azure-ad}.md — strip Auth Bundle 2 framing + Phase 10/3/4
references; replace with feature-name prose.
- docs/operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md — drop Bundle F / M-023
audit-reference framing; keep CWE-326.
- docs/operator/database-tls.md — drop Bundle B / M-018 framing
from intro + Helm section.
- docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md — drop 'Production
hardening II Phase 10' status callout.
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO';
strip Bundle 1/2 framing from prereqs, troubleshooting, related
docs; update __Host- cookie callout from 'audit MED-14' to
v2.1.0-BREAKING.
- docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from
intro, migration table, IsAdmin section, and cross-references.
- docs/migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md — strip residual
'Phase 5' tags from cert-manager integration test references.
- docs/reference/configuration.md — retitle Auth section.
- docs/reference/profiles.md — strip Bundle 1 Phase 9 framing
from RequiresApproval section + Related list.
- docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md — rewrite intro
(API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout +
break-glass); rename 'Bundle 1 (RBAC) standards covered
separately' H2; clean per-row Phase references.
- docs/README.md — rewrite nav-table entries to drop Bundle 1/2
parentheticals; retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO' migration entry.
No code or test changes; pure operator-facing prose polish for
the v2.1.0 tag.
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shankar0123
|
c03d18bb1c |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 16: docs updates (security.md OIDC + sessions + break-glass + auditor split sections; new migration/oidc-enable.md; CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 Bundle 2 release notes)
Closes Phase 16 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Three operator-
facing docs updated, one new migration guide ships, README nav row
added.
Files
=====
docs/operator/security.md (MODIFIED, Last reviewed bumped to 2026-05-10):
* Added 5 new Bundle 2 subsections under '## Authentication
surface' after the Bundle 1 approval-bypass-closure entry:
- 'OIDC federation (Bundle 2 Phases 1-7)' — alg allow-list,
IdP-downgrade defense, iss/aud/azp/at_hash, single-use
state+nonce, PKCE-S256 mandatory, JWKS rotation handling,
encrypted client_secret at rest with the v3 blob format
pinned by an integration test, pointer to oidc-runbooks/
for per-IdP setup.
- 'Sessions + back-channel logout (Bundle 2 Phases 4-6)' —
length-prefixed HMAC cookie wire format, HttpOnly + Secure
+ SameSite cookie hardening, idle/absolute timeouts, CSRF
defense, signing-key rotation primitive, fail-fatal
EnsureInitialSigningKey at server boot, OpenID Connect
Back-Channel Logout 1.0 (NOT RFC 8414).
- 'OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Bundle 2 Phase 7)' — coexists
with Bundle 1's env-var-token bootstrap, group-scoped via
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS + CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID,
one-shot per tenant.
- 'Break-glass admin (Bundle 2 Phase 7.5)' — default-OFF,
surface invisibility via 404-not-403, Argon2id with OWASP
2024 params, lockout state machine, constant-time-via-
verifyDummy, WARN log at boot, runbook pointer for
operator drill.
- 'Migrating an existing deployment to OIDC' — pointer to
the new migration/oidc-enable.md walkthrough.
docs/migration/oidc-enable.md (NEW, Last reviewed 2026-05-10):
* Step-by-step migration guide for an operator on a Bundle-1-merged
deployment to enable OIDC SSO. Pre-reqs (CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
admin actor with auth.oidc.create + auth.oidc.edit, IdP tenant)
+ 7 numbered steps (pin encryption key, complete IdP-side per
runbook, configure certctl-side OIDCProvider, add group→role
mappings with fail-closed warning, optional first-admin bootstrap,
verify with single test user, announce SSO endpoint).
* Rollback section covering the 4-step disable flow + the 409
Conflict on provider-delete-while-sessions-exist + the
existing-sessions-keep-working-until-expiry semantics.
* Troubleshooting section pinning 8 most-common failure modes
(discovery doc fetch fails / IdP downgrade defense rejects /
no roles assigned / iss mismatch / pre-login expired / state
mismatch / sessions revoked but user can hit API / JWKS
rotation breaks login).
* Database row count drift documented so operators know what to
expect after OIDC is live (10 Bundle 2 tables enumerated).
* Cross-references to oidc-runbooks/ + security.md +
auth-threat-model.md + auth-benchmarks.md + auth-standards-implemented.md.
CHANGELOG.md (MODIFIED):
* v2.1.0 section title bumped from 'Auth Bundle 1: RBAC primitive'
to 'Auth Bundles 1 + 2: RBAC primitive + OIDC SSO + sessions'.
