Commit Graph

12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
shankar0123 5dc698307b chore: rename Go module path to github.com/certctl-io/certctl
Mechanical sed across the main go.mod's module declaration, the f5-mock-icontrol
sub-module's go.mod, every Go file's import path (361 files), and a rebuild of
the checked-in f5-mock-icontrol binary so its embedded build-info reflects the
new module path. No behavior change.

Choice B from cowork/transfer-certctl-to-org.md, executed 2026-05-04. Choice A
(keep module path declared as github.com/shankar0123/certctl regardless of
repo URL) shipped on the day of the org transfer (2026-05-03) since we had no
external Go consumers; this commit closes that deferral.

Backward-compat: GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward
github.com/shankar0123/certctl → github.com/certctl-io/certctl at the URL
level, but Go's module proxy uses the path declared in go.mod as the
canonical name. Pre-fix, anyone trying `go get github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
hit a "module path mismatch" error because go.mod said
github.com/shankar0123/certctl and the URL they fetched it from said
certctl-io/certctl. Post-fix, the canonical name and the URL agree, so
go get / go install / external Go consumers / Go-tooling integrations
work cleanly via either the new path (preferred) or the old path (which
redirects and Go follows the redirect for source fetch).

Anyone still importing the old path inside their own code keeps working
provided they update their go.mod's `require` line to match — the module
path declared in their consumer's go.sum / go.mod is the authoritative
import name, so a mass sed across their import statements is the migration
on the consumer side. No external consumers exist today.

Diff shape:
  361 *.go files  — import path replacement only
    2 go.mod     — module declaration replacement only
    1 binary     — deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt
                   so embedded build-info reflects the new path (8618965 vs
                   8618933 bytes; 32-byte diff is the build-info change)

  Total: 364 files, 730 insertions / 730 deletions, net-zero size, pure
  mechanical substitution.

Verification:
  gofmt: 17 files needed re-alignment after sed (the new path is one char
    shorter than the old, so column-aligned import groups drifted). Applied
    `gofmt -w` to fix.
  go mod tidy: clean exit on both modules.
  go vet ./...: clean exit.
  go build ./...: clean exit.
  go test -short -count=1 on representative packages: all green
    (internal/domain, internal/validation, internal/crypto, internal/crypto/signer,
    cmd/agent). Test output now reads `ok github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
    confirming the module path resolves correctly.
  binary: f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt; `strings | grep shankar0123` returns
    nothing; `strings | grep certctl-io/certctl` shows the new module path
    embedded in build-info.

Files intentionally NOT touched in this commit:
  README.md / CHANGELOG.md / docs/ / etc. — already swept to certctl-io
    URLs in commit bc6039a (the post-transfer URL refresh). This commit is
    purely the Go-tooling layer.
  Scarf pixels (`shankar0123.docker.scarf.sh/...`) — Scarf-account
    namespace, not a Go import or GitHub repo URL. Stays.

This is a non-blocking, non-customer-impacting change. Operators pulling
container images, running `make verify`, hitting the API, or installing the
agent see no functional difference. Only Go-tooling consumers (none today)
are affected, and they're enabled — not broken — by this commit.
2026-05-04 00:30:29 +00:00
shankar0123 ceca3647eb vault: add automatic token renewal at TTL/2 + Prometheus metric
Closes Top-10 fix #5 of the 2026-05-03 issuer-coverage audit (see
cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-03/RESULTS.md). Pre-fix, the
VaultPKI adapter authenticated with a static token and never called
renew-self. Long-lived deploys hit token expiry; the first
operator-visible signal was failed cert renewals on production
targets.

