Closes M-001 partially; M-002, M-003, and CI threshold raise #2 deferred.
Stubs coverage shipped across 8 issuer connectors via per-connector
<conn>_stubs_test.go (~50 LoC each) pinning the not-supported
issuer.Connector interface methods (GenerateCRL, SignOCSPResponse,
GetCACertPEM, GetRenewalInfo). Most CAs delegate CRL/OCSP/CA-cert
distribution to managed services, so these are documented stubs that
return errors. Pinning them ensures the stubs aren't silently replaced
with no-ops in a future refactor.
Coverage delta:
digicert: 79.3% -> 81.0% (+1.7pp)
ejbca: 75.8% -> 76.5% (+0.7pp)
entrust: 70.8% -> 70.8% (stubs already covered)
sectigo: 78.0% -> 79.4% (+1.4pp)
vault: 81.0% -> 84.1% (+3.1pp)
openssl: 76.9% -> 78.0% (+1.1pp)
googlecas: 81.0% -> 83.4% (+2.4pp)
globalsign: 75.9% -> 78.2% (+2.3pp)
(awsacmpca not included; its 0%-coverage hotspots are stubClient methods
structurally different from the others' interface stubs. Already at 83.5%.)
Why the gates aren't yet met: the stub functions are tiny (1-2 lines
each, mostly 'return nil, fmt.Errorf("not supported")'). Lifting each
connector to >=85% requires per-connector failure-mode test files
mirroring Bundle J's ACME pattern (httptest.Server + canned 401/403/
429+Retry-After/5xx/malformed responses against the actual API methods).
That's ~200-300 LoC x 9 connectors = ~2000-2700 LoC of bespoke per-CA
mock work; exceeds this session's budget. Tracked as follow-on
Bundle N.A-extended / N.B-extended.
Deferred sub-batches:
N.C (M-002 + M-003): internal/service (70.5%) + internal/api/handler
(79.4%) round-out NOT YET STARTED. Tracked as Bundle N.C-extended.
N.CI (CI threshold raise #2): prescribed raises require underlying
coverage at proposed floors first. Premature raise would fail CI
immediately. Tracked as Bundle N.CI-extended.
Verification:
go vet ./internal/connector/issuer/{8-pkgs}/... clean
gofmt -l clean
go test -short -count=1 PASS for all 8
Audit deliverables:
gap-backlog.md: M-001 partial-strikethrough with per-connector table
+ Bundle N closure-log entry covering all 4 sub-batch statuses
closure-plan.md: Bundle N [~] with per-sub-batch status breakdown
CHANGELOG.md: [unreleased] Bundle N entry
The GlobalSign Atlas HVCA connector previously used InsecureSkipVerify:true
on its mTLS TLS config, disabling server certificate validation and
defeating the purpose of the client-side mTLS handshake. This was a
CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability silently degrading
trust on every production call to GlobalSign's signing API.
Remediation (per H-5 audit finding, Lens 4.4):
- Remove InsecureSkipVerify from all three http.Client construction sites
(ValidateConfig, getHTTPClient, and legacy initialisation path).
- Introduce buildServerTLSConfig() helper that constructs tls.Config with
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12 (addresses adjacent L-1 recommendation).
- New optional config field `server_ca_path` (env:
CERTCTL_GLOBALSIGN_SERVER_CA_PATH). When unset the connector trusts the
system root CA bundle (correct default for GlobalSign's publicly-trusted
HVCA endpoints). When set the bundle is loaded via x509.NewCertPool() +
AppendCertsFromPEM, and only those roots are trusted (supports private
HVCA deployments and defence-in-depth root pinning).
- Error wrapping chain: "failed to read server CA bundle at %s" and
"no valid PEM certificates found in server CA bundle at %s" surface
config problems at ValidateConfig time instead of silently failing at
request time.
Docs, config, service env-seed, and GUI issuer type definition updated to
expose the new field. Tests: 9 dead `InsecureSkipVerify: true` client
TLSClientConfig blocks (no-ops against httptest.NewServer plain-HTTP)
replaced with bare http.Client; new TestGlobalSign_ServerTLSConfig covers
pinned-CA trust, untrusted-server rejection, missing-file and invalid-PEM
error paths.
Verification:
- go build ./... clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -race ./internal/connector/issuer/globalsign/... ./internal/config/... ./internal/service/... ok
- go test ./... (excluding testcontainers-gated repo layer) ok
- golangci-lint run ./... 0 issues
- govulncheck ./... 0 reachable vulns
- Per-layer coverage: service 68.7% (≥55), handler 83.6% (≥60), domain 82.0% (≥40), middleware 63.8% (≥30)
- globalsign package coverage: 75.9%
- Invariant sweep: 0 InsecureSkipVerify references remain in globalsign
package (only a test-file comment documenting the removal).
Add three new issuer connectors completing commercial and open-source CA
coverage. Entrust uses mTLS client certificate auth with sync/async
issuance. GlobalSign Atlas uses mTLS + API key/secret dual auth with
serial-based tracking. EJBCA supports dual auth (mTLS or OAuth2) for
self-hosted Keyfactor CAs.
Each connector implements the full issuer.Connector interface (9 methods),
includes httptest-based unit tests (~14 each), and follows established
patterns (injectable HTTP clients, RFC 5280 revocation reason mapping,
CRL/OCSP delegated to CA).
Also includes: issuer factory cases, env var seeding, config structs,
domain types, seed data (3 rows, all disabled), OpenAPI enum updates,
frontend issuer catalog entries with config fields, and full docs
(connectors.md, architecture.md, features.md, README).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
shankar0123