* Replaced the Bundle 1 closing-bullet ('Bundle 2 starts after
Bundle 1 lands on master') with 18 new Bundle 2 entries:
- OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + break-glass overview.
- OIDC token validation pinned at three layers (alg allow-list,
IdP-downgrade defense, OIDC Core §3.1.3.7 re-verification).
- Length-prefixed HMAC session cookies.
- CSRF double-submit + hashed-token-on-row.
- OIDC client_secret AES-256-GCM v3 blob at rest +
integration-test invariant.
- OIDC first-admin bootstrap.
- Default-OFF break-glass admin (Argon2id + lockout +
constant-time + surface invisibility).
- GUI: 4 new pages + login-page IdP buttons + sidebar logout.
- 11 new MCP tools for OIDC + session management.
- 6 per-IdP runbooks (Keycloak / Authentik / Okta / Auth0 /
Entra ID / Google Workspace).
- Threat model extended with 5 new defense subsections + 8 new
threat-catalogue subsections.
- Performance baselines documented (4 benchmarks; 3 measured
+ 1 operator-runs).
- Standards-and-RFC implementation table (13 RFCs + 14 CWEs;
NOT a compliance-mapping doc).
- Coverage gates held at floor 90 across all 4 Bundle 2
packages (anti-Bundle-1-mistake invariant).
- Multi-tenant query CI guard (ratchet baseline 32).
- Phase 10 Keycloak testcontainers integration test + optional
Okta smoke test.
- OpenAPI cookieAuth security scheme + 13 new endpoints + 4
break-glass endpoints.
- Bundle-1-only compat regression CI guard +
Bundle-1-to-2-upgrade regression CI guard.
* Final paragraph updated to point at oidc-enable.md alongside
api-keys-to-rbac.md as the two migration walkthroughs.
docs/README.md (MODIFIED):
* Added the new oidc-enable.md migration row under '## Migration'
alongside the existing api-keys-to-rbac.md entry, with a
one-line description flagging it as the Bundle 2 OIDC
onboarding walkthrough.
Verification
============
* Last-reviewed on security.md + oidc-enable.md: 2026-05-10.
* Internal-link sweep on oidc-enable.md: 0 broken (every relative
link resolves via shell-loop verification).
* Internal-link sweep on docs/README.md: 0 broken (all .md
references resolve).
* No Go-side impact, make verify gate unchanged.
Bundle 2 documentation deliverables now complete: security.md +
auth-threat-model.md + oidc-runbooks/ + auth-benchmarks.md +
auth-standards-implemented.md + api-keys-to-rbac.md + oidc-enable.md
+ CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0. The full Bundle 2 surface is operator-
discoverable from docs/README.md root nav.
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shankar0123
|
3f335af45e |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 15: docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md (RFC + CWE evidence list, NOT a compliance-mapping doc)
Closes Phase 15 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Ships a single operator-facing doc that lists every RFC the auth bundles implement and every CWE class the implementation closes, with concrete file paths + test anchors per row. Files ===== docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md (NEW): * Table 1: 13 RFCs / standards rows (RFC 6749, 7636, 7519, 7517, OIDC Core 1.0, OIDC BCL 1.0, RFC 6265, RFC 9700, RFC 8414, RFC 7633, RFC 8555, RFC 7515 plus the OIDC Core §5.3.2 UserInfo endpoint). Every row has a concrete source file path + a negative-test anchor. * Table 2: 14 CWE rows (CWE-287, 352, 384, 294, 916/329, 307, 345, 200, 770, 330, 311, 326, 1004, 614, 1275). Every row points at where the defense lives + where it is pinned. * Bundle 1 RBAC standards covered separately at the end with CWE-285, 862, 863, 732 pointers into Bundle 1's surface. * Explicit 'What this document is NOT' section preserving the operator's 2026-05-05 retired-compliance-docs decision: the doc is an evidence list, NOT a SOC 2 / PCI-DSS / HIPAA / NIST SP 800-53 / NIST SSDF / FedRAMP framework-mapping doc. Framework name-drops appear ONLY inside the explicit 'this is NOT' disclaimer paragraphs; no marketing-flavored prose claims certctl 'satisfies CC6.1' or similar. docs/README.md (MODIFIED): * Adds the auth-standards-implemented.md doc to the Reference section nav table between intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md and the deployment-model.md entry, with a one-line description flagging it as RFC + CWE evidence (NOT a compliance-mapping doc). Verification ============ * Last-reviewed header: 2026-05-10. * Internal-link sweep: every relative link resolves cleanly. * Framework-name grep: SOC 2 / PCI-DSS / HIPAA / NIST SSDF / FedRAMP appear ONLY inside the 'this is NOT a compliance- mapping doc' disclaimer paragraphs (lines 7 and 66 of the new doc). No marketing-flavored claims. * No Go-side impact; pure docs commit, make verify gate unchanged. |
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shankar0123
|
9b6294e83d |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 14: session + OIDC validation benchmarks (steady-state + cold paths) + auth-benchmarks.md operator doc + Makefile targets
Closes Phase 14 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Ships four
benchmarks producing four numbers + the operator-doc table; three
default-tag benchmarks runnable on every CI runner, the fourth
(cold-cache OIDC) runnable on operator-side Docker hosts via the
new make target.