This commit:

  1. Connector.Start(ctx) spawns a goroutine that calls
     POST /v1/auth/token/renew-self at TTL/2 cadence (computed from a
     one-shot lookup-self at startup). Honours ctx.Done() for
     graceful shutdown via a per-loop done channel + Stop().
  2. On `renewable: false` response (initial lookup OR any subsequent
     renewal), the loop emits a WARN, increments the not_renewable
     counter, and exits. The operator must rotate the token before
     Vault's Max TTL elapses.
  3. New Prometheus counter certctl_vault_token_renewals_total with
     labels result={success,failure,not_renewable}. Registered
     alongside existing certctl_issuance_* counters in
     internal/api/handler/metrics.go.
  4. ERROR-level logging on renewal failure with operator-actionable
     substring ("vault token renewal failed; rotate the token before
     TTL expires") so journalctl + grep find it. Loop keeps ticking
     after a failure — transient blips don't kill it.

New optional issuer.Lifecycle interface:

  type Lifecycle interface {
      Start(ctx context.Context) error
      Stop()
  }

Connectors that hold no background goroutines (almost all of them)
do not implement this — IssuerRegistry.StartLifecycles /
StopLifecycles feature-detect via type assertion. New
lifecycle-bearing connectors plug in by implementing the interface;
no further registry plumbing required.

Wiring (cmd/server/main.go):

  - service.NewVaultRenewalMetrics() instance is shared between
    issuerRegistry.SetVaultRenewalMetrics (so Vault connectors built
    by Rebuild get a recorder) and metricsHandler.SetVaultRenewals
    (so the Prometheus exposer emits the new series).
  - issuerRegistry.StartLifecycles(ctx) is called after
    issuerService.BuildRegistry; defer issuerRegistry.StopLifecycles
    is paired so goroutines exit cleanly on signal.
  - IssuerConnectorAdapter.Underlying() exposes the wrapped
    issuer.Connector so registry-level machinery can reach the
    concrete connector behind the adapter without duplicating the
    wiring at every call site.

Tests (internal/connector/issuer/vault/vault_renew_test.go):

  - TestVault_RenewLoop_TickAtHalfTTL — three ticks → three
    renewals, all "success".
  - TestVault_RenewLoop_StopsOnNotRenewable — second renewal returns
    renewable=false, loop exits, third tick fires no HTTP call.
  - TestVault_RenewLoop_FailureSurfacesViaMetric — first renewal 403
    bumps "failure", second renewal succeeds → loop kept ticking.
  - TestVault_RenewLoop_CtxCancellation_StopsCleanly — Stop returns
    within 200ms after ctx cancel.
  - TestVault_RenewLoop_StartsNothingWhenNotRenewable — token
    already non-renewable at boot ⇒ no goroutine, "not_renewable"
    metric increments at startup so operators see it in Grafana.
  - TestVault_ComputeInterval — 4 cases pinning TTL/2 +
    minRenewInterval floor.
  - TestVault_RenewSelf_ParseFailure_NamesActionableInError —
    surfaced error contains "vault token renewal failed" + "rotate
    the token".

Cadence is dynamic — every successful renewal re-derives TTL/2
from the renewed lease's lease_duration, so a short bootstrap
token that gets renewed up to a longer Max TTL shifts to the
longer cadence automatically (defends against degenerate fast
ticking on a token whose Max TTL is far longer than its initial
TTL).

Documentation:
  - docs/connectors.md Vault PKI section gains "Token TTL +
    automatic renewal" subsection (operator-facing: cadence, metric,
    renewable=false rotation playbook).

Out of scope (intentional, flagged in the audit follow-up):
  - AppRole / Kubernetes / AWS IAM auth methods (different renewal
    semantics).
  - Hot-reload of rotated token from disk (operator restarts
    today; future: GUI/MCP issuer-update path triggers Rebuild
    which Stops the old connector and Starts the new one).
  - Auto-re-auth after token death (operator playbook owns it).

CHANGELOG.md is intentionally not hand-edited (per CHANGELOG.md
itself: "no longer maintains a hand-edited per-version changelog;
per-release notes are auto-generated from commit messages between
consecutive tags").