Files
=====
internal/auth/session/bench_test.go (NEW):
* BenchmarkSession_SteadyState (target p99 < 1ms; measured 5µs).
Warm in-memory repo + warm session row. Pure CPU: parseCookie +
HMAC verify + map lookup + sentinel checks.
* BenchmarkSession_ColdProcess (target p99 < 10ms; measured 7.1ms).
Same pipeline but with a configurable per-call delay simulating
a 1ms Postgres RTT on each repo call. Two repo calls per
Validate (signing-key fetch + session-row fetch) = 2ms minimum;
Go time.Sleep granularity adds ~1-2ms jitter. Documented why
testcontainers Postgres isn't viable inside b.N: 30+ second
container boot incompatible with per-iteration timing.
* slowSessionRepo + slowKeyRepo wrappers add the per-call delay
via time.Sleep; they delegate to the existing in-memory stubs.
* reportPercentiles helper sorts + reports p50/p95/p99/max via
b.ReportMetric (Go testing.B doesn't surface percentiles
natively).
internal/auth/oidc/bench_test.go (NEW):
* BenchmarkOIDC_SteadyState (target p99 < 5ms; measured 1.5ms).
Drives full HandleCallback against an in-process mockIdP
(httptest.Server localhost loopback). Pre-warmed JWKS cache via
RefreshKeys at setup. Pipeline: pre-login consume + state
compare + token exchange (localhost ~50-200µs) + go-oidc
Verify (RSA-2048 sig verify + alg pin) + service-layer iss/
aud/azp/at_hash/exp/iat/nonce re-checks + group-claim
resolution + group→role mapping + user upsert + session mint.
* The localhost-loopback /token call adds ~100-500µs of TCP
overhead vs pure crypto; the prompt's "no network calls"
steady-state framing accommodates this since the localhost
loopback is the closest practical proxy for a same-region
IdP /token call (which adds 5-15ms in production).
internal/auth/oidc/bench_keycloak_test.go (NEW, //go:build integration):
* BenchmarkOIDC_ColdCache (target p99 < 200ms; operator-runs).
Drives RefreshKeys against a live Keycloak container from the
Phase 10 testfixtures harness. Each iteration evicts the
in-process cache + re-fetches discovery + re-fetches JWKS over
real HTTP + re-runs the IdP-downgrade-attack defense.
* Network-bounded: the cold path is dominated by HTTPS RTT to
the IdP discovery endpoint, NOT crypto. The 200ms cap
accommodates a geographically-distant IdP (~150ms RTT) plus
the in-process JWKS fetch + downgrade-defense logic (~5ms
locally).
* Reuses the sharedKeycloak fixture from
integration_keycloak_test.go (Phase 10) so the benchmark
doesn't pay the 60-90s container boot cost separately. Skips
with a clear message if invoked without the integration test
setup.
* Reports p50/p95/p99/max in MILLISECONDS (vs the
microsecond-granularity steady-state benchmarks) since the
cold path is two orders of magnitude slower.
internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go (MODIFIED):
* Refactored newMockIdP(t *testing.T) to delegate to a new
newMockIdPWithTB(t testing.TB) sibling. Standard Go pattern
for sharing test fixtures between *testing.T and *testing.B.
No behavior change for existing service_test.go tests; the
benchmark file in bench_test.go calls newMockIdPWithTB(b)
to get the same fixture.
docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md (NEW):
* Result table with all four benchmarks + targets + measured
numbers + status markers. Four-row matrix for the default-tag
benchmarks; the fourth row (cold-cache) is operator-recorded
with an empty cell waiting for the first Docker-equipped run.
* Hardware floor section pinning the 4 vCPU / 8 GiB RAM /
Postgres 16 / Go 1.25 baseline. GitHub-hosted Ubuntu runners
satisfy this; operators on weaker hardware re-record.
* "What each benchmark covers (and what it doesn't)" section
per benchmark, distinguishing the warm steady-state pipeline
from the cold path's network-bounded budget.
* "Cold-cache OIDC: how to run" subsection documenting the
make target + the test+benchmark coupling needed to populate
sharedKeycloak. Operator-recorded baseline table seeded
empty for first runs.
* "Why the cold path is bounded by network latency, not crypto"
section explaining the budget breakdown:
- TCP handshake (1 RTT)
- TLS 1.3 handshake (1-2 RTTs)
- 2 HTTPS GETs (discovery + JWKS, 1 RTT each)
- In-process crypto on the certctl side (~5-10ms total)
So the 200ms cap is operator-checkable: real measurement >
200ms means the IdP is slow OR network congestion OR DNS
issues — the diagnosis is upstream of certctl. Real
measurement < 200ms means the IdP is on a fast same-region
link.
* Methodology section pinning the per-iteration timing capture
+ sort + percentile-extract approach.
* Pre-merge audit section for the Phase 14 exit gate: four
benchmarks ran, four numbers recorded, steady-state targets
met, cold path is operator-runnable + measurably-bounded.
Makefile (MODIFIED):
* Added `make benchmark-auth` (default-tag, runs three of four
benchmarks at 2000 samples each).
* Added `make benchmark-auth-coldcache` (integration-tagged,
runs OIDC cold-cache against live Keycloak; requires Docker).
* Both targets carry explanatory comment blocks.
docs/README.md (MODIFIED):
* Added the auth-benchmarks.md doc to the Operator nav table
alongside performance-baselines.md.
Measured baselines at Phase 14 close (linux/arm64, 4 vCPU)
==========================================================
BenchmarkSession_SteadyState p99 = 5µs (target < 1ms) ✓ 200× under
BenchmarkSession_ColdProcess p99 = 7.1ms (target < 10ms) ✓
BenchmarkOIDC_SteadyState p99 = 1.5ms (target < 5ms) ✓ 3× under
BenchmarkOIDC_ColdCache operator-runs (Docker required)
Verification
============
* gofmt -l on three new bench files: clean.
* go vet ./internal/auth/session/... ./internal/auth/oidc/...: clean
(default tag).
* go vet -tags integration ./internal/auth/oidc/...: clean (integration
tag covers the bench_keycloak_test.go file).
* go test -short -count=1 across all 5 OIDC + session packages:
green; the bench_*_test.go files compile but don't run under
-short (testing.Short() guards + benchmarks are not selected
by -run pattern).
* All three runnable benchmarks executed and produce the numbers
above; recorded in auth-benchmarks.md.
|
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shankar0123
|
2893f9b48e |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 11: 6 per-IdP OIDC runbooks + index + docs/README wiring
Closes Phase 11 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Operators can now configure each major IdP against certctl's OIDC SSO surface with documented steps, no guessing. Files ===== docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md (NEW): * Index page linking all six per-IdP runbooks. * Comparison matrix (free vs paid, group-claim shape, special quirks) so operators pick the right runbook in <30 seconds. * "Common shape" section pinning the consistent five-section layout every runbook follows. * "Cross-IdP recurring concepts" section consolidating the redirect-URI / client-secret-rotation / JWKS-cache-TTL / fail-closed- group-mapping / PKCE-S256 / IdP-downgrade-attack-defense behaviors so each per-IdP runbook can stay focused on what differs. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/keycloak.md (NEW): * Canonical reference. Mirrors the testfixtures/keycloak-realm.json shape from Phase 10's integration test fixture so the operator's hand-config matches the CI-verified config exactly. * Step-by-step IdP-side: realm → client → groups → group-mapper → user. Cites the exact Keycloak admin-console paths (Clients → certctl → Client scopes → certctl-dedicated → Add mapper, etc.). * GUI + API + MCP equivalents for the certctl-side configuration. * JWKS-rotation drill mapped to the Phase 10 integration test that exercises the same flow. * 6 most-common troubleshooting paths mapped to certctl service- layer sentinel errors (ErrIssuerMismatch / ErrGroupsUnmapped / ErrPreLoginNotFound / ErrStateMismatch / IdP-downgrade-defense rejection / clock-skew on iat). docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/authentik.md (NEW): * Authentik-specific deltas vs Keycloak: provider/application split, property-mapping abstraction, explicit `groups` scope requirement, hashed-vs-email subject mode, signing-key rotation via Crypto/Tokens. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/okta.md (NEW): * Okta-specific deltas: Org server vs custom auth server distinction, the load-bearing "Define groups claim" step (Okta does NOT emit groups by default), group-filter regex on the claim definition, access-policy gotcha, optional Okta smoke test pointer to Phase 10's integration_okta_smoke_test.go. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/auth0.md (NEW): * Auth0's namespaced-custom-claim quirk documented up front: any Action-emitted claim MUST use a URL-shape namespaced key (e.g. https://your-namespace/groups), and certctl's hand-rolled groupclaim resolver recognizes URL-shape paths as a single literal key (no path-walking through `/`). Walks operators through writing the Login Action that emits groups from app_metadata. Three alternative group-modeling options (app_metadata vs Authorization Extension vs Roles+Permissions) with tradeoffs. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/azure-ad.md (NEW): * The big Entra ID quirk documented up front: groups claim emits GROUP OBJECT IDs (GUIDs), NOT human-readable names. Certctl group→ role mappings MUST be configured against the GUIDs. The cloud-only-display-names alternative is documented but not recommended for hybrid AD environments. Covers the >200 groups truncation case (Microsoft's `hasgroups: true` claim) + the v1.0 vs v2.0 endpoint distinction (certctl supports v2.0 only). docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/google-workspace.md (NEW): * The big Google Workspace quirk documented up front: Google does NOT emit a groups claim in the ID token. Recommended pattern is to broker through Keycloak (or Authentik) as a federated identity provider — the user authenticates at Google but certctl talks to Keycloak. Walks operators through wiring Google as a federated IdP in Keycloak, four group-assignment options (manual vs default-group vs claim-derived vs SCIM), and the end-to-end browser flow. The "direct integration without groups" anti-pattern is documented at the bottom with explicit "NOT RECOMMENDED" framing so operators understand why the broker pattern is the right call. docs/README.md (MODIFIED): * Adds the OIDC / SSO runbooks index to the operator-facing docs nav table, between "Auth threat model" and "Control plane TLS". Conventions held ================ * Every runbook carries `> Last reviewed: 2026-05-10` per the docs convention. * Every runbook follows the prompt-mandated five-section layout: Prerequisites → IdP-side configuration → certctl-side configuration → Verification → Troubleshooting → Validation checklist (with operator sign-off line). * Internal-link sweep clean — every relative link resolves to an existing file (verified via shell loop checking each `](../...)` and `](*.md)` reference). External links to IdP vendor sites are the canonical https URLs. * No leakage of cowork/ workspace paths as Markdown links — the azure-ad.md initially had a `[auth-bundles-index.md](../../../../cowork/...)` reference; replaced with prose-only mention to match the existing convention from rbac.md + migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md. * The 7 files share a "Validation checklist" footer with operator sign-off line; per the prompt's exit criterion, each runbook must be validated end-to-end by either the operator or an external tester before Bundle 2 ships. Verification ============ * Last-reviewed dates: 7/7 runbooks dated 2026-05-10. * Internal-link sweep: 0 broken (every `]( ...)` reference resolves). * docs/README.md → operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md link resolves. * No backend / frontend / Go-test impact — pure docs commit. The pre-commit `make verify` gate is unchanged; this commit doesn't touch any Go file. Phase 11 deviation note ======================= The merge-gate criterion's "≥ 2 external testers" requirement is operator-driven and post-tag — Phase 11 ships the runbooks; the operator runs each end-to-end against a real production-tier IdP and fills in the sign-off footers before flipping Bundle 2 to "merged." Sandbox cannot exercise live Keycloak / Okta / Auth0 / Entra ID / Google Workspace tenants; the Phase 10 testcontainers Keycloak integration is the load-bearing automated test on the Keycloak axis, and the per-IdP runbooks document the manual-validation matrix the operator runs against the other five IdPs. |
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shankar0123
|
e7a94b6080 |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 13: docs (rbac.md + threat model + migration guide + security.md update)
Closes the last Phase before the Bundle 1 Exit gate. Operators
now have authoritative reference + threat model + migration guide
covering every behavior change Bundles 0-12 introduced.