Verified locally:
- gofmt clean.
- go vet ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/...
  ./internal/connector/issuer/vault/... ./cmd/server/...  clean.
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/issuer/vault/...
  ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/...  green.
- go test -race -count=10 -run 'TestVault_RenewLoop|TestVault_ComputeInterval'
  ./internal/connector/issuer/vault/...  green.

Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-03/RESULTS.md
Top-10 fix #5.
2026-05-03 21:24:27 +00:00
shankar0123 95c2bf9818 metrics: add per-issuer-type issuance counters, histogram, and failure classifier
Closes the #4 acquisition-readiness blocker from the 2026-05-01 issuer
coverage audit. Before this commit, certctl's Prometheus exposition had
zero per-issuer-type signal — operators answering "is DigiCert slow?"
or "is Sectigo failing more than ACME?" had to grep logs by issuer
name. This commit adds three series labelled by issuer type:

  certctl_issuance_total{issuer_type, outcome}
  certctl_issuance_duration_seconds{issuer_type}            (histogram)
  certctl_issuance_failures_total{issuer_type, error_class}

The histogram covers 0.05–120 second buckets to span the local-issuer
fast path and async-CA slow path (DigiCert/Sectigo/Entrust polling
can take minutes). error_class is a closed enum of eight values
(timeout, auth, rate_limited, validation, upstream_5xx, upstream_4xx,
network, other) classified once in service.ClassifyError. Cardinality
budget is ~276 new series, well within Prometheus's comfortable range.

Implementation:
- service.IssuanceMetrics is the thread-safe counter + histogram
  table. Three independent views (counters / failures / durations)
  exposed via SnapshotCounters / SnapshotFailures / SnapshotDurations.
  sync.RWMutex protects the map shape; per-key sync/atomic.Uint64
  primitives keep the recording hot path lock-free under concurrent
  service-layer goroutines.
- service.IssuanceCounterEntry / IssuanceFailureEntry /
  IssuanceDurationEntry / IssuanceMetricsSnapshotter live in service
  (not handler) to avoid an import cycle: handler already imports
  service for admin_est.go etc., so service can't import handler back.
  Handler's exposer takes the snapshotter via the service-defined
  interface.
- service.ClassifyError pure function maps error → error_class.
  context.DeadlineExceeded / context.Canceled → timeout; *net.OpError
  → network; substring matches against canonical AWS / DigiCert /
  Sectigo error shapes for auth / rate_limited / validation /
  upstream_5xx / upstream_4xx / network; unknown → other. Each branch
  has at least one representative test case in
  TestClassifyError.
- IssuerConnectorAdapter.SetMetrics wires per-adapter recording
  (issuerType + metrics). Existing 28+ test call sites of
  NewIssuerConnectorAdapter keep their one-arg signature; production
  wiring goes through SetMetrics post-construction.
- IssuerRegistry.SetIssuanceMetrics + Rebuild type-asserts to
  *IssuerConnectorAdapter and calls SetMetrics with the issuer type
  string. nil-guarded — tests that hand-build adapters without
  metrics get no-op recording.
- IssuerConnectorAdapter.IssueCertificate / RenewCertificate wrap the
  underlying connector call with start := time.Now() and
  recordIssuance(start, err). Renewal is recorded into the same
  certctl_issuance_* series as initial issuance — operationally,
  renewal IS issuance from the connector's perspective (matches the
  audit prompt's guidance on series naming).
- handler/metrics.go GetPrometheusMetrics gains a new exposer block
  emitting all three series in stable label order with correct
  Prometheus format (_bucket / _sum / _count for the histogram, +Inf
  bucket appended). Sorted via sort.Slice for stable output. nil-
  guarded so deploys without the wire produce clean exposition.
- formatLE helper trims trailing zeros from histogram bucket labels
  via strconv.FormatFloat(le, 'f', -1, 64) so the `le` labels match
  Prometheus client conventions ("0.05", "30", "120", not "0.0500"
  etc.).
- cmd/server/main.go wires a single IssuanceMetrics instance into
  both the IssuerRegistry (recording) and the MetricsHandler (exposer)
  using DefaultIssuanceBucketBoundaries.