# New docs
* docs/operator/rbac.md (340 lines) — operator how-to:
- Mental model (actors / roles / permissions / scopes)
- 7 default roles seeded by migration 000029 + the 5
admin-only fine-grained perms seeded by 000030
- Permission catalogue table by namespace
- Scope semantics (global beats specific) + the Bundle-2
deferral on scope_id FK enforcement
- Granting / revoking access from GUI + CLI + HTTP API + MCP
- The auditor pattern (audit-only, no resource read)
- Day-0 bootstrap flow (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN → curl →
HTTP 410 thereafter)
- Demo-mode (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none) caveat for production
* docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md (180 lines) — what the
controls defend against:
- 5 threat actors (external, wrong-role, compromised key,
insider operator, compromised auditor)
- Per-defense walk-through (API-key auth, RBAC, bootstrap,
approval workflow + Phase 9 closure, audit trail,
protocol-endpoint allowlist)
- 9 explicit deferrals (OIDC, sessions, local accounts,
JIT elevation, MFA, etc.) — Bundle 2 / future scope
- Compliance mapping (SOC 2 CC6.1/CC6.3, HIPAA §164.312(b),
NIST SSDF PO.5.2, FedRAMP AU-9, PCI-DSS §10)
- 5 operator-runnable sanity checks (e.g.,
'SELECT FROM audit_events WHERE actor=system-bypass' MUST
return 0 in production)
* docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md (200 lines) — v2.0.x →
v2.1.0 upgrade flow:
- The SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout
- Migration list (000029-000033) + what each does
- 4-mode scope-down flow (interactive / non-interactive
JSON / --suggest / --suggest --apply)
- What changes for code that called auth.IsAdmin
- Helm-specific upgrade flow with example post-upgrade Job
- Docker Compose upgrade flow + the 5 examples folders
that ride demo mode unchanged
- Verification queries + rollback flow
# Updated docs
* docs/operator/security.md — Last-reviewed bumped to
2026-05-09; existing Authentication-surface section
extended to call out the Bundle 1 RBAC primitive,
day-0 bootstrap path, and approval-bypass closure with
cross-references to the new docs.
* docs/reference/profiles.md — Last-reviewed header
formatting fixed (added the > blockquote prefix used
consistently across the docs tree).
# docs/README.md navigation
* Operator section gains 2 new rows (RBAC + auth-threat-model)
and Approval-workflow row updated to mention Phase 9
closure.
* Reference section gains the Profiles row.
* Migration section gains the api-keys-to-rbac row with the
AUDIT YOUR API KEYS callout in the link description.
# CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 section refreshed
The Phase 7 commit landed the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
callout. This commit appends the missing Phase 9-12 highlights:
- Approval-bypass closure (profile-edit gate + flip-flop
loophole + ErrApproveBySameActor invariant)
- GUI: Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings / Approvals queue
- 12 new MCP RBAC tools
- Coverage gates on internal/auth + internal/service/auth
- Protocol-endpoint allowlist pinned at 3 layers
Trailing cross-reference block now points at all 4 new docs.
# Verifications
* Every internal link in the 4 new/modified docs validated by
shell sweep (find broken links → 0 hits).
* Every new doc carries 'Last reviewed: 2026-05-09' header
with the > blockquote prefix matching the docs-tree
convention.
* go vet ./... clean.
* staticcheck across every Bundle-1-touched Go package clean.
* gofmt -l clean repo-wide.
* go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth (incl.
bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router,
internal/cli, internal/service (incl. auth),
internal/domain/auth, internal/mcp, cmd/cli (cmd/server
has 1 environmental failure on the sandbox virtiofs-tmp:
TestPreflightSCEPRACertKey_KeyWorldReadable_Refuses depends
on tmpfs file-mode semantics that virtiofs propagates
differently — pre-existing, unrelated to Bundle 1).
* Frontend: 19 Vitest tests across src/pages/auth/ +
AuditPage all pass; tsc --noEmit clean.
|
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shankar0123
|
d809874fa1 |
docs: retire compliance subtree + sweep framework name-drops from prose
Per operator decision the framework-mapping docs are gone. They
were aspirational (no audit, no certification, no validated
mapping); keeping them around was misleading.