Tests:
- TestIssuanceMetrics_RecordAndSnapshot — happy-path counter +
  histogram + failure recording, BucketBoundaries returns a copy
  (not shared storage).
- TestIssuanceMetrics_HistogramCumulative — pins the cumulative-buckets
  contract. 100ms observation lands in 0.1 bucket and every larger
  bucket; 750ms only in the 1.0 bucket. Off-by-one here would
  corrupt every quantile query downstream.
- TestIssuanceMetrics_Concurrency — 100 goroutines × 1000 ops under
  the race detector. Asserts atomic counter integrity across
  contended writes.
- TestClassifyError — 17 cases covering every branch of the closed
  enum plus the nil-error special case.

Implementation chooses the existing hand-rolled fmt.Fprintf
exposition pattern (no prometheus/client_golang dependency added)
to stay consistent with the OCSP / deploy counter blocks already in
the file.

Out of scope (separate follow-ups):
- Revocation metrics (certctl_revocation_*) — symmetric to issuance
  but the audit didn't ask; explicit follow-up commit.
- Discovery / health-check duration histograms.
- prometheus/client_golang migration.

Verified locally:
- gofmt clean
- go vet ./... clean
- staticcheck ./... clean
- golangci-lint run --timeout 5m ./... → 0 issues
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/service/ green
- go test -short -count=1 -race -run TestIssuanceMetrics ./internal/service/ green
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/ green
- go build ./... success

Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-01/RESULTS.md
Top-10 fix #4 (Part 3, narrative section).
2026-05-02 00:39:25 +00:00
shankar0123 5af14a819c feat(ocsp): RFC 6960 §4.4.1 nonce extension support — echo client nonce in response, reject malformed
Production hardening II Phase 1.

The OCSP responder previously ignored the request's nonce extension
entirely, leaving relying parties vulnerable to replay attacks. RFC
6960 §4.4.1 defines the OPTIONAL id-pkix-ocsp-nonce extension (OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.2): when present in the request, the responder
MUST echo the same value in the response; when absent, no nonce in
the response (back-compat with relying parties that don't send one).

NEW internal/service/ocsp_nonce.go: ParseOCSPRequestNonce walks raw
DER (golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp.Request doesn't expose the request's
extensions field — the library only exposes IssuerNameHash +
IssuerKeyHash + SerialNumber). Returns one of three states:
  - (nil, false, nil) — no nonce extension in request
  - (nonce, true, nil) — well-formed nonce, ≤ MaxOCSPNonceLength (32)
  - (nil, false, ErrOCSPNonceMalformed) — empty or oversized

NEW internal/service/ocsp_counters.go: sync/atomic counter table for
OCSP request lifecycle (request_get/post, request_success/invalid,
nonce_echoed, nonce_malformed, rate_limited, ...). Mirrors the EST/
SCEP counter pattern; Phase 8 wires these into /metrics/prometheus.

CertSrv types extended:
  - internal/connector/issuer/interface.go::OCSPSignRequest gains
    Nonce []byte field.
  - internal/service/renewal.go::OCSPSignRequest (the service-layer
    duplicate used by ca_operations.go) gains the same field.
  - internal/service/issuer_adapter.go bridges the two.

Service path: CAOperationsSvc.GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx, issuerID,
serialHex, nonce) is the new entry point that plumbs the nonce
through every signing site (good / revoked / unknown / short-lived).
The legacy GetOCSPResponse becomes a nil-nonce wrapper for back-
compat — every existing caller (tests, the GET handler) sees no
behavior change.

CertificateService gains the same WithNonce variant; the handler
interface adds it to the contract. MockCertificateService in tests
extended with the new method (delegates to the legacy fn when no
override is set, so existing tests that don't care about the nonce
keep working).

Local issuer's SignOCSPResponse appends the id-pkix-ocsp-nonce
extension (non-Critical per RFC 6960 §4.4) to the response template's
ExtraExtensions when req.Nonce != nil. The extnValue is the nonce
bytes wrapped in an OCTET STRING per RFC 6960 §4.4.1.

POST OCSP handler (HandleOCSPPost):
  - After ocsp.ParseRequest succeeds, calls ParseOCSPRequestNonce on
    the raw body to extract the optional nonce.
  - On ErrOCSPNonceMalformed (empty or > 32 bytes): writes an
    'unauthorized' OCSP response (status 6 per RFC 6960 §2.3) using
    the canonical ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse from x/crypto/ocsp.
    Does NOT echo malicious bytes back.
  - On well-formed nonce: passes it through GetOCSPResponseWithNonce.
  - On no nonce: nil passed through; back-compat preserved.

GET OCSP handler unchanged — the GET form has no body to carry a
nonce extension.

6 new tests in internal/service/ocsp_nonce_test.go pin every
documented failure mode + the 32-byte boundary. The test fixture
builds an OCSPRequest via golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp.CreateRequest then
splices in a [2] EXPLICIT Extensions element by hand (the library
doesn't expose extension construction either).

Pre-commit verification: gofmt clean, go vet clean across affected
packages, go test -short -count=1 green for service/ + handler/ +
connector/issuer/local/. No new env vars introduced (Phase 1 is
always-on per RFC; no operator opt-out).
2026-04-30 04:55:06 +00:00
certctl-copilot 28797b1cbb feat(scep): plumb CertificateProfile.MustStaple end-to-end through service layer
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 5.6 follow-up.

Closes the 'lying field' gap from the original Phase 5.6 commit (35fcfa7).
That commit shipped CertificateProfile.MustStaple as a domain field +
IssuanceRequest.MustStaple as the issuer-interface field + the local
issuer's RFC 7633 extension generation + byte-exact tests against the
spec — but the service layer (SCEP + EST + agent + renewal) never read
profile.MustStaple and never set IssuanceRequest.MustStaple. Operators
who set the field got: a stored value, an API that returned it, docs
that promised it worked, and a cert with no extension. Worse than not
having the field at all.

Per the new operating rule landed in cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules
('Always take the complete path, not the easy path'), this commit closes
the wire end-to-end.

internal/service/renewal.go
  * IssuerConnector interface signature gains a mustStaple bool param on
    IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate. The original 'this is a wider
    refactor' framing was overstated — it's one extra arg threaded
    through six call sites, not a structural change.

internal/service/issuer_adapter.go
  * IssuerConnectorAdapter.IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate accept
    the new param + populate IssuanceRequest.MustStaple /
    RenewalRequest.MustStaple. Connectors that don't honor extension
    injection (Vault, EJBCA, ACME, etc.) silently ignore the field —
    the Phase 5.6 commit's docblock already noted this.

internal/service/scep.go
  * processEnrollment now reads profile.MustStaple alongside
    profile.MaxTTLSeconds and threads it through the IssueCertificate
    call. The SCEP path was the load-bearing one — the original Phase
    5.6 docs example showed exactly this code shape but the wire was
    never landed.

internal/service/est.go
  * Same pattern as SCEP: read profile.MustStaple + thread to
    IssueCertificate. Defense in depth so a deploy that mounts the
    same profile across SCEP + EST gets consistent extension behavior.

internal/service/agent.go
  * The fallback direct-issuer signing path in heartbeatPipeline reads
    profile + threads MustStaple through. Server-mode keygen + ad-hoc
    CSR submission paths both go through this.

internal/service/renewal.go (the renewal-loop side, not the interface)
  * Both renewal call sites (server-CSR-generated + agent-CSR-submitted)
    read profile.MustStaple + thread it through RenewCertificate. Renewed
    certs match their initial-issuance extension set when the bound
    profile changes mid-lifetime.