Files deleted (1,883 lines):
- docs/compliance/index.md
- docs/compliance/soc2.md
- docs/compliance/pci-dss.md
- docs/compliance/nist-sp-800-57.md
Hyperlinks removed:
- README.md: 'Auditor / compliance' row in the doc table; the
'(compliance mapping included)' parenthetical in the
positioning paragraph
- docs/README.md: the '## Compliance' section table; the
'Auditor / compliance team' reading-order-by-role row
Prose name-drops swept across 24 files:
- README.md: 'FedRAMP boundary CAs / financial-services policy
CAs' → '4-level boundary CAs / 3-level policy CAs';
'Compliance-grade for PCI-DSS Level 1, FedRAMP Moderate / High,
SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA' → cut entirely
- getting-started/{quickstart,concepts,examples,why-certctl,
advanced-demo}.md: 'compliance' → 'audit' / 'policy';
'PCI-DSS / SOC 2 / NIST SP 800-57' framework lists cut;
''pci': 'true'' tag example → ''environment': 'production''
- migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md: 'compliance rules' →
'policy rules'
- operator/approval-workflow.md: 'Compliance customers (PCI-DSS
Level 1, FedRAMP Moderate / High, SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA)' →
'Operators'; entire 'Compliance control mapping' table
(PCI-DSS §6.4.5 / NIST SP 800-53 SA-15 / SOC 2 Type II CC6.1
/ HIPAA §164.308(a)(4)) deleted; 'compliance contract' →
'two-person-integrity contract'; 'compliance auditors' →
'reviewers'
- operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md: 'PCI-DSS v4.0 Req 4 §2.2.5'
audit-reference → CWE-326 (kept); 'PCI-DSS Req 4 §2.2.5
attestation' section retitled to 'TLS posture summary' and
rewritten without framework framing; 'PCI-DSS, NIST, and
major browsers will eventually deprecate TLS 1.2' →
'Major browsers and OS vendors will eventually deprecate
TLS 1.2'
- operator/database-tls.md: PCI-DSS Req 4 §2.2.5 audit-ref →
CWE-319 only; 'PCI-DSS scope' → 'sensitive data'; PCI-DSS
Req 4 v4.0 prose footing → cut
- operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md: 'SOC 2 / PCI
procurement-team deliverable' → 'on-call deliverable';
'compliance auditors' → 'reviewers'
- reference/connectors/{acme,aws-acm,azure-kv,globalsign,
local-ca,openssl,ssh,index}.md: 'compliance reporting
(PCI-DSS §3.6, HIPAA §164.312)' → 'audit reporting';
'Compliance environments (PCI-DSS Level 1, FedRAMP High,
HIPAA)' → 'Regulated environments'; 'compliance audits' →
'audit'; 'FedRAMP boundary CA' pattern names →
'4-level boundary CA' (technically descriptive)
- reference/protocols/est.md: 'compliance-hook seam' →
'device-state hook seam'; 'compliance gating' → 'device-state
gating'; 'est_compliance_failed' → 'est_device_state_failed'
- reference/protocols/scep-intune.md: 'Optional compliance
check' → 'Optional device-state check'; failure-counter
'compliance_failed' → 'device_state_failed'; 'Conditional
Access compliance gating' → 'Conditional Access
device-state gating'
- reference/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md: 'FedRAMP boundary-CA
deployments where the regulator requires...' →
'Boundary-CA deployments where you want separation of policy
and issuing authorities'; pattern A retitled '4-level FedRAMP
boundary CA' → '4-level boundary CA'
- reference/architecture.md: broken Related-docs link to
compliance.md removed; the rest of that block had stale
pre-Phase-2 paths (quickstart.md, demo-advanced.md,
connectors.md, openapi.md, testing-guide.md, test-env.md) —
retargeted to current locations
- reference/deployment-model.md: 'SOC 2 evidence-report
generator' → 'Audit-evidence report generator'
- reference/vendor-matrix.md: 'SOC 2 / PCI auditors paste this
into evidence packs' → 'reviewers paste this into
vendor-evaluation packs'
- contributor/qa-test-suite.md: 'compliance exist' coverage
description cut; 'Compliance (PCI / SOC2 / HIPAA-relevant)'
risk-class label → 'Audit-relevant'
What was kept:
- CWE references (legitimate technical pointers)
- Microsoft API/feature names that happen to use 'compliance'
literally ('Microsoft Graph compliance API',
'device-compliance validators' — these are MS product names,
not framework name-drops)
- 'NIST PQC' on the landing page (Post-Quantum Cryptography is
the actual NIST standard family, not a compliance framework)
Verified: zero hyperlinks into docs/compliance/ remain. All 24
ci-guards/*.sh pass locally. qa-doc-seed-count.sh clean.
Net diff: 26 files / -1,883 deletions in compliance/ + -32 net
across the prose sweep.
Companion edits in cowork/ (CLAUDE.md doc-tree summary +
WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md retirement note) land separately.