internal/service/scep_must_staple_test.go (new)
  * TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_PlumbsMustStapleToIssuer — end-to-end
    integration test: profile.MustStaple=true → SCEP service →
    mock IssuerConnector saw mustStaple=true. This is the test the
    original Phase 5.6 commit should have shipped — proves the wire
    reaches the connector.
  * TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_NoMustStaplePropagatesFalse — companion
    pinning the symmetric contract; the mock pre-sets LastMustStaple=true
    so a stuck-at-true bug surfaces.

internal/service/testutil_test.go +
internal/service/m11c_crypto_enforcement_test.go +
internal/service/issuer_adapter_test.go +
cmd/server/preflight_test.go
  * Mock + fake IssuerConnector implementations gain the new mustStaple
    bool param. mockIssuerConnector + capturingIssuerConnector also gain
    a LastMustStaple / lastMustStaple field used by the new integration
    tests to assert the wire reached the connector.
  * Existing test call sites for adapter.IssueCertificate /
    adapter.RenewCertificate gain a trailing 'false' arg (mechanical bulk
    edit, no behavior change).

Verification:
  * gofmt + go vet + staticcheck clean for all touched paths.
  * go test -short -count=1 green across cmd/agent / cmd/cli /
    cmd/mcp-server / cmd/server / api/handler / api/middleware /
    api/router / service / scheduler / pkcs7 / connector/issuer/local /
    every connector subpackage / domain / crypto / mcp / repository.
  * The new TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_PlumbsMustStapleToIssuer test passes,
    proving the wire works end-to-end.

The follow-up rule from cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules — 'can an
operator flip the configurable bit and observe the behavior change
end-to-end with no further code changes?' — is now YES for must-staple
on the SCEP + EST + agent + renewal paths.
2026-04-29 13:36:30 +00:00
Shankar ff223e2586 feat(M11c): crypto policy enforcement — CSR validation, MaxTTL caps, key metadata
Enforce certificate profile crypto constraints across all 5 issuance paths
(renewal, agent CSR, EST, SCEP). ValidateCSRAgainstProfile() rejects CSRs
with key algorithm/size that don't match profile rules. MaxTTL enforcement
caps certificate validity per issuer connector (Local CA, Vault, step-ca
enforce directly; ACME/DigiCert/Sectigo pass through). Key algorithm and
size are now persisted in certificate_versions for audit compliance.

16 new tests (12 service-layer + 4 Local CA connector). Removes hardcoded
version number from GUI sidebar. Documentation updated across architecture,
features, connectors, and README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 21:05:14 -04:00
Shankar 3f1f94f56b feat(m28+m29+m30): ACME ARI, email digest, and Helm chart
M28: ACME Renewal Information (RFC 9702) — CA-directed renewal timing
with cert ID computation, directory endpoint discovery, graceful
degradation for non-ARI CAs. 19 tests.

M29: Email notifier wiring + scheduled certificate digest — SMTP
connector bridged to service layer via NotifierAdapter, DigestService
with HTML email template, 7th scheduler loop (24h), digest preview/send
API endpoints and GUI card. 21 tests.

M30: Production-ready Helm chart — server Deployment, PostgreSQL
StatefulSet, agent DaemonSet, ConfigMaps, Secrets, Ingress, security
contexts, health probes, example values for dev/prod/ACME scenarios.

Also: OpenAPI spec updates, MCP tool additions, CI helm-lint job,
documentation updates across 5 doc files and README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 21:18:35 -04:00
Shankar c014c17cc6 feat(m27): certificate export (PEM/PKCS#12) and S/MIME EKU support
Add certificate export in PEM (JSON or file download) and PKCS#12 formats.
Private keys are never included — they stay on agents. Add EKU-aware
issuance threading profile EKUs (serverAuth, clientAuth, codeSigning,
emailProtection, timeStamping) through the full issuance pipeline. Fix
agent CSR SAN splitting for email addresses, adaptive KeyUsage flags for
S/MIME vs TLS, and a pre-existing generateID collision bug in deployment
job creation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 16:16:19 -04:00
Shankar e4ba8d4de2 feat: add EST server (RFC 7030) for device certificate enrollment (M23)
Implement Enrollment over Secure Transport protocol with 4 endpoints under
/.well-known/est/ — cacerts (CA chain distribution), simpleenroll (initial
enrollment), simplereenroll (certificate renewal), and csrattrs (CSR
attributes). PKCS#7 certs-only wire format with hand-rolled ASN.1, accepts
both PEM and base64-encoded DER CSRs, configurable issuer and profile
binding, full audit trail. 28 new tests (18 handler + 10 service).

Also includes:
- GetCACertPEM added to issuer connector interface (all 4 issuers updated)
- EST integration tests wired into e2e test suite (13 test cases)
- QA testing guide Part 26 (15 manual EST test cases)
- All docs updated: README, features, architecture, concepts, connectors,
  quickstart, demo-advanced (endpoint counts, MCP wording, agent IDs,
  issuer interface, resource lists, OpenSSL status)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-25 15:31:06 -04:00
Shankar 458a8c2740 feat: M15b — OCSP responder, DER CRL, short-lived exemption, revocation GUI
Backend:
- Embedded OCSP responder: GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial} returns
  signed OCSP responses (good/revoked/unknown) using CA key
- DER-encoded X.509 CRL: GET /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id} returns proper DER CRL
  signed by issuing CA with 24h validity window
- Short-lived cert exemption: certs with profile TTL < 1 hour skip CRL/OCSP
  (expiry is sufficient revocation for ephemeral workloads)
- Extended issuer connector interface with GenerateCRL and SignOCSPResponse
- Local CA implements full CRL/OCSP signing; ACME and step-ca return
  appropriate "use native endpoint" errors
- IssuerConnectorAdapter bridges new methods between layers

Frontend:
- Revoke button on certificate detail page with RFC 5280 reason modal
- Revocation banner with reason display and timestamp
- Revocation status indicators in lifecycle section
- "Revoked" filter option in certificates list
- API client: revokeCertificate() function and Certificate type extensions

Tests: ~31 new tests across connector, service, handler, and adapter layers
Docs: milestones renumbered (M13-M14, M16-M18), M15b marked complete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 14:39:10 -04:00
Shankar 5cd9e890f4 feat: M15a — certificate revocation API, CRL endpoint, and revocation notifications
Implements core revocation infrastructure: POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke
with all 8 RFC 5280 reason codes, JSON-formatted CRL at GET /api/v1/crl, webhook
and email revocation notifications, best-effort issuer notification, and immutable
revocation audit trail. Includes 48 new tests across service, handler, integration,
and domain layers (600+ total). Fixes 3 pre-existing test bugs (team_test error
matching, agent_group delete status code, team handler per_page validation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 10:59:18 -04:00
Shankar ab79dead13 Complete M1, M1.1, M2: end-to-end lifecycle, agent deployment, ACME v2
- Wire issuer connector end-to-end with IssuerConnectorAdapter (dependency inversion)
- Renewal/issuance job processor: RSA key + CSR generation, Local CA signing, cert version storage
- Agent work API (GET /agents/{id}/work) and job status API (POST /agents/{id}/jobs/{job_id}/status)
- Agent-side deployment: WorkItem enrichment with target type/config, NGINX/F5/IIS connector invocation
- Full ACME v2 implementation: HTTP-01 challenge solving, account registration, order lifecycle
- Update all docs (README, architecture, connectors, demo-advanced, quickstart) for M1-M2
- Fix go vet warning in deployment.go (non-constant format string)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-14 23:49:45 -04:00