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shankar0123
|
3275f9f1e0 |
ci: post-Phase-2-docs-overhaul cleanup of stale guards + missing config doc
CI run on the
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shankar0123
|
f179eab071 |
docs: expand docs/README.md connectors section to enumerate all 28 deep-dive pages
After the Phase 4 follow-on (commits |
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shankar0123
|
b452013dd9 |
docs: Phase 5 — testing-guide.md prune (8268 → 0 lines, content dispersed)
Per Phase 1 audit at cowork/docs-overhaul-phase-1-audit-2026-05-04/
and the section-by-section plan in testing-guide-tumor.md.
testing-guide.md was 30% of all docs/ content (8268 lines) but was
integration test code written in markdown, not operator documentation.
The audit's tumor analysis disposed of every Part:
- ~65% DELETE (test cases that already exist in code)
- ~22% MOVE to inline test code
- ~8% KEEP-COMPRESSED into focused operator-runbook docs
- Title + contents + release sign-off ~5% KEEP
This commit ships the KEEP-COMPRESSED dispersal:
docs/contributor/qa-prerequisites.md (NEW, ~120 lines):
From testing-guide.md "Prerequisites" section. Stack boot procedure,
demo data baseline, reference IDs operators reuse across QA docs.
docs/contributor/gui-qa-checklist.md (NEW, ~105 lines):
From testing-guide.md "Part 35: GUI Testing". Manual GUI verification
pass for release sign-off. 25-row table covering every dashboard page.
docs/contributor/release-sign-off.md (NEW, ~130 lines):
From testing-guide.md "Release Sign-Off" section (originally 1009
lines of per-test detail tables). Compressed to a release-day
checklist organized by gate category: code state, automated gates,
manual QA passes, release artefact verification, branch protection,
post-release.
docs/operator/performance-baselines.md (NEW, ~100 lines):
From testing-guide.md "Part 39: Performance Spot Checks". Four
operator-runnable benchmarks (API request handling, inventory list
pagination, scheduler tick, bulk revoke) with baseline numbers and
when-to-re-baseline guidance.
docs/operator/helm-deployment.md (NEW, ~120 lines):
From testing-guide.md "Part 52: Helm Chart Deployment". Operator
runbook for the bundled deploy/helm/certctl/ chart: prereqs,
install, four cert-source patterns, verify, upgrade, troubleshooting.
docs/reference/cli.md (NEW, ~120 lines):
From testing-guide.md "Part 28: CLI Tool". certctl-cli command
reference with command-group breakdown, common workflows
(list/filter, renew, revoke, bulk import, EST enrollment, status),
output formats, CI/CD integration patterns.
docs/README.md navigation index updated to include the 6 new docs:
Reference section gains: cli.md, release-verification.md (was added
in Phase 13)
Operator section gains: helm-deployment.md, performance-baselines.md
Contributor section gains: qa-prerequisites.md, gui-qa-checklist.md,
release-sign-off.md
docs/testing-guide.md deleted. Git history preserves the 8268 lines —
if any specific test case is found missing from inline test code or
the destination docs during future work, lift from `git show
HEAD~1:docs/testing-guide.md`.
Net: docs/ total line count drops by ~7700 lines (28%), from 26,369
to 18,742. testing-guide.md was the single largest doc; pruning it is
the single biggest content-edit win of the entire restructure.
Phase 5 is the last major content phase. Remaining: Phase 4 follow-on
(per-connector page extractions from reference/connectors/index.md),
Phase 15 (WHAT/HOW/WHY remediation), Phase 16 (final acceptance gate).
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shankar0123
|
affaa11d14 |
docs: Phase 12 — populate docs/README.md navigation index
Per Phase 1 audit at cowork/docs-overhaul-phase-1-audit-2026-05-04/.
The placeholder from Phase 1 (commit
|
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shankar0123
|
cda957f302 |
docs: Phase 2 prep — placeholder navigation index
Per Phase 1 audit at cowork/docs-overhaul-phase-1-audit-2026-05-04/. Phase 2 organizes docs/ into eight audience-aligned subdirectories (getting-started, reference, operator, migration, compliance, contributor, archive). docs/README.md will be the navigation index linking into each. This commit only adds the placeholder. Subdirectories materialize as Phase 2 file moves land. Index gets populated in Phase 12 once all moves and content edits are complete. Audit folder: cowork/docs-overhaul-phase-1-audit-2026-05-04/ Phase 2 prompt: cowork/docs-overhaul-phase-2-restructure-prompt.